Teleological Argument vs. Weak Anthropic Principle

[QED]

As an introduction to this long-overdue debate I could not sum up the position of the Teleological Argument vs. the Weak Anthropic Principle any better than this:

The teleological argument, or argument from design, is considered by many to be one of the strongest arguments for the existence of god(s). Many proponents of this argument point to the improbability of a universe existing with properties compatible with the existence of observers as evidence that the universe was designed. This fine-tuning argument argues that the probability of the universe existing with the features compatible with our existence is prohibitively low and therefore necessitate a divine designer.

In many other debates Harvey takes the Teleological Argument as evidence for God and here he denounces the WAP calling it a "conceptual scheme for the denial of the evidence for God":

This only demonstrates the tendencies of atheists to construct conceptual schemes to try and deny the evidence for God--not the actual doing away of the evidence. If anything, the arguments for a beginning have only increased since Hoyle uttered his comments.

By "conceptual schemes that deny the evidence of God" you're probably referring to the WAP. Well, unless you have tangible evidence other than the eminent suitability of our environment to our existence, then yes, this observation is denied as evidence.

The WAP doesn't explain why something exists as it does,

Agreed -- it doesn't set out to do this. What it does tell us is that there can be circumstances where we should not be surprised at what might otherwise seem like remarkable coincidences. It is this element of surprise that is the motivation for seeing the apparent fine-tuning as a deliberate and purposeful act. Harvey's take on this is as follows:

it just explains how it is that under certain circumstances things could have been slightly different.

This sounds like an attempt to play down the importance of the WAP, which other than telling us that things could have been different, tells us that sometimes we should not be surprised at remarkable coincidences when our existence depends on them. So when he follows up with an example:

For example, in our air the percentage of nitrogen and oxygen is approximately 78/21%, but the WAP doesn't tell us why there are people that breathe air--it just explains how it is that under certain circumstances things could have been slightly different. Perhaps there could have been people who breathe a slightly different percentage of composition of air. That's not to say that the WAP explains how there could have been people had there been no air.

The real importance of the WAP in this example is that it shows that there is nothing remarkable about the fact that the ratio of gasses in the atmosphere is just right for us to breathe. I think Harvey should have emphasised this more in his example. Instead it looks as though he has chosen, once more, to stress the fact that the WAP offers no actual explanation for why there is an atmosphere. Clearly if there wasn't, we wouldn't be debating the point and that in itself might be evidence for God -- but Given that we would probably also be able to contemplate different ratios for the gasses (i.e. other ratios that could also support intelligent life) then the particular ratio we have now should not be viewed as being "tailored to us", rather it is far more probable that we are "tailored to it". Likewise, it can be argued, it is also unnecessary for the universe to have been tailored for us.

So, the WAP is not sufficient reason to deny Hoyle's insight that the big bang insinuated God's existence. In my view, since Hoyle's time the big bang has been perceived differently by the atheist because the atheist has had no choice but to perceive it differently to remain an atheist. As part of that re-perceptual process they have ignored the significance of the evidence. But, who are we really kidding here? In my opinion it's not that most atheists aren't aware of the significance of a beginning, it's that they purposely choose to not be aware of this evidence. That's enmity of God, and that's why I say that most atheists have this enmity. That's okay to have enmity for a concept if it helps them get over their puppy who was run over when they were five, but I think that enmity is a motive to ignore evidence--tons and tons of evidence.

So the question for debate is this: Does the WAP cast serious doubt on the "tons of evidence" that so convinces Harvey and others -- when our environment may just be one of many, perhaps most of which would be unsuitable for life?

[McCulloch]

For those following along at home:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the Teleological Argument for God's Existence

Some phenomena within nature exhibit such exquisiteness of structure, function or interconnectedness that many people have found it natural - if not inescapable - to see a deliberative and directive mind behind those phenomena. The mind in question, being prior to nature itself, is typically taken to be supernatural. Philosophically inclined thinkers have both historically and at present labored to shape the relevant intuition into a more formal, logically rigorous inference. The resultant theistic arguments, in their various logical forms, share a focus on plan, purpose, intention and design, and are thus classified as teleological arguments (or, frequently, as arguments from or to design).

