God and the Meaningful Life

[spetey]

Hi again DC&R debaters, I have another puzzler for you. I think it's an important one to consider.

In my experience, many people say they believe in God because God gives their lives meaning. This reason to believe involves two important claims that should be separated:

1. If God did not exist, life would not have sufficient "meaning".
2. This previous claim, if true, is itself reason to believe that God does exist.

(I should make it clear I mean, here, the traditional God of Abraham--the God of Jews, Christians, and Muslims--the one who gave Moses the 10 Commandments, and sent the flood, and who Christians think sent Jesus to die for our sins, etc.)

I think both of these claims are false. That is:

1. I think that life has plenty of "meaning" even though I think there is no God. For example: I still think the world is beautiful, that there is reason to be good to other people, that there is often reason for awe and humility in the face of nature, that life is a precious thing, and so on. In fact, I often think a life with a God would have less meaning, just as I think an adult life spent living with your parents has less "meaning" than when you strike out on your own.
2. Even if it were true that life would not have sufficient meaning without God, I don't think that would itself be reason to believe that there is a God. Compare this: even if it were true that without $1 million I can never be happy, I still don't think that alone is reason to think I have $1 million. That is, even if I really do need $1m to be happy (something I doubt), maybe the truth is I just don't have enough money to be happy. To believe I have that money just because I need it is to commit the wishful thinking fallacy.

Now I should say, I do think there are lots of good things that belief in God can do for people. For example, off the top of my head:

• It can bring people together in a community, for contemplation, celebration, and grieving.
• It can get people thinking about ethical issues.
• It can get people thinking about spiritual issues.
• It can encourage calm reflection and meditation.

But I think all of these can be had without belief in God. You could go, for example, to a Unitarian Universalist Church, where belief in God is not required, but where people think morally, reflect spiritually, grieve and celebrate, and so on.

Meanwhile I think belief in God encourages some very bad things:

• For many, it encourages faith--which is just belief without reason, and which many seem to agree is irresponsible (as in this thread).
• In particular, such faith appeals lead to impasses and intolerance when encountering cultures that disagree. As we have seen throughout history, this is a common cause for war and terrorism and the like.
• Belief in a non-material intelligence promotes a kind of magical, non-scientific thinking.
• It historically has promoted, and continues to promote, confused ethical values based solely on particular leaders' readings of "what the Sacred Text says".
• It has hindered, and continues to hinder, the progress of science (by resisting the Copernican revolution, or evolutionary theory...).

...and so on.

Well, that's plenty to start discussion. What do you think? Is life meaningless without God? Even if so, would this alone be reason to believe that God does exist?


spetey

[harvey1]

it clear that the Paramecium is already quite a long way up this scale. I consider the thermostat I mentioned is nearest the lower end of the scale. I would also class something like a bi-metallic thermostat an IGUS as it gathers information from temperature and utilises it to make a decision to switch on a heating or cooling system.

One problem with using instruments as your example is that humans created those sensors, and the data processed by those instruments is meaningful simply because a human designed them. The intent is originally due to a human(s). So, I would not consider man-made products to be a real example of an IGUS since we are part of the IGUS in that example.

In the universe as a whole, every phase transition and threshold-crossing is a product of information utilization.

Of course, I believe that but for different reasons than you. In your case, what is the IGUS in this example? What is the thing that is adapting to some constraint because it is actually processing data and generating useful information? I don't see how an atheist can identify an IGUS in phase transitions. Is boiling water, a first order phase transition, a collection of data and using that data to create meaningful information? I hardly see how.

Don't forget that consciousness is just a continuum of properties -- most people get hung-up on regarding the immutable nature these reactions as divorcing them from our "higher" properties, but we have evolved systems with sufficient complexity to render them mutable.

I said I accepted that, but what I do not accept is that you have identified an IGUS as the universe without showing the properties of an IGUS. I would ask that you look at Chris Menant's paper again and read about the information processing properties of paramecium. This will help you to understand why I have to reject your argument unless you can demonstrate such capabilities for the universe as a whole. If you wish to appeal to some metaphysical function (e.g., pantheism), then that's fine too.

I say that the pantheist is missing my point about our levels of consciousness and intent being the product of a bazillioin little thermostats.

I don't think they do. Pantheists are some of the most sophisticated thinkers in this arena, and I do think that their concept of consciousness is very similar to what you are advocating. The difference, though, is that a pantheist has an IGUS in mind when advocating the information processing that they do.

[QED]

First off...

