The Permissibility of Faith

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In my experience, when debating with those who believe in God, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.

For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have faith that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "faith" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.

So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to faith?


spetey

[harvey1]

Hey Harvey, let me take a stab at clearing up a confusion here. Epistemic relativism, as I would use the phrase anyway, is the position that there are no facts about what kind of thinking (what standards of rationality, if you like) are better or worse. Epistemic relativism is a metaphysical position--a claim about the way things are. It's called "epistemic" relativism because it's a claim about the way things are when it comes to our thinking. Is this the position you want? It sounds to me like what you really want, most of all, is what you call fallibilism--that though there are facts, and that there are even facts about what kinds of thinking are better or worse, we don't have some kind of immediate access to these facts. We might be wrong to hold any of the beliefs or rationality standards

That's how I defined the weak and strong versions of epistemic relativism, and I strictly deny that I am a relativist in this sense. Fallibilism is a little unclear for my usage of the term since although we are fallibilists we could still believe that because we don't have immediate access to these facts some other justification of knowledge is needed, especially in the shortterm, other than traditional claims to knowledge. However, we could also take a much more conservative position of fallibilism and say that there is always a reason to believe a belief or admit that we have no good reason to believe that belief based on the apparent reasons that are available and accessible right now. I am the former, but not the latter kind of fallibilist. That's why I said I have a version of epistemic relativism.

So, if you don't mind, I'm going to make up some labels and then you tell me if you know what is the correct label (I'll include some of the definitions I've already included)...

• Strong Normative Epistemic Relativism: In any given situation, there are no ontologically true (i.e., mind-independent) facts about the standards or norms of rationality. Epistemic standards or norms of any kind, even those that contradict themselves, are epistemologically 'correct' relative to some situation.
• Weak Normative Epistemic Relativism: In any given situation, there are no ontologically true (i.e., mind-independent) facts about the standards or norms of rationality. However, there can be a traditional epistemic standard or norm that happens to be applicable in a situation.
• Strong Descriptive Epistemic Pragmatism: The successful implementation of beliefs is the proper criterion that best describes our (usually non-exhaustive) knowledge of a physical system. Epistemic knowledge of any kind, even knowledge that contradicts itself, is epistemologically 'valid' as it relates to some efficacious experience of a 'society' in question.
• Weak Descriptive Epistemic Pragmatism: The successful implementation of beliefs is the proper criterion that best describes our (usually non-exhaustive) knowledge of a physical system. A traditional epistemological account of knowledge is much, much more likely to have the most efficacy for a 'society' in question. However, the efficacious experience of the 'society' in question is at the 'bottom' of justifying knowledge.
• Strong Fallibilism: "[T]here are facts, and that there are even facts about what kinds of thinking are better or worse, we don't have some kind of immediate access to these facts", and it is possible we may never know the real facts. However, because we don't have immediate access to these facts some other justification of knowledge is needed, especially in the shortterm, other than traditional claims to knowledge - epistemic pragmatic justification is frequently used to justify knowledge.
• Weak Fallibilism: "[T]here are facts, and that there are even facts about what kinds of thinking are better or worse, we don't have some kind of immediate access to these facts", and it is possibe we may never know the real facts. However, there is always a reason to believe a belief, or admit that we have no good reason to believe that belief, based on the apparent reasons that are available and accessible right now.

Base on these definitions above I am a strong fallibilist/weak descriptive epistemic pragmatism/non-relativist. I guess what I need is a definition that shows a few positions that address how we access reality over a long-term, but that would have to combine epistemic pragmatism and fallibilism and then the name of the definition is longer than most definitions... In any hoot, you strike me as a 'weak fallibilist'. [Btw, I played with switching 'strong' and 'weak' terms on the fallibilist definition because from certain perspectives one is strong and the other is weak (and vice versa). Finally I decided the most epistemically fallibilist in perspective should be the strong version...] Tell me what you think.

that we in fact hold now. (Notice this version actually requires epistemic anti-relativism.) According to this view, it can be hard to figure out what the facts are, including the facts about what the good rational standards are. But put this way, it should be clear by now that I fully agree with this kind of "faillibilism". This stuff is hard and I concede my standards and beliefs might be wrong. Then again, it might be your standards or beliefs that are wrong. So though it's hard work, let's try to figure it out, shall we?

