The Necessity of Omniscience

[Shild]

Now, I am definitely not much of a mathematician, but I have recently seen a simple set of statements which claims to prove that God exists. here is the proof:

-Jim is a rational being which knows everything (i.e. Jim is omniscient).

-All rational beings believe in their own existence (i.e. Bugs Bunny believes Bugs Bunny exists, he is just mistaken).

-If Jim did not exist, then Jim would know it. However, this would contradict our second statement, so Jim (or some being with the same basic description) must exist.

Don't get me wrong; I know no atheist is going to start believing in God just because of this proof. I am starting this thread so people can discuss its actual value.

Question to Debate: Does this proof really have any value in determining the existence of God, or is it just a funny piece of semantic gymnastics?

Also: Is there a logical flaw here?

Note that we do not define the concept of existence. The idea of Bugs Bunny does, after all, exist.

Also, the basic assumptions. Does God really have to be rational? What about gods who are not necessarily omniscient (pantheism)? Is there such a thing as a rational entity which does not believe it exists?

Furthermore, even if it is valid, this proof only establishes the existence of a rational and omniscient being. Not an omnipotent or righteous entity.

Penny for your thoughts...

(Disclaimer: I am not saying I will actually pay you a penny for each of your posts)

[otseng]

One statement that stands out that doesn't make sense to me is...

-If Jim did not exist, then Jim would know it.

If Jim did not exist, how would Jim know it? If Jim did not exist, anything applied to Jim (including knowing) would be meaningless.

[Yahweh]

-Jim is a rational being which knows everything (i.e. Jim is omniscient).

-All rational beings believe in their own existence (i.e. Bugs Bunny believes Bugs Bunny exists, he is just mistaken).

-If Jim did not exist, then Jim would know it. However, this would contradict our second statement, so Jim (or some being with the same basic description) must exist.

...

Question to Debate: Does this proof really have any value in determining the existence of God, or is it just a funny piece of semantic gymnastics?

Does the proof have any value in determining the existence of God? Not in the least.

One of the problems with proofs of God which rely upon ontology is the fact those "ontological gods" only exist in Philosophy.


Just to show the uselessness of Ontology in relation to God:
P1 (stated as a truism): There is nothing which is greater than God.
P2 (stated as a truism): It is greater for God to exist in reality than as a concept
Conclusion: God exists in reality.

A lot of people seem to accept that proof as effectively establishing the existence of God. However, with a few minor alterations...
P1 (stated as a truism): There is nothing which is scarier than a big monsters.
P2 (stated as a truism): It is greater for monsters to exist in reality than as a concept.
Conclusion: Monsters exists in reality (and they are about to eat you).

Also: Is there a logical flaw here?

A rather obvious flaw: Premise 1 establishes that Jim exists. The conclusion is that Jim must exist. The argument is circular. (As unusual as it may sound at first, "I think therefore I exist" is not circular logic, yet "Jim thinks therefore Jim exists" is indeed circular.)

Premise 1 continues to describe that Jim is omniscient. This omniscience is a superfluous property. Many Philosophers agree with the idea that the first provable statement is "I exist", it is not necessary for Jim to be omniscient to observe his own existence.

Premise 3 states "if Jim did not exist, Jim would know know it". That is a logically contradictory statement, a being which does not exist cannot "know" its own non-existence.

Premise 3 continues states "If Jim did not exist, he would know it... however this would contradict premise 2 [that rational beings believe in their own existence]". I dont see how Jim's nonexistence contradicts the idea that rational beings believe in their own existence. It only contradicts Premise 2 if we presuppose the existence of Jim (of course that would effectively make the proof circular again).

Premises 1 and 3 do not logically lead to the conclusion that Jim exists.

[Abulafia]

-All rational beings believe in their own existence (i.e. Bugs Bunny believes Bugs Bunny exists, he is just mistaken).

The problem of existence and non-existent beings is a great one! It's been in the forefront of philosophy since Russell.

When making a non-existence statement, such as “Pegasus does not exist”, a challenge arises in interpretation: intuitively, the name of the entity whose existence I wish to deny must have meaning, otherwise the statement is meaningless. Yet intuitively a name typically refers to the entity named. When I say “Pegasus does not exist”, it seems I am making a statement about Pegasus, namely that he does not exist. Yet, if my statement is about Pegasus, the intuition runs, surely he must exist in order for me to talk about him at all.

Likewise, Shild's comment regarding Bugs Bunny presumes he can be a believer, an attribute reserved for things which exist. On the surface intuition tells us there's a meaning to the statement "Bugs Bunny mistakenly believes he exists". We can understand what it means. We understand what it is for Bugs Bunny to believe he exists, and we know that he does not exist, thus he must be mistaken (or so the intuition goes).