Although enjoying some prominent defenders over the centuries, such arguments have also attracted serious criticisms from a number of major historical and contemporary thinkers. Both critics and advocates are found not only among philosophers, but come from scientific and other disciplines as well. In the following discussion, major variant forms of teleological arguments will be distinguished and explored, traditional philosophical and other criticisms will be discussed, and the most prominent contemporary turns (cosmic fine tuning arguments, many-worlds theories, and the present Intelligent Design debate) will be tracked. Discussion will concluded with a brief look at one historically important non-inferential approach to the issue.
...
But as before, the issue turns in part upon the availability of alternative explanations. In this case, there are two discussed historically—necessity and chance. It could be claimed (a) that a cosmos having the appearance of being designed had to exist, that a universe like ours was virtually inevitable, or, more circumspectly, (b) that any cosmos in which intelligent beings found themselves would have to have some threshhold level of order and complexity, that being a necessary condition for the existence of any such observing intelligent beings to begin with. The former never gained substantial influence. The latter would be a version of a (Weak) Cosmological Anthropic Principle. While trivially true, such a principle has no explanatory power, and does not constitute a substantive alternative explanation. And although historically the idea of sheer chance production of a life-hospitable cosmos was occasionally injected into the discussion and although that was no doubt logically possible in some technical sense, few saw that suggestion as attractive. Barring any viable alternative, cosmic fine-tuning seems to many to constitute a live candidate for a design argument.

Emphasis in the original.
Weak Anthropic Principle
As cited in The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle by William Lane Craig.

WAP: The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable, but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.

[wgreen]

It seems to me that, as Lane's page points out, the WAP only weakens the fine-tuning argument if the Many Worlds Hypothesis (MWH) is true. Since the MWH is inherently untestable (with the exception of Tegmark's Quantum Suicide experiment--who's first?), this seems like a weak objection to the fine-tuning argument. It only serves to provide an alternative, with no way of discriminating between the two.

Occam's Razor might help (and might dispose of the MWH), though of course this principle is just a guide and not a real discriminator, so I would not use it in this way.



Bill

[QED]

It seems to me that, as Lane's page points out, the WAP only weakens the fine-tuning argument if the Many Worlds Hypothesis (MWH) is true. Since the MWH is inherently untestable (with the exception of Tegmark's Quantum Suicide experiment--who's first?), this seems like a weak objection to the fine-tuning argument. It only serves to provide an alternative, with no way of discriminating between the two.

There are though, a good many different MWH hypothesis. Some of these add real testability to the proposal (I'm doubtfull that Quantum Suicide can deliver conclusive results). Lee Smolin's Cosmic Natural Selection is a good example. But you're right Bill, until any test has been made the WAP only weakens the fine-tuning argument. What might be a little unfair however is to focus on the more bizarre MWH's such as Everetts -- for example the universe that we live in has a distinct horizon imposed by the finite speed of light -- beyond which we are cut-off from an unknown extent of space-time. All forms of causation from this region are decoupled from our region so we have no way of knowing what conditions may be like in the bulk of our own universe let alone any number of potential universes"outside" of the BB singularity.

Occam's Razor might help (and might dispose of the MWH), though of course this principle is just a guide and not a real discriminator, so I would not use it in this way.

Quite so, it's a difficult and dangerous tool to wield. If the notion is that “plurality should not be assumed without necessity” then we should first consider very carefully the nature of necessity. For example the Anthropic Principle demands a plurality of galaxies - even if only just one has one solar system containing life. The necessity of all this plurality might not be so obvious until one understands all the factors required to lead to the evolution of stars, planets and life in a finite time-frame.

