Good afternoon, Ionian_Tradition, and thank you for your thorough critiques. I anticipated one of them, but the others were novel to me, though I'm not sure I find them decisive. I appreciate your bringing them to my attention.
theopoesis wrote:
(1)
The Trinity: Though it is common to suggest that there are trinities in multiple religions, I am not convinced of the same through my reading in comparative religion. A triad is distinct from a Trinity. I am convinced that teleology helps us overcome Hume's objection that we cannot deduce "ought" from "is". We can do so through this logical form: If moral agent A wants outcome O, A ought to do O. If outcome O is the teleological purpose of that agent, and if failing to act according to one's purpose is in fact self-destructive, then we can formulate a moral system based on a mutual desire of agent A for his/her own benefit, and of God G (from whom teleology originates). It is cooperative in the Christian metaphysic, and it truly can move from is to ought.
Ionian_Tradition wrote:
While I grant that one can construct a rationale which would oblige one to act in accordance with one's teleological purpose, I do not believe the logical form you've put forward is sufficient in establishing an objective moral "ought" from the "is" of God's nature. The "ought" seems predicated upon a subjective desire to achieve the conditions attainable through O. If moral agent A subjectively desires an outcome which is conducive for actualizing the conditions only acquired through O, then it follows that that A "ought" to perform actions in keeping with O. Yet if, for any reason, moral agent A does not subjectively desire said conditions, it equally follows that A "ought not" perform actions in keeping with O. The "ought" is acquired through an analysis of A's subjective desires, from which a rational conclusion regarding how best to behave is derive. It is not derived from an objective obligation seated in God's nature. As such, it cannot be said that God's nature provides an "objective obligation" for man to act in accordance with his teleological purpose...Rather, it is a "rational obligation", produced from the subjective mind of man, which instructs human behavior according to the desires of the individual ...Desires which may or may not align with the purpose prescribed for man by God.
I believe it does show that there is a way to get from "is" to "ought", and also that we must qualify exactly what this way consists of. In the way I have formulated it, the obligation derives from the desires of human beings. If I want to have a relationship with God (and thereby to have existence, goodness, joy, and truth), then I ought to follow my purpose. But my purpose is given by God, and the specific character that I must therefore strive to develop through repeated specific moral actions is a character and set of actions derived from the character of God. So the moral system itself derives both from the character of God and from the will of humans.
In my "theological ethics" class in seminary, the professor, Sam Wells, suggested that there were three broad schools of theological ethics. The first, which he called the "universal" or the "dominant" strain indicated that there was a universal divine law which all peoples in all times and places were required to obey. Typically, this universal moral law was discernible through the help of reason. The second group was called "subversive ethics" and rooted ethics in a particular perspective overcoming what that perspective considered the pseudo-universal tradition. In this group would belong feminist theology, liberation theology (which is rooted in the perspective of the poor), black theology, mujerista theology, womanist theology, Latino/a theology, etc. The third group believed that ethics was made possible through a specific community, and denied any universally applicable law. However, the group also denied that the community must adopt a particular subversive perspective; Rather, the community is the church. Therefore, the third group is called "ecclesial ethics."
This is a very important distinction to draw. To be sure, my argument above would not preserve a universal ethic, and I am skeptical that it could preserve a subversive ethic. This is not to say that there aren't arguments that might do so, but rather that the arguments I am putting forward do not do so. And I do not think this is a problem. After all, the logical form I have presented above is taken from Alasdair MacIntyre, who is classified in the third group by Wells (and indeed is very influential on others in that group, such as Stanley Hauerwas). Others claim MacIntyre is a communitarian.
So what does that mean? That means that the moral system deriving from the character of God and from the willingness of humanity is a covenant, which establishes the moral obligation known as the law, a written explanation of the telos of humankind. This covenant is like a contract, entered through the mutual desires of both parties. The covenant with God should be attractive to all people, and the law is the source of joy (Psalm 119:16), truth (Psalm 119:30), and goodness (Psalm 119:30 -> just to show that these principles are in the Bible when it speaks of the law). As Paul says, "Indeed I would not have known what sin was except through the law" (Romans 7:7). Prior to the law, we are lawless (greek anomos - we are without a law), we have missed the mark (greek amartema), we are without worship (greek asebo), we are unrightous (greek adikos, which can mean "useless"), we have fallen away (greek parapipto), all of these things can be interpreted to indicate that we are not conforming to our purpose. We are
alogoi (Greek for lacking the logos, which can be reason or the ordering principle) according to Jude 1:10. But once we come into a relationship with God by our desire and according to our purpose, there is a specific way in which we must live: a moral system created by God's design and our desire. We are under the law as a guide (the greek word for this derives from pedagogy).
