Hello again! First, the two rival hypotheses again:
spetey's tentative hypothesis on life's meaning wrote:
Life is meaningful if and only if there are objectively good goals to achieve (that is, there are goals that are good whether or not anyone actually represents them as being good).
Harvey's tentative hypothesis on life's meaning wrote:
Life is meaningful if and only if there are objective goals by the Universe (or universe, or even God) in which life is either a goal or sub-goal to achieve, and which would require at least a normal intelligent human being to understand the significance of those goals or sub-goals.
And now, some discussion.
harvey1 wrote:spetey wrote:Let me try to indicate why I prefer mine. I'll start with the intuition that, for example, teaching people to read is a meaningful activity. My hypothesis accounts for this common intuition: teaching people to read seems to be an objectively good goal, and therefore can provide meaning. Your hypothesis does not account for this: teaching people to read is only meaningful if the universe has a kind of intent to bring us about. But this is mysterious. The meaning that comes from doing something good seems to be (roughly) intrinsic to the activity. It doesn't seem to matter whether anyone is watching you teach the person to read, for example.
This is a case of reductionism at play. I'm talking about atoms, and you are talking planets.
If we deal with the same layer of complexity, then there are reasons to doubt your hypothesis. For example, your argument of meaning is entirely subjective, as I suppose you realize.
No, I certainly don't "realize" that. What's subjective about my account of meaning? It explicitly calls for
objectively good goals. It seems not to be at all subjective. Please indicate
why you think my hypothesis must be subjective, rather just stating it with the hope of rhetorical force.
harvey1 wrote:
What is the actual referent when you talk of "meaning"?
My hypothesis about
meaning (in the context of "life having meaning") is as stated above. If you are changing the subject to
intentionality, then I'm inclined toward the
biosemantic view, but I don't see what that has to do with our discussion.
harvey1 wrote:
What happens if the brain cells die, does the meaning perish with the brain cells?
If you mean "meaning of life" meaning, then no, of course not, since goals are not brain cells or even human desires that might be made up of brain cells. I might have the objectively good goal to help people even if I don't believe I have this goal.
If you mean "meaning" like intentionality--the content of mental states--then yes, mental content such as beliefs and desires can disappear with the death of brain cells, as is amply demonstrated by brain damage cases. But again, why are we talking about intentionality now? Is it because you confuse it with "meaning of life" meaning?
harvey1 wrote:
What if a unforeseen black hole the size of Mars sneaks near our planet and sucks all the atoms of our planet into its gravitational arms, does that end whatever meaning was found there?
I would say yes on both versions of "meaning". If all sentient life disappeared, then there would be no meaning of life either. And if there are no sentient creatuers, there are no mental states with intentionality.
harvey1 wrote:
If so, then why speak in terms of meaning at all? Why not just refer to meaning as an epiphenomenon?
What? Because something would disappear if sucked down a black hole, you conclude that thing is a mere "epiphenomenon"? Do you feel the same way about tables? "Why talk about tables, since they would disappear if their atoms were sucked down a black hole? They must be mere epiphenomena!" Myself I think there are tables, with real causal powers, even though they would disappear if sucked down a black hole. I feel the same way about (both senses of) meaning.
harvey1 wrote:
I see your hypothesis along these lines. Meaning is a figure of speech to generalize concepts that you think are too complex or too awkward to describe technically...
Then you see my hypothesis along incorrect lines. Please explain why my hypothesis--stated again above--entails that there is not meaning except as a mere "figure of speech". It seems to say that there
is meaning, and furthermore to hypothesize about what that meaning is.
harvey1 wrote:
Perhaps Best Buy will even sell the portable memory device that you can plug into your brain which will give the person that specific sense of meaning without having to do the activity. Has meaning been found (or bought) in such a world? I think not.