Do you see why my 'strong fallibilism' causes us to disagree on what is possible in terms of 'figuring it out'? If I justify facts based on pragmatic experience and only slowly develop knowledge (or standards) that provides an epistemic gateway for later agreement, then I easily accept that many beliefs fall in this 'gap', but not to worry, pragmatic experiences are source of justification - as they are for even traditional sources of knowledge and standards. So, the only difference as I see it is that in some cases we agree because we all have enough shared experiences and in other cases we disagree because we don't all have enough shared experiences yet to agree. This is evolution in process.

See why that might lead me to think you were saying you're not a relativist, not even an epistemic one?)

It seems to me that the field of epistemology is not as careful as the philosophy of science (where I'm much more familiar) in terms of designating what kind of truth we feel we know, or what kind of reality we are confident we have access. That opinion is just based on my limited experience...

[spetey]

Hello alll...

Fallibilism is a little unclear for my usage of the term since although we are fallibilists we could still believe that because we don't have immediate access to these facts some other justification of knowledge is needed, especially in the shortterm, other than traditional claims to knowledge. However, we could also take a much more conservative position of fallibilism and say that there is always a reason to believe a belief or admit that we have no good reason to believe that belief based on the apparent reasons that are available and accessible right now. I am the former, but not the latter kind of fallibilist. That's why I said I have a version of epistemic relativism.

You say the former is the kind of fallibilist you are. I'm not sure I can parse what you mean here, but based partly on what you say later, it sounds like you're saying that that on your brand of faillibilism, it's epistemically responsible to keep believing a belief even when you don't have current reasons for it, because after all justification might show up later. Is that correct?

I'm not sure what "traditional claims to knowledge" and "some other justification of knowledge" is.

Base on these definitions above I am a strong fallibilist/weak descriptive epistemic pragmatism/non-relativist.

First, wait: are you a relativist (of any stripe or strength), or not? In the quotation immediately above you say you aren't; in the quotation just before that, you say you are. Please pick an answer on this topic and stick to it. Are you in any relevant way a relativist? If so, in what way?

I guess what I need is a definition that shows a few positions that address how we access reality over a long-term,

Why do you need a definition? Why not just give your epistemology? As you've stated it so far, it's uncontroversial: we seem to be approaching some truth (or at least better beliefs in some sense) over time. No one's arguing there. Now, what does that have to do with the defensibility of belief without reason? My guess, as above, is that you think these are connected because you want to say that it's okay to believe something without reason now because later there might be reason for it. (Notice this argument works for unreasoned racists just as well as for Christians.)

So, the only difference as I see it is that in some cases we agree because we all have enough shared experiences and in other cases we disagree because we don't all have enough shared experiences yet to agree.

Back to leaning on the "experience" stuff. When I pressed you on it earlier, you said that experience in the sciences is just experiments and data--what I would call good old-fashioned reasons to believe something. You also gave an example of how someone might be emotionally motivated to believe something without actually having justificatory reasons. But we agreed that such emotional motivation is not enough to justify the belief to others who disagree, right? So if you insist on leaning on "experiences" as distinct from "reasons" but as somehow belief-justifying, then I need to hear much more about what these "experiences" are and how they work.

It seems to me that the field of epistemology is not as careful as the philosophy of science (where I'm much more familiar) in terms of designating what kind of truth we feel we know, or what kind of reality we are confident we have access. That opinion is just based on my limited experience...

What does it mean to "designat[e] what kind of truth we feel we know"? Does it mean "state our beliefs"? Or "discuss different theories of truth"? What are the different options for "kinds of reality"? It's phrases like these that make me think maybe you should reserve such judgments while you have only "limited experience".

Anyway for what it's worth I think epistemology is a good place for discussing questions of epistemic access, something like by definition. To the extent philosophers of science engage this question, they are doing epistemology. And there is better and worse work in both fields, of course.


spetey

[harvey1]

You say the former is the kind of fallibilist you are. I'm not sure I can parse what you mean here, but based partly on what you say later, it sounds like you're saying that that on your brand of faillibilism, it's epistemically responsible to keep believing a belief even when you don't have current reasons for it, because after all justification might show up later. Is that correct?

No. As I understand it, fallibilism doesn't talk about how we justify knowledge, rather, my understanding is that fallibilism states our status with respect to knowledge. My definition on "weak descriptive epistemic pragmatism" shows how we justify knowledge (notice that I put heavy emphasis on logical argument as a means by which to know what is efficacious without necessarily having to reinvent the wheel each time we wish to know if a certain method is efficacious or not).