What of those who do not desire existence, goodness, beauty, and truth? They are then objects of God's wrath, which many Christians interpret to mean that they are given over to their desires (This is the language of Romans 1:24 for example). If they do not want existence, goodness, beauty, or truth, they are without a law, free to do anything, but destined to receive what they desire: hell, a place of evil and darkness, ugliness and suffering, deception and falsehood. Perhaps even a place of annihilation. The judgment towards those outside of the covenant is different than the judgement of those within the covenant, according to Biblical terms. The former are
anomos, without a law. "Their destiny is destruction, their god is their stomach, and their glory is in their shame. Their mind is on earthly things" (Philippians 3:19). The later are
paranomos, transgressors of the law. They are unable to fulfill their purpose despite their desire to fulfill their moral obligation, and they are dependent on God's grace.
I hope that opens up the possibility that your objection need not be a violation of MacIntyre's intention, Christian theology, or the Bible. Rather, a moral "ought" is derived from subjective rational understanding of what ought to be done if a person desires to fulfill his/her telos through truth, goodness, beauty, and existence, and the content of that telos is established according to the character of God.
I'd also like to make two theological foot notes. First, if we take the strongest reformed approach (double predestination), then God is behind the desires of those who want to fulfill their purpose, and of those who do not want to fulfill their purpose. I think such a formulation would introduce levels of God's purpose: there would be a
creative purpose which would include the intrinsic Augustinian design related to truth, goodness, beauty, and existence discussed above. Second, there would be a
salvific purpose, related to whether one fulfilled the creative purpose. Defending this would involve much more intense discussions of divine will, and of the relation between the divine will and divine character. I don't see the need to present this at the present time. However, it could resolve your claim that some people's desires would be against God's purpose. Perhaps they would be against the creative purpose, and therefore not a basis for moral obligation, but still according to God's salvific purpose.
Second, I'd like to note that natural law theory, along the lines of Aquinas, could perhaps suggest that the moral obligation which MacIntyre reduces to a communal moral obligation could be universally derived through reason. Certain desires are rationally superior, and as rational creatures we, given time, will come to possess these desires, which would then obligate us to certain acts to fulfill those desires. Thus, the God-bestowed rational principle, though subjective, can reach objective truth as to which moral obligation we rationally should select for ourselves. I'm not one to defend natural theology, but I do think that someone who believes it might be able to overcome the subjectivist objection you mentioned above in a different way than I have.
theopoesis wrote:
Now, suppose that you were to hold to a polytheistic view of the world, or an atheistic view. You could potentially run into problems with the teleological component of this whole metaphysic. If there were two distinct sources of creation, there could potentially be two distinct purposes, two distinct teleologies, and two distinct moral systems. Therefore, for moral coherence, we would need to posit a single source of teleology: monotheism.
Ionian_Tradition wrote:
If teleology is prescribed by the mind of God through conscious volition, then the same problem which exists for polytheism exists for trinitarian monotheism given that at least two members of the trinity (father and son) have been shown in scripture to possess separate and distinct minds which harbor mutually independent wills (John 6:38 & Luke 22:42 come to mind). It follows then that it is at least possible for two, or even three, distinct teleologies to emerges from these minds. If we contend that the minds which comprise the trinity prescribe teleology through shared consensus, or some heirarchical authoritative structure within the trinity through which decisions are filtered, then I fail to see why the same could not be true for a polytheistic account of teleology. This would seem to render the notion that moral coherency can only be acquired through trinitarian monotheism more or less unsubstantiated.
