The Permissibility of Faith

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In my experience, when debating with those who believe in God, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.

For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have faith that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "faith" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.

So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to faith?


spetey

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In fact I explicitly deny belief-foundationalism. I think all beliefs must be justified. I'm just not positive that this justification must always refer ultimately to sense experience. I am agnostic about the very difficult question of whether some beliefs can be justified a priori.

That's fine. So, why don't you say that a belief in a priori beliefs is not justified until the adherents can convincingly show that a) they exist, and b) justification must not always refer ultimately to sense experience?

I don't see why the default position should be empiricism. Some very smart people think there are beliefs that are justified a priori. Other very smart people think there aren't. Why should I default with one such side when I don't have my own well-formed opinion?

You, on the other hand, have a very strong position on this question: you say there is no such thing as a priori justification. This is a very difficult and intricate question, and I have yet to see why you believe it so strongly.

Good pragmatists who believe knowledge is a result of experience should be inclined to reject a priori ridiculousness.

Words like "ridiculous" and "obvious" do not carry the argumentative weight you think they do. There are many experts who think it is not at all ridiculous to think there are beliefs justified a priori, and they certainly don't find it obvious that there aren't. Why are they wrong? (We'll look at the argument from that recent post in a moment, since you insist.)

Besides, if you can provide better evidence that a priori beliefs exist and that they are about the world, then I'd be happy to be agnostic about them. What ever happened to your "I need a reason, bit?"

I'm defending my agnosticism by showing you that it's hard to justify certain things by sense experience. It's hard to justify inference rules (like rules of logic) using sense experience. It's hard to justify mathematical axioms by sense experience (as we'll see, again). It's hard to justify "all bachelors are unmarried" by sense experience. It's even hard to justify "no beliefs can have a priori justification" by sense experience. That makes them, at least plausibly, a priori claims.

You see, Spetey, this is why I am suspicious of the rigmarole that you put theism through. When it comes to other philosophical beliefs, you are more than happy to remain agnostic about those beliefs!

You are suspicious about my atheism because I don't have a well-formed opinion about every philosophical topic? Do you also suspect quantum physicists who don't know everything about astronomy, or materials science, or biology? I think sometimes being agnostic is the responsible thing to be--namely, when you have no good reason to believe either way. But I have, I think, good reason to believe there is no God. If you disagree, show me what's wrong with my reason (given here and following) or give your own good reasons to believe in God on this thread.

You are discriminating against theism. Do you see why theists often suspect atheists of having deeply personal resentments that fuel their disbelief?

I am "discriminating" against theism? You mean, I guess, that I'm not a theist. That is correct, I'm not. But the weird choice of the word 'discrimination' makes it sound like I'm not being "fair" in this belief, or something. If so, show me. I give reasons for my view. I want to hear your reasons for believing otherwise. Instead, you seem (suspiciously) much more interested in spending much more time investigating whether someone who holds my epistemology (but not me) might someday be committed to dogmatism about beliefs that have nothing to do with God's existence (like a priori beliefs).

Again, if I made a statement that you were a dogmatist, then I apologize. I meant to always say that your agnosticism of a priori beliefs leave the door open for dogmatists to claim any belief as a priori, even beliefs that support dogmaticism.

Thank you, again, for agreeing I'm not a dogmatist. But I don't get this: if we're agreed that I'm not a dogmatist, what's the point of this discussion for the purposes of this thread? I know, you say my epistemology might lead someone else to dogmatism, despite its explicit commitment to giving justification for every belief. I suppose it's possible someone could hold this stupid combination of views, just as someone could be a physicist and an astrologist, I suppose. Why is that an objection to me or my view?

These are two very tricky things...

I only counted one.

Sorry, I didn't list them so clearly. The two I meant:

1. Establish, contra Kant, Leibniz, Peacocke, BonJour, Jackson, Chalmers, et al., that there is no such thing as a priori justification.
2. Show that if one is merely agnostic about the existence of a priori justification, one is thereby a dogmatist.

Since when must I argue against someone who can't prove there is other knowledge other than empirical?

You don't have to! If you're willing to let me remain an agnostic, then let me remain agnostic. If you want to convince me that no belief could possibly have a priori justification, then you have to give me reasons.

If you want me to argue that there is empirical knowledge, then I'll be glad to do so.