A traditional epistemological account of knowledge is much, much more likely to have the most efficacy for a 'society' in question. However, the efficacious experience of the 'society' in question is at the 'bottom' of justifying knowledge.

I'm not sure what "traditional claims to knowledge" and "some other justification of knowledge" is.

My understanding is that "the traditional view of justification, to be justified in believing something is to have an epistemic reason to support it, a reason for thinking it is true. Thus, to be a priori justified in believing a given proposition is to have a reason for thinking that the proposition is true that does not emerge or derive from experience.."

First, wait: are you a relativist (of any stripe or strength), or not? In the quotation immediately above you say you aren't; in the quotation just before that, you say you are. Please pick an answer on this topic and stick to it. Are you in any relevant way a relativist? If so, in what way?

According to "A Companion to the Philosophy of Science" edited by W .H. Newton-Smith, Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. 2000, p.405 (article titled 'Relativism' by James W. McCallister), I would be a relativist about rationality:

Relativism about rationality is the thesis that none of the many possible canons of reasoning has a priveleged relationship with reality, and thus none has special efficacy in establishing truths or intervening in the world

If someone means does this status exist today with regard to the different forms of reasoning that are out there with standards that are emerging, then, 'yes' I am a relativist of the here and now. However, if you mean do I think that e-v-e-n-t-u-a-l-l-y certain canons have privelege, then the answer is also 'yes'.

So, you see, I'm not the only one who associates a strong fallibilism with a version of relativism. But, I flatly deny that I'm a relativist with regard to 'precisely the way it is' reality/truth.

Why do you need a definition? Why not just give your epistemology? As you've stated it so far, it's uncontroversial: we seem to be approaching some truth (or at least better beliefs in some sense) over time. No one's arguing there. Now, what does that have to do with the defensibility of belief without reason? My guess, as above, is that you think these are connected because you want to say that it's okay to believe something without reason now because later there might be reason for it. (Notice this argument works for unreasoned racists just as well as for Christians.)

Not so. And, we discussed this. Why do we have to keep going over it? As I said before, if you were really an epistemic pragmatist then your standards/beliefs would be ultimately rooted in pragmatic experiences and, as we know, pragmatic experiences differ depending on where and when you lived in history. The 'bottom' of reasoning through something is experience. If one wants to move forward with coming to have the same beliefs, one must extend their experiences with others so that they share the same 'bottom' experiences.

Back to leaning on the "experience" stuff. When I pressed you on it earlier, you said that experience in the sciences is just experiments and data--what I would call good old-fashioned reasons to believe something. You also gave an example of how someone might be emotionally motivated to believe something without actually having justificatory reasons. But we agreed that such emotional motivation is not enough to justify the belief to others who disagree, right? So if you insist on leaning on "experiences" as distinct from "reasons" but as somehow belief-justifying, then I need to hear much more about what these "experiences" are and how they work.

Pragmatic experience="successful implementation of beliefs [is] the proper criterion that...". What is successful implementation? It all depends on what the 'society' values those 'successful implementations' as being. A certain scientific society of paleontologists (e.g., trilobites) value the finding of trilobite fossils. They don't care about 'successful implementation' that comes from finding quarks at Fermi. Their 'society' has a very specific criteria of experiences that they will accept. It's a different situation for major political parties in the United States. For them successful implementation is more control over the House or Senate or Presidency. Perhaps it is seeing lower employment, or the end of the Iraq war, etc. It all depends on the 'society' in question and the specific set of experiences that they value as defining their society. For humans across the planet it might be the end of poverty, wealth, the end of war, etc. For a small Protestant church it might be getting excited about a new program the church is conducting to feed the poor, or to help out a church in Angola, etc. Likewise, failure has the opposite effect. It causes changes to beliefs because things aren't going well. For sports teams it might mean firing the coach or trading a star player because there is no successful implementation. For humans evolving in Africa maybe it meant teaching the youth about overgeneralizing their arguments, or not begging the question. Perhaps there was a big debate about whether begging the question was a bad thing, that tribe didn't make it and the surrounding tribes learned not to beg questions...

What does it mean to "designat[e] what kind of truth we feel we know"? Does it mean "state our beliefs"? Or "discuss different theories of truth"? What are the different options for "kinds of reality"? It's phrases like these that make me think maybe you should reserve such judgments while you have only "limited experience".

