Some thoughts on the Euthyphro dilemma

[shinydarkrai94]

I've been thinking about the Euthyphro dilemma lately and I made a response a few days ago to an atheist on YouTube named TheoreticalBS and his comments on the Euthyphro dilemma (if you want to watch it, it's right here: In this thread I'd like to elaborate on some of those ideas and discuss my solution to the dilemma.


The Euthyphro dilemma is as follows:

“Is something moral because God commands it or does God command it because it is moral?�

It is asserted that both of these possibilities are problematic. One objection to the first possibility is that this opens up the possibility of abhorrent commands. In one possible world, God would command that we should love our neighbor, but what is to prevent him from commanding that we should torture innocent babies for our pleasure?

It is said that the second possibility would be problematic because that would mean that morality is independent of God. If morality is independent of God, then you don't need theism for morality.

The typical apologetic response to this is that neither of these options are accurate. Instead, something is moral because it is in God's nature. I would agree that this is more accurate. If we were to say that something is moral BECAUSE God commands it, that would imply that God's commands are the ultimate standard of morality. But from a Christian worldview, God bases his commands from his nature.

Some have claimed that this does not free us from the Euthyphro dilemma. They have argued that a new Euthyphro dilemma can be proposed:

“Is something moral because it is in God's nature or is it in God's nature because it is moral?�

Of these two, I accept the first option. Things are moral because they are in God's nature. This option is still subject to the objections raised against the proposal that things are moral because they are commanded by God, but I don't any of them convincing problems.

In this thread, I will mainly cover one objection, the one that I previously mentioned. That is, if things are good solely because they are in God's nature, then why couldn't God have had a different nature, one which would obligate us to torture innocent babies, for instance?


Arbitrary morality in different worlds

I have two problems with the claim that the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma leads to arbitrary morality (in this sense).

My first problem is that this claim relies upon the assertion that moral facts remain the same in every possible world. If this assertion is false, then a world in which we are morally obligated to torture innocent babies for fun would be possible, and thus choosing this first possibility of the Euthyphro dilemma would not really be problematic. Personally, I don't see a lot of problems with moral facts varying in hypothetical possible worlds, except that we may feel that this couldn't be true.

The second problem that I have is that this makes morality arbitrary only in the case of a God who has a nature that could vary in different worlds. In other words, this first option wouldn't be a problem for Christian morality because if Yahweh's nature was different, then we simply wouldn't define him as Yahweh. In every possible world in which morality is dependent upon Yahweh's nature, moral facts will stay the same.

So let's say that Yahweh's nature is the same in every possible world in which he exists. Another potential objection would be that if this were the case, then God's nature wouldn't really be the ultimate source of morality, but it would be the things that God's nature is based upon (like love, forgiveness, etc). If this were the case, then God wouldn't be necessary for morality. This is a bad argument though. Yes, you can describe God's nature in a different way by figuring out what the criteria are for 'being in God's nature', but if God's nature were different or if God didn't exist, then those criteria would be meaningless. It would no longer be true that love, forgiveness, etc are objectively moral (unless we're considering a Platonistic world with the same moral facts). The only reason why love, forgiveness, etc are considered moral is because that's what God's nature is.

Arbitrary standard

Is there a reason or justification for God's nature being the way that it is or is it simply arbitrary? In this case, I would say that God's nature must be arbitrary and this isn't a problem. Any objective moral standard must be arbitrary, actually. If there was a further explanation of the ultimate standard for morality, then we would have to ask what the reason for that standard is...on and on into infinite regress. It has to stop somewhere and no matter what, the standard will be arbitrary in this sense. This is true regardless of whether we hold a Christian view of morality, a Platonistic view of morality or whether we simply reject the idea of objective morality altogether. In Christianity, the ultimate standard would be God's nature. In Platonism, the ultimate standard would be whatever moral facts happen to exist eternally. Without objective morality, the standard is whatever the person decides it to be (least amount of suffering, for example). The main difference between objective morality and subjective morality is that if we lived in a world with objective morality, it would actually be true that our actions were morally right or wrong.

[Thatguy]

What was it that imbued God's nature with these particular morals? If a god did not create its own moral code, could we not imagine an even greater god, one who did choose its own moral values? If, somehow, God's nature was imbued with these moral values, could the same process not have imbued the universe directly with these values? If different gods are possible in different universes, is a universe with no gods possible as well?
If morality is arbitrary, can it really be called good? If morality just happens to be what it is in this universe by chance, then I'd think we could say that we aren't bound by it. A morality produced by chance hardly seems necessary to believe in since it is no better than any of the other possible moralities. It is the moral view, but it ought not be.

[shinydarkrai94]

What was it that imbued God's nature with these particular morals?

The essential character or nature of something is not 'imbued'.

If a god did not create its own moral code, could we not imagine an even greater god, one who did choose its own moral values?

Why would the action of choosing one's moral values make you greater? A God that is unable to contradict his moral values (since they are part of his nature) is consistent with the definition of omnnipotent (which I think is best defined as 'able to do everything that is logically coherent').

If, somehow, God's nature was imbued with these moral values, could the same process not have imbued the universe directly with these values? If different gods are possible in different universes, is a universe with no gods possible as well?

I don't know. I would assume that it is possible.

