The Kalam Cosmological Argument William Lane Craig

[William]

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writing ... l-argument

Finally, Ghazali argued that this Uncaused First Cause must also be a personal being. It’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning like the universe.

Here’s the problem: If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for the water to begin to freeze just a finite time ago. Now the cause of the universe is permanently there, since it is timeless. So why isn’t the universe permanently there as well? Why did the universe come into being only 14 billion years ago? Why isn’t it as permanent as its cause?

Ghazali maintained that the answer to this problem is that the First Cause must be a personal being endowed with freedom of the will. His creating the universe is a free act which is independent of any prior determining conditions. So his act of creating can be something spontaneous and new. Freedom of the will enables one to get an effect with a beginning from a permanent, timeless cause. Thus, we are brought not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its Personal Creator.

This is admittedly hard for us to imagine. But one way to think about it is to envision God existing alone without the universe as changeless and timeless. His free act of creation is a temporal event simultaneous with the universe’s coming into being. Therefore, God enters into time when He creates the universe. God is thus timeless without the universe and in time with the universe.

Ghazali’s cosmological argument thus gives us powerful grounds for believing in the existence of a beginningless, uncaused, timeless, spaceless, changeless, immaterial, enormously powerful, Personal Creator of the universe.

Ghazali formulates his argument very simply: “Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning.” [1]

Ghazali’s reasoning involves three simple steps:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its beginning.


Q: Does this cosmology require a supernatural/unnatural/non-physical cause?

(If so/if not, why so/not?)

[fredonly]

I’m trying to figure out your counter response about an initial state of affairs being necessarily uncaused.

Here's my reasoning:
1. If x was caused to exist then it’s cause temporarally preceded it
2. Nothing temporally preceded an initial state of affairs
3. Therefore the initial state of affairs was not caused to exist.

It's established science that time is relative to a reference frame, and that time proceeds more slowly as velocity approaches the speed of light. I'm not insisting that this entails "timeless" existence, per se, I'm just saying that it's plausible.

It’s plausible if there is no absolute time. Craig argues for a Neo-Lorentzian understanding of special relativity, which involves an absolute time. You need to show a different understanding of special relativity is the more reasonable one.

Craig’s view that there is absolute time is non-standard, so he has to show why it’s more plausible if he wants to use this to show his hypothesis is a BETTER explanation. But we can just call this one a toss-up, because we’re both just making unverifiable metaphysical assumptions about the nature of time.

It's a technicality in Craig's account. He doesn't consider the state of affairs "God sans universe" as a point of time - BECAUSE it is not an event; therefore it is not an initial state of affairs. Craig denies that God (the alleged cause of the universe) existed "temporally prior" to the universe. This is at odds with point 1, which you agreed with. So you're defending a different account than Craig's.

Are you saying that Craig’s assumption (1) and (4) contradict each other, or that I’m disagreeing with Craig on (1)?

I’m saying you aren’t being consistent with Craig if you treat “God sans universe” as a point of time. Since Craig denies this, it cannot be an “initial state of affairs”. I don’t know if you disasgree with him, or aren’t aware that he says this. His argument has no internal contradictions, so I recommend sticking with it – and researching what he actually says. Otherwise you’re likely to hit snags. He’s been working on this most of his life (it was his doctoral dissertation), so he probably has a more refined view than you would.

Yes, sorry for my misreading earlier. I agree that temporal causes must temporally precede their effect. But that doesn’t mean that all causes must be temporal. You seem to be tying causal powers to being temporal and I’m not sure why.

My point is there’s no evidence of atemporal causation – it’s therefore an ad hoc assumption, and is therefore a strike against his argument being the best explanation.

Could you clarify the difference you see in Craig’s definition of eternal and mine?

AFAIK, Craig doesn’t use the term “eternal” in defending his KCA. He uses the term “timeless”. God “timelessly” causes the universe to exist. But he also says God’s “timeless existence” does not temporally precede the universe. It’s a mystery to me how he reconciles it. I know how I would reconcile it, if I were him: I’d modify my definition of time to include “God sans universe” as a state of affairs temporally preceding the universe. I don’t understand why he doesn’t do this. Maybe it’s because it makes “God sans universe” an initial state of affairs, on par with a material state of affairs.