This is very importantly different, and maybe again the source of the confusion. I think there is plenty of empirical knowledge. Everyone thinks so. The question is whether there is any tiny scrap of knowledge anywhere that is not derived from sense experience. You claim there is not, despite apparent examples like truths of math and logic and definitional claims. This is a strong claim that needs support.

The fact that you are agnostic about this issue (where it isn't even sensible to consider), while you are atheist about theism (where it is very reasonable to believe), just shows a tremendous inconsistency on your part.

And the inconsistency is what... that I don't have strong opinions about everything? That I only come to have strong beliefs about something when I'm provided good reasons to believe them?

Even if you mark the grout blue for 1000 rows of tiles, if you haven't marked the grout purple for one column of tiles, you still should have a zero count of tiles. That axiom is trivially true, obviously, but it all stems from our experience.

If it's "trivially true" then how does it stem from our experience? I still don't see any areas of size zero. And even if I did see areas of size zero, or if it counts that I can tell by sense experience that "there are no tiles", that still doesn't justify (x)(x*0=0). For one thing, you have only demonstrated this for certain size tile matrices. But you have to demonstrate through sense experience that this is true for all x. Furthermore, it's not obvious that justifying the rule that "zero times anything is zero" will justify that axiom. I wanted you to justify a formal axiom, that happens to use symbols that look like our zero and times-sign, and that might be interpreted as like our common practice of multiplication, but might not be--as in nonstandard arithmetics.

Here are a few more challenges of claims that might be a priori. Please justify by appeal to experience:

• If p, then p.
• All bachelors are unmarried.
• Two sets are identical if and only if they share their members.

Now let's be clear on the point here: I'm not saying that it's impossible to justify these from sense experience. I'm just saying it's at least difficult and that should give us room to think that maybe there are a priori beliefs. I'm suggesting it's reasonable to think that maybe some beliefs can be shown true without appeal to experience.

As for philosophy of math, you seem to be in just as much trouble (as an empiricist) with platonic math and nominalist math. If you're a platonist about the objects of math, then you have to show how you experience these platonic, non-material objects. If you think there aren't really any objects of math, then it seems to me even harder to show how math axioms are true by appeal to experience. So this question seems orthogonal to yours.

I know you see it as "overwhelmingly obvious" that there is no a priori justification. But Plato and Descartes and Leibniz and ... and Peacocke and BonJour and tons of other extremely smart philosophers throughout the ages have not found it so obvious. So perhaps you can explain it to them (and me). Remember, we are committed to giving reasons for our controversial claims, instead of saying "it's obvious". If you can show it's obvious that there is no a priori justification, you should consider getting it published, because it would revolutionize epistemology.

You crack me up. Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz were theists. Do you accept their beliefs on theism as reasonable too?

This of course misses the point entirely. I do not believe in God. I don't think this claim is obvious, since smart people like Descartes and Leibniz have thought otherwise. So I therefore try to back up my claim with reasons, as in those cited threads.

Similarly, you should acknowledge that it is not obvious that there are no beliefs justified a priori, given that lots of smart people have thought otherwise. So then, if you're not dogmatic about this stance, you should give reasons for your position.

For me it's evident, from the lack of evidence and clear lack of conception, that a priori beliefs are some of the most ridiculous beliefs that linger from pre-evolutionary days.

I know that "for you" it is "evident" and that Descartes and Kant and all the others are "ridiculous". But they don't know that. So please explain it to them. Again, "evident" and "ridiculous" don't carry the argumentative weight you think they do.

But, if someone is going to argue a priorism and not be referring to knowledge that is of biological origin, then they better give pretty strong supporting reasons why they think such knowledge was not acquired by evolutionary processes.

You could think that a priori beliefs are hardwired by biology, as I said long ago. Then they are not acquired by sense experience.

I would recommend that you take another look at my five-point argument. It gave a rough (rough) draft why you cannot have a priori knowledge unless you are thinking in supernatural terms.

Oh yes, the "argument" that there is no a priori justification <sigh>. Frankly I overlooked it out of charity to you; I thought it was a late-night post that you would be embarrassed about later. But if you insist, let's take a look at it again. I'll put my comments after the points.