You'll have to give me my whole quotes. I have no idea what the context was. Regarding the "limited experience" quote, you're sort of taking that out of context. I was talking about comparisons between philosophy of science and epistemology. What I'm talking about with regard to our pragmatic experiences being the basis of our rational thoughts is Evolution 101 as far as I'm concerned. I'm not completely ignorant either -despite what you might think.

[spetey]

Hello again!

Cutting to the chase here...

According to "A Companion to the Philosophy of Science" edited by W.H. Newton-Smith, Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. 2000, p.405 (article titled 'Relativism' by James W. McCallister), I would be a relativist about rationality:

Relativism about rationality is the thesis that none of the many possible canons of reasoning has a priveleged relationship with reality, and thus none has special efficacy in establishing truths or intervening in the world

If someone means does this status exist today with regard to the different forms of reasoning that are out there with standards that are emerging, then, 'yes' I am a relativist of the here and now. However, if you mean do I think that e-v-e-n-t-u-a-l-l-y certain canons have privelege, then the answer is also 'yes'.

Okay good, this is important and we are getting clearer. First of all, this definition sounds like a good one to me. Now, what do you mean "this status exist[s] today with regard to the different forms of reasoning"? Either some standards of rationality are "priveleged" with respect to reality or none are, correct? What does it mean to be a relativist "of the here and now"? You want to add this strange time dimension to your position, and that's what I don't understand. Time doesn't seem to have anything to do with this matter. If a standard of rationality is "priveleged" then it is priveleged always, whether we believe it or not, just like if the earth is round then it was round even when lots of people believed it was flat.

Put it this way: suppose we take "priveleged with respect to reality" in a very pragmatist-friendly way, to mean "a rational standard that would be used at the end of inquiry." Then that is a good rational standard now, even if we don't know which standard is the one we would use at the "end of inquiry". Right? I don't see what it is to be a "relativist of the here and now" but an anti-relativist (in the before and after?). Either you think there are some rational standards that are priveleged, now and forever (whatever those might be), or you don't. Which is it?

Remember that to say there are better and worse rational standards is not to say that we know now which they are "here and now". That might---does---take some work and discussion.

Now, given this, let me repeat my question from before: on your view is it okay to believe something now without reason because later there might be reason for it? Or is it in any way, in any sense epistemically responsible to believe something now without reason, and despite rational people holding reasoned views to the contrary?

(I cut the stuff on epistemic pragmatism because although I'm tempted to clear up what I see as confusions there, it's also irrelevant to the key issue.)

What I'm talking about with regard to our pragmatic experiences being the basis of our rational thoughts is Evolution 101 as far as I'm concerned.

I'm not an expert in evolution, but I did take Evolution 101, 201, and 301, and in each they were careful to distinguish literal, biological natural selection working on genotypes from the many metaphorical extensions people have brought to cultural stuff like ideas and social standing. Evolution 101 does not teach that our ideas are eventually changing in the direction of believing in the God of Abraham.

I'm not completely ignorant either -despite what you might think.

I know you're not ignorant, Harvey--on the contrary you are remarkably well-informed about many areas outside your expertise (whatever your expertise is). And I'm sorry that comment was snippy. To be fair though, you hurled mud first. I should have turned the other cheek to your aspersion on epistemologists, but I felt compelled to agree with your own claim that you aren't in an ideal position to judge on that matter (that was the context of your "limited experience" quotation).


spetey

[harvey1]

To be fair though, you hurled mud first. I should have turned the other cheek to your aspersion on epistemologists, but I felt compelled to agree with your own claim that you aren't in an ideal position to judge on that matter (that was the context of your "limited experience" quotation).

I apologize, I didn't think of my comment as slinging mud. I was taken by surprise that epistemology when referring to truth/reality/etc has little in the way of qualifiers in front of their reference, and it seems it is odd that this is so. I took it as an indication that epistemology had fallen behind. I didn't mean it as an insult.

Okay good, this is important and we are getting clearer. First of all, this definition sounds like a good one to me. Now, what do you mean "this status exist[s] today with regard to the different forms of reasoning"? Either some standards of rationality are "priveleged" with respect to reality or none are, correct?

I agree. You are speaking from the "precisely the way it is" perspective.

What does it mean to be a relativist "of the here and now"? You want to add this strange time dimension to your position, and that's what I don't understand. Time doesn't seem to have anything to do with this matter. If a standard of rationality is "priveleged" then it is priveleged always, whether we believe it or not, just like if the earth is round then it was round even when lots of people believed it was flat.

