The Kalam Cosmological Argument William Lane Craig

[William]

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writing ... l-argument

Finally, Ghazali argued that this Uncaused First Cause must also be a personal being. It’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning like the universe.

Here’s the problem: If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for the water to begin to freeze just a finite time ago. Now the cause of the universe is permanently there, since it is timeless. So why isn’t the universe permanently there as well? Why did the universe come into being only 14 billion years ago? Why isn’t it as permanent as its cause?

Ghazali maintained that the answer to this problem is that the First Cause must be a personal being endowed with freedom of the will. His creating the universe is a free act which is independent of any prior determining conditions. So his act of creating can be something spontaneous and new. Freedom of the will enables one to get an effect with a beginning from a permanent, timeless cause. Thus, we are brought not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its Personal Creator.

This is admittedly hard for us to imagine. But one way to think about it is to envision God existing alone without the universe as changeless and timeless. His free act of creation is a temporal event simultaneous with the universe’s coming into being. Therefore, God enters into time when He creates the universe. God is thus timeless without the universe and in time with the universe.

Ghazali’s cosmological argument thus gives us powerful grounds for believing in the existence of a beginningless, uncaused, timeless, spaceless, changeless, immaterial, enormously powerful, Personal Creator of the universe.

Ghazali formulates his argument very simply: “Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning.” [1]

Ghazali’s reasoning involves three simple steps:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its beginning.


Q: Does this cosmology require a supernatural/unnatural/non-physical cause?

(If so/if not, why so/not?)

[fredonly]

Your premise would be the reasonable one if we didn’t have something like the KCA and its conceptual analysis. Because if that is sound, then we have an example of something that was caused to exist (spatio-temporal matter), but logically cannot have a cause temporally preceding it.

That's circular reasoning. You're using the conclusion of the KCA to argue the KCA is sound.

No, I’m not doing that. I’m saying that the KCA is a possible counterpoint to your premise, calling it into question. Therefore, we can’t use your premise to disprove the KCA (or that would be circular). This doesn’t mean the KCA is sound; it says nothing about that.

It's not a counterpoint because the KCA is unsound if my premise is true.
This means the KCA is contingent upon my premise being false, so it's logically equivalent to saying "the possibility of my premise being false is evidence that it's false”. Hardly.

Parsimony only comes into the equation if all else is equal. Craig argues they aren’t metaphysically equal, so while he may be wrong, he’s not being ad hoc.

As you said, they're empiricly equivalent, so it is the case that "all else is equal".

But Craig says they aren’t metaphysically equivalent and, therefore, all else isn’t equal.

I don't think he can do that, but show me the reasoning.

The philosophical arguments he makes only imply the past is finite, not that the universe was caused.

That the past is finite implies that the universe began to exist. With the first premise, this leads to the universe being caused.

To clarify: his inference that the universe was caused depends on 1) his first premise being true (which means it reflects metaphysical necessity) 2) my causal premise being false, 3) atemporal causation being metaphysically possible, and 4) logical priority having causal efficacy.
That's a lot of assumptions based on no evidence, and shows mine is by far the better explanation.

Most cosmologists do not treat the big bang as a beginning of existence for material reality, which is exactly what Craig chooses to infer, even though it is not logically entailed. That is assumption.

Craig’s argument does not rely on this. He notes it as the best attested current scientific theory (obviously, updated from early scientific versions of big bang cosmology)...

No, he doesn't rely on the big bang, but he references it as a possible beginning. He also references the "BGV theorem" which proves that classical physics entails a finite past. But all these do is to suggest the past is finite, which I’m not contesting. I’m contesting his inference that an uncaused initial state is metaphysically impossible (this is an entailment of his premise#1 and his definition of “begin to exist”).

why think that there must be temporal priority as well? I’m not understanding why you think logical priority isn’t adequate.

First and foremost: because logic is semantics, and reasoning based on those semantics, not causal acts. Furthermore:

1. % of observed cases of causation in which the cause temporally precedes the effect: 100%
2. % of observed cases of causation in which the cause is logically prior but does not temporally precedes the effect: 0%

You've presented no reason to think the second is true other than the mere logical possibility #1 is false (refer to my first point in this post)

If you want to say an uncaused initial state is the cause of the spatio-temporal universe, then it is this logical nonsense because the uncaused initial state would have to be temporal, yet the creation of all things temporal.