Orthodox theology would, in fact, make things more complicated than this even. First, orthodox theology, in claiming that Father, Son, and Spirit are all Persons, would claim that each would have three wills as three divine Persons. To complicate things more, in the incarnation, Jesus took on the fullness of human nature. To quote a rather famous patristic maxim from Gregory of Nazianzus: "That which he did not assume, he did not redeem." Thus, contrary to the later heresy of monothelitism (Greek for "one will"), Jesus had two wills: a human and a divine. Thus, we have four wills to consider. The question remains whether it is possible for these four wills to will something different, and thereby to create several
teloi, or purposes, for human kind.
I'll address the matter of the incarnation first. (And let the reader be advised that much of patristic and even later theology would interpret John 6:38 and Luke 22:42 as referring to the human will in Jesus). To put it very briefly, the traditional view is that the human will in Jesus submitted perfectly to the divine will in Jesus. I recognize that there are philosophical problems arising from this, and I am ready to address some of them. But for now let me note that, if the assertion stands, then the human will need not be a problem for current purposes.
I will respond to the three divine wills in two ways. First, I will point out the theological category that theologically resolves the challenge, and then I will note some philosophical points that may validate the theological claim.
Theologically, one way that the unity of the Trinity is described is called
perichoresis (in Greek), or
circumincessio (in Latin). There's not a great English translation, but Ive heard "mutual interpenetration" comes close. I'll just stick with perichoresis. Anyway, the doctrine claims that all three Persons of the Trinity work in perfect harmony in everything they do. To cite a few brief examples, we see the scriptures attribute activity to the Father, Son and Spirit in creating. Likewise, Jesus claims he was sent by the Father, by the Spirit, and by his own will. The Spirit is sent by the Father, by the Son, and it goes where it wishes. And so forth. The basic doctrine would declare that, by virtue of being the Trinity, the three Persons and the three wills are going to act in agreement, and therefore there can't be a conflicting
telos in the same way that there could be with polytheism.
How would we philosophically justify the doctrine of perichoresis? The first thing to note is that the doctrine has an ontological basis. The Three Persons are eternal hypostasizations of One Being. There is One God, who is Tri-Personal. The unity is then based not just in their shared activity, but in their shared nature and being. That's already a step above polytheism.
We must then consider the divine nature. If the nature has the attribute "omniscient", then the three Persons all know all things. If each Person is also a perfect hypostasization of the divine character, and thereby of goodness, then the three will all know the course of action that is most good in a situation and will thereby perfectly do the course of action which is most good because of the divine character. All three will therefore cooperate.
But, one might object, does this mean that God does not have the free will to act sinfully, and thereby be an imperfect hypostasization of the divine nature, and thereby break up the doctrine of perichoresis? The answer given by the philosophy of religion is that, since God is omniscient, and since God has foreknowledge, then God already knows, or more precisely, the three persons already know, what course of action they will take in all future events. If God ever will take a less than perfect course of action, God already knows. And if God already knows this but has not changed it, God already is less than morally perfect. But we claim that God is already morally perfect, which would suggest (even entail?) that God will always be morally perfect. Therefore, the doctrine of perichoresis stands.
Now, I do believe that this would make Trinitarian monotheism different from polytheism in several ways. First, surveying the polytheistic religions I am aware of, I see none of them claiming a doctrine similar to perichoresis. Even if they philosophically could claim this, it seems they don't and therefore they risk multiple teleologies in a way that Christianity doesn't. Second, I see no philosophical basis for a doctrine similar to perichoresis in polytheistic religion. It seems the different Gods are just that: different. They have different natures (and in the case of dualistic religions, they have opposite natures). Therefore, it would seem that they would instantiate persons with very different modes of existence. They certainly would not draw on a single identical nature to form a single being in the way the Trinity does. Of course, someone following a polytheistic religion could put forward an argument to defend the unity of telos, and then we could assess its validity. But, for now, I am unaware of such an argument or of how I might construct one myself. Third, some polytheistic religions ascribe creation to a single god, which would be a form of henotheism which might allow for one telos. Then I believe such a henotheistic form of polytheism would fall subject to my comments on love, noted below.
theopoesis wrote:
Having done so, we run into the Euthyphro dilemma, which argues from a false dichotomy that morality would be meaningless if derived from God. I resolve this dilemma through the suggestion that God acts according to his character. In patristic thought, you could explain this by claiming that God's actions are Personal, and undertaken by the Three Persons of the Trinity, who are perfect hypostasizations of the divine nature and character. Thus, they work in perfect harmony according to a real moral standard that is not contingent on their will nor is external to their nature (thereby defeating Euthyphro as I understand it).