I'm talking about the angle of perspective. In regards to the 'God's eye' perspective, I certainly agree with you. However, from our perspective, the perspective of our 'strong' fallibilist knowledge, there are not necessarily any clear indications on what is priveleged from what is not. This is why we can possess reasons for our views, but not necessarily convince the other that our view is "precisely the way it is" despite our best efforts (even to the point of having to keep repeating our reasons). It's not that someone is being epistemologically unreasonable, rather neither view has privelege and that lacking privelege we can only go about wondering what is wrong with "them."

Put it this way: suppose we take "priveleged with respect to reality" in a very pragmatist-friendly way, to mean "a rational standard that would be used at the end of inquiry." Then that is a good rational standard now, even if we don't know which standard is the one we would use at the "end of inquiry". Right? I don't see what it is to be a "relativist of the here and now" but an anti-relativist (in the before and after?). Either you think there are some rational standards that are priveleged, now and forever (whatever those might be), or you don't. Which is it?

Yes, I believe "there are some rational standards that are priveleged, now and forever", however this is after the fact. It is similar to saying that there are some pieces of art that are now being made that are priveleged, now and forever, however with the caveat that nobody today sees that they are priveleged 'now' even though they really will be considered to be priveleged 100 years from now when somebody thinks about art history in 2005. For now, the guy who is painting that piece of art might be a starving artist and he might have a hard time selling the piece for anything more than pocket change. The value 'exists' today even though the artist cannot sell it for close to its value in the future.

[I realize that you might wish to call this attribute something other than relativism, perhaps short-term skepticism, or something like that.]

Remember that to say there are better and worse rational standards is not to say that we know now which they are "here and now". That might---does---take some work and discussion.

What I'm saying is stronger than someone saying "is not to say that we know now". I'm saying that multiple standards are competing in the marketplace for the right of being considered priveleged. This competitive process of ideas is what determines that the standards either are or are not going to be called 'priveleged'. If history flows in one direction standard A wins, if history goes in anther direction standard B wins. What I'm saying is very close to being on the edge of relativism, and it is "precisely the way it is" relativism if I finish that by saying that history does randomly choose rational standards. I don't say that, but I say the next closest thing. History could have chosen a different rational standard and we wouldn't know any better. We would just think that our rational standard that history did choose was "priveleged." My Peircean view as to why history didn't choose the wrong standard is fallibilistic. That is, maybe history does choose the wrong standard a lot, but over time it tends to favor the real standards that are rational. However, that is a belief. The only thing that separates me from the relativist is that belief. I don't have proof to offer to a relativist that she's wrong and I'm right. All I can do is look the relativist in the eye and say "I think if history randomly chooses standards and there are no such standards, then in that case, I say that view doesn't look right to me." All my arguments can't defeat the skeptics' challenge to prove that history gets it right at least once.

This is important for me to distinguish my Peircean belief from the more self-confident position that there are reasons that we can all share and figure out which is right. There are no convincing reasons to defeat the skeptic's challenge. There are just convincing reasons that we accept which defeat the skeptic's challenge. That's why people who come from different experiences cannot necessarily convince each other with their reasons since reasons rest on experience which may be unique and currently non-shareable until the two parties can share experiences as time goes by.

Now, given this, let me repeat my question from before: on your view is it okay to believe something now without reason because later there might be reason for it? Or is it in any way, in any sense epistemically responsible to believe something now without reason, and despite rational people holding reasoned views to the contrary?

In my view, it is never permissible to believe something without a reason, and it is never permissible to believe something without working hard to strengthen your belief through reasons. The reason (har har) is that this view itself is a rational standard that has allowed us to survive. People who are given to rash temperaments without thinking out their emotions are inclined to follow actions that they deeply regret later. In any case, and unfortunately, I cannot even prove this basic of a claim. It too resides in my own experience and if someone has a set of experiences which make them think they don't need vocalizable reasons for their belief, then I can only tell them "you'll learn later...". Notice, I can only share reasons with others up to a point, and then it becomes "you'll learn later...". I haven't given up on reasons, although I have hit the "bottom" and now need to wait for shared experiences to make some kind of "reflective equilibrium" possible.

(I cut the stuff on epistemic pragmatism because although I'm tempted to clear up what I see as confusions there, it's also irrelevant to the key issue.)