Another unstated premise that Craig has, that cripples his “best inference” claim: “God sans universe” entails the existence of an uncaused being, whose timeless mind contains an intact plan for the universe. That’s ad hoc, and an ENORMOUS assumption – unless you already believe such a being exists (as he obviously does). That’s why the KCA seems more of a rationalization than a persuasive argument.

[The Tanager]

Here's my reasoning:
1. If x was caused to exist then it’s cause temporarally preceded it
2. Nothing temporally preceded an initial state of affairs
3. Therefore the initial state of affairs was not caused to exist.

What’s your reasoning for premise 1?

Craig’s view that there is absolute time is non-standard, so he has to show why it’s more plausible if he wants to use this to show his hypothesis is a BETTER explanation. But we can just call this one a toss-up, because we’re both just making unverifiable metaphysical assumptions about the nature of time.

Anyone that makes a positive claim (Craig and those who take a different view) have to show why their view is a better explanation. Craig has written on this. Why do you think his reasoning fails?

I’m saying you aren’t being consistent with Craig if you treat “God sans universe” as a point of time. Since Craig denies this, it cannot be an “initial state of affairs”. I don’t know if you disasgree with him, or aren’t aware that he says this. His argument has no internal contradictions, so I recommend sticking with it – and researching what he actually says. Otherwise you’re likely to hit snags. He’s been working on this most of his life (it was his doctoral dissertation), so he probably has a more refined view than you would.

Yes, he certainly does. I misunderstood some of what you were saying and, therefore, thought you weren’t using the terms in the same way he was and I was trying to work off of how you use it. I’ve since realized my misunderstanding.

My point is there’s no evidence of atemporal causation – it’s therefore an ad hoc assumption, and is therefore a strike against his argument being the best explanation.

But it’s not an assumption, it’s a conclusion from the conceptual analysis attached to the KCA.

AFAIK, Craig doesn’t use the term “eternal” in defending his KCA. He uses the term “timeless”. God “timelessly” causes the universe to exist.

Okay, but he does use the concept of something that didn’t begin to exist. That was how I was using ‘eternal’. So, while there is no point of time at which the universe doesn’t exist, it doesn’t fit my definition of eternal.

But he also says God’s “timeless existence” does not temporally precede the universe. It’s a mystery to me how he reconciles it. I know how I would reconcile it, if I were him: I’d modify my definition of time to include “God sans universe” as a state of affairs temporally preceding the universe. I don’t understand why he doesn’t do this. Maybe it’s because it makes “God sans universe” an initial state of affairs, on par with a material state of affairs.

What do you mean? How ‘initial state of affairs’ is defined is neutral towards whether that would be God sans universe or a material state of affairs. They would be on par in that sense, but that doesn’t tell us anything for or against one view or the other.

You also say it is a mystery, but you’ve been explaining how he does it, haven’t you? Technically, since time began with the act of creation, the ‘God sans universe’ logically cannot have existed at a time prior to the start of time. If Craig defines ‘initial state of affairs’ to necessarily be within time, then ‘God sans universe’ logically cannot be an ‘initital state of affairs.’ But this isn’t a reason offered for the existence of God, as far as I’ve read Craig.

Another unstated premise that Craig has, that cripples his “best inference” claim: “God sans universe” entails the existence of an uncaused being, whose timeless mind contains an intact plan for the universe. That’s ad hoc, and an ENORMOUS assumption – unless you already believe such a being exists (as he obviously does). That’s why the KCA seems more of a rationalization than a persuasive argument.

How is this an assumption Craig brings to the argument rather than a conclusion Craig draws from it through the subsequent conceptual analysis?

[fredonly]

Here's my reasoning:
1. If x was caused to exist then it’s cause temporarally preceded it
2. Nothing temporally preceded an initial state of affairs
3. Therefore the initial state of affairs was not caused to exist.

What’s your reasoning for premise 1?

We already settled that - you said you agreed:

1) It's more reasonable to believe causes always temporally preceed their effects: all real world cases are consistent with this.