This argument blurs the line between fiction and reality by using semantics, attempting to get us to include both existent and non-existent beings in the domain of the "All rational beings". Yet there's other choices which don't give this paradox.

If you can separate the Referent and the Meaning of a phrase such as "Bugs Bunny" or "All Rational Beings", you can have the phrase be meaningful without "Bugs Bunny" or "God" referring to an entity.

Quine in his paper On What there Is offers the solution of treating proper names as descriptions.

"Bugs Bunny" as a name can then be treated as "The unique x which Bugs-Bunnifies" (it looks awkward, but does the trick)

With this new tool we look at the third premise:

-If Jim did not exist, then Jim would know it.

It becomes:

If there does not exist a unique X such that Jim(X), then there exists a unique Y such that Jim(Y) and Knows(Y,P) where P is the premise "Jim Exists".

This is clearly in and of itself a contradictory premise as it states:

If there does not exist a unique X such that Jim(X) then there DOES eixst a unique X such that Jim(X).

Or If P then ~P.

While one needn't go with Quine, but if one does not and wishes to speak in a manner capable of being treated logically, they have to offer semantic rules at least as strong as Quines in dealing with the problems of existence and non-existence.


In short, to answer the question of whether there is a logical flaw in the argument, I believe the answer is either:

A) Yes. There is a logical flaw in the argument
or
B) The question was not put forward in a systematic way which allows for treatment in a logical system.



As to the statement

-Note that we do not define the concept of existence. The idea of Bugs Bunny does, after all, exist.

Any definition we offer of existence should be one which can at least in theory differentiate between an idea of an entity and the entity to which that idea refers.

To quote from a paper I wrote earlier this year,

One proposed solution is that in a non-existence claim, the entity in question is an idea. Thus, when I say “Pegasus does not exist”, the entity referred to by “Pegasus” is the idea of Pegasus. Quine points out that one “never confuses the Parthenon with the Parthenon-idea. ” If we are typically able to distinguish between external entities and our ideas of them, this distinction should not be blurred when making a non-existence claim.

I hope these ramblings aren't too out of place. They seemed relevant, and it's a topic I'm totally fascinated by.

[mrmufin]

-All rational beings believe in their own existence (i.e. Bugs Bunny believes Bugs Bunny exists, he is just mistaken).

If Bugs Bunny believes in his own existence, how could he be mistaken? Or, how could a nonexistent entity have the capacity to believe anything, rational or otherwise?

-If Jim did not exist, then Jim would know it. However, this would contradict our second statement, so Jim (or some being with the same basic description) must exist.

I agree with otseng's response on this, and I'll raise it, too. If Jim did not exist, how could that nonexistence be effectively (or conclusively) known by the existing non-Jims?

Don't get me wrong; I know no atheist is going to start believing in God just because of this proof.

Which might just be an admission that this really isn't a proof at all...

Question to Debate: Does this proof really have any value in determining the existence of God, or is it just a funny piece of semantic gymnastics?

Given only those two choices, I'd vote for semantic gymnastics.

Also: Is there a logical flaw here?

I'd say so: the part about nonexistent Jim being aware of his own nonexistence is, IMO, the most glaring logical flaw.

Note that we do not define the concept of existence. The idea of Bugs Bunny does, after all, exist.

Agreed, but existence as a concept is discernable from existence in the physical realm. The fundamental theorem of algebra exists in concept, but not in the physical realm (it also provides a nice example of a useful, consistent mental construct which survives the interrogation of rigorous proof). However, I suspect that most theists would argue that the god(s) that they believe in are more than just mental constructs (or fictional characters, like Bugs Bunny, Harry Callahan, or Captain Janeway).

Also, the basic assumptions. Does God really have to be rational?

Not necessarily; God could be irrational (like pi, e, or the cubic root of 10), imaginary (like the square root of -4), or complex (in the form of a + bi). Sorry, but you left yourself wide open to my (occassionally geeky) sense of humor.

What about gods who are not necessarily omniscient (pantheism)? Is there such a thing as a rational entity which does not believe it exists?

I think this would depend on how you define rational. If I didn't believe that I existed, would that necessarily mean that I'm irrational? Is solipsism really that unfashionable?

Furthermore, even if it is valid, this proof only establishes the existence of a rational and omniscient being. Not an omnipotent or righteous entity.

Actually, I don't think the "proof" establishes the existence of anything at all. If it did, neither faith nor debate would remain meaningful.

Regards,
mrmufin