The “logical nonsense” is a consequence of applying Craig's definition of time (a relation between events) which I reject. It’s coherent with my definition of time.
Be aware that I’m not claiming Craig isn’t using a coherent metaphysical framework, but all this does is to show that the KCA is POSSIBLY sound. I’m showing that his metaphysical framework contains more assumptions than mine, with less evidence to support it – so it’s not the “better” explanation.

No. I argue that time is a relation between states of affairs, not a relation between events. This puts the initial state of affairs temporally prior to the first event.

Why should one agree with you?

Because a finite past entails an initial state of affairs and we know this led to temporally subsequent states of affairs. You and Craig are trying to deny this purely by stipulating a definition of time that precludes it.

(1) Timeless - Craig argues that the uncaused cause must transcend time because the spatio-temporal universe includes the beginning of time itself. This follows necessarily. What problem do you see with that?

This depends on his definition of time being true and mine being false. My definition is consistent with background knowledge: no timeless entities exist, unless one stipulates that abstractions are existents (i.e. platonism is true). That's unparsimonious. Abstractions are mental objects, not things that exist in the world. But even if we were to assume abstractions exist, they clearly don't have causal efficacy. So his claim of a timeless entity having causal efficacy is prima facie implausible.
I grant that his complex metaphysical theory is coherent. The problem is that it’s dependent more assumptions than mine, so it’s clearly not the best explanation.

(2) Mind/Personal - Craig gives at least 3 arguments I am aware of, but I think the following is the best one. Remember that the effect (the spatio-temporal universe) is temporal, while the cause is timeless.

As noted, a causally efficacious timeless entity is prima facie implausible, and it’s your PREMISE. This doesn’t help. You haven’t shown that a MIND can be immaterial. All minds we're aware of are associated with physical brains, so it’s ad hoc. Further, having knowledge entails data, and data doesn’t just exist independently – it is encoded (e.g. encoded in computers; encoded in brains). Even if unencoded knowledge can exist, you're assuming this massive amount of knowledge exists uncaused. The alternative is simply that material reality exists uncaused - which entails some fundamental set of objects with relatively simple relations between them that make it POSSIBLE subsequent events to occur. This alternative has the same explanatory scope, and is much simpler.

Impersonal causes produce their effects as soon as all of the necessary and sufficient conditions are present.

Don’t confuse timeless with static (unchanging over a period of time). An initial state of affairs doesn’t entail a delay.

(I DO think the nature of time is more complex than that, as I discussed earlier).

Impersonal timeless causes can only produce eternal effects. Cause and effect is (so to speak) simultaneous. But timeless personal agents can have the causes without the effects to where the effect can come into existence when it ‘previously’ wasn’t.

If I apply Craig’s definition of time to an uncaused, physical, initial state of affairs, then this initial state of affairs is "timeless" because it’s not an event. It’s perfectly reasonable for it to fluctuate into the early, inflationary universe as we know it, as a first event. (I think that's an overly simplistic treatment of TIME, but that's not relevant unless we first recognize that this is a coherent account). How is that “eternal”, and what’s the problem with this scenario?

[The Tanager]

I don't think he can do that, but show me the reasoning.

In some contexts Craig talks about how the existence of God from various arguments for God’s existence tips the scales towards a neo-Lorentzian view of relativity, but that obviously wouldn’t work within defending the KCA itself, since that is the conclusion he is arguing for. So, he also talks about

(1) how absolute time would follow from a Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics (which is debated itself, of course, but Craig’s view).