Yes. Plus this would always result based on the most reasonable view of the nature of time.

Anyone that makes a positive claim (Craig and those who take a different view) have to show why their view is a better explanation. Craig has written on this. Why do you think his reasoning fails?

Special relativity is a better explanation for the nature of time -it’s a component of General Relativity and has been thoroughly tested and verified. I’ve seen Craig defend his view in terms of a privileged reference frame: God’s point of view. If that’s his basis, it makes his argument circular (assuming God to prove God). If he has something better – then you need to bring it forward.

My point is there’s no evidence of atemporal causation – it’s therefore an ad hoc assumption, and is therefore a strike against his argument being the best explanation.

But it’s not an assumption, it’s a conclusion from the conceptual analysis attached to the KCA.

His conceptual analysis consists of rationalizing the assumption. But if you see it differently, then present his argument and defend it.

You also say it is a mystery, but you’ve been explaining how he does it, haven’t you?

No, I described how I would explain it, if I were him. He does not explain it this way, as I noted. If you want to defend Craig’s argument, you need to research what he says, understand it, and then defend it.

How is this an assumption Craig brings to the argument rather than a conclusion Craig draws from it through the subsequent conceptual analysis?

It is a conclusion that he jumps to and rationalizes. Without the assumption of a being with a timeless plan for a universe, it’s equivalent to a natural “beginning”.

[The Tanager]

Here's my reasoning:
1. If x was caused to exist then it’s cause temporarally preceded it
2. Nothing temporally preceded an initial state of affairs
3. Therefore the initial state of affairs was not caused to exist.

What’s your reasoning for premise 1?

We already settled that - you said you agreed:

I tried to clarify that I agreed that temporal things that are caused to exist have causes that temporally precede them.

Special relativity is a better explanation for the nature of time -it’s a component of General Relativity and has been thoroughly tested and verified. I’ve seen Craig defend his view in terms of a privileged reference frame: God’s point of view. If that’s his basis, it makes his argument circular (assuming God to prove God). If he has something better – then you need to bring it forward.

Are you saying the thorough tests and verification show special relativity to be better than a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity? If so, can you provide the evidence? Craig argues that the theories are empirically equivalent, but his view is more credible for metaphysical reasons, not simply assuming God.

His conceptual analysis consists of rationalizing the assumption. But if you see it differently, then present his argument and defend it.

The effect is the spatio-temporal universe. If that is caused, i.e., if space and time come into existence, then the cause itself must transcend space and time.

No, I described how I would explain it, if I were him. He does not explain it this way, as I noted. If you want to defend Craig’s argument, you need to research what he says, understand it, and then defend it.

You shared how you would do it, but you’ve also talked about how he does it. You called it a technicality at one point. Craig teaches that time began at the act of creation. So, logically ‘prior’ to the creation of the universe (God sans universe) time doesn’t exist. If time doesn’t exist ‘there’, logically, it couldn’t temporally precede its effect.

Another unstated premise that Craig has, that cripples his “best inference” claim: “God sans universe” entails the existence of an uncaused being, whose timeless mind contains an intact plan for the universe. That’s ad hoc, and an ENORMOUS assumption – unless you already believe such a being exists (as he obviously does). That’s why the KCA seems more of a rationalization than a persuasive argument.

How is this an assumption Craig brings to the argument rather than a conclusion Craig draws from it through the subsequent conceptual analysis?

It is a conclusion that he jumps to and rationalizes. Without the assumption of a being with a timeless plan for a universe, it’s equivalent to a natural “beginning”.

No, he argues to the cause being uncaused (since there can’t be an infinite regress of causes). He offers three arguments for the cause being personal. We can go over those if you want.

What is the problem you see with a timeless mind having a plan for the universe and making that come to be? It’s more reasonable that a timeless mind just randomly created stuff? Perhaps I’m missing something there.

[fredonly]

deleted (I had posted the same thing twice)

[fredonly]

I tried to clarify that I agreed that temporal things that are caused to exist have causes that temporally precede them.

Are you claiming the universe isn't temporal?