I would ask that you look at Chris Menant's paper again and read about the information processing properties of paramecium. This will help you to understand why I have to reject your argument unless you can demonstrate such capabilities for the universe as a whole.

OK, read and re-read (thankfully a short and simple paper) so now I can answer your points with respect to Menant's work.

One problem with using instruments as your example is that humans created those sensors, and the data processed by those instruments is meaningful simply because a human designed them. The intent is originally due to a human(s). So, I would not consider man-made products to be a real example of an IGUS since we are part of the IGUS in that example.

This reflects the statement:

On the same token, it is generally agreed upon that information processing machine do not take into account the meaning attached to the information they process. Because the meaning related to the information comes from the user of the machine or from the
designer. And it cannot be transferred to the machine.

Menant tells us this because the machine is seen as exhibiting simple, immutable behavior. But you're both still missing my point. Simple machines/instruments exhibiting immutable behavior are what higher organisms are constructed from. I'm using simple instruments as my example, because they are the most fundamental, functional building-blocks of all. If you do not accept that they are arbiters of micro-Intent then at what level of construction (using these blocks) do you imagine intent comes in?

Looking at that paper I think I can see where you are getting hung-up on this question: In figure 1 in the box that identifies the connection between the constraint and the incident information, we have in parenthesis "Connection between staying alive and the presence of acid". Which simply means that evolution has assembled a particular construct of simple instruments and relays that is good at persisting in its particular environment. So intent is merely a consequence or reflection of the evolutionary selection criteria -- which is what I have been trying to get over to you in this debate.

Meaning, in this respect, manifests itself in a large feedback system. The criteria of survival gives meaning to acid. Other feedback systems are rife in the micro/macro world and so I conclude that intent and meaning lie there as well. The confusion arises when people attach highly anthromorphic values to these properties. I don't do that. As I said, I conclude that all the 'magic' resides in the simple, immutable, responses of the thermostat-like instruments that we are all constructed from.

[spetey]

Hullo again!

Oh, "semantic" information theory--you mean like Dretske, or Fodor? That's not what their theories are normally called, but I'm happy to discuss that attempt to naturalize intentionality if you like. Until now, you were talking about measures of information, its relation to informational entropy and randomness, and such. These are topics squarely in standard information theory, and that's what led me to believe you were referring to the theory of channel capacity and the like.

I'm specifically talking of semantic information theory since I'm focused on the issue of meaning. Statistical information theory does not get into a definition of meaning and knowledge as it is applied to IT. However, that doesn't mean that cybernetics, information systems, statistical and algorithmic information theory do not have something to contribute to these issues. The groups tend to work in isolation, but from what I've read there is great interest in trying to bridge the gaps that separate these groups. So, specifically I'm talking semantic IT, but if I see concepts better stated using a different branch of IT, I will mention it. For your relief, I'll try to be more specific when I make those crossovers.

Good. So we're agreed that we're now talking about a pretheoretic notion of "information" where theorems of information theory are not of use, right? So you no longer take yourself to have proved that the universe is meaningful purely via statistical information theory, correct? And we can put aside statistical information theory completely for now, then?

notice that my point does not concede that the there is no meaning to life. It merely states that you have failed to establish a conditional that you seem to want. This in itself says nothing about my position.

Spetey, why should I have to establish that there is God in the universe when I already did that in our other thread that you've been too busy to post responses?

First, your job for this thread is not to establish that there is a God. You have the (presumably much easier) job of showing that life would be meaningless without a God. (Then there's the other tricky matter of showing that this, if true, would itself be a reason to believe.)

Second, you did not establish that there is a God in any other thread of which I'm aware! If you mean the "reasons for atheism" thread, it simply became too bifurcated, and from what I saw, you never responded to my reason to be an atheist (just about the exact same reason you don't believe in the Invisible Pink Unicorn). Shame on you! My silence on that thread certainly does not imply conceding your points--and you should know better!

Actually, as my first post to this thread makes clear, I think there is a great deal of meaning to life. I think there is no God and I think life is meaningful.

What kind of meaning? Are you saying the universe is inherently meaningful, or are you saying that atheists are able to subjectively create their own meaning. For example, Karl Rove probably thinks it is meaningful to keep Democrats out of office anyway possible, do you think Karl Rove could be mistaken or do you think the whole issue of meaning in this context is so subjective that you can't even compare notes between what Hitler would have found meaningful and what the United Way charity organization finds meaningful?

Good and interesting question. It sound like you and I are veering toward this tentative hypothesis:

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objectively good goals to achieve (that is, there are goals that are good whether or not anyone actually represents them as being good).