1. Bob claims a priori knowledge about p.
2. Upon further evaluation there is indeed no way that Bob should possess p knowledge from any explainable means. spetey says: so far you have stipulated an example where Bob claims to have knowledge he can't possibly have, so his claim must be wrong.
3. Bob claims that each night while sleeping (since he can remember) a little bit of p knowledge has accumulated up until today.
4. Receiving p while sleeping is therefore a perception of Bob. Therefore, Bob has an unexplainable "sixth sense" of perception to receive p. spetey says: here you contradict the earlier stipulation of your own example that there is no way Bob could have attained this knowledge. Instead you now stipulate that if Bob can get this knowledge, it must be through some sense, perhaps a sense of a type of which we're not yet aware. By assuming that the knowledge must have been acquired by some kind of perception, of course you beg the question at hand.
5. Hence, Bob cannot claim p as a priori knowledge since p conforms to an empiricist account of knowledge (i.e., knowledge comes from perceptions, including a speculated "sixth sense"). spetey says: in effect you have stipulated an example of a person who got knowledge through a sixth sense. How does this even come close to showing that no belief could ever be justified a priori?

Compare this "argument": Bob says there is a fairy living in his cookie jar. But, as I stipulate the example, there isn't a fairy living in his cookie jar. Therefore, I conclude there are no fairies anywhere.

Even the idea of knowledge being inside the biological brain suggests that it got there biologically. If knowledge comes to reside in the brain from a source other than experiences, how would you suggest that happens from a biological perspective?

Hardwiring, for example.

I'm not a metaphysical naturalist by any means, but I do think that our interaction with eternal stuff happens by our interaction with the world and not by soul migration.

Funny you should draw the line there. Why can't God just give us knowledge, say of God, or of the average rainfall in Virginia, without our having to experience it? If that is even possible then it seems possible we can have a prioiri knowledge, according to you.

It's my extended willingness to defend my agnosticism with respect to this topic, despite its irrelevance to anything we really came here to discuss, that I think demonstrates that I am committed to giving reasons for any controversial claim, and therefore am not a dogmatist. On the other hand your repeated insistence on a claim you find "obvious" still strikes me as dogmatic.

That's funny. I'm dogmatic because I say that a concept makes no sense (because it doesn't), there isn't a shread of evidence (because there isn't), and that makes me dogmatic?

Yes! Just saying "it makes no sense" and "there isn't a shred of evidence" and "it's evident" and "it's ridiculous that not" is dogmatic. Racists are good at making those kind of "arguments" too! Now to your credit, you did make an argument, which you apparently wanted me to take seriously. But I think you can see why I didn't take it seriously, right? So let's hear good reasons or let's drop it.

And, as far as what we consider reasonable, sure, we can be agnostic on every possible belief since we need to be fallibilistic with respect to our experiences, however that is really not necessary. We can eliminate the ridiculous (e.g., we are in the Matrix) and spend our time more fruitfully by doubting only those things that we really are not so sure about (e.g., string theory, quantum loop theory, etc.) and not spend that time debating the ridiculous (e.g., whether or not knowledge is acquired magically).

Good, good! Maybe this is the confusion. I agree with all of this. (Except I wouldn't say we should be "agnostic" about every belief--I just think every belief should be open to revision.) But I am 100% with you that no knowledge can be acquired in a non-naturalistic, "magical" manner. (I am surprised that you hold that position, however.) That's not obviously the same question as whether there are a priori beliefs, as I said earlier. So maybe that's the confusion. If you just want me to say that no knowledge can be acquired by non-naturalistic means, I grant it happily!

Somehow you get from sensory beliefs to all your other beliefs. You presumably have inference rules for these. What is the experiential justification for those? (Those, note, are just the kind of thing people often claim are a priori--laws of logic and such.)

Well, you see Spetey, that's the job of some new branch of paleo studies ...

This confuses scientific explanation of our inferential practices with their justification. We're also biologically inclined to murder, as can be explained scientifically--does that mean that all murder is justified? I want to know how you justify our experiential practices by appeal to sense experience. Several of our inferential practices seem unjustified, as our very human tendencies to commit various fallacies attests. There may be evolutionary reason, some speculate, that we're not good at reckoning probability, for example.