[Bugmaster]

Actually, we don't need the MWH for the WAP to weaken the fine-tuning argument. There are at least a couple other objections I can think of:

* What about other intelligent aliens, with vastly different biologies from our own ? Are they possible in principle ? If so, then finding some of these aliens would weaken the fine-tuning argument. If these guys live on a Jupiter-like world, then the argument for the Earth being fine-tuned is weakened.

* If our Universe is fine-tuned to produce us, how come there aren't more of us ? We're pretty sure that no one's inhabiting the Alpha Centauri star system, for example, to say nothing of the rest of the planets in our own Solar system. Whoever was fine-tuning our Universe sure wasted a lot of space.

* QED actually stated the inverse of the above point in one of his threads (I think): there are tons more black holes than there are humans. Does this mean that the Universe was fine-tuned to produce black holes, and humans are just a by-product ?

* The fine-tuning argument, ultimately, falls prey to infinite regress. Assuming that our Universe is the only one in existence (i.e., the MWH is false), then who fine-tuned the fine-tuner, so that he could fine-tune us in return ?

[HughDP]

* If our Universe is fine-tuned to produce us, how come there aren't more of us ? We're pretty sure that no one's inhabiting the Alpha Centauri star system, for example, to say nothing of the rest of the planets in our own Solar system. Whoever was fine-tuning our Universe sure wasted a lot of space.

* QED actually stated the inverse of the above point in one of his threads (I think): there are tons more black holes than there are humans. Does this mean that the Universe was fine-tuned to produce black holes, and humans are just a by-product ?

Two good reasons to doubt intelligent design. Add to that the fact that billions of years passed before the Earth evolved intelligent life (why wait that long?) and one has to question the intelligence of any postulated designer (yeah, yeah - God works in mysterious ways etc.).

I don't think the WAP can be ignored. It has never struck me as being an 'athiest argument'; it's just so obvious that we're bound to notice conditions that are coincidental to life.

[QED]

I don't think the WAP can be ignored. It has never struck me as being an 'athiest argument'; it's just so obvious that we're bound to notice conditions that are coincidental to life.

Exactly! Thank you Hugh, yet this is precisely what is fuelling a large number of people's deepest convictions about there being a deliberate intention for there to be life. The WAP does not dismiss this as a possibility, but it does remove it as a necessity. Of all the observations that we can make when contemplating "the meaning of life" Monty Python fashion, I think this has to be one of the more sobering.

[island]

All I'm going to say is... Anthropic Dogma

http://evolutionarydesign.blogspot.com/ ... dogma.html

[QED]

All I'm going to say is... Anthropic Dogma

http://evolutionarydesign.blogspot.com/ ... dogma.html

Hello island

If the most accurate cosmological principle is biocentric in nature, then the principle is telling us the good physical reason why the forces are constrained in the manner that they are. This science should not be ignored because politics and misplaced perceptions about geocentric arrogance get in the way.

It's hard to see how to strike the right balance here. How can we meaningfully say that the most accurate cosmological principle is bio centric in nature when our very presence makes that a tautology? I'd very much like to hear your own opinion of this.

[island]

Hello QED,

ummm... I'm not absolutely positive that I understand what you're asking, but I think that I do.

The mistake that I see most commonly being made here is to equate the tautology to insignificance by ignoring the fact that the anthropic coincidences aren't simply tautologous, they are strange and unusual enough to cause leading physicists, like, Leonard Susskind, to make statements like:

'The "appearance" of design is undeniable...' or others to note that... "We may occupy a preferred place or preferred time in the Universe"

http://zebu.uoregon.edu/~imamura/209/ma ... ropic.html

We have no natural turbulance generated mechanism that explains why the universe doesn't have a higher rate of entropy than it does.

So the point that you're missing is that the AP is telling us something about that mechanism... and the most special implication is that we are it.

Ergo Wheeler's interpretation... although that one just cracks me up, at least it is "causality responsible"... unlike the other most popular jokes... hahaNot