The Kalam Cosmological Argument William Lane Craig

[William]

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writing ... l-argument

Finally, Ghazali argued that this Uncaused First Cause must also be a personal being. It’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning like the universe.

Here’s the problem: If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for the water to begin to freeze just a finite time ago. Now the cause of the universe is permanently there, since it is timeless. So why isn’t the universe permanently there as well? Why did the universe come into being only 14 billion years ago? Why isn’t it as permanent as its cause?

Ghazali maintained that the answer to this problem is that the First Cause must be a personal being endowed with freedom of the will. His creating the universe is a free act which is independent of any prior determining conditions. So his act of creating can be something spontaneous and new. Freedom of the will enables one to get an effect with a beginning from a permanent, timeless cause. Thus, we are brought not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its Personal Creator.

This is admittedly hard for us to imagine. But one way to think about it is to envision God existing alone without the universe as changeless and timeless. His free act of creation is a temporal event simultaneous with the universe’s coming into being. Therefore, God enters into time when He creates the universe. God is thus timeless without the universe and in time with the universe.

Ghazali’s cosmological argument thus gives us powerful grounds for believing in the existence of a beginningless, uncaused, timeless, spaceless, changeless, immaterial, enormously powerful, Personal Creator of the universe.

Ghazali formulates his argument very simply: “Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning.” [1]

Ghazali’s reasoning involves three simple steps:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its beginning.


Q: Does this cosmology require a supernatural/unnatural/non-physical cause?

(If so/if not, why so/not?)

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #70]

As far as I am concerned you have created a strawman and are wasting my time, so we can agree that it is pointless to continue.

[William]

Your perspective suggests that mind/mindfulness is the essential "real" thing in any experience, far more so than the physical brain or even the external universe we experience. This frames reality not as something grounded in physical objects or sensory data but in the awareness that interacts with those things. This approach contrasts with the Atheist Scholar’s naturalistic viewpoint, which holds that reality is fundamentally material and not necessarily mindful.
You are proposing that mind precedes matter and that it is the ultimate reality behind all experiences, whether in this universe or any other potential scenario (such as simulations or the "brain in a vat" idea). This idea ties into your broader belief in a mindfully created universe, where consciousness is not an emergent property of matter but the foundation of existence itself. (SOURCE)

Note: I myself have no beliefs I am aware of and consider belief to be a subset of the Unjustified Fact (UF)category.

Therefore, this idea ties into my broader understanding that a mindfully created universe where consciousness is not an emergent property of matter but the foundation of existence itself is something worth discussing and attempting to find evidence for which can move it from subset (UF) to subset Justified Fact (JF)

That is why I offer an Irrefutable Fact (IF) which I think is worthwhile examining further to see how it might link as evidence to proposed mindism.

The (IF) I offer, is a=1...z=26.

That is Irrefutable Fact through which a data-base can be built off of and scientifically studied.

[The Tanager]

Last I checked, Craig's KCA had 2 premises and a conclusion:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2.The universe began to exist.
3.Therefore, the universe has a cause.

See: https://www.reasonablefaith.org/videos/ ... bby-conway

Craig then makes a case for the cause being God through a conceptual analysis, wherein he makes debatable metaphysical assumptions.

Sometimes he adds the conceptual analysis into the premise-conclusion form. What debatable metaphysical assumptions do you think he makes in that analysis?

How does Craig define “begins to exist” in a way that exempts God?

He defines "begins to exist" like this:
x begins to exist ≡ x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence.

How does that definition exempt God?

Either something “begins to exist” or it doesn’t (i.e., is eternal). And it’s not observation, but logic that tells us that something that begins to exist is preceded by a past state where it did not exist.

Logic? If you believe that, then provide the logic.

But I'll clarify. Craig refers to the claim as "intuition". My point is that this intuition is grounded in our collective experience. The only alternative would be to claim it's a properly basic belief, but then it would still be an innate belief that was caused by the way the universe is. In the universe, every case in which something has begun to exist was temporally preceded by a state of affairs at which it did not exist.

Could you quote where Craig says that? If X isn’t preceded by a past state of affairs, then isn’t it eternal?

Imagine a state of affairs consisting of a quantum system. Suppose the quantum system as a whole does not experience time (conforming with a time-independent Schroedinger equation), but time emerges internally through quantum entanglements.