That's a first tentative draft, but does it sound good to you? If so, then it could help sharpen our debate considerably. I am willing to take this on board as a working hypothesis. If you don't like this proposal, please proffer something different as to what you mean by "meaning" to life.

My view is that information only exists if there is a sender of some sort that intends for there to be a message.

This is an unorthodox position. Most people would say that I can get information by sneaking a glimpse of the first few cards in a deck, even if no one else intends for me to have a belief with regard to what cards are on top of the deck. Are you sure you want to say that I can't get information by, say, looking at things?

my point above was to show that the universe could have a purpose or intent without any God (though I am not committed to this one way or another; it's merely a consistent atheist position).

How can the universe have a purpose or intent without a God?

Just as I explained before--basically, the same way we atheists think an eye can have a purpose without a God. The human eye was plausibly designed not by an intelligent agent, but by a natural process of selection, and this gave it the genuine purpose of seeing things. If there is a similar kind of selection for universes--and I don't know the details of this view, but it could be features like stability or rich enough material to create further black holes for further universes--then the universe might have a similar purpose, without any God.

Intent is the basis of pantheism which believes in the existence of God. It's very dissatisfying that we still do not agree on the boundary condition of what God is and what God is not after we have debated on a regular basis for 8 months now. Do you make any allowance for pantheism in your belief system or do you just assume this is part of atheism?

I have said that if you could show that the universe were literally mindful or intelligent in some way, that would go some way toward the existence of a God--and might be enough on its own to establish pantheism. This is progress that we've made; we seem to have agreed that a deity would require at least a smidgen of intelligence (at least as much intelligence as a plant, you say; I think it would require a great deal more to count as a deity). But this is irrelevant because I still have no reason to believe that the universe itself has any kind of mind.

Perhaps you want to say that by definition pantheism is correct if the universe has a purpose (even a purely natural one like the kind I imagine). But this would take some argument. I think most people would find the worship of such a thing just as implausible as worshipping a plant.

I think our lives have a great deal of meaning. Maybe I would agree that the "universe itself" doesn't have meaning. I would have to have the phrase clarified first; but at any rate it's irrelevant to this topic.

How can the universe not have meaning and life have meaning? Where does meaning originate then? Is meaning a mind-independent? If not, then whose mind establishes what is meaningful?

Well, if the working hypo is correct, the universe might not have meaning because it might not itself have goals (or might not have objectively good ones). But we still could. You find it plausible our lives could have meaning even if some rock didn't have meaning, right? How about if all of Mars doesn't have meaning? How about the entire solar system minus Earth? How about everything that's non-sentient? My claim is basically that meaning comes with objectively rational desires. That's how we could have meaning without the "universe itself" having meaning: we could each have objectively rational desires without the universe having any.

For the universe to possess objective meaning it must contain a meaningful message that was intensionally encoded. ...

This again relies on a view that I can't get information about the world by, say, looking at things. Is this a view you can defend?


spetey

[harvey1]

Good. So we're agreed that we're now talking about a pretheoretic notion of "information" where theorems of information theory are not of use, right? So you no longer take yourself to have proved that the universe is meaningful purely via statistical information theory, correct? And we can put aside statistical information theory completely for now, then?

That's not what I said. I said I'm specifically talking about semantical IT, but I might refer to other ITs as the need arises. For now, I'm talking specifically about semantical IT and I'll let you know if I begin to refer to other ITs, that's all I can commit to at this moment.

Shame on you! My silence on that thread certainly does not imply conceding your points--and you should know better!

Now, now. Don't start scolding your elders for sins they did not commit. I merely pointed out that we were having a discussion, and it is not necessary for me to have to prove here especially since I believe I proved it elsewhere without the privilege of being able to finish our discussion on that very important topic.

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objectively good goals to achieve (that is, there are goals that are good whether or not anyone actually represents them as being good).

That's a first tentative draft, but does it sound good to you? If so, then it could help sharpen our debate considerably. I am willing to take this on board as a working hypothesis. If you don't like this proposal, please proffer something different as to what you mean by "meaning" to life.

This is why I brought up information theory. It is my view that we should try to keep the term "meaning" as a concept directly attached to information. This does a few things. One, it means that we can use words like "sender," "receiver," "intent," etc., which gives us simple models such as Chris Menant's paper on paramecium which I think allows us to talk in much more objective terms on this subject matter. Another reason for this is because I believe that meaning is directly related to information, hence my argument is only going to keep coming back to this point anyway, so it makes sense for me to talk in those terms.