I don't understand your basis for rejecting my premise (if x was caused to exist then its cause temporally preceded it). Everything we've ever observed that begins to exist had a pre-existing cause. You can't just assert the universe isn't temporal to get around that.

Are you saying the thorough tests and verification show special relativity to be better than a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity? If so, can you provide the evidence? Craig argues that the theories are empirically equivalent, but his view is more credible for metaphysical reasons, not simply assuming God.

I'm saying it's a better explanation because it's more parsimonious. The existence of a privileged reference frame has no explanatory value, so it's ad hoc to assume it.

For readability, I'm going to skip using "quote" and just show some exchanges as a dialog:

Fredonly: My point is there’s no evidence of atemporal causation – it’s therefore an ad hoc assumption, and is therefore a strike against his argument being the best explanation.
Tanager: But it’s not an assumption, it’s a conclusion from the conceptual analysis attached to the KCA.
Fredonly: His conceptual analysis consists of rationalizing the assumption. But if you see it differently, then present his argument and defend it.
Tanager: The effect is the spatio-temporal universe. If that is caused, i.e., if space and time come into existence, then the cause itself must transcend space and time.

This gets to the heart of the matter:
If we start with my premise that causes necessarily temporally precede the effect, then it is impossible for spacetime to have been caused.
On the other hand if we start with the premise that spacetime was necessarily caused, then we must assume it was caused atemporally.
My premise (that causes necessarily precede the effect) is supported by common experience, which is the basis for the laws of physics and seems to be a true law of nature. Your premise (that spacetime was caused) has no evidentiary support. (Craig treats the big bang as evidence for the universe "beginning to exist", but that's not what cosmologists say. Maybe you've seen a better analysis from him).

You shared how you would do it, but you’ve also talked about how he does it. You called it a technicality at one point. Craig teaches that time began at the act of creation. So, logically ‘prior’ to the creation of the universe (God sans universe) time doesn’t exist. If time doesn’t exist ‘there’, logically, it couldn’t temporally precede its effect.

That agrees with my understanding of Craig’s account. The problem is that he treats “logically prior” as a reasonable alternative for “temporally prior”. That makes no sense. Logical priority is related to reasoning – it is an epistemological process of discovering new facts based on logical relationships to prior facts that we know. Premises are logically prior to a conclusion. That doesn’t imply the ontological entity represented by the conclusion was caused by the premises. So it’s problematic to use “logically prior” to account for causation.

Fredonly: Another unstated premise that Craig has, that cripples his “best inference” claim: “God sans universe” entails the existence of an uncaused being, whose timeless mind contains an intact plan for the universe. That’s ad hoc, and an ENORMOUS assumption – unless you already believe such a being exists (as he obviously does). That’s why the KCA seems more of a rationalization than a persuasive argument.
Tanager: How is this an assumption Craig brings to the argument rather than a conclusion Craig draws from it through the subsequent conceptual analysis?
Fredonly: It is a conclusion that he jumps to and rationalizes. Without the assumption of a being with a timeless plan for a universe, it’s equivalent to a natural “beginning”.
Tanager: he argues to the cause being uncaused (since there can’t be an infinite regress of causes). He offers three arguments for the cause being personal. We can go over those if you want. What is the problem you see with a timeless mind having a plan for the universe and making that come to be? It’s more reasonable that a timeless mind just randomly created stuff? Perhaps I’m missing something there.

As I said previously, I accept the reasonableness of an "uncaused first cause". I'm objecting to the claim that it's more likely to be a timeless mind containing a fully-formed plan for the universe. That sounds like magic, and thus seems prima facie implausible. But can you make a case the plausibility of a timeless mind existing with a fully-formed universe-plan imbedded in it? If not, it’s just an (enormous) assumption, – which is what I said. If this can’t be established, then there seems to be no basis for concluding this being is “personal”.

You are a theist, and so you naturally consider the concept of an unembodied, omniscient mind perfectly reasonable. Step back and see if you can make a case for it. Keep in mind that the alternative to a mind+universe plan is: just a universe (sans mind+universe plan). I hope it's obvious that the latter is more parsimonious.