Please do. I'd pay you but you're doing this for free.

What I'm talking about with regard to our pragmatic experiences being the basis of our rational thoughts is Evolution 101 as far as I'm concerned.

I'm not an expert in evolution, but I did take Evolution 101, 201, and 301, and in each they were careful to distinguish literal, biological natural selection working on genotypes from the many metaphorical extensions people have brought to cultural stuff like ideas and social standing. Evolution 101 does not teach that our ideas are eventually changing in the direction of believing in the God of Abraham.

Har har. You must have been doing theater the day that subject was covered...

Of course, what I mean is that in Evolution 101 we learn that that humans evolved from lower forms of life. Now, maybe I'm wrong about this, but I don't think caterpillars care much about rational standards that humans have come to accept, so I'm taking a big leap here by saying that at some point along the way of our evolution, our ancestors choose between competing standards of rationality. If it happened yesteryear than I have no reason not to think it is happening today. If these ancient folks didn't have previous knowledge of rational standards prior to some point in their evolution, then it only makes sense that they acquired those rational standards from "their" experience. Actually, I mean the collective experience of their species as it is passed on through the genes and perhaps some other evolutionary mechanisms that are still not fully understood (e.g., group selection, etc).

Therefore, I know I'm probably drastically oversimplying things, but I usually go for the answer that looks right, and, to me, the basis of all knowledge as being pragmatic-evolutionary based seems like Evolution 101. I apologize if it isn't that simple, but it seems so to me...

on the contrary you are remarkably well-informed about many areas outside your expertise (whatever your expertise is).

Thanks, Spetey. And, I'm very pleased that you've chosen to scratch your claws here for fun(?).

[spetey]

Hullo again! Again, cutting way down past many tempting incidental confusions ...

Now, given this, let me repeat my question from before: on your view is it okay to believe something now without reason because later there might be reason for it? Or is it in any way, in any sense epistemically responsible to believe something now without reason, and despite rational people holding reasoned views to the contrary?

In my view, it is never permissible to believe something without a reason, and it is never permissible to believe something without working hard to strengthen your belief through reasons.

Hooray! An almost perfectly straightforward answer. (Almost... see the next bit.) And just the answer I was hoping for! Hooray. We agree on this point. Belief without at least trying to provide reason is irresponsible. Hooray! I was really worried for a long while there that you were trying to defend (what I call) appeals to faith. Now let's see if anyone else out there wants to defend faith, and we can disagree with that person together! Wouldn't that be a fun switch?

In any case, and unfortunately, I cannot even prove this basic of a claim. It too resides in my own experience and if someone has a set of experiences which make them think they don't need vocalizable reasons for their belief, then I can only tell them "you'll learn later...". Notice, I can only share reasons with others up to a point, and then it becomes "you'll learn later...". I haven't given up on reasons, although I have hit the "bottom" and now need to wait for shared experiences to make some kind of "reflective equilibrium" possible.

Why can't you give them the kind of reasons you just gave about how important reasons are? Anyway, just to be clear, "you'll learn later..." doesn't itself count as a responsible reason to give another, right? After all, the racist could do the same: "oh, you just don't agree that my race is superior? Well, I can't give you a reason to believe this, at the moment, and I hear all your reasons against my position--but trust me, you'll learn later that my race is superior, and meanwhile I'll continue to believe."


spetey

[harvey1]

In any case, and unfortunately, I cannot even prove this basic of a claim. It too resides in my own experience and if someone has a set of experiences which make them think they don't need vocalizable reasons for their belief, then I can only tell them "you'll learn later...". Notice, I can only share reasons with others up to a point, and then it becomes "you'll learn later...". I haven't given up on reasons, although I have hit the "bottom" and now need to wait for shared experiences to make some kind of "reflective equilibrium" possible.

Why can't you give them the kind of reasons you just gave about how important reasons are?

You can. But, the skeptic can effectively dispute every reason that you can construct.

Anyway, just to be clear, "you'll learn later..." doesn't itself count as a responsible reason to give another, right? After all, the racist could do the same: "oh, you just don't agree that my race is superior? Well, I can't give you a reason to believe this, at the moment, and I hear all your reasons against my position--but trust me, you'll learn later that my race is superior, and meanwhile I'll continue to believe."

That's right they could, and what's worse - they do! However, the final arbitrator in all of this is evolutionary processes. A process that I believe is led by, and ultimately responsible to, God.