Therefore, the tentative hypothesis for life's meaning that I favor is:

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objective goals by the Universe (or universe, or even God) in which life is either a goal or sub-goal to achieve, and which would require at least a normal intelligent human being to understand the significance of those goals or sub-goals.

I prefer to leave out the "good" since that's just another term that needs definition and as far as I'm concerned, life could be meaningful if the universe was neither good nor evil in its intent for life. The last part of that hypothesis is important since when we speak of "meaning" we are specifically talking about human meaning.

This is an unorthodox position. Most people would say that I can get information by sneaking a glimpse of the first few cards in a deck, even if no one else intends for me to have a belief with regard to what cards are on top of the deck. Are you sure you want to say that I can't get information by, say, looking at things?

If the cards were organized in a particular pattern, then you can glean information with regards to organization. Or, if you have a theory in place, then you can gain information in which the theory provides an intepretation of that data so that you organize the data into information. However, this is an interpretation of the data which is the information. The photons striking your cornea is not information, it is data. If you had no theory or explanation of the phenomena, then this would not be information. The "theory" may be our genetic or neural pre-dispositional wiring to interpret the data into information so that we're not even aware the data has become meaningful information.

Just as I explained before--basically, the same way we atheists think an eye can have a purpose without a God. The human eye was plausibly designed not by an intelligent agent, but by a natural process of selection, and this gave it the genuine purpose of seeing things. If there is a similar kind of selection for universes--and I don't know the details of this view, but it could be features like stability or rich enough material to create further black holes for further universes--then the universe might have a similar purpose, without any God.

Hmm... I don't think natural selection has a teleological purpose. The eye didn't evolve so that we could see. Rather, the eye evolved and as a result we could see. Nature is economical in its resources, so if there is a feature that enabled our ancestors to have more babies, then that feature was "selected" by natural selection as a trait to keep. There was no intent on the part of natural selection to have creatures see, or even an intent to have us have more babies. Natural selection doesn't care if we survive or not, or if we see or not. It is a dumb function that allows the haves to continue on and takes life away from the have nots. Where is the intent in this natural process? If you take Smolin's black hole hypothesis, the same would seem to apply. The universes that survive were not intended to survive. They simply survived because they were the haves, not because they were intended to survive. The have not universes didn't survive because their existence wasn't intended, it simply lacked the resources to survive (e.g., black holes).

I have said that if you could show that the universe were literally mindful or intelligent in some way, that would go some way toward the existence of a God--and might be enough on its own to establish pantheism. This is progress that we've made; we seem to have agreed that a deity would require at least a smidgen of intelligence (at least as much intelligence as a plant, you say; I think it would require a great deal more to count as a deity). But this is irrelevant because I still have no reason to believe that the universe itself has any kind of mind.

But, this is why atheism is about a meaningless world. There is no willful intent, even the intent formed by the intelligence of a plant, for there to be any particular feature in the world. Hence, without this willful intent, the world is meaningless. Meaning comes from a willful intent. No willful intent, no meaning. If the intent is by accident (e.g., sophisticated eyeballs that can see), then it is not willful--hence, not meaningful.

Perhaps you want to say that by definition pantheism is correct if the universe has a purpose (even a purely natural one like the kind I imagine). But this would take some argument. I think most people would find the worship of such a thing just as implausible as worshipping a plant.

I don't think the majority of pantheists believe God is intelligent. If they thought of God as intelligent, then why not be theists? Pantheism is the view that the universe has a property of moving toward some kind of unity for metaphysical reasons. Theism is the view that God exists in addition to the universe, and God is able to direct the universe along some intelligent path that only God knows the reason. Theism requires an intelligent God, whereas pantheism doesn't make all that much sense with one. I certainly don't think that Spinoza would have believed that God was intelligent. He certainly never said so in his writings that I know of.

Well, if the working hypo is correct, the universe might not have meaning because it might not itself have goals (or might not have objectively good ones). But we still could. You find it plausible our lives could have meaning even if some rock didn't have meaning, right? How about if all of Mars doesn't have meaning? How about the entire solar system minus Earth? How about everything that's non-sentient? My claim is basically that meaning comes with objectively rational desires. That's how we could have meaning without the "universe itself" having meaning: we could each have objectively rational desires without the universe having any.

I know that's what you believe because that's what you said you believe, but what are your reasons in showing how meaning can emerge from non-meaning? If you take a purely materialistic position, for example, every meaningful thought, every meaningful poem, etc., is just a configuration of elementary particles. Change the configuration only slightly, and you would have a different meaning. For example, Hitler's brain would have meaning X for all life, and Murray O'Hare's brain would have meaning Y for all life. In a materialist conception, there is only a biological connection between X and Y. What in the world makes one more meaningful than the other? What objective criteria shows that X is less meaningful than Y?

