Why Free Will is an illusion

[Miles]

Interest in free will has usually centered around the affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Some very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of these discussions, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's been a frequent problem with some of the terms involved, most often those concerning "free will" and "will."

As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than an automaton, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is commonly seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.

Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing,"chosen," or any other form of the word.


There are only two ways in which actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway; completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes leading to the event had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

Any disagreements?

[Miles]

Double post

[Miles]

I showed you that there are degrees of freedom of will so this permits decisions to be made with responsibility.

Having gone through the entire thread and finding nothing of the sort, I believe you have me confused with someone else.

[marco]

I showed you that there are degrees of freedom of will so this permits decisions to be made with responsibility.

Having gone through the entire thread and finding nothing of the sort, I believe you have me confused with someone else.

We have debated for just 6 posts I believe; finding what you wanted should not have been hard. In post 56 I wrote:


"Confronted with what seems a free choice we take course A. We are not perfect creatures and we all work with flawed mechanisms, but mechanisms that allow us a degree of choice, despite their shortcomings. There are some whose mechanisms are so flawed that free choice is removed. There are youngsters who make decisions with limited responsibility. The fact that we can observe gradation in choice, indicates we have varying degrees of freedom. "

I gave you this to illustrate that each of us has varying degrees of freedom to choose. This implies we are exercising some sort of free will. The restrictions on a baby are more than on a child and an adult has more choice still. People who have a bank of knowledge behind them make a more informed choice. This is not to negate your proposition but to show that choice exists in various strengths.


Your proposition that no one has free will is a bogus hypothesis because to test its truth we have to admit anything at all as a contributing cause. The reason for a choice might well be the rotation of the Earth. In other words it is so universal as to say nothing whatsoever. There are a few propositions in philosophy of that type.

[Miles]

We have debated for just 6 posts I believe; finding what you wanted should not have been hard. In post 56 I wrote:


"Confronted with what seems a free choice we take course A. We are not perfect creatures and we all work with flawed mechanisms, but mechanisms that allow us a degree of choice, despite their shortcomings. There are some whose mechanisms are so flawed that free choice is removed. There are youngsters who make decisions with limited responsibility. The fact that we can observe gradation in choice, indicates we have varying degrees of freedom. "

I don't find this as demonstrating there's any degrees of freedom of will at all. Mere assertions of fact without evidence or argument to back them up do not convince. For one thing, you don't bother to explain what you mean by flawed mechanisms or "gradation in choice."

I gave you this to illustrate that each of us has varying degrees of freedom to choose.

But failing to explain what this "varying degrees of freedom to choose" amounts to, you haven't illustrated anything.

This is not to negate your proposition but to show that choice exists in various strengths.

Well, my "proposition" is that freewill does not exist, and that there is no such a thing as choice, which may come in various strengths or not.

Your proposition that no one has free will is a bogus hypothesis because to test its truth we have to admit anything at all as a contributing cause. The reason for a choice might well be the rotation of the Earth. In other words it is so universal as to say nothing whatsoever. There are a few propositions in philosophy of that type.

Just to be clear here, it isn't only my "proposition," but that of many others, such as, Albert Einstein, Peter Gill, Clarence Darrow, Pierre Simon De Laplace, Max Planck, Karl popper, David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinoza, and Voltaire, to name a few. So, I feel I'm in very good company, and honestly have no concern with your perceived failing of my position.


.

[marco]

Just to be clear here, it isn't only my "proposition," but that of many others, such as, Albert Einstein, Peter Gill, Clarence Darrow, Pierre Simon De Laplace, Max Planck, Karl popper, David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinoza, and Voltaire, to name a few. So, I feel I'm in very good company, and honestly have no concern with your perceived failing of my position.

That's an impressive set of collaborators. Have you read Hume? They use the idea of lack of freewill as a philosophical play thing. Yes, Einstein agonised over his determinism, but from the point of view of causality; God not playing dice. Hume found a way of reconciling liberty with determinism.

Your hypothesis is fun for philosophy students to argue over and they do. But it is best seen as a claim that says absolutely everything and absolutely nothing.

Since you have no concern for my view then it is the parting of the waves. I assumed you asked for correction or refutation. I took a short cut: the long road involved ploughing through treatises, which we haven't time or space for.

Go well.

[Miles]

Yes, Einstein agonised over his determinism, but from the point of view of causality;

Although the indeterminacy in quantum mechanics troubled him, he didn't agonize over it. Moreover, he recognized it had no bearing on the invalidity of freewill.

But it is best seen as a claim that says absolutely everything and absolutely nothing.

Turning it into a Zen K�an is cute I guess, but hardly relevant.

And although I could be wrong here, what appears to be going on is a frustration with your previous failures to successfully counter the argument(s) against freewill. Hence, your ploy of dismissively declaring them bogus.

In any case, have a good day.

[marco]

.