This may sound far-fetched, but it's consistent with a mechanism proposed by theoretcal physicists (Page & Wooters) and has some experimental support (see: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.00707)

We need more than Imagining a theory that, if true, would overturn the reasoning, especially when various quantum theories are empirically equivalent.

[fredonly]

Sometimes he adds the conceptual analysis into the premise-conclusion form. What debatable metaphysical assumptions do you think he makes in that analysis?

He assumes:
1) that the cause of an object's existence does not necessarily have to temporally precede it
2) that only "timeless" objects can exist uncaused.
3) that only immaterial objects can exist timelessly.
4) that time is strictly a relation between events.
5) that a timeless object can have causal efficacy.

He defines "begins to exist" like this:
x begins to exist ≡ x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence.

How does that definition exempt God?

The last clause ("the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence.") applies only to God.

Either something “begins to exist” or it doesn’t (i.e., is eternal). And it’s not observation, but logic that tells us that something that begins to exist is preceded by a past state where it did not exist.

Logic? If you believe that, then provide the logic.

But I'll clarify. Craig refers to the claim as "intuition". My point is that this intuition is grounded in our collective experience. The only alternative would be to claim it's a properly basic belief, but then it would still be an innate belief that was caused by the way the universe is. In the universe, every case in which something has begun to exist was temporally preceded by a state of affairs at which it did not exist.

Could you quote where Craig says that?

First- you answer the question I asked (I highlighted it in bold).

If X isn’t preceded by a past state of affairs, then isn’t it eternal?

It depends on how you define "eternal". If you define it as "existing at all times" - then yes. Some definite it as existing infinitely to both past and future.

We need more than Imagining a theory that, if true, would overturn the reasoning, especially when various quantum theories are empirically equivalent.

Actually, no- we don't. We just have to show a logical possibility, because in a sound deductive argument, the conclusion must be logically necessary.

[The Tanager]

He assumes:
1) that the cause of an object's existence does not necessarily have to temporally precede it
2) that only "timeless" objects can exist uncaused.
3) that only immaterial objects can exist timelessly.
4) that time is strictly a relation between events.
5) that a timeless object can have causal efficacy.

First, he is usually pretty good about giving his reasons for his beliefs, rather than just assuming them. Second, he approaches this argument as an inference to the best explanation, so it’s about which beliefs are most reasonable, not proving building premises with 100% certainty.

Do you think these counter beliefs are more reasonable than what you’ve named as his?

1) causes don’t always temporally precede their effect
2) items can begin to exist uncaused
3) material object can exist timelessly
4) time is not a relation between events
5) a timeless object cannot have causal efficacy

The last clause ("the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence.") applies only to God.

Why does that apply only to God?

Could you quote where Craig says that?

First- you answer the question I asked (I highlighted it in bold).

I pointed towards it in what you quoted next. We can keep clarifying as well. So, can you reference and quote what you are referring to?

It depends on how you define "eternal". If you define it as "existing at all times" - then yes. Some definite it as existing infinitely to both past and future.

The argument is using it as one of two categories of things that exist. We have things that begin to exist and things that have always existed. It seems indifferent as to whether there is no end in the future.

Actually, no- we don't. We just have to show a logical possibility, because in a sound deductive argument, the conclusion must be logically necessary.

He doesn’t offer it as a deductive argument, but an inference to the best explanation.

[fredonly]

Do you think these counter beliefs are more reasonable than what you’ve named as his?

Absolutely, in some of the cases. In others it's a toss-up. To be effective at convincing anyone (or to be considered a "best explanation), every assumption he makes has to be true. I'll go through each of them.

1) It's more reasonable to believe causes always temporally preceed their effects: all real world cases are consistent with this.

2) Do items begin to exist uncaused?
No, they don't. But if causes necessarily precede effects, than an initial state of affairs is necessarily uncaused. Why even say that an initial state of affairs has actually begun to exist- given that it exists at all points of time?

Step back, and consider that we're considering a first cause: something so completely unique we aren't justified in making any assumptions about it.