Just to re-emphasize where I stand, yes, I agree that the solar system may not have much in the way of meaning minus Earth. However, because I think there was intent for the universe, I believe that every particle has some level of meaning. Let's call the most basic building block of meaning a unit of meaning. By certain evolutionary processes, these building blocks can be built on top of each other (metaphorically speaking) to create a meaningful structure. Thus, human lives are these grand structures in the universe full of meaning. The parts of the universe that don't have these kind of sophisticated structures have less meaning. Someone like Mother Teresa (call her Z) can lead a significantly more meaningful life than X or Y simply because she has the added spiritual and moral structures to make her life objectively more meaningful than either X or Y.

For the universe to possess objective meaning it must contain a meaningful message that was intensionally encoded. ...

This again relies on a view that I can't get information about the world by, say, looking at things. Is this a view you can defend?

I certainly defend the view that you need some kind of cognitive structure to gain subjective meaning about anything. However, even without the cognitive structures, there is an objective meaning to the universe if there is intent for the universe as a whole (which includes its sub-structures).

[QED]

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objectively good goals to achieve (that is, there are goals that are good whether or not anyone actually represents them as being good).

That's a first tentative draft, but does it sound good to you? If so, then it could help sharpen our debate considerably. I am willing to take this on board as a working hypothesis. If you don't like this proposal, please proffer something different as to what you mean by "meaning" to life.

This is why I brought up information theory. It is my view that we should try to keep the term "meaning" as a concept directly attached to information. This does a few things. One, it means that we can use words like "sender," "receiver," "intent," etc., which gives us simple models such as Chris Menant's paper on paramecium which I think allows us to talk in much more objective terms on this subject matter. Another reason for this is because I believe that meaning is directly related to information, hence my argument is only going to keep coming back to this point anyway, so it makes sense for me to talk in those terms.

As I explained earlier in this topic I have good reason to believe that all meaning comes down to conditioned reactions. Furthermore, all conditioning seems to be the product of evolution. This is amply demonstrated by the Paramecium you mentioned above which regards information about the acidity of it's environment as meaningful, in so much as natural selection has caused the organism to evolve a reaction that moves it away from water that is too acid.

Therefore, the tentative hypothesis for life's meaning that I favor is:

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objective goals by the Universe (or universe, or even God) in which life is either a goal or sub-goal to achieve, and which would require at least a normal intelligent human being to understand the significance of those goals or sub-goals.

I would say that life can be seen as a goal for the universe, and this is where the evolutionary conditioning comes in. But you go on to add a useless caveat about a human being able to understand the significance of this. I'm guessing you don't like this breakdown of meaning, but I think you'll find that if you consider it long and hard, you'll see for yourself that evolution is making the vital connection that confers meaning to the incident information:

SYSTEM SUBMITTED TO A CONSTRAINT (Paramecium)
Incident information (Acid in water)
V
Identification of the connection between the constraint and the incident information (Connection between staying alive and the presence of acid worked out by natural selection)
V
Meaningful information (Acid non compatible with staying alive)
V
Determination of the action satisfying the constraint of the system (Organism has evolved To move away from acid area)

This shows how meaning arises as a result of evolution. I think this applies to all classes of meaning and shows how central a role evolution plays in the cosmos. I'm suggesting that all meaning can be audited back to this simple loop and it can only be sheer vanity that causes people to try and make it more special by adding human considerations into the equation.

[harvey1]

Menant tells us this because the machine is seen as exhibiting simple, immutable behavior. But you're both still missing my point. Simple machines/instruments exhibiting immutable behavior are what higher organisms are constructed from. I'm using simple instruments as my example, because they are the most fundamental, functional building-blocks of all. If you do not accept that they are arbiters of micro-Intent then at what level of construction (using these blocks) do you imagine intent comes in?

They have "micro-intent," but where did that intent arise? I know of no non-life objects that are not human designed who show micro-intent. You want to attribute micro-intent to a non-life object (i.e., the universe), but you have not shown how the universe has micro-intent. In the case of robotic machines, the micro-intent originated from humans, so it is an extension of human intent for those machines.

Which simply means that evolution has assembled a particular construct of simple instruments and relays that is good at persisting in its particular environment. So intent is merely a consequence or reflection of the evolutionary selection criteria -- which is what I have been trying to get over to you in this debate.