(2) while Craig has some misgivings on the importance of simplicity, he argues the received view isn’t actually simpler anyway, as they share the same number of basic assumptions. Yes, an absolute reference frame in addition to relativistic frames is one more thing, but simplicity is about how many things are assumed to make it work and there they are equal

(3) the received theory also leaves us with physical effects without any causal explanations for them (e.g., what causes the relativity of simultaneity, the measured constancy of the velocity of light in all inertial reference systems, the reciprocity of relativistic variations of length, of mass, and of clock rate) that the neo-Lorentzian view accounts for. This points to how the received theory is a theory of principle, not a constructive theory, being based on postulates that can have no direct empirical confirmation, while the neo-Lorentzian approach is a constructive theory and, therefore, can enrich our understanding of the causal structure in ways that the received theory cannot

(4) there are metaphysical grounds for rejecting the spacetime (instead of space and time) of the received view since there are powerful grounds for believing that time can exist independently of space. Here he talks about how time isn’t just applicable to the external world, but also consciousness. Mental states don’t necessarily have spatial coordinates. And Craig has arguments for the distinction of mental states from materialistic concepts of the mind/brain. Craig also critiques the spacetime realist on their contention that spacetime intervals between timelike separated events take imaginary values. Yes, it’s convenient for calculations, but this requires there to exist mathematically imaginary physical quantities. He says at one point “what sense is there in affirming the spacetime separation of, say, my having lunch and my having dinner is imaginary?” Spacetime realism also entails the doctrine of perdurance (the existence of 4-D objects composed of temporal parts), but finds many metaphysical faults with a B-theory of time over the A-theory.

To clarify: his inference that the universe was caused depends on 1) his first premise being true (which means it reflects metaphysical necessity)

What do you mean it reflects metaphysical necessity as opposed to, say, being the most reasonable premise over the alternatives?

2) my causal premise being false,

Furthermore:

1. % of observed cases of causation in which the cause temporally precedes the effect: 100%
2. % of observed cases of causation in which the cause is logically prior but does not temporally precedes the effect: 0%

You've presented no reason to think the second is true other than the mere logical possibility #1 is false (refer to my first point in this post)

(1) here is not true. We do not know that the cause of the spatio-temporal universe temporally precedes the effect. That is the question under consideration. You are saying that since everything else shows that relationship, we should use this premise to answer this question. That’s begging the question.

The KCA agrees with the premise that it is the most probable view among the alternatives at the start, but then says that there are these other pieces of evidence and reasoning that call that into question and lead to a rejection of your premise.

3) atemporal causation being metaphysically possible, and

You think it is metaphysically impossible? What is your reasoning for that?

4) logical priority having causal efficacy.
That's a lot of assumptions based on no evidence, and shows mine is by far the better explanation.

It relies on the possibility of causal efficacy not requiring temporal priority, if that is what you mean. If so, why do you think it is impossible?

And, again, these aren’t assumptions based on no evidence; Craig offers reasons on all of his beliefs.

No, he doesn't rely on the big bang, but he references it as a possible beginning. He also references the "BGV theorem" which proves that classical physics entails a finite past. But all these do is to suggest the past is finite, which I’m not contesting.

You said Craig infers that the big bang was the beginning of the existence for material reality. I responded to that. Craig doesn’t. As you say here he references it as the possible beginning (and what science shows is most reasonable at the time), but also addresses if that isn’t the case and how the KCA still continues to be sound (via things like the BGV theorem or scientific issues with proposed alternatives, etc.).

I’m contesting his inference that an uncaused initial state is metaphysically impossible (this is an entailment of his premise#1 and his definition of “begin to exist”).

Are you saying that his first premise and definition of ‘begin to exist’ is what he uses to argue for the initial material state to be the uncaused cause? If so, that is not his argument.

Or are you saying that his premise and definition entails an uncaused initial state to me the truth and he’s missing it? If so, can you give the reasoning you are using to get there?

Or are you saying something else that you could clarify?

First and foremost: because logic is semantics, and reasoning based on those semantics, not causal acts.

Logic alone is semantics and reasoning based on semantics, but Craig’s argument for an act of causality coming from an atemporal cause is logic based on more than just semantics.

Because a finite past entails an initial state of affairs and we know this led to temporally subsequent states of affairs. You and Craig are trying to deny this purely by stipulating a definition of time that precludes it.

Perhaps we should focus on this. Could you give the two competing definitions of time and your case for why yours is a better definition?

(1) Timeless - Craig argues that the uncaused cause must transcend time because the spatio-temporal universe includes the beginning of time itself. This follows necessarily. What problem do you see with that?