I sure hope that this was just a misunderstanding, and that you just want me to agree that no knowledge can be acquired non-naturalistically. I grant that. As I said earlier, if it could be shown that a priori justification would violate naturalism (as some do indeed claim, though others disagree), then I would take that as reason to reject the existence of a priori justification for beliefs. (Maybe I shouldn't have said that's what I hope, though, since you have a track record of taking some position back once I agree with it!)


spetey

[harvey1]

And, as far as what we consider reasonable, sure, we can be agnostic on every possible belief since we need to be fallibilistic with respect to our experiences, however that is really not necessary. We can eliminate the ridiculous (e.g., we are in the Matrix) and spend our time more fruitfully by doubting only those things that we really are not so sure about (e.g., string theory, quantum loop theory, etc.) and not spend that time debating the ridiculous (e.g., whether or not knowledge is acquired magically).

Good, good! Maybe this is the confusion. I agree with all of this. (Except I wouldn't say we should be "agnostic" about every belief--I just think every belief should be open to revision.) But I am 100% with you that no knowledge can be acquired in a non-naturalistic, "magical" manner. (I am surprised that you hold that position, however.) That's not obviously the same question as whether there are a priori beliefs, as I said earlier. So maybe that's the confusion. If you just want me to say that no knowledge can be acquired by non-naturalistic means, I grant it happily!

Spetey, I'm glad that you will admit that knowledge is obtain naturalistically. I was beginning to worry about you. Again, let me state unequivocally that I hold the position that all knowledge is causally obtained, not necessarily what you would call "naturalistically obtained." The subtle difference is that whereas I do not think a priori beliefs magically find themselves in our head (i.e., what you call "non-naturalistic"), I do hold that empirically obtained knowledge can be treated as a priori beliefs. However, as you pointed out, perception that is obtained from dreams, "sixth senses", visions, etc., is still empiricism -- albeit, not a naturalistic understanding of perception. I imagine that you deny that knowledge of the world can be obtained from sense other than what deals with electromagnetic or olfactory sensations. I differ in that view since I think that one can be sleeping and obtain information about the world that is occurring at a distant.

However, let me point out, that you are contradicting yourself by saying knowledge might potentially be really a priori (i.e., really obtained without being based on a direct perceptual experience -- "causally connected"), and saying something is naturally obtained. For knowledge of something "out there" to be acausally connected is equivalent to say it is non-naturally obtained knowledge. Natural-obtained knowledge of the external world requires a causal link between the external thing and the internal belief. That link is through perceptions, otherwise what natural mechanism are you suggesting on how knowledge can be obtained? If you are saying empiricism is not the only means on how natural knowledge is causally connected to the world, then what other causal connection are saying is reasonable?

For one thing, you have only demonstrated this for certain size tile matrices. But you have to demonstrate through sense experience that this is true for all x.

No, I don't. The experience is translated into an axiom, which by definition is an unproved statement. The experience itself is so convincing that it applies "for all x" that it is an axiomatic belief.

Furthermore, it's not obvious that justifying the rule that "zero times anything is zero" will justify that axiom. I wanted you to justify a formal axiom, that happens to use symbols that look like our zero and times-sign, and that might be interpreted as like our common practice of multiplication, but might not be--as in nonstandard arithmetics.

Justification isn't something that I have to do to be nominalistic about the axioms of math. To be nominalistic about the axioms all I have to do is show how those axioms refer to a particular (e.g., tiles, boat lengths, etc.). It's not necessary to "justify" them as though I'm treating mathematical knowledge as scientific knowledge of our world. I don't treat the theorems of math as though they are all true about our world. There are many theorems that probably do not apply in principle to our world. In order to justify that theorems do apply to the world (e.g., Pythagorean theorem), then it all depends on what level of justification one is looking for (e.g., justification that is elgible for a nobel prize, or justification such as evidence for inflation, etc.). Nevertheless, the level of justification is not the topic I am discussing here. The topic I ask is that one should be committed to knowledge about the world being causally connected -- i.e., knowledge must be empirical-based for it to be justified knowledge about the world. Just because knowledge is empirical-based (i.e., causally connected to the world) does not itself qualify it as "justified," however it certainly should disqualify it as knowledge if it cannot - in principle - meet that criteria.

Here are a few more challenges of claims that might be a priori. Please justify by appeal to experience:

[*] If p, then p.
[*] All bachelors are unmarried.
[*] Two sets are identical if and only if they share their members.