Ionian_Tradition wrote:
If the standard of human morality is rooted in God's nature and character then it follows that every action which is conducive with God's nature and character is by definition "moral" or "good". Therefore, it can never be said that anything which is conducive with God's nature and character is "immoral" if emulated by man. Yet in scripture we observe a quality which is conducive with the nature and character of God which would not be considered moral if emulated by man:
Deuteronomy 32:35
To me belongeth vengeance and recompense; their foot shall slide in due time: for the day of their calamity is at hand, and the things that shall come upon them make haste.
Romans 12:19
Do not take revenge, my friends, but leave room for God's wrath, for it is written: "Vengeance belongeth to me; I will repay," says the Lord.
Proverbs 20:22
Do not say, "I'll pay you back for this wrong!" Wait for the LORD, and he will deliver you.
It seems apparent that what is conducive with the nature and character of God (vengeance) is not permitted, and therefore, immoral for man to replicate. As such, it cannot be said that God's nature and character forms the standard which instructs human morality. Morality, in this context, is measured by whether or not a man remains obedient to God's command. Thus the Euphythro dilemma stands.
This is a fascinating objection. I think it's mistaken in assuming that if human morality's content is based on God's character, then human morality must be identical to divine morality.
Let's say that it is a moral truth that "if one is omniscient, and perfectly good, one is qualified to judge." Human beings are not omniscient, nor perfectly good, therefore they would not be qualified to judge. It would seem that this statement could apply to both humans and God and yield different moral actions to be undertaken by each. God's communication in telling humans not to judge need not be the source of that moral truth, nor of a particular moral obligation not to judge. Rather, it could just be the presentation of that truth to humans.
Let me see if I can explain in Augustinian terms: If God's nature is omniscient, God's judgment is simply stating what is true: someone who is sinful is "off the mark", or not fulfilling their purpose, and therefore is tending toward non-being, and as a result of this move away from God is tending toward despair, falsehood, and evil. A human being, created in the image of God, but not created as God, is not omniscient. Therefore, human judgment might not be a statement of something true. If this judgment is a statement of falsehood, and if such a statement turns one away from God and therefore away from existence, then such a statement would lead one (1) to not fulfill one's God-given purpose; (2) to not fulfill the "ought" of covenantal moral obligation derived from that purpose; and (3) to reduce the extent to which one reflects the character of God as the image of God by reducing one's degree of existence as that image.
I believe that such a formulation would explain why different moral courses of action would be taken, while still explaining how moral obligation is rooted in a shared human and divine desire, in telos, and ultimately in the character of God and not His command. I could be wrong.
theopoesis wrote:
The trinity is necessary first because without the three persons instantiating the same nature, there could be division and teleology would break down. But why not simple monotheism, as in Islam or Judaism?
The answer is in considering that "God is love." If we defeat Euthyphro by referring to God's character, then we would hope that God's character was loving in order to maintain any degree of morality as we know it.
Ionian_Tradition wrote:
This is a rather small quibble but if morality is rooted in God's character then we should "hope" nothing in regard to what characteristics ought be manifested within that character. "Love" being an attribute of God's character is more or less circumstantial in this context. If malice or deceit happened to be attributes of God's intrinsic character then these qualities would be "moral" by definition. If we maintain that love, by its own nature, is intrinsically "good", and its antithesis is intrinsically "evil", and that God's character must reflect a character of love and not malice in order to be considered truly moral, then your argument will have found its negation.
I think this part of my argument is less a philosophical argument, and more an appeal to what we already know. This would be an appeal to what Christians would call general revelation, or prevenient grace. If anything is moral, love is moral, and if morality finds its basis in God's nature and character, then God's nature and character is loving, and the Trinity makes this possible in a way that sharp monotheism doesn't. It's more intuitive based on the fact that we know love is good, not on any philosophical necessity (though some would argue as much, such as Bernard Lonergan I believe). I'm not talking about possible worlds, about what could be good, but rather about what we all think
is good, in the world we live in with the God who, I believe, exists in this world.