This depends on his definition of time being true and mine being false. My definition is consistent with background knowledge: no timeless entities exist, unless one stipulates that abstractions are existents (i.e. platonism is true). That's unparsimonious.

“No timeless entities exist” is not background knowledge. To treat it as such when answering this issue is begging the question. Or, at best, it’s saying Craig’s argument for a timeless entity isn’t true because we don’t have other (than this argument) evidence that shows it is true.

(2) Mind/Personal - Craig gives at least 3 arguments I am aware of, but I think the following is the best one. Remember that the effect (the spatio-temporal universe) is temporal, while the cause is timeless.

As noted, a causally efficacious timeless entity is prima facie implausible, and it’s your PREMISE. This doesn’t help. You haven’t shown that a MIND can be immaterial. All minds we're aware of are associated with physical brains, so it’s ad hoc. Further, having knowledge entails data, and data doesn’t just exist independently – it is encoded (e.g. encoded in computers; encoded in brains). Even if unencoded knowledge can exist, you're assuming this massive amount of knowledge exists uncaused. The alternative is simply that material reality exists uncaused - which entails some fundamental set of objects with relatively simple relations between them that make it POSSIBLE subsequent events to occur. This alternative has the same explanatory scope, and is much simpler.

(1) How is a causally efficacious timeless entity prima facie implausible?

(2) We could certainly talk about minds and the evidence for them being more than physical brains, but moreso, why must we show that an immaterial mind exist before analyzing an argument that concludes with the existence of an immaterial mind. Again, it’s saying you reject this argument because there aren’t other arguments that already establish it. What if I said for you to prove electrons without using the evidence we have that shows evidence for the reality of electrons?

(3) We observe that knowledge by physical beings requires data encoded in physical things. That’s all. To conclude from that that only physical beings could have knowledge is not a rational move.

(4) What do you mean that I’m assuming the massive unencoded knowledge exists uncaused?

(5) We are discussing whether it has the same explanatory scope. I don’t think materialism does.

Impersonal causes produce their effects as soon as all of the necessary and sufficient conditions are present.

If I apply Craig’s definition of time to an uncaused, physical, initial state of affairs, then this initial state of affairs is "timeless" because it’s not an event. It’s perfectly reasonable for it to fluctuate into the early, inflationary universe as we know it, as a first event. (I think that's an overly simplistic treatment of TIME, but that's not relevant unless we first recognize that this is a coherent account). How is that “eternal”, and what’s the problem with this scenario?

I think we should better pin down what time is before further going into these.

[fredonly]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #92]
You gave no response to this:

Your premise would be the reasonable one if we didn’t have something like the KCA and its conceptual analysis. Because if that is sound, then we have an example of something that was caused to exist (spatio-temporal matter), but logically cannot have a cause temporally preceding it.

That's circular reasoning. You're using the conclusion of the KCA to argue the KCA is sound.

No, I’m not doing that. I’m saying that the KCA is a possible counterpoint to your premise, calling it into question. Therefore, we can’t use your premise to disprove the KCA (or that would be circular). This doesn’t mean the KCA is sound; it says nothing about that.

It's not a counterpoint because the KCA is unsound if my premise is true.
This means the KCA is contingent upon my premise being false, so it's logically equivalent to saying "the possibility of my premise being false is evidence that it's false”. Hardly.

This alone is sufficient to defeat the KCA.
The KCA can only be efficacious if it provides grounds to believe God's existence is more likely than not. Before considering evidence and arguments, we should all agree God's existence is possible. The above shows that God's existence is still just possible. The KCA doesn't move the needle.

…So, he also talks about
(1) how absolute time would follow from a Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics (which is debated itself, of course, but Craig’s view).

The Bohmian interpretation entails only that QM is strictly deterministic. It doesn’t establish that there is absolute time.

(2) while Craig has some misgivings on the importance of simplicity, he argues the received view isn’t actually simpler anyway, as they share the same number of basic assumptions. Yes, an absolute reference frame in addition to relativistic frames is one more thing, but simplicity is about how many things are assumed to make it work and there they are equal.

