Secularism - Good, Bad, Too Much, Too little?

[JoshB]

Forward: I am not going to take a side in this original post. I will merely propose questions I have about Secularism.

A) In an extremely diverse societies with citizens who hold immense amounts of perspectives, is Secularism a necessary governmental philosophy to govern the people ubiasly?

B) Should there be any restrictions to Secularism? If so, give examples.

C) Is it better to have a 100% Secular government (exaggeration. I mean EXTREMELY Secular) or a government with certain restrictions on Secularism? Explain why you think the Former or the Latter.

Extra: Can Theocracies only function with a large (8/10) majority of religious like-mindedness?

[McCulloch]

I understand secularism to be the idea that governments are completely neutral with regard to religion. Governments take no measures to restrict religion or religious practice other than measures which would be taken to restrict the same practice if it were not religiously motivated. Governments take no measures to promote religion in general or any specific religion.

With that understanding of what secularism is, I cannot see any possible limit beyond which a government could be seen as being too secular.

[JoshB]

You do have a point. In that original post I've made a mistake Ill be sure to be more mindful int the future.

But I still think this thread poses at least 2 good questions.

[geospiza]

A) In an extremely diverse societies with citizens who hold immense amounts of perspectives, is Secularism a necessary governmental philosophy to govern the people ubiasly?

Extra: Can Theocracies only function with a large (8/10) majority of religious like-mindedness?

I would caution that “hard� secularism (the sense in which I think you may be describing it) would ultimately cave in on itself because it would lead to the absurd result that the government would be prohibited from adopting it. Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

Milder forms of secularism are the current trend in countries that are governed in the tradition of liberal, constitutional democracy. This seems to represent an improvement in terms of greater liberty and quality of political participation (or at least perceptions thereof) among the citizenry. However it is too soon to say whether this is a necessary component of all decent societies. It is very difficult to conceive of government outside of the framework of a rights-based liberalism for those of us in the West that can so easily take this for granted.

“Secularism� means many different things to many different people. That is why I would avoid the use of the term as much as possible in favour of more narrowly circumscribed concepts that may be embodied by it. One idea within the broader concept of secularism that I would advance is the one that John Rawls termed “public reason�. Roughly, it is the idea that there are reasons that ought to be required in the implementation of public policy; reasons that people from every moral, religious or philosophical perspective would accept behind a “veil of ignorance�. The veil of ignorance is an imaginary situation in which the principles of justice are selected prior to any knowledge about the decision maker’s social status or rank. A related idea is that of an “overlapping consensus� whereby persons adhering to mutually incompatible comprehensive visions of the “good life� may nevertheless find in those private doctrines the support they need to agree upon social arrangements that everyone can live with. Belief in the idea of public reason is the belief that there exists a sufficient overlapping consensus in order for public standards, norms and institutions to exist in a way that is fair.

[McCulloch]

Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

I am not sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you could provide an example of a strong form of secularism that led to the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

In fact, it is fundamental, on the one hand, to insist upon the distinction between the political realm and that of religion in order to preserve both the religious freedom of citizens and the responsibility of the state toward them.
[...]
On the other hand, [it is important] to become more aware of the irreplaceable role of religion for the formation of consciences and the contribution which it can bring to – among other things – the creation of a basic ethical consensus within society.

I disagree with the Pope on his second point. I do not see that religion has an irreplaceable role to the creation of ethical consensus within society. Our government and our representatives to government should function without recourse to their own personal religious beliefs.

[geospiza]

Perhaps you could provide an example of a strong form of secularism that led to the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

To fulfil your request would be inimical to the nature of my enquiry. Allow me to explain.

Imagine you are looking under a microscope at a Petri dish that contains 12 protozoa. The Petri dish is divided down the middle into two semi-circles. As you view the Petri dish under the microscope, you tally 5 protozoa in the left semi-circle and 8 protozoa in the right semi-circle. From this evidence, should you conclude that 5+8=12? No you shouldn’t; you should count again. As with arithmetic, so with political philosophy.

I have not commenced upon an empirical analysis of the secular state (however “secular� is to be construed). Were I to attempt to do so, would I set up different political regimes under controlled experimental conditions and test the various outcomes? While I do not believe this to be impossible in principle, I am at a loss to know how it would be practically achievable (or ethical). Or am I to conduct this experiment using the data of actual existing political regimes, with all of their unpredictable variables and historical contingencies? Such an experiment would be of limited value, but more to the point it is quite simply not in the nature of the enquiry under consideration here. This reflex towards empiricism only changes the topic.

