Is it possible to build a sapient machine ?

[Bugmaster]

Topic

Many threads regarding dualism, theism, and philosophy in general, often run into this topic. Is it even hypothetically possible to build a computer that will be sapient -- i.e., an artificial being that will think, feel, and socialize as humans do ? Well, here's our chance: to resolve this debate once and for all ! Smoke 'em if you got 'em, people, this post is gonna be a long one.

I claim that creating Strong AI (which is another name for a sapient computer) is possible. We may not achieve this today, or tomorrow, but it's going to happen sooner rather than later.

First, let me go over some of the arguments in favor of my position.

Pro: The Turing Test

Alan Turing, the father of modern computing (well, one of them), proposed this test in ages long past, when computers as we know them today did not yet exist. So, let me re-cast his argument in modern terms.

Turing's argument is a thought experiment, involving a test. There are three participants in the test: subject A, subject B, and the examiner E. A and B are chatting on AIM, or posting on this forum, or text-messaging each other on the phone, or engaging in some other form of textual communication. E is watching their conversations, but he doesn't get to talk. E knows that one of the subjects -- either A or B -- is a bona-fide human being, and the other one is a computer, but he doesn't know which one is which. E's job is to determine which of the subjects is a computer, based on their chat logs. Of course, in a real scientific setting, we'd have a large population of test subjects and examiners, not just three beings, but you get the idea.

Turing's claim is that if E cannot reliably determine which being -- A or B -- is human, then they both are. Let me say this again: if E can't tell which of the subjects is a computer, then they're both human, with all rights and privileges and obligations that humanity entails.

This seems like a pretty wild claim at first, but consider: how do you know that I, Bugmaster, am human ? And how do I know that you're human, as well ? All I know about you is the content of your posts; you could be a robot, or a fish, it doesn't really matter. As long as you act human, people will treat you as such (unless, of course, they're jerks who treat everyone like garbage, but that's another story). You might say, "well, you know I'm human because today's computers aren't advanced enough to post intelligently on the forums", but doesn't prove much, since our technology is advancing rapidly all the time (and we're talking about the future, anyway).

So, if you're going to deny one of Turing's subjects his humanity, then you should be prepared to deny this humanity to everyone, which would be absurd. Therefore, a computer that acts human, should be treated as such.

Pro: The Reverse Turing Test

I don't actually know the proper name for this argument, but it's sort of the opposite of the first one, hence the name.

Let's say that tomorrow, as you're crossing the street to get your morning coffee, you get hit by a bus. Your wounds are not too severe, but your pinky is shattered. Not to worry, though -- an experimental procedure is available, and your pinky is replaced with a robotic equivalent. It looks, feels, and acts just like your pinkie, but it's actually made of advanced polymers.

Are you any less human than you were before the treatment ?

Let's say that, after getting your pinkie replaced, you get hit by a bus again, and lose your arm... which gets replaced by a robo-arm. Are you human now ? What if you get hit by a bus again, and your left eye gets replaced by a robotic camera -- are you less human now ? What if you get a brain tumor, and part of your brain gets replaced ? And what if your tumor is inoperable, and the doctors (the doctors of the future, of course) are forced to replace your entire brain, as well as the rest of your organs ? Are you human ? If so, then how are you different from an artificial being that was built out of the same robotic components that your entire body now consists of ?

Note that this isn't just idle speculation. People today already have pacemakers, glasses, prosthetic limbs, and yes, even chips implanted in their brains to prevent epileptic seizures (and soon, hopefully, Alzheimers). Should we treat these people as less human than their all-natural peers ? I personally don't think so.

Ok, I know that many of you are itching to point out the flaws in these arguments, so let me go over some common objections.

(to be continued below)

[Bugmaster]

What makes a robot a robot? The fact it is made out of metal and has silicon chips instead of a brain?

Searle and Harvey would say, "yes", arbitrarily (as far as I can tell).

IMO we are a sapient machine.

Obviously, I'd agree. However, Searle, Harvey, and pretty much every theist out there argue that there's an immaterial component to humans -- call it "spirit", "qualia", "mind", "soul", or "The Force", or whatever -- and that the robots lack it, because they're not organic (or, in extreme cases, because God doesn't like them as much as he likes us).

The whole point of the Turing Test argument is to show that it doesn't matter whether dualism is true or not. As long as our only yardstick for judging whether some entity is a soul or not is the entity's ability to communicate, we are forced to conclude that whatever acts sapient, is sapient -- or end up in an absurd place where we're all hiding under our beds, crying "can't talk to anyone, because everyone might be a robot ! My preeeeciousss !". Of course, if dualism is irrelevant, that speaks volumes about its validity (or lack thereof), but that's another story...

Why not also ask "is it possible for a computer to have free will?" Or would that be too far-fetched?

I personally don't think that the term "free will" has any real meaning. No one's will is truly free (except maybe for really crazy people). If you disagree, just will yourself into truly, wholeheartedly believing that you have three heads.