3) Can material object can exist timelessly? The material object in question is: the totality of material reality. In what sense is it temporal, given what we know about special relativity? Time increasingly slows for an object as it's speed approaches the speed of light. A photon travels at the speed of light; it experience no elapse of time. It exists at every point in its trajectory. It exists timelessly.

The Page & Wootters effect shows that time is (or at least may be) a local, quantum effect of entanglements: external observers see the system as static: timeless.

So yes, it does seem reasonable to think material objects can exist timelessly.

4) Is time necessarily a relation between events? I'd say that time entails a relation between states of affairs. Each state of affairs coincides with an event- except for the unique case of the initial state of affairs. It's arbitrary to exclude it, but that's what Craig does by defining time as he does.

5) Can a timeless object have causal efficacy?
Can you identify a timeless object that does have causal efficacy? Abstractions are timeless objects, and they clearly don't have causal efficacy.

Of course, I earlier referred to the totality of material reality as a (possibly) timeless object. Even so, it causes nothing- because there is nothing outside of material reality that could be caused.

I pointed towards it in what you quoted next.

Here's what you said:

"Either something “begins to exist” or it doesn’t (i.e., is eternal). And it’s not observation, but logic that tells us that something that begins to exist is preceded by a past state where it did not exist"

You just repeated the collective experience (things that begin to exist are preceded by a past state where it did not) and relabelled it "logic". The only logic involved is inductive inference, but it's an induction based on our collective observation. So maybe we're saying the same thing.

Regarding your request, Craig often refers to intuitive support. Here's one example:
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writing ... -principle

Regardless, this is a minor point.

The argument is using it as one of two categories of things that exist. We have things that begin to exist and things that have always existed. It seems indifferent as to whether there is no end in the future.

(this pertained to the definition of "eternal") In that case even if God created the universe, the universe is eternal (unless you treat the state of affairs "God sans universe" as a point of time; Craig doesn't, as far as I can tell). But this semantic point is irrelevant.

Actually, no- we don't. We just have to show a logical possibility, because in a sound deductive argument, the conclusion must be logically necessary.

He doesn’t offer it as a deductive argument, but an inference to the best explanation.

My only point is that this demonstrates the 3-line deductive argument that is presented as the KCA is not necessarily sound (I know you accept that). This then sends us in the direction of considering an IBE, and that's where we weigh the list of assumptions I discussed.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #76]

Step back, and consider that we're considering a first cause: something so completely unique we aren't justified in making any assumptions about it.

If true, it would be a kind of madness to even argue about it since any argument would constitute unjustified assumption, regardless of the position taken on the matter.

A photon travels at the speed of light; it experience no elapse of time.

Has it been established that a photon experiences anything?

The speed of light also takes time to traverse great distances. So how do you justify no elapse of time has occurred, especially since light can be used to determine time and distance?

The Page & Wootters effect shows that time is (or at least may be) a local, quantum effect of entanglements: external observers see the system as static: timeless.

Assuming external observers are true, how can we presume how such would see things?

So yes, it does seem reasonable to think material objects can exist timelessly.

Light has no mass, so does it constitute a "material object"?

There is nothing outside of material reality that could be caused.

How does one validate this assumption?
If true, does this mean that anything outside of material reality must be uncaused?

[The Tanager]

1) It's more reasonable to believe causes always temporally preceed their effects: all real world cases are consistent with this.

Yes. Plus this would always result based on the most reasonable view of the nature of time.

2) Do items begin to exist uncaused?
No, they don't. But if causes necessarily precede effects, than an initial state of affairs is necessarily uncaused. Why even say that an initial state of affairs has actually begun to exist- given that it exists at all points of time?

Step back, and consider that we're considering a first cause: something so completely unique we aren't justified in making any assumptions about it.

We are justified in treating it like a cause because it still is a cause. Being first instead of second doesn’t change that.

And Craig isn’t saying that the initial state of affairs begun to exist; he’s saying it was eternal.

3) Can material object can exist timelessly? The material object in question is: the totality of material reality. In what sense is it temporal, given what we know about special relativity? Time increasingly slows for an object as it's speed approaches the speed of light. A photon travels at the speed of light; it experience no elapse of time. It exists at every point in its trajectory. It exists timelessly.

The Page & Wootters effect shows that time is (or at least may be) a local, quantum effect of entanglements: external observers see the system as static: timeless.