There is no knowledge on the part of evolution, however there is a form of knowledge on the part of a paramecium. The "knowledge" of a paramecium is based on its genetic structure, and this kind of genetic structure has not been postulated by you to exist for the universe. If you postulate some similar kind of structure that contains knowledge (e.g., a genetic code) for our universe, then how is that not pantheism? Pantheism is based on the notion that certain unity principles are at work that make decisions for the universe as a whole (e.g., the paramecium's "decision" to avoid acid).

Meaning, in this respect, manifests itself in a large feedback system. The criteria of survival gives meaning to acid. Other feedback systems are rife in the micro/macro world and so I conclude that intent and meaning lie there as well. The confusion arises when people attach highly anthromorphic values to these properties. I don't do that. As I said, I conclude that all the 'magic' resides in the simple, immutable, responses of the thermostat-like instruments that we are all constructed from.

I understand your point, but there is a major difference between the universe exhibiting micro-cognitive abilities and structures within the universe exhibiting micro-cognitive abilities. I think the idea that cognitivity begins on a micro basis is a sound proposal, but it is not sound to apply micro-cognitivity to pre-biological environments unless you are willing to accept that the universe (or whatever caused the universe) possesses a metaphysical structure. This metaphysical structure is what separates an atheist from a pantheist.

Btw, when talking about human meaning I do not agree that micro-cognitive features automatically means the universe itself possesses human meaningful. I think at that level we should consider what is human meaning and see if the universe possesses that quality. I don't see much in the way of human meaning even in many pantheist views.

[harvey1]

I would say that life can be seen as a goal for the universe, and this is where the evolutionary conditioning comes in.

I think this confuses a goal with a tendency. A tendency of the universe to produce life is not the universe possessing a goal anymore than it is a goal for a smoker to get lung cancer after years of smoking.

But you go on to add a useless caveat about a human being able to understand the significance of this. I'm guessing you don't like this breakdown of meaning

No, I don't mind this approach to meaning in terms of understanding how meaning evolved in the human brain. However, just because paramecium can have intent/meaning does not mean that this solves all philosophical issues with regard to meaning. My view is that when humans look for meaning they are looking for something more than a biological reaction of avoiding acid while floating in water.

This shows how meaning arises as a result of evolution.

It may or may not. Meaning may have arisen in later organisms for completely different reasons. The reason I referred to this paper is that it does exhibit how a primitive aspect of meaning could have evolved. But, I would think that many philosophers who struggle to offer a theory of meaning would not be very impressed with this approach.

[QED]

You want to attribute micro-intent to a non-life object (i.e., the universe), but you have not shown how the universe has micro-intent. In the case of robotic machines, the micro-intent originated from humans, so it is an extension of human intent for those machines.

I think there is a very interesting point coming out here, but there's a risk of us losing it to confusion over several different issues.

Which simply means that evolution has assembled a particular construct of simple instruments and relays that is good at persisting in its particular environment. So intent is merely a consequence or reflection of the evolutionary selection criteria -- which is what I have been trying to get over to you in this debate.

There is no knowledge on the part of evolution, however there is a form of knowledge on the part of a paramecium. The "knowledge" of a paramecium is based on its genetic structure, and this kind of genetic structure has not been postulated by you to exist for the universe. If you postulate some similar kind of structure that contains knowledge (e.g., a genetic code) for our universe, then how is that not pantheism? Pantheism is based on the notion that certain unity principles are at work that make decisions for the universe as a whole (e.g., the paramecium's "decision" to avoid acid).

I agree that there is no knowledge on the part of evolution, but the process of evolution builds knowledge into its products. This is where the Paramecium gains meaning from acidity. I think it's worth considering how we arrive at this point. The 'magic' lies within the simple but effective feedback loop that is natural selection. To try and understand this process at any deeper, metaphysical, level maybe is a job for philosophers.

Meaning, in this respect, manifests itself in a large feedback system. The criteria of survival gives meaning to acid. Other feedback systems are rife in the micro/macro world and so I conclude that intent and meaning lie there as well. The confusion arises when people attach highly anthromorphic values to these properties. I don't do that. As I said, I conclude that all the 'magic' resides in the simple, immutable, responses of the thermostat-like instruments that we are all constructed from.

I understand your point, but there is a major difference between the universe exhibiting micro-cognitive abilities and structures within the universe exhibiting micro-cognitive abilities. I think the idea that cognitivity begins on a micro basis is a sound proposal, but it is not sound to apply micro-cognitivity to pre-biological environments unless you are willing to accept that the universe (or whatever caused the universe) possesses a metaphysical structure. This metaphysical structure is what separates an atheist from a pantheist.