[The Tanager]

Are you claiming the universe isn't temporal?

I don't understand your basis for rejecting my premise (if x was caused to exist then its cause temporally preceded it). Everything we've ever observed that begins to exist had a pre-existing cause. You can't just assert the universe isn't temporal to get around that.

No, I think the universe is temporal. I also noticed I butchered my clarification. I’ll try to actually clarify my position better this time. I believe that temporal causes temporally precede their effects.

Your premise would be the reasonable one if we didn’t have something like the KCA and its conceptual analysis. Because if that is sound, then we have an example of something that was caused to exist (spatio-temporal matter), but logically cannot have a cause temporally preceding it.

I'm saying it's a better explanation because it's more parsimonious. The existence of a privileged reference frame has no explanatory value, so it's ad hoc to assume it.

Parsimony only comes into the equation if all else is equal. Craig argues they aren’t metaphysically equal, so while he may be wrong, he’s not being ad hoc.

This gets to the heart of the matter:
If we start with my premise that causes necessarily temporally precede the effect, then it is impossible for spacetime to have been caused.

Sure, but that begs the question.

On the other hand if we start with the premise that spacetime was necessarily caused, then we must assume it was caused atemporally.

Sure, but that begs the question. Craig doesn’t start here, though. Craig gives two philosophical arguments in favor of it as well as scientific confirmations.

My premise (that causes necessarily precede the effect) is supported by common experience, which is the basis for the laws of physics and seems to be a true law of nature. Your premise (that spacetime was caused) has no evidentiary support. (Craig treats the big bang as evidence for the universe "beginning to exist", but that's not what cosmologists say. Maybe you've seen a better analysis from him).

No, common experience supports that all temporal causes we know of temporally precede their temporal effects. Most of our observations involve temporal causes with temporal effects. But we don’t observe any timeless causes temporally preceding their effects. That’s why I think your premise needs to be spoken of in terms of temporal causes, rather than from the reference of temporal effects.

Now, one can say, that’s because we don’t observe any and, therefore, there probably aren’t any timeless causes. Sure, but Craig’s KCA is an attempt to show there must be a timeless cause with a temporal effect. And logic tells us that the timeless cause isn’t temporal and, therefore, can’t temporally precede anything. To use your premise to defeat that attempt is to beg the question against it by your premise.

That agrees with my understanding of Craig’s account. The problem is that he treats “logically prior” as a reasonable alternative for “temporally prior”. That makes no sense. Logical priority is related to reasoning – it is an epistemological process of discovering new facts based on logical relationships to prior facts that we know. Premises are logically prior to a conclusion. That doesn’t imply the ontological entity represented by the conclusion was caused by the premises. So it’s problematic to use “logically prior” to account for causation.

I don’t see why it’s problematic to use ‘logically prior’. Logically, the beginning of time would have to pre-exist itself in order for its cause to be temporal. That’s logical nonsense. Are you saying you think time didn’t begin to exist, but has always existed? But haven’t you said that the universe (space-time matter) did begin to exist?

As to the bolded part above, are you saying Craig thinks it does imply that? If so, where or why?

As I said previously, I accept the reasonableness of an "uncaused first cause". I'm objecting to the claim that it's more likely to be a timeless mind containing a fully-formed plan for the universe. That sounds like magic, and thus seems prima facie implausible. But can you make a case the plausibility of a timeless mind existing with a fully-formed universe-plan imbedded in it? If not, it’s just an (enormous) assumption, – which is what I said. If this can’t be established, then there seems to be no basis for concluding this being is “personal”.

First, a clarification. Is it about it being (1) timeless, (2) a mind/personal, (3) having a fully-formed universe plan imbedded in it, or (4) all three?

You are a theist, and so you naturally consider the concept of an unembodied, omniscient mind perfectly reasonable. Step back and see if you can make a case for it. Keep in mind that the alternative to a mind+universe plan is: just a universe (sans mind+universe plan). I hope it's obvious that the latter is more parsimonious.

Yes, it certainly is more parsimonious, but that only matters if all other things are equal.