[harvey1]

However, Searle... pretty much every theist out there argue that there's an immaterial component to humans -- call it "spirit", "qualia", "mind", "soul", or "The Force", or whatever -- and that the robots lack it, because they're not organic (or, in extreme cases, because God doesn't like them as much as he likes us).

What are you talking about, Bugmaster? Searle's an atheist, and he is by no means a dualist, he holds to an identity theory of the mind:

this world view is not an option. It is not simply up for grabs along with a lot of competing world views. Our problem is not that somehow we have failed to come up with a convincing proof of the existence of God or that the hypothesis of afterlife remains in serious doubt, it is rather than in our deepest reflections we cannot take such opinions seriously. When we encounter people who claim to believe such things, we may envy them the comfort and security they claim to derive from these beliefs, but at bottom we remained convinced that either they have not heard the news or they are in the grip of faith. (John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992): 90–91)

[Bugmaster]

What are you talking about, Bugmaster? Searle's an atheist, and he is by no means a dualist, he holds to an identity theory of the mind:

That may be so, but his entire Chinese Room argument boils down to, "humans have semantics, but robots only have syntax". Well, what is this semantics ? It's whatever powers the human consciousness. What is consciousness ? Well, it's this thing humans have but robots don't. Because they're robots, natch.

That's just another form of dualism, albeit a much milder one than the one theists subscribe to.

[scorpia]

Obviously, I'd agree. However, Searle, Harvey, and pretty much every theist out there argue that there's an immaterial component to humans -- call it "spirit", "qualia", "mind", "soul", or "The Force", or whatever -- and that the robots lack it, because they're not organic (or, in extreme cases, because God doesn't like them as much as he likes us).

Again, maybe it's far-fetched or something, but why can't a robot have a soul?

For all I know it could.

Then again I don't know much.

I personally don't think that the term "free will" has any real meaning. No one's will is truly free (except maybe for really crazy people). If you disagree, just will yourself into truly, wholeheartedly believing that you have three heads.

Hey, I do have three heads thank you very much. :p

[Bugmaster]

Again, maybe it's far-fetched or something, but why can't a robot have a soul?
For all I know it could.
Then again I don't know much.

Oh, the standard answer is, "because only humans can have souls, because I say so", or "because God really likes humans but he hates the filthy robots, so he won't give them souls". I haven't really seen any kind of an argument that doesn't boil down to these two, not even from Harvey.

[scorpia]

Well I can't really think of any Biblical quote that would say so. Hey if God could make dust from the Earth in his image and call it human what's stopping humans from attempting the same? He gave those said piles of dust souls, why not a pile of nuts and bolts?

Mind you though I am liking this Turing test. It's a good thought experiment especially in dealing over the internet. There's already these programs where you "talk" to a computer program, but then maybe it really is a human on the other end. :p Not just that, who knows what's on the other end of the computer? You can have two people pretending to be one person, or vice versa..........

[harvey1]

That may be so, but his entire Chinese Room argument boils down to, "humans have semantics, but robots only have syntax". Well, what is this semantics ? It's whatever powers the human consciousness. What is consciousness ? Well, it's this thing humans have but robots don't. Because they're robots, natch. That's just another form of dualism, albeit a much milder one than the one theists subscribe to.

In the case of Searle, it's not dualism because he disagrees that physical processes are identical to simulations of physical processes. I see no dualism in that.

[Bugmaster]

In the case of Searle, it's not dualism because he disagrees that physical processes are identical to simulations of physical processes. I see no dualism in that.

Yes, but he claims that consciousness is an undetectable physical process that only human brains can engage in. In other words, if we see an entity that appears to act identically to a human being, we are still not justified in assuming the entity is human, because only biological humans can possess consciousness, a priori. That's dualism in scientific-looking clothing.

[harvey1]

Yes, but he claims that consciousness is an undetectable physical process that only human brains can engage in. In other words, if we see an entity that appears to act identically to a human being, we are still not justified in assuming the entity is human, because only biological humans can possess consciousness, a priori. That's dualism in scientific-looking clothing.

He doesn't say that biological humans can only possess consciousness.

[Bugmaster]

He doesn't say that biological humans can only possess consciousness.

Actually, Searle pretty much invented biological naturalism, which states just that (milder versions state that only living things with human-like brains can possess consciousness). Searle's main point is that, as Wikipedia puts it, "[consciousness] is a real part of the real world and it cannot be eliminated in favor of, or reduced to, something else". Since consciousness is subjective and undetectable (and Searle rejects behavior as a possible means of detection, as illustrated by his Chinese Room argument), Searle's belief simply substitutes one kind of dualism (mind/body) for another, prettier-sounding one (consciousness/body). Note that Wikipedia and I disagree on this point (shocking !). Well, we actually both agree and disagree, because Wikipedia's description of the "Searle's Demon" is very similar to my own views on the matter. Kudos to Wikipedia and its neutral point of view.

I think we're kind of getting off-topic here, though. I don't really care what Searle believes (other than for illustrative purposes); I care what I believe. I could be completely wrong about Searle, but that has no bearing on my argument.