And although I could be wrong here, what appears to be going on is a frustration with your previous failures to successfully counter the argument(s) against freewill. Hence, your ploy of dismissively declaring them bogus.

If I have demonstrated frustration of any sort it is entirely illusory. I offered a standard philosophical analysis of your adopted proposition. It has no possible counterexamples; it is vacuously true. It is saying that air is air. No matter how many people you ask to refute this statement they can't - because it is not expressing something that can be nullified. I cannot be clearer.

And yes, a variety of celebrities have adopted a deterministic view. Whether Einstein agonised or not depends on which biography you read. I like the one I have.

Have a good day.

[Kyrani99]

............hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise.

So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something.

We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .
Any disagreements?

Most scientists still accept the viewpoint of Classical Newtonian physics even though the physics is no longer accepted as valid. They adhere to the view that "materialism is all that there is", because they feel that the only other solution is solipsism, which is the view that the mind is all that can be known to exist. That is that there is no independent reality "out there", that everything is a mental construct. There are no widely accepted theories that bridge these two extremes.

So the scientific position is determinism. Determinism is the doctrine that all events and actions are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will AND only physical causes are considered as leading to physical events. These scientists would say the will is only neural circuitry in the brain, which is of course a position that the will can't affect anything outside the brain. So when scientists, like Sam Harris, says "we can't map free will onto anything", they are talking from a "material is all that there is.. Classical Newtonian worldview, which has been replaced by modern physics.

A materialism viewpoint means that everything that is argued from there on has to only involve material, physical causes.

But there is evidence that contradicts the mainstream scientific viewpoint.

The two big areas where there is evidence for a non-physical reality:
ESP or what I call direct mental perception. It requires related individuals to see because most people's awareness is limited. For instance it is possible to perceive at a distance. Remote viewing is possible but most people, mostly for lack of practice, are not able to have such perception. All experiments are done OUTSIDE of relationship, so ESP is seen but very, very weakly. Thus they argue it is not real. However there are hundreds of millions of people's experience with ESP in respect to their loved ones, close friends and relatives. They reveal that within relationship ESP is seen.

The other area is in physics.
Firstly Physicists insist that nothingness is physical because they see energy arise and dissipate within nothingness. However this argument is not evidence but merely an opinion.

Secondly there is also the measurement problem. The evidence suggests that somehow consciousness is involved. Most physicist (60%) try to explain the results in a way that denies this. Yet 55% admit some role of the observer but most (49%) say not a distinguished role. Only 6% of participants in the survey done admit that the observer plays a fundamental role and a distinguished role, i.e., that consciousness is involved.

So there is evidence showing that reality is both physical AND non-physical, though at present there are no good theories that describe this in science. If you accept the evidence then everything changes.

Then there is also other evidence that was found about the will and centers in the brain. In the 1950s, Penfield the first neurosurgeon in Montreal, developed a map of the brain. He found that putting electrodes into a patient's brain, in surgery, he could cause the patient to raise their hand involuntarily, vocalize involuntarily and recall memories but he could not force the patient to act involuntarily, i.e., he could not simulate the will. He argued that the mind is not found in brain chemistry and could not be explained by neural activity.

The brain has been mapped with respect to visual information. Scientists know where for example information about color is stored and information about shape is stored etc. The visual system have been completely mapped but no area has been found where there is information that combines all the information in the different areas to account for a unified perception. This has lead some scientists to suggest that the mind is a different substance from the brain and that the mind is not physical.

IMO there is ample evidence that a person does have free will and can do something other than what they did, if they chose to do otherwise. You can't throw away choice because where there is free will there is choice.

[OpenYourEyes]

[Replying to post 1 by Miles]

It seems that some people equate a choice without free-will with being a reflexive or instinctual behavior. Clearly we can make choices beyond just instinct and reflex through our higher brain functions, otherwise we'd be no different than the animal world. We are different in that we can be self-aware of how we are, and most importantly we are self-aware of what's causing our choice, and then we can contemplate our choices before we make them. And of course, there's the fact that we sometimes act based on instinct and reflexes. Whether or not this meets the definition of free-will, I believe being able to contemplate your choices is enough to attribute moral culpability.

When you say that free-will should involve no external constraints, that almost makes it sound like the notion of a true democracy in which case both would fail miserably. We need the constraints of morality, law, government, biology, etc in order for things to work.

It seems that in order for some to accept free-will, it would have to exist in a vacuum, ie without the influence of biology and environment, and that is impossible to obtain let alone prove. Or perhaps, free-will should be viewed as balancing between randomness and determinism rather than being a distinct concept?

[koko]

If it is true that we have free will under all circumstances, then an abortion victim can easily walk out of impending doom. But such a thing is impossible. We have all seen or heard of stories such as when a good person who has treated people kindly all his life is walking along the street minding his own business when suddenly someone takes a shot and kills him. I could readily give you thousands of other scenarios, all of which prove there is no such thing as free will.