They share the same basic assumptions, but there’s no evidence of a privileged reference frame. However, I'll grant that IF God exists, then the God-reference frame is privileged - and this is consistent with physics. It's not BETTER interpretation because it's contingent upon a God existing. The converse could be said about the alternative, so this point is a tossup- irrelevant to the analysis other than to show physics is consistent with both possibilities.

(3) the received theory also leaves us with physical effects without any causal explanations for them (e.g., what causes the relativity of simultaneity, the measured constancy of the velocity of light in all inertial reference systems, the reciprocity of relativistic variations of length, of mass, and of clock rate) that the neo-Lorentzian view accounts for.

The neo-Loentzian view does not account for general relativity. There is no account of them. All laws of nature exist by brute fact, just like God’s existence is a brute fact. It is metaphysically necessary that whatever is the fundamentalbasis of reality exists by brute fact.

(1) here is not true. We do not know that the cause of the spatio-temporal universe temporally precedes the effect.

Here’s (1) again: % of observed cases of causation in which the cause temporally precedes the effect: 100%
You haven’t identified an OBSERVED case where this isn’t true, so my statement is correct. You can only point to the fact that it’s LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that it’s not true. This is irrelevant, because we’re considering what is the best explanation for the evidence. My statement refers specifically to the evidence – which is observations. It appears you’re once again trying to treat possibility as evidence.

Perhaps we should focus on this. Could you give the two competing definitions of time and your case for why yours is a better definition?

OK. Craig defines time as a relation between events. I define time as a relation between states of affairs. The totality of existence is a state of affairs – under either definition.

Why think the initial state of material reality is an event?It can only be an event if it was caused. We don’t KNOW it was caused; and that is the very point that the KCA is supposed to be proving.

My definition is better because 1) it’s neutral as to whether or not the universe was caused, whereas Craig’s definition eliminates the possibility that the universe is uncaused. 2) it’s consistent with everything we know about causation – that causes temporally precede the effect; Craig definition forces him to claim logical priority is a sufficient condition for causation.

(1) Timeless - Craig argues that the uncaused cause must transcend time because the spatio-temporal universe includes the beginning of time itself. This follows necessarily. What problem do you see with that?

This depends on his definition of time being true and mine being false. My definition is consistent with background knowledge: no timeless entities exist, unless one stipulates that abstractions are existents (i.e. platonism is true). That's unparsimonious.

“No timeless entities exist” is not background knowledge. To treat it as such when answering this issue is begging the question. Or, at best, it’s saying Craig’s argument for a timeless entity isn’t true because we don’t have other (than this argument) evidence that shows it is true.

It IS background knowledge: everything in material reality is temporal (not timeless), and material reality is the only thing we can be certain of that exists – until it be shown otherwise through evidence and argument. That’s what the KCA is purporting to do, but as I keep pointing out – it depends on more assumptions.

(1) How is a causally efficacious timeless entity prima facie implausible?

Because in the material world, all causes are temporal and temporally precede effects. It’s logically possible such things exist, but (as Craig often says): possibility is cheap. Something more than logical possibility is needed to raise from possible to plausible.

(2) We could certainly talk about minds and the evidence for them being more than physical brains, but moreso, why must we show that an immaterial mind exist before analyzing an argument that concludes with the existence of an immaterial mind. Again, it’s saying you reject this argument because there aren’t other arguments that already establish it. What if I said for you to prove electrons without using the evidence we have that shows evidence for the reality of electrons?

Minds being “more than physical brains” isn’t quite the issue – there’s no evidence that UNEMBODIED minds exist.
Regarding the rest of what you said: remember we’re discussing an inference to best explanation, and I’m just pointing out the various ways the KCA fails at that – because it depends on so many assumptions unsupported by evidence.

(2) We observe that knowledge by physical beings requires data encoded in physical things. That’s all. To conclude from that that only physical beings could have knowledge is not a rational move.

It’s ad hoc to assume unencoded knowledge can exist. Possibility is cheap.

(3) What do you mean that I’m assuming the massive unencoded knowledge exists uncaused?

God’s knowledge of the universe plan was not developed. It just exists, and there is not state of affairs in which it didn’t exist, so it wasn’t caused.

(4) We are discussing whether it has the same explanatory scope. I don’t think materialism does.