So yes, it does seem reasonable to think material objects can exist timelessly.

You are offering one interpretation of special relativity, not “what we know” about it. If you want to defend this as the more reasonable explanation, then make the case. The same goes for the Page and Wootters mechanism.

4) Is time necessarily a relation between events? I'd say that time entails a relation between states of affairs. Each state of affairs coincides with an event- except for the unique case of the initial state of affairs. It's arbitrary to exclude it, but that's what Craig does by defining time as he does.

I think I may be missing your point here. Could you explain this more?

5) Can a timeless object have causal efficacy?
Can you identify a timeless object that does have causal efficacy? Abstractions are timeless objects, and they clearly don't have causal efficacy.

Of course, I earlier referred to the totality of material reality as a (possibly) timeless object. Even so, it causes nothing- because there is nothing outside of material reality that could be caused.

You believe photons exist timelessly and they have causal efficacy, right? I don’t think they exist timelessly, but I don’t see any reason to connect causal efficacy to a thing’s temporality (or lack thereof). Why not connect it to a different characteristic?

Here's what you said:

"Either something “begins to exist” or it doesn’t (i.e., is eternal). And it’s not observation, but logic that tells us that something that begins to exist is preceded by a past state where it did not exist"

You just repeated the collective experience (things that begin to exist are preceded by a past state where it did not) and relabelled it "logic". The only logic involved is inductive inference, but it's an induction based on our collective observation. So maybe we're saying the same thing.

No, I said “If X isn’t preceded by a past state of affairs, then isn’t it eternal?”

Regarding your request, Craig often refers to intuitive support. Here's one example:
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writing ... -principle

Regardless, this is a minor point.

Yes, he does talk about intuition at various times, I was just trying to get a better grasp on the specifics here. The alternative premisses have less intuitive support, so I’m not really sure what the problem is you are pointing out.

(this pertained to the definition of "eternal") In that case even if God created the universe, the universe is eternal (unless you treat the state of affairs "God sans universe" as a point of time; Craig doesn't, as far as I can tell). But this semantic point is irrelevant.

Why would the effect (the natural universe) be eternal? It would have been preceded by a past state of affairs (one in which it didn’t exist, but God did).

My only point is that this demonstrates the 3-line deductive argument that is presented as the KCA is not necessarily sound (I know you accept that). This then sends us in the direction of considering an IBE, and that's where we weigh the list of assumptions I discussed.

Not everyone presents it as a deductive argument. Craig doesn’t. But, yes, we weigh the list of assumptions.

[fredonly]

1) It's more reasonable to believe causes always temporally preceed their effects: all real world cases are consistent with this.

Yes. Plus this would always result based on the most reasonable view of the nature of time.

Craig denies this. He goes to great pains to defend atemporal causation. For example, he claims a bowling ball sitting on a cushion from an infinite past, entails the bowling ball atemporally causing a depression in the cushion.

My arguments pertain specifically to Craig's account. If you want to defend a different account, you need to provide a complete argument+account.

2) Do items begin to exist uncaused?
No, they don't. But if causes necessarily precede effects, than an initial state of affairs is necessarily uncaused. Why even say that an initial state of affairs has actually begun to exist- given that it exists at all points of time?

Step back, and consider that we're considering a first cause: something so completely unique we aren't justified in making any assumptions about it.

We are justified in treating it like a cause because it still is a cause. Being first instead of second doesn’t change that.

And Craig isn’t saying that the initial state of affairs begun to exist; he’s saying it was eternal.

Craig claims a material initial state is problematic. He also does not treat "God sans universe" as an initial state. Whether or not we label the universe as "eternal" is irrelevant to the argument. That's just semantics.

...
So yes, it does seem reasonable to think material objects can exist timelessly.

You are offering one interpretation of special relativity, not “what we know” about it. If you want to defend this as the more reasonable explanation, then make the case. The same goes for the Page and Wootters mechanism.

It's established science that time is relative to a reference frame, and that time proceeds more slowly as velocity approaches the speed of light. I'm not insisting that this entails "timeless" existence, per se, I'm just saying that it's plausible.

This matters because: IF we were to infer that the initial state must have existed timelessly, this would not tip the scale in the direction of theism.