[fredonly]

Your premise would be the reasonable one if we didn’t have something like the KCA and its conceptual analysis. Because if that is sound, then we have an example of something that was caused to exist (spatio-temporal matter), but logically cannot have a cause temporally preceding it.

That's circular reasoning. You're using the conclusion of the KCA to argue the KCA is sound.

Parsimony only comes into the equation if all else is equal. Craig argues they aren’t metaphysically equal, so while he may be wrong, he’s not being ad hoc.

As you said, they're empiricly equivalent, so it is the case that "all else is equal".

This gets to the heart of the matter:
If we start with my premise that causes necessarily temporally precede the effect, then it is impossible for spacetime to have been caused.

Sure, but that begs the question.

On the other hand if we start with the premise that spacetime was necessarily caused, then we must assume it was caused atemporally.

Sure, but that begs the question. Craig doesn’t start here, though. Craig gives two philosophical arguments in favor of it as well as scientific confirmations.

My assumption is based on direct experience. The philosophical arguments he makes only imply the past is finite, not that the universe was caused. His so-called "scientific confirmations" do no more than show the science is consistent with that. Most cosmologists do not treat the big bang as a beginning of existence for material reality, which is exactly what Craig chooses to infer, even though it is not logically entailed. That is assumption.

I said this was the heart of the problem because they are mutually exclusive and pivotal - the KCA is unsound if my assumption is correct.

Now, one can say, that’s because we don’t observe any and, therefore, there probably aren’t any timeless causes. Sure, but Craig’s KCA is an attempt to show there must be a timeless cause with a temporal effect. And logic tells us that the timeless cause isn’t temporal and, therefore, can’t temporally precede anything. To use your premise to defeat that attempt is to beg the question against it by your premise.

Yes, we don't observe any timeless causes, so why should we believe there can be such a thing? The way he tries to argue "there must be one" depends on debatable assumptions - that it was caused (supported only by the fact that the past is finite), and "logically prior" sufficiently accounts for a cause-effect relation.

I don’t see why it’s problematic to use ‘logically prior’. Logically, the beginning of time would have to pre-exist itself in order for its cause to be temporal. That’s logical nonsense.

An uncaused initial state does not entail this nonsense.

Are you saying you think time didn’t begin to exist, but has always existed? But haven’t you said that the universe (space-time matter) did begin to exist?

No. I argue that time is a relation between states of affairs, not a relation between events. This puts the initial state of affairs temporally prior to the first event.

As to the bolded part above, are you saying Craig thinks it does imply that? If so, where or why

No, I'm not accusing Craig of saying that. I'm explaining why it is unreasonable to treat logical priority as adequate to account for causation. The fact that Craig treats it this way implies he's making another questionable metaphysical assumption.

First, a clarification. Is it about it being (1) timeless, (2) a mind/personal, (3) having a fully-formed universe plan imbedded in it, or (4) all three?

All three, except that "personal" seems moot unless you can show the rest of it is plausible.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #88]

Most cosmologists do not treat the big bang as a beginning of existence for material reality

Q: Confirmed or unconfirmed... "Most cosmologists do not treat the big bang as a beginning of existence for material reality"?

LLSGPT. The statement is largely confirmed.

Most cosmologists today do not treat the Big Bang as the definitive beginning of existence for all material reality. Instead, they often view it as the beginning of the observable universe as we currently understand it. Here are a few important points:

Observable Universe: The Big Bang theory describes the evolution of the universe from a hot, dense state about 13.8 billion years ago, but it doesn't necessarily address what, if anything, preceded it.

Pre-Big Bang Theories: Many cosmologists explore various models that suggest something existed before the Big Bang, such as:

Inflationary cosmology: Proposes an exponential expansion prior to the hot Big Bang.

Cyclic models: Suggest the universe goes through infinite cycles of expansion and contraction.

Quantum gravity models: Suggest spacetime and matter could exist in a different form or phase before the Big Bang.

Limitations of Current Understanding:
While the Big Bang represents the point where the universe becomes observable due to the expansion of space and time, there’s still debate about whether this marks the absolute origin of all material existence or just the observable stage.