I have suggested that the metaphysics is confined to the process of evolution (amounting to nothing more than the power of feedback loops). Structures within the universe, and possibly whole universes are the products of similar loops, so while it might not please you very much, I submit that this ultimately is where all meaning comes from. Crack the metaphysics of feedback loops and I think you'll have an answer to it all. But without this crack we still have an account of meaning contained within the known physics of the universe.

I would say that life can be seen as a goal for the universe, and this is where the evolutionary conditioning comes in.

I think this confuses a goal with a tendency. A tendency of the universe to produce life is not the universe possessing a goal anymore than it is a goal for a smoker to get lung cancer after years of smoking.

This underlines our different philisophical outlooks. You use the sematics to push for something stronger than a tendency. But the thrust of my argument is that if there is anything stronger, it only resides within the metaphysics of feedback loops.

But you go on to add a useless caveat about a human being able to understand the significance of this. I'm guessing you don't like this breakdown of meaning

No, I don't mind this approach to meaning in terms of understanding how meaning evolved in the human brain. However, just because paramecium can have intent/meaning does not mean that this solves all philosophical issues with regard to meaning. My view is that when humans look for meaning they are looking for something more than a biological reaction of avoiding acid while floating in water.

Your reluctance to accept this point is understandable. But you've also agreed that it is valid to work-up meaning from the micro-level. Again, you are asking that something 'magic' intervenes at a certain level however apart from the need to retain a degree of human dignity, this is wholly unnecessary and only obscures the issue.

This shows how meaning arises as a result of evolution.

It may or may not. Meaning may have arisen in later organisms for completely different reasons. The reason I referred to this paper is that it does exhibit how a primitive aspect of meaning could have evolved. But, I would think that many philosophers who struggle to offer a theory of meaning would not be very impressed with this approach.

No philosopher with a theist agenda maybe. But I've left that open really, as I said there could be a metaphysical element within the mechanics of feedback loops and you and your preferred philosophers can do what they like with that. Rather than tell me how unimpressed philosophers would be with my approach, why don't you unpick it?

To summarise:
Things take on meaning with reference to constraint and conditioning.
Constraint arises from the need to exists.
Conditioning is a product of evolution.
Evolution applies at all levels: from the development of micro/macro organisms to the higher cognitive developments such as personality/spirituality (or whatever we fill our brains with)

[harvey1]

I agree that there is no knowledge on the part of evolution, but the process of evolution builds knowledge into its products. This is where the Paramecium gains meaning from acidity.

I have no problem with the process of evolution building some kind of subjective meaning into its products. The problem for atheism, though, is that there is no escaping the ultimate meaninglessness of the universe. This presents a much bigger problem, though. If the universe is ultimately meaningless, then what is this subjective meaning that an atheist would ask us to consider as meaningful in itself? How can you build meaning from non-meaning?

Of course, I understand that you wish to say that subjective meaning is built from evolved functions (e.g., paramecium's behavior, etc.), however this doesn't answer the question. All of that subjective meaning merely supervenes on some physical state, PM. It is the physical state which you wish to say has meaning. But, why talk in terms of meaning in that case? Why not just talk in terms of PM (i.e., some physical state)? It's just a configuration of matter. Some configurations are better than others for certain functions, but it is all subjective with regard to whatever is valued by the individual making their (subjective) decision as to what they regard as meaningful. If Joe has a configuration of gray matter, c1, that deems "morality" as important, and Jamie has configuration of gray matter, c2, that values "immorality" as important, then there is no independent set of values that determine one as "right" and the other as "wrong." Hitler's morals and Gandhi's morals are equally meaningful and equally meaningless in the atheist worldview. The only merit one has over the other is biological survival and well-being. The individual should then judge which configuration of gray matter will aid them in their well-being the best. Of course, if they wish to suffer or perish, that's okay too. Nothing matters, really (i.e., under a consistent atheist worldview).

so while it might not please you very much, I submit that this ultimately is where all meaning comes from. Crack the metaphysics of feedback loops and I think you'll have an answer to it all. But without this crack we still have an account of meaning contained within the known physics of the universe.

I know that you believe that this is meaning, but what I argue is that this represents a universe with no meaning at all. It seems what you wish to say is that meaning is an epiphenomena that is a byproduct of evolution. Okay, I accept that an atheist view holds this view of the universe as being meaningless. My second argument that I haven't put forth yet is that this gives us a good indication that atheism is wrong as a result of holding such a view of a meaningless universe.