Notice that my hypothesis does not state that meaning is a brain state or a neurotransmitter or an algorithm or anything of the sort one could someday purchase at Best Buy. It hypothesizes that life has meaning if there are objectively good goals to pursue. Objectively good goals are not the kind of thing you could ever get at Best Buy. So your point does not seem like any kind of objection to my view. (It
may be that in an attenuated sense, one could someday buy
mental content at Best Buy--for example, chips that implant memory into our brain. But first, that has nothing to do with whether life has meaning, and second, that's not so crazy--indeed, it's not really different from the normal
books we buy today, though the delivery method of the content is quite different.)
harvey1 wrote:
Now, my answer isn't quite so mysterious. If there is intent to the world ...
Let me interrupt you there and point out that
already your hypothesis is mysterious. Why think the
world itself has "intent"?!
harvey1 wrote: ... then whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic there is an overall carryover of this intent into the evolution of the universe.
Another mystery. Why think that? You agree that you and I have intent (~ mental content), but it doesn't "carry over" to the evolution of staplers. Evolution and mental content are not
contagious or something!
harvey1 wrote:
Every event is meaningful to some extent since every event is causally related to the intentful event that started it all.
Here with your "since" you propose a new hypothesis:
x is meaningful if it is causally related to a meaningful
y. But first, of course this needs a "base clause" to avoid circularity--in what cases would something be meaningful independently of its causal relations to another meaningful thing? Secondly, it seems obviously false. The smoke from a fire I make to save someone from hypothermia does not itself have deep meaning just because it's causally related to a meaningful act.
harvey1 wrote:
If the world is random to start, then it is still random. However, if the world is intentful to start, then that intent is only snowballing increasing the amount of information in the world.
This doesn't follow. Compare: "if the universe has no life to start, then it still has no life". Meaning might
emerge just as life did; indeed, my hypothesis makes sense of this fact.
harvey1 wrote:spetey wrote:It seems we have no reason to think the universe itself has any genuine goal or intent.
Well, I think this is just wrong. We have every reason to believe the universe has intent since we see the growth of information in the world.
Instead of entropy taking hold we see the exact opposite situation: the increase of information. On our planet we're doubling the amount of information in the world it seems every decade.
Yes, humans transfer more and more "information" all the time. But first, this does not mean that the universe
started with information. Compare: "the human population is getting larger all the time. That means there must have been humans at the beginning of the universe!" And second, the increase of information in the world (in the sense you mean) does not seem to do with meaning to life and does not favor either of our hypotheses. Or do you think the meaning of life varies directly with the number of books and webpages there are to read? That there was no meaning to life in prehistoric times?
harvey1 wrote:spetey wrote:Of course, I take this to support my hypothesis. On my view, Mother Theresa's activities were meaningful because there was objective good for her to do. Your claim is that her actions were only meaningful if conditions totally outside Mother Theresa and her work are in place. But this is mysterious.
I think your hypothesis would have it that MT possessed a subjective meaning that is better classified as a series of brain states.
I can't work out at all why you would think that about my hypothesis. It clearly calls for an
objective meaning that is
independent of brain states. For what reason do you conclude that it's really about "subjective" meaning? And I'd still like to know: how do you account for the intuitoin that MT's activities were
intrinsically meaningful?
harvey1 wrote:
This, I believe, is why science is so enriching to people. There is a meaningful joy coming from understanding the universe since it as if a message is being decoded that gives ones life more purpose.
Why does it have to be a message
from someone / something to be enriching? Why can't there be meaningful joy in
understanding the universe, period? I sure seem to get joy out of doing science, even though I don't think there's someone "sending me a message" when I learn things. (I can learn things sometimes just by
looking at inanimate objects, as I think we agreed.) Again, on your hypothesis, science is only meaningful
if there are mysterious external conditions in place. But that goes against the common intuition that gaining understanding is an
intrinsically worthwhile activity. Only my hypothesis accounts for this intuition.
So I am still left wondering why we should prefer any of your various hypotheses to mine, and therefore still see no reason to think that life would be meaningless without a deity.

spetey