Materialism has all the explanatory scope needed to explain everything in the material world. It depends on one brute fact: it exists uncaused. But the same is true of God, if it exists: God’s uncaused existence is a brute fact

[The Tanager]

You gave no response to this:
fredonly wrote: ↑
Wed Sep 18, 2024 10:48 am
The Tanager wrote: ↑
Tue Sep 17, 2024 6:06 pm
fredonly wrote: ↑
Mon Sep 16, 2024 6:45 pm
Your premise would be the reasonable one if we didn’t have something like the KCA and its conceptual analysis. Because if that is sound, then we have an example of something that was caused to exist (spatio-temporal matter), but logically cannot have a cause temporally preceding it.
That's circular reasoning. You're using the conclusion of the KCA to argue the KCA is sound.
No, I’m not doing that. I’m saying that the KCA is a possible counterpoint to your premise, calling it into question. Therefore, we can’t use your premise to disprove the KCA (or that would be circular). This doesn’t mean the KCA is sound; it says nothing about that.
It's not a counterpoint because the KCA is unsound if my premise is true.
This means the KCA is contingent upon my premise being false, so it's logically equivalent to saying "the possibility of my premise being false is evidence that it's false”. Hardly.
This alone is sufficient to defeat the KCA.

I did respond to it when I responded to your “2) my causal premise being false,” and “Furthermore: …” quotes, as it seemed to be making the same point. Sorry for not also quoting this in that section to make that clearer. Please correct my misunderstanding if this is a different point.

On the metaphysical case for a neo-Lorentzian view of relativity

The Bohmian interpretation entails only that QM is strictly deterministic. It doesn’t establish that there is absolute time.

The standard interpretation of Bohmian mechanics involves absolute time, as far as I have read. I know there are attempts to get around this, but I haven't found them convincing. Feel free to offer a case for it for us to analyze, though.

They share the same basic assumptions, but there’s no evidence of a privileged reference frame. It seems fair to thing that IF God exists, then he the God-reference frame if privileged, but that just makes the interpretations equivalent – it certainly doesn’t make his a BETTER explanation.

I didn’t say this (with no mention in this context of the reference frame being God’s reference) made it better. You said that the alternative view was simpler, which would be a point in its favor. It’s not simpler. Then Craig aruges, we have the other things that tip the scales in the neo-Lorentzian direction.

The neo-Loentzian view does not account for general relativity. There is no account of them. All laws of nature exist by brute fact, just like God’s existence is a brute fact. It is metaphysically necessary that whatever is the fundamental basis of reality exists by brute fact.

Of course it doesn’t account for that; it rejects general relativity. Why would rejecting general relativity be a mark against it when discussing if general relativity or an alternative is true? Are you saying general relativity is more reasonable because it accounts for general relativity and a view that rejects it doesn’t? You’ve got to be meaning something else, as that is clearly begging the question, but that is what this sounds like.

Did you have a response to the fourth point? I’ll quote it again:

(4) there are metaphysical grounds for rejecting the spacetime (instead of space and time) of the received view since there are powerful grounds for believing that time can exist independently of space. Here he talks about how time isn’t just applicable to the external world, but also consciousness. Mental states don’t necessarily have spatial coordinates. And Craig has arguments for the distinction of mental states from materialistic concepts of the mind/brain. Craig also critiques the spacetime realist on their contention that spacetime intervals between timelike separated events take imaginary values. Yes, it’s convenient for calculations, but this requires there to exist mathematically imaginary physical quantities. He says at one point “what sense is there in affirming the spacetime separation of, say, my having lunch and my having dinner is imaginary?” Spacetime realism also entails the doctrine of perdurance (the existence of 4-D objects composed of temporal parts), but finds many metaphysical faults with a B-theory of time over the A-theory.

On Craig's supposed assumptions

Did you have a response to the following from my previous post:

To clarify: his inference that the universe was caused depends on 1) his first premise being true (which means it reflects metaphysical necessity)

What do you mean it reflects metaphysical necessity as opposed to, say, being the most reasonable premise over the alternatives?