What I have done is attempted to describe what would be entailed by a secular state, acknowledging that there are a variety of ways in which to conceive of the extremely vague notion of “secularism�. I believe there are strong and mild forms of this doctrine roughly corresponding to differing levels of accommodation of traditional religious commitment. Strong forms posit the existence of individuals who operate totally unguided by any religious influence; these individuals are necessary for the proper functioning of an enshrined liberal democratic government. I reject that on a number of grounds: that it is unnecessary; that it represents an impoverished view of liberalism and pluralism; and that it is inhumane. Weaker forms acknowledge religious experience as a component of the lives of at least some (but actually most) people, regardless of the political regime that they find themselves coping with. This seems to me to reflect the reality of the world as I find it. As such, I believe the classical liberalist may justifiably endorse this weaker form of secularism at least insofar as they wish to advance more specific concepts, such as the ideas of public reason, overlapping consensus and the veil of ignorance.

[McCulloch]

Perhaps you could provide an example of a strong form of secularism that led to the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

To fulfill your request would be inimical to the nature of my inquiry. Allow me to explain.

Yes. Please do explain. I look at things somewhat simplistically. You made a claim.

Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

I doubt that claim and ask for an example. You respond with what appear to me to be evasive gibberish. I am not claiming that your post was evasive gibberish, necessarily, just that I, in my simpleness cannot help but perceive it that way.

Imagine you are looking under a microscope at a Petri dish that contains 12 protozoa. The Petri dish is divided down the middle into two semi-circles. As you view the Petri dish under the microscope, you tally 5 protozoa in the left semi-circle and 8 protozoa in the right semi-circle. From this evidence, should you conclude that 5+8=12? No you shouldn’t; you should count again. As with arithmetic, so with political philosophy.

Analysis. Living things move, making them hard to count. Right. Got it.

Extension. Political philosophy is a moving target. Influences are difficult to determine. One should be very careful about making statements like Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position. OK, you're making sense now.

I have not commenced upon an empirical analysis of the secular state (however “secular� is to be construed). Were I to attempt to do so, would I set up different political regimes under controlled experimental conditions and test the various outcomes? While I do not believe this to be impossible in principle, I am at a loss to know how it would be practically achievable (or ethical). Or am I to conduct this experiment using the data of actual existing political regimes, with all of their unpredictable variables and historical contingencies? Such an experiment would be of limited value, but more to the point it is quite simply not in the nature of the inquiry under consideration here. This reflex towards empiricism only changes the topic.

Agreed. In the arena of political philosophy, controlled experiments are difficult if not impossible. This leads me to wonder just how you intend to support the claims you have made in this area. I naively thought that an example or two might help. Silly me! Anyway, proceed to find some other way to support your assertion.

What I have done is attempted to describe what would be entailed by a secular state, acknowledging that there are a variety of ways in which to conceive of the extremely vague notion of “secularism�.

While there may be some gray areas, I really do not think that the notion of secularism is that vague. Am I missing something?

I believe there are strong and mild forms of this doctrine roughly corresponding to differing levels of accommodation of traditional religious commitment. Strong forms posit the existence of individuals who operate totally unguided by any religious influence; these individuals are necessary for the proper functioning of an enshrined liberal democratic government. I reject that on a number of grounds: that it is unnecessary; that it represents an impoverished view of liberalism and pluralism; and that it is inhumane.

Are there examples of this so-called strong form, or is it merely a strawman?

Weaker forms acknowledge religious experience as a component of the lives of at least some (but actually most) people, regardless of the political regime that they find themselves coping with. This seems to me to reflect the reality of the world as I find it. As such, I believe the classical liberalist may justifiably endorse this weaker form of secularism at least insofar as they wish to advance more specific concepts, such as the ideas of public reason, overlapping consensus and the veil of ignorance.

Thus you conclude, I think, and I concur, that people in modern liberal societies are hold a wide variety of religious views with a wide variety of conviction.

Thus a truly secular society is one where the public institutions acknowledge this rather obvious reality without necessarily endorsing or supporting nor restricting or prohibiting any specific religion or even religion in general.

[geospiza]

Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

I doubt that claim and ask for an example. You respond with what appear to me to be evasive gibberish. I am not claiming that your post was evasive gibberish, necessarily, just that I, in my simpleness cannot help but perceive it that way.