[spetey]

However, the final arbitrator in all of this is evolutionary processes. A process that I believe is led by, and ultimately responsible to, God.

Okay. Now that we've agreed that the responsible thing to do is to try to give reasons to each other, I'd like to hear what reasons you or anyone else have to believe that some God is leading the "evolutionary process" (where you mean the "evolution of ideas", not literal, biological evolution). Let's pick up where we left off, perhaps on that other topic, where I originally asked for such reasons.

Meanwhile, anyone else out there think that belief by faith alone is responsible and good? I'm taking all callers.


spetey

[harvey1]

However, the final arbitrator in all of this is evolutionary processes. A process that I believe is led by, and ultimately responsible to, God.

Okay. Now that we've agreed that the responsible thing to do is to try to give reasons to each other, I'd like to hear what reasons you or anyone else have to believe that some God is leading the "evolutionary process" (where you mean the "evolution of ideas", not literal, biological evolution). Let's pick up where we left off, perhaps on that other topic, where I originally asked for such reasons. Meanwhile, anyone else out there think that belief by faith alone is responsible and good? I'm taking all callers.

I guess the question I have since the beginning of this thread is the following...

Assume the following is true:

• 1) All beliefs must terminate to some kind of a priori knowledge or some kind of belief that we take for granted (e.g., "there's an infinite set of reasons that support my belief", etc).
  
  2) If we can prove the beliefs that have this termination property, then they are not terminal beliefs (i.e., they are non-terminal beliefs)
  
  3) There is no guarantee that everyone shares the same terminal beliefs
  
  Hence,
  
  (4) There is no way we can necessarily provide a reason that will persuade someone of our terminal belief if it is not consistent with someone else's terminal belief.

My contention is that (4) is what you call "faith"-based, and hence you are not justified in your original assertion that "["faith"] is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous" since to hold this position you must also hold a terminal belief that contradicts your own position.

That's not to say that we don't have a reason for our beliefs, since a terminal belief(s) can be the reason for all non-terminal beliefs.

How do you respond to this claim?

[spetey]

All beliefs must terminate to some kind of a priori knowledge or some kind of belief that we take for granted (e.g., "there's an infinite set of reasons that support my belief", etc).

This is to assume that the structure of justification is foundationalist, which I do not assume. (Also notice infinitism, which I think is what you intend by your example belief, contradicts foundationalism.)

If we can prove the beliefs that have this termination property, then they are not terminal beliefs (i.e., they are non-terminal beliefs)

Huh? Do you mean that "inferential" beliefs (roughly, beliefs believed because of other beliefs) are not "terminal" in your sense? Yes, this is true by definition.

There is no guarantee that everyone shares the same terminal beliefs

No, of course there is no guarantee of this. For a dogmatic racist, "my race is superior" is a terminal belief. I think it shouldn't be--I think the racist should be prepared to give reasons for her position.

There is no way we can necessarily provide a reason that will persuade someone of our terminal belief if it is not consistent with someone else's terminal belief.

No, of course not it doesn't necessarily follow. We might have to change someone's mind, or get them to consider the reasons for the belief they are treating as terminal. So?

My contention is that (4) is what you call "faith"-based,

The proposition you state in 4 is not the property of being a faith-based belief. My contention is roughly, in your new terms, that terminating in a non-shared belief when provided reasons against your belief is irresponsible. That is the sense in which I say faith is impermissible. And you agree, right? So let's move on!

Or do we have to start all over again? Are you that hesitant to agree with me about anything? It's okay! This is a good thing to agree on! Look, I say the racist is being epistemically irresponsible when he refuses to consider reasons for or against his racist assumption. And you agree, right? Similarly you agree that an atheist is being irresponsible if she flatly refuses to consider reasons for or against her belief when others provide reason against it, right? Similarly again, you agree that a Christian is being irresponsible if he flatly refuses to consider reasons for or against his belief when others provide reason against it, right?

Honestly, sometimes I think you would claim 2+2=5 if you heard me claim 2+2=4, out of some dread fear that agreeing with me about anything will lead you down the devil's path to scary atheism. As soon as we show any signs of agreeing about anything, you back off. In the past for example, you proposed simplicity as a theoretical virtue. I simply agreed. Then you started attacking simplicity and suggesting it's not a good criterion to judge theories by, and so on. Don't you find this suspicious behavior, on reflection?


spetey