To the other points that I saw you did respond to:

Here’s (1) again: % of observed cases of causation in which the cause temporally precedes the effect: 100%
You haven’t identified an OBSERVED case where this isn’t true, so my statement is correct. You can only point to the fact that it’s LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that it’s not true. This is irrelevant, because we’re considering what is the best explanation for the evidence. My statement refers specifically to the evidence – which is observations. It appears you’re once again trying to treat possibility as evidence.

I’m sorry for misunderstanding your (1). Everything else I said remains the exact same. Go back to when we only thought white swans existed. There was a premise that 100% of observed cases of swans was that they were white. Now someone comes along with claimed evidence that there is a black swan. Do you fall back on that premise or press pause on it until you’ve looked at the new evidence? Here, you are doing the former with the KCA by saying your premise defeats it from the start.

This is not treating the possibility that your premise is wrong as evidence for the alternative premise, it’s simply pressing pause on it to see if it is truly sound as new evidence is considered.

OK. Craig defines time as a relation between events. I define time as a relation between states of affairs. The totality of existence is a state of affairs – under either definition.

Why think the initial state of material reality is an event?It can only be an event if it was caused. We don’t KNOW it was caused; and that is the very point that the KCA is supposed to be proving.

My definition is better because 1) it’s neutral as to whether or not the universe was caused, whereas Craig’s definition eliminates the possibility that the universe is uncaused. 2) it’s consistent with everything we know about causation – that causes temporally precede the effect; Craig definition forces him to claim logical priority is a sufficient condition for causation.

How does Craig’s definition eliminate the possibility that the universe is uncaused? And how does your view not beg the question? Your definition requires anything to exist to be temporal by definition.

It IS background knowledge: everything in material reality is temporal (not timeless), and material reality is the only thing we can be certain of that exists – until it be shown otherwise through evidence and argument. That’s what the KCA is purporting to do, but as I keep pointing out – it depends on more assumptions.

Every time you've said it depends on assumptions, I've offered the reasoning offered. It doesn't depend on assumptions.

(1) How is a causally efficacious timeless entity prima facie implausible?

Because in the material world, all causes are temporal and temporally precede effects. It’s logically possible such things exist, but (as Craig often says): possibility is cheap. Something more than logical possibility is needed to raise from possible to plausible.

We are talking about the cause of the material world. That things in the material world are all temporal does not make it prima facie implausible that something outside of the material world (if it exists) must be temporal. And Craig has not supported any premise with only “it’s logical possible”.

Minds being “more than physical brains” isn’t quite the issue – there’s no evidence that UNEMBODIED minds exist.
Regarding the rest of what you said: remember we’re discussing an inference to best explanation, and I’m just pointing out the various ways the KCA fails at that – because it depends on so many assumptions unsupported by evidence.

The KCA is evidence for an unembodied mind. To show that it rests on assumptions instead of reasoning is one thing (which I've already addressed as clearly wrong even if the reasoning were to be unsound), but to critique the KCA because “there’s no evidence that unembodied minds exist” (which is this particular critique we are talking about here) is irrational. It’s the exact same as asking someone to prove electrons without the evidence they believe exists for electrons existing. The KCA doesn’t assume unembodied minds exist to reach its conclusion; it is one of the conclusions reached from other premises that are not just assumed, but supported with reasoning.

It’s ad hoc to assume unencoded knowledge can exist. Possibility is cheap.

No, assuming that unencoded can possibly exist is rational since there is no argument that shows it is logically impossible. Using that alone to then argue the next step, that unencoded knowledge actually does exist would be irrational, but that’s not what Craig does. The KCA results in the necessity of unencoded knowledge existing; it doesn't assume it.

(3) What do you mean that I’m assuming the massive unencoded knowledge exists uncaused?

God’s knowledge of the universe plan was not developed. It just exists, and there is not state of affairs in which it didn’t exist, so it wasn’t caused.

But why is that an assumption and not a result of the KCA?

Materialism has all the explanatory scope needed to explain everything in the material world. It depends on one brute fact: it exists uncaused. But the same is true of God, if it exists: God’s uncaused existence is a brute fact

We aren’t just talking about the material world (if there is anything outside of it). So, the question of equal explanatory scope is still open and that is part of what our discussion is over.