If you say that something appears to be evasive gibberish, then you are saying that it is evasive gibberish. Let’s be honest.

Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position. That is to say strong forms of secularism make moral relativism easier to defend, and make moral dogmatism more difficult to defend. Strong secularism does not strictly imply moral relativism, but rather a political regime that embraces strong secularism makes life more comfortable for those who have adopted moral relativism. Moral relativism and moral dogmatism are both undesirable, so government should do what it can to counteract both. If religion serves to reinforce morality in some citizens (and it does) then a liberal democratic government should not be prohibited from praising that and incorporating it into policy considerations.

Here is a geographically pertinent example. Square One Shopping Mall recently beat out certain public opposition to allow its retailers to open for business on retail business holidays. The objection (made by religiously motivated individuals) was that to allow shopping malls to open on holidays would contradict the very purpose of those holidays, and would have deleterious effects on the traditional family value of spending time with your family away from materialistic shopping malls. Square One prevailed, partially because they had more money and resources to fight, but also partially because of a political regime that was at a loss to comprehend “traditional family values�. Square One is not primarily interested in family values or moral issues in society; it is interested in profit. They were morally relativistic in favour of whatever would promote their ability to make more money. In this instance the government appeared indifferent to this. It is unnecessary (and counterproductive) for a liberal democratic regime to be so indifferent to moral issues, even ones that may be underpinned for some people by their religious beliefs.

Thus you conclude, I think, and I concur, that people in modern liberal societies are hold a wide variety of religious views with a wide variety of conviction.

Thus a truly secular society is one where the public institutions acknowledge this rather obvious reality without necessarily endorsing or supporting nor restricting or prohibiting any specific religion or even religion in general.

I agree with this in general, but we differ over the details of how it might be implemented. You seem to take a more narrow view.

[Goat]

Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position.

I doubt that claim and ask for an example. You respond with what appear to me to be evasive gibberish. I am not claiming that your post was evasive gibberish, necessarily, just that I, in my simpleness cannot help but perceive it that way.

If you say that something appears to be evasive gibberish, then you are saying that it is evasive gibberish. Let’s be honest.

Strong forms of secularism pave the way to moral relativism and the utter inability to express or defend any normative position. That is to say strong forms of secularism make moral relativism easier to defend, and make moral dogmatism more difficult to defend. Strong secularism does not strictly imply moral relativism, but rather a political regime that embraces strong secularism makes life more comfortable for those who have adopted moral relativism. Moral relativism and moral dogmatism are both undesirable, so government should do what it can to counteract both. If religion serves to reinforce morality in some citizens (and it does) then a liberal democratic government should not be prohibited from praising that and incorporating it into policy considerations.

And what is wrong with moral relativism?? Can you show any moral that isn't relative?
There are many claims for 'objective morality'. .. and you demonstrate it? Or, is that claim just empty rhetoric?

Here is a geographically pertinent example. Square One Shopping Mall recently beat out certain public opposition to allow its retailers to open for business on retail business holidays. The objection (made by religiously motivated individuals) was that to allow shopping malls to open on holidays would contradict the very purpose of those holidays, and would have deleterious effects on the traditional family value of spending time with your family away from materialistic shopping malls. Square One prevailed, partially because they had more money and resources to fight, but also partially because of a political regime that was at a loss to comprehend “traditional family values�. Square One is not primarily interested in family values or moral issues in society; it is interested in profit. They were morally relativistic in favour of whatever would promote their ability to make more money. In this instance the government appeared indifferent to this. It is unnecessary (and counterproductive) for a liberal democratic regime to be so indifferent to moral issues, even ones that may be underpinned for some people by their religious beliefs.

So, the people that feel fervently about their religion, and want to impose it on others have the moral right to do so? And, if I am not of that religion, I have to suffer through another religions holidays because of it? What nonsense.

[geospiza]

And what is wrong with moral relativism??

It is a politically destabilizing and antisocial philosophy.

So, the people that feel fervently about their religion, and want to impose it on others have the moral right to do so? And, if I am not of that religion, I have to suffer through another religions holidays because of it? What nonsense.

You misunderstood me. I said only that secularism does not entail the absolute refusal to involve moral and religious claims in policy deliberations. Also, the particular holidays in question were mostly civic and of no religious significance.