In short, while the Big Bang theory is essential to our understanding of the universe's early state, many cosmologists are cautious about declaring it the ultimate beginning of all material reality.

[The Tanager]

Your premise would be the reasonable one if we didn’t have something like the KCA and its conceptual analysis. Because if that is sound, then we have an example of something that was caused to exist (spatio-temporal matter), but logically cannot have a cause temporally preceding it.

That's circular reasoning. You're using the conclusion of the KCA to argue the KCA is sound.

No, I’m not doing that. I’m saying that the KCA is a possible counterpoint to your premise, calling it into question. Therefore, we can’t use your premise to disprove the KCA (or that would be circular). This doesn’t mean the KCA is sound; it says nothing about that.

Parsimony only comes into the equation if all else is equal. Craig argues they aren’t metaphysically equal, so while he may be wrong, he’s not being ad hoc.

As you said, they're empiricly equivalent, so it is the case that "all else is equal".

But Craig says they aren’t metaphysically equivalent and, therefore, all else isn’t equal.

My assumption is based on direct experience.

It is based on direct experience of known temporal causes having temporal effects. That does not mean all causes must be temporal. Yes, it is the most rational view until other evidence comes by, but that is exactly what the KCA claims to be.

The philosophical arguments he makes only imply the past is finite, not that the universe was caused.

That the past is finite implies that the universe began to exist. With the first premise, this leads to the universe being caused.

His so-called "scientific confirmations" do no more than show the science is consistent with that.

Yes, they show that the best attested current scientific thought agrees with the conclusion of the philosophical arguments. Many scientific theories have tried to go against that scientific thought, but have been largely rejected for scientific reasons. Other scientific theories are still being explored.

Most cosmologists do not treat the big bang as a beginning of existence for material reality, which is exactly what Craig chooses to infer, even though it is not logically entailed. That is assumption.

Craig’s argument does not rely on this. He notes it as the best attested current scientific theory (obviously, updated from early scientific versions of big bang cosmology), (along with James Sinclair) addresses the weaknesses of alternative scientific theories, and even notes that many of those (if true) still lead to a beginning before the big bang.

Yes, we don't observe any timeless causes, so why should we believe there can be such a thing? The way he tries to argue "there must be one" depends on debatable assumptions - that it was caused (supported only by the fact that the past is finite), and "logically prior" sufficiently accounts for a cause-effect relation.

That it was caused is supported by the past being finite (via two philosophical arguments and looking at the scientific evidences) and the first premise that everything that begins to exist has a cause. That’s logically enough, if those premises are true.

As to the second part, why think that there must be temporal priority as well? I’m not understanding why you think logical priority isn’t adequate.

I don’t see why it’s problematic to use ‘logically prior’. Logically, the beginning of time would have to pre-exist itself in order for its cause to be temporal. That’s logical nonsense.

An uncaused initial state does not entail this nonsense.

If you want to say an uncaused initial state is the cause of the spatio-temporal universe, then it is this logical nonsense because the uncaused initial state would have to be temporal, yet the creation of all things temporal.

No. I argue that time is a relation between states of affairs, not a relation between events. This puts the initial state of affairs temporally prior to the first event.

Why should one agree with you?

All three, except that "personal" seems moot unless you can show the rest of it is plausible.

Okay.

(1) Timeless - Craig argues that the uncaused cause must transcend time because the spatio-temporal universe includes the beginning of time itself. This follows necessarily. What problem do you see with that?

(2) Mind/Personal - Craig gives at least 3 arguments I am aware of, but I think the following is the best one. Remember that the effect (the spatio-temporal universe) is temporal, while the cause is timeless.

Impersonal causes produce their effects as soon as all of the necessary and sufficient conditions are present. Think about how water freezing works. Simplifying things, If the temperature is below zero Centigrade, any water that existed would be frozen. If the temperature was below zero from eternity, then any water would also have to be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for water to have begun to freeze a finite time ago if the temperature was eternally zero.

Impersonal timeless causes can only produce eternal effects. Cause and effect is (so to speak) simultaneous. But timeless personal agents can have the causes without the effects to where the effect can come into existence when it ‘previously’ wasn’t.