Yeah, here you've gone off tangent. You've taken my notion that beliefs must be causally connected to the world by means of one's perceptions, and turned that into a view that I'm not advocating. I'm not advocating that propositions are only justified by appealing to perceptions. As I said a couple of posts ago, knowledge can be treated as a priori, and it is perfectly permissible to prove statements (or disprove statements) by appealing to knowledge that is treated as a priori. However, it is a mistake (I'll tone down my rhetoric...) to think that this treatment of knowledge as a priori is the same as saying knowledge is a priori, that is, not causally connected - in principle - to experiences (either now or in the past, perhaps evolutionary past).

As for philosophy of math, you seem to be in just as much trouble (as an empiricist) with platonic math and nominalist math. If you're a platonist about the objects of math, then you have to show how you experience these platonic, non-material objects. If you think there aren't really any objects of math, then it seems to me even harder to show how math axioms are true by appeal to experience. So this question seems orthogonal to yours.

As a platonist, I only have to justify a platonic explanation by appealing to theoretical conceptions that better explain how the world appears to us based on a reasonable scientific and philosophical framework. I don't have to experience platonic reality (I'm not a full-blooded platonist with regards to objects) to believe that reality is real (anymore than I have to experience virtual particles to know they are real).

This of course misses the point entirely. I do not believe in God. I don't think this claim is obvious, since smart people like Descartes and Leibniz have thought otherwise. So I therefore try to back up my claim with reasons, as in those cited threads.

If atheism is not obvious, then why is it unreasonable to believe in God?

You could think that a priori beliefs are hardwired by biology, as I said long ago. Then they are not acquired by sense experience.

Maybe not our sense experience, but they are acquired by sense experience. If we agree to this issue (which I said long ago too), then you agree that knowledge must always be causally connected to our experiences?

Funny you should draw the line there. Why can't God just give us knowledge, say of God, or of the average rainfall in Virginia, without our having to experience it? If that is even possible then it seems possible we can have a prioiri knowledge, according to you.

That would be a perception, then. We are perceiving and therefore obtaining knowledge from an external source. It would be causally connected to the world since God would be causally connected to the world by having created the world and having all-knowledge of the world.

Somehow you get from sensory beliefs to all your other beliefs. You presumably have inference rules for these. What is the experiential justification for those? (Those, note, are just the kind of thing people often claim are a priori--laws of logic and such.)

Well, you see Spetey, that's the job of some new branch of paleo studies ...

This confuses scientific explanation of our inferential practices with their justification. We're also biologically inclined to murder, as can be explained scientifically--does that mean that all murder is justified? I want to know how you justify our experiential practices by appeal to sense experience. Several of our inferential practices seem unjustified, as our very human tendencies to commit various fallacies attests. There may be evolutionary reason, some speculate, that we're not good at reckoning probability, for example.

Natural selection provides a justification for why we have those particular inference rules, however it doesn't necessarily justify that we should use those inference rules in any particular situation. However, this would be chasing our tail here because evolutionary selective strategies are "justified" by the benefit that is obtained (largely, survival of the species). As far as why we use particular inference rules in a given situation (since natural selection is of no help in a world where our survival is often not at stake in deciding p or not-p), we can utilize whatever pragmatic choice that produces the most benefit -- which is often a decision based on the criteria of the "society" we deem most important in influencing that decision. We talked about my use of external pragmatic justification before.

(Maybe I shouldn't have said that's what I hope, though, since you have a track record of taking some position back once I agree with it!)

Well, if you wouldn't use agreement as a means to get me to accept a larger agenda, then that would never happen. If you want agreement in a situation, then agree to exactly what I'm saying, nothing more, nothing less. Don't introduce simplicity as more than an agreement of an aesthetic criterion, and don't introduce the idea of naturalism as more than an agreement of a causal connnection principle.

[spetey]

Hi Harvey and gang! I'll skip past many tempting points here to the heart of the matter.

(I've learned the points are often "tempting" because they feel accusatory, and so I feel like I have to defend myself even if it's not really relevant to the discussion... but I'm trying to learn to let such stuff go. If you really want me to defend myself against any of the things that felt like accusations above--that I'm inconsistent, that I have strayed off-topic in trying to provide examples of a priori beliefs, that I use agreement for an agenda, etc.--please let me know, since I do have such defenses.)