...you are asking that something 'magic' intervenes at a certain level however apart from the need to retain a degree of human dignity, this is wholly unnecessary and only obscures the issue.

That's not correct. There need not be anything magical about objective properties of the universe passing along certain objective properties of meaning to all the components in the universe. In fact, all that must be the case is that objective properties of meaning exist, and that's sufficient to see why the world has objective meaning even though it evolved through micro-situations of meaning. The evolutionary process itself can be quite natural, in fact.

No philosopher with a theist agenda maybe. But I've left that open really, as I said there could be a metaphysical element within the mechanics of feedback loops and you and your preferred philosophers can do what they like with that. Rather than tell me how unimpressed philosophers would be with my approach, why don't you unpick it?

I don't think there would be but a handful who would argue your position. The main reason is that a theory of meaning is a tough problem, and there are no easy answers. Even less so if one is offering an explanation based solely on this level of micro-intent. For example, Michael Dummett (an agnostic, I think) has written extensively on a theory of meaning. He has mentioned that

[a]ny theory of meaning which was not, or did not immediately yield, a theory of understanding, would not satisfy the purpose for which, philosophically, we require a theory of meaning. (What is a Theory of Meaning, "The Seas of Language", M. Dummett, 1993)

He also ties a theory of meaning into a theory of truth, along with a theory of natural language. In short, many have spent their careers having concluded that they are no closer than when they first began their intensive study of the subject.

[spetey]

Hullo!

First, I should say: I don't think that Chris Menant paper is of any help, from the skimming I did. It looks to me like another unfortunate example of a scientist (who is probably does just fine work in science) trying to do philosophy while ignorant of the huge literature on the philosophy side. He refers to Peirce (over 100-year-old reference) and to some author who apparently in turn refers to the very good going philosophical theory by Ruth Garrett Millikan (sometimes called "biosemantics"). He doesn't even seem aware of the hugely foundational (and very good) Knowledge and the Flow of Information by Dretske, for example--but that book covers exactly the topic of the relation between meaning and the statistical notion of information. Meanwhile the author provides a "definition" of meaning that begins with the claim that meaning is meaningful information. Does this strike anyone as genuinely helpful?!

Again, there have surely been many embarrassing incidents of philosophers doing bad science. This is widely acknowledged. But for some reason it it is not acknowledged that it is just as easy for scientists to do bad philosophy.

So if we may, let's put the Menant paper aside.

For review, let's put our respective tentative hypotheses on the table:

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objectively good goals to achieve (that is, there are goals that are good whether or not anyone actually represents them as being good).

Life is meaningful if and only if there are objective goals by the Universe (or universe, or even God) in which life is either a goal or sub-goal to achieve, and which would require at least a normal intelligent human being to understand the significance of those goals or sub-goals.

Okay. So we have two tentative hypotheses. Now we need to discuss which of these hypotheses to prefer. Let me try to indicate why I prefer mine. I'll start with the intuition that, for example, teaching people to read is a meaningful activity. My hypothesis accounts for this common intuition: teaching people to read seems to be an objectively good goal, and therefore can provide meaning. Your hypothesis does not account for this: teaching people to read is only meaningful if the universe has a kind of intent to bring us about. But this is mysterious. The meaning that comes from doing something good seems to be (roughly) intrinsic to the activity. It doesn't seem to matter whether anyone is watching you teach the person to read, for example. It doesn't seem to matter to the meaning of that activity what the DJIA was on that same day in 1975. And it sure doesn't seem to matter how the universe was billions of years before, and whether it was swirling as it did because of some utterly mysterious "intent" that the universe has.

This is a related reason I am skeptical of your hypothesis, of course. It seems we have no reason to think the universe itself has any genuine goal or intent. Thus, on your hypothesis, we have no reason to think life is meaningful. On what grounds do you attribute goals to the universe itself, like the goal to create intelligent life? This is an old discussion for us, Harvey, but I don't feel I ever got an answer on the topic.

Someone like Mother Teresa (call her Z) can lead a significantly more meaningful life than X or Y simply because she has the added spiritual and moral structures to make her life objectively more meaningful than either X or Y.

Of course, I take this to support my hypothesis. On my view, Mother Theresa's activities were meaningful because there was objective good for her to do. Your claim is that her actions were only meaningful if conditions totally outside Mother Theresa and her work are in place. But this is mysterious.

There's a great deal else from your response to me that is tempting to discuss but that I've cut in the interests of brevity. Please let me know if you think I've cut something important.


spetey