4) Is time necessarily a relation between events? I'd say that time entails a relation between states of affairs. Each state of affairs coincides with an event- except for the unique case of the initial state of affairs. It's arbitrary to exclude it, but that's what Craig does by defining time as he does.

I think I may be missing your point here. Could you explain this more?

It's a technicality in Craig's account. He doesn't consider the state of affairs "God sans universe" as a point of time - BECAUSE it is not an event; therefore it is not an initial state of affairs. Craig denies that God (the alleged cause of the universe) existed "temporally prior" to the universe. This is at odds with point 1, which you agreed with. So you're defending a different account than Craig's.

You believe photons exist timelessly and they have causal efficacy, right?

No. I'm saying that from the reference frame of a photon, there is no elapse of time - and there is no causation occurring.

I don’t see any reason to connect causal efficacy to a thing’s temporality (or lack thereof).

You seemed to agree with my first point, that causes temporally precede effect. This implies that if there's no elapse of time, there has been no instances of causation.

Why would the effect (the natural universe) be eternal? It would have been preceded by a past state of affairs (one in which it didn’t exist, but God did).

As I noted above, Craig denies that "God sans universe" temporally precedes the universe. In his account, time begins as the universe "begins to exist". So there is no point of time at which the universe doesn't exist. Therefore the universe fits your definition of eternal.

You need to decide if you want to defend Craig's account, or your own.

*edit* I am registered on Craig's "reasonable faith" platform, which is called "Equip". On that platform, he has a tutorial on the KCA where he summarizes his reasoning.

[The Tanager]

1) It's more reasonable to believe causes always temporally preceed their effects: all real world cases are consistent with this.

Yes. Plus this would always result based on the most reasonable view of the nature of time.

Craig denies this. He goes to great pains to defend atemporal causation. For example, he claims a bowling ball sitting on a cushion from an infinite past, entails the bowling ball atemporally causing a depression in the cushion.

My arguments pertain specifically to Craig's account. If you want to defend a different account, you need to provide a complete argument+account.

Oh, I misread your Craig assumption #1. Could you quote the passage you based that on? My first hunch is that this is about how an eternal cause would have an eternal effect, but that Craig believes temporal causes are prior to temporal effects.

Craig claims a material initial state is problematic. He also does not treat "God sans universe" as an initial state. Whether or not we label the universe as "eternal" is irrelevant to the argument. That's just semantics.

Okay, I misunderstood you. I’m trying to figure out your counter response about an initial state of affairs being necessarily uncaused.

It's established science that time is relative to a reference frame, and that time proceeds more slowly as velocity approaches the speed of light. I'm not insisting that this entails "timeless" existence, per se, I'm just saying that it's plausible.

It’s plausible if there is no absolute time. Craig argues for a Neo-Lorentzian understanding of special relativity, which involves an absolute time. You need to show a different understanding of special relativity is the more reasonable one.

This matters because: IF we were to infer that the initial state must have existed timelessly, this would not tip the scale in the direction of theism.

Craig gives different reasons to tip the scale.

It's a technicality in Craig's account. He doesn't consider the state of affairs "God sans universe" as a point of time - BECAUSE it is not an event; therefore it is not an initial state of affairs. Craig denies that God (the alleged cause of the universe) existed "temporally prior" to the universe. This is at odds with point 1, which you agreed with. So you're defending a different account than Craig's.

Are you saying that Craig’s assumption (1) and (4) contradict each other, or that I’m disagreeing with Craig on (1)?

I don’t see any reason to connect causal efficacy to a thing’s temporality (or lack thereof).

You seemed to agree with my first point, that causes temporally precede effect. This implies that if there's no elapse of time, there has been no instances of causation.

Yes, sorry for my misreading earlier. I agree that temporal causes must temporally precede their effect. But that doesn’t mean that all causes must be temporal. You seem to be tying causal powers to being temporal and I’m not sure why.

As I noted above, Craig denies that "God sans universe" temporally precedes the universe. In his account, time begins as the universe "begins to exist". So there is no point of time at which the universe doesn't exist. Therefore the universe fits your definition of eternal.

You need to decide if you want to defend Craig's account, or your own.

Could you clarify the difference you see in Craig’s definition of eternal and mine?