Meanwhile the good news is I think that confusions are clearing up and we're approaching agreement. I think I have a better idea of how widely you construe "caused by the world" or "caused by sense perception". It looks to me like we agree on these two key things:

• All beliefs must have a causal explanation. That is to say, no beliefs are formed "magically"; they all had some cause ("in the world", you might add--I think it's redundant to add this in the case of causes). So I think we agree that for a belief to be justified, it must have some causal explanation. In my case, I think that because I think for a belief to be at all it must have some causal explanation, and I think that because I'm a naturalist.
  
  Of course, causal explanations for beliefs are not always justificatory; we could explain the various causes of Hitler's monstrous beliefs, but that would not be to justify those beliefs. In summary it seems we agree that causal explanations are necessary but not sufficient for a belief's justification.
• We both also seem open to the idea that maybe, not all of a creature's beliefs need to have their causal origin in that creature's sensory nerves to be justified. We agree that hardwired beliefs could be justified, for example. You also think that a belief could be formed without natural sensory perception (optical or olfactory or ... nerve stimulation), since you think God could give us "perceptual" knowledge directly.

Is it right we agree on these? If so, where are we with regard to this thread?


spetey

[harvey1]

Is it right we agree on these? If so, where are we with regard to this thread?

It seems we can agree on these issues. So, before we leave this topic and move back to the Diversity thread again, let me ask this question.

If "[a]ll beliefs must have a causal explanation.... [meaning] all had some cause... in the world" and "we agree that for a belief to be justified, it must have some causal explanation," then can we agree that since justification of beliefs is always rooted in our experiences (i.e., causal connections), it is therefore necessary that our collective experiences (including evolutionary experiences that are hardwired into us) determine what beliefs will be seen as "justified" and what beliefs are not? If you accept that, then can we agree that basic beliefs are terminated in experience(s), and the only way to revise a basic belief is to undergo new experiences that allow a new "belief to be justified" -- despite the pull that those previous experiences had in our basic beliefs?

The relevance of this question is to confirm that the reasons you have for a basic belief is founded on causal explanations (i.e., experiences) and not "faith" (e.g., beliefs without causal explanation). If you think that all basic beliefs aren't founded on experiences (i.e., causal explanations) that somehow terminate with those experiences, then this would, in my view, still leave your epistemology subject to "faith" arguments since it gets back to an a priori argument that is not causally based.

[trs]

In other words, the reason to believe is because it is intuitively obvious, ...

What is "intuitively obvious" about

• one God versus many,
• a personal God versus and impersonal God,
• a loving and forgiving God versus a hateful and vindictive God,
• a 'good' God versus an 'evil' Demiurge,
• a God of Abraham versus a God of Canaan,
• etc.?

Conversely, is not more "intuitively obvious" that our gods tend inexorably to fall into one of two categories: (1) anthropomorphisms/anthropopathisms, and (2) the god-of-the-gaps?

[spetey]

It seems we can agree on these issues.

Yay! See, progress isn't impossible; it just takes patience. This is a big step, I hope. I'm eager to get back to the Argument from Diversity thread, as you know. I think the ball was last left in your court over there, Harvey, so any time you're ready.

Two very small things:

If you accept that, then can we agree that basic beliefs are terminated in experience(s) ...

First, I think it's worth noting again that you construe "experience" broadly enough to include the causal influences on our genetic ancestors. Given this broad construal, yes I agree.

... and the only way to revise a basic belief is to undergo new experiences that allow a new "belief to be justified" -- despite the pull that those previous experiences had in our basic beliefs?

Well, I think we agree also that for example we could revise (even "basic") beliefs by further reflection on the experience already available. For example, Einstein and others could have all the experimental facts before them, and still believe in an ether or whatever. Then, Einstein could go to his study and think about it for a while longer--with no new relevant sensory experiences--and come up with a better explanation of the experiences already available. In this way, I would say, Einstein justifiably changed a belief without further (relevant) experiences. You agree this kind of belief-change can be justified, right?


spetey

[harvey1]

Okay, I'm convinced that you are not relying on "faith" explanations yourself. I still have some issues regarding the meaning of all of what you agreed to, but that can be covered in the other thread since it is really an issue of what it means to give a reason for a belief in the first place. So, over the weekend I'll try and post something there.

So, are there any atheists who believe that you can hold a belief of atheism without having to give experiences to back up that belief? Just as a reminder, by experiences I construe this concept "broadly enough to include the causal influences on our genetic ancestors."

If there are any atheists who think their beliefs are construed from other than experience, I'd like to discuss whether that "faith" is a good thing or not.