If morality is arbitrary, can it really be called good? If morality just happens to be what it is in this universe by chance, then I'd think we could say that we aren't bound by it. A morality produced by chance hardly seems necessary to believe in since it is no better than any of the other possible moralities. It is the moral view, but it ought not be.

If objective morality exists and it is arbitrary and produced by chance, I still think that you would be obligated to do whatever that standard dictates. After all, moral oughts start with an 'ought', not an 'is'. They provide the basis for what we ought to do so it would only be rational to follow them, regardless of whether other universes could have a different standard.

Reading over my post again, there's only one statement that I've recently been reconsidering--the sentence, "Personally, I don't see a lot of problems with moral facts varying in hypothetical possible worlds, except that we may feel that this couldn't be true." I've recently read an epistemological defense of our moral intuition. I'm not totally convinced, but if there is reason that our moral intuition is correct, then the view that moral facts could vary in our universe could be reasonably rejected.

[Quath]

It sounds like you may wind up with a fine tuning problem. Why was this God created when another God could have existed with different morals? If only one God could exist with only one kind of morality, then it seems that God is forced to have certain morals.

[shinydarkrai94]

It sounds like you may wind up with a fine tuning problem. Why was this God created when another God could have existed with different morals? If only one God could exist with only one kind of morality, then it seems that God is forced to have certain morals.

I don't think that an eternal God could be created. Saying that God is 'forced to have certain morals' isn't totally accurate. I think it would be better to say that it's possible that it is necessary for God to have certain morals.

[Thatguy]

It sounds like you may wind up with a fine tuning problem. Why was this God created when another God could have existed with different morals? If only one God could exist with only one kind of morality, then it seems that God is forced to have certain morals.

I don't think that an eternal God could be created. Saying that God is 'forced to have certain morals' isn't totally accurate. I think it would be better to say that it's possible that it is necessary for God to have certain morals.

If God could have had a different nature, I'm wondering how we could call the nature he happens to have "essential." Wouldn't essential imply that without these particular attributes he would not be God? If his moral code could have been different and he'd still be God, then why couldn't he change his morals and still be God?

If God had to have this particular set of morals, then the Euthyphro problem seems to me to remain. The morals are the only morals He could have, he is powerless to define them. Saying that they are god's morals because they are good and they are good because they are god's morals sounds circular.

[shinydarkrai94]

It sounds like you may wind up with a fine tuning problem. Why was this God created when another God could have existed with different morals? If only one God could exist with only one kind of morality, then it seems that God is forced to have certain morals.

I don't think that an eternal God could be created. Saying that God is 'forced to have certain morals' isn't totally accurate. I think it would be better to say that it's possible that it is necessary for God to have certain morals.

If God could have had a different nature, I'm wondering how we could call the nature he happens to have "essential." Wouldn't essential imply that without these particular attributes he would not be God? If his moral code could have been different and he'd still be God, then why couldn't he change his morals and still be God?

If God had to have this particular set of morals, then the Euthyphro problem seems to me to remain. The morals are the only morals He could have, he is powerless to define them. Saying that they are god's morals because they are good and they are good because they are god's morals sounds circular.

If a god x has a different nature from god y, then they are not the same beings. So God can't change his morals.

I'm not saying that God's nature is the way it is because that nature is good. Actually, if there were a reason for God's nature (i.e. God's nature is the way it is because it causes less suffering), then that would be relying on an external standard and God's nature would not be the ultimate standard of morality. I'm arguing that God's nature is the ultimate standard to judge things. So instead we might say, "causing less suffering is good because it is in God's nature". (Note: that's just a hypothetical--I'm not arguing in this thread that God's nature is to cause the least amount of suffering because it will lead to discussions about Biblical evil that are offtopic).

[Ionian_Tradition]

You say the nature of Yahweh is the standard of human morality...I must confess, I have my doubts.

However in an attempt to perhaps quell my doubts I submit this simple test which I believe will help us determine whether or not Yahweh's nature is indeed the standard of human morality:

Is there an attribute, aspect or quality intrinsic to Yahweh's nature which would be immoral if reflected in human beings?

For instance, is it in Yahweh's nature to take vengeance upon those who have offended him/her/it? Is it moral for man to do the same? Or is it in Yahweh's nature to punish infants for the crimes of their family or community? Is it moral for man to do the same? If it is in Yahweh's nature to do these things yet it remains immoral for man to emulate this conduct, then it is clear that what is within Yahweh's nature is not the standard of human morality. The moral quality of human conduct will then require measurement by some different standard.

What say you?

[shinydarkrai94]

You say the nature of Yahweh is the standard of human morality...I must confess, I have my doubts.

However in an attempt to perhaps quell my doubts I submit this simple test which I believe will help us determine whether or not Yahweh's nature is indeed the standard of human morality:

Is there an attribute, aspect or quality intrinsic to Yahweh's nature which would be immoral if reflected in human beings?

Since we are assuming for the moment that there is objective morality rooted in God's nature, then no, there is nothing in God's nature that would be immoral if reflected in human beings. This is true by definition.

For instance, is it in Yahweh's nature to take vengeance upon those who have offended him/her/it? Is it moral for man to do the same? Or is it in Yahweh's nature to punish infants for the crimes of their family or community? Is it moral for man to do the same? If it is in Yahweh's nature to do these things yet it remains immoral for man to emulate this conduct, then it is clear that what is within Yahweh's nature is not the standard of human morality. The moral quality of human conduct will then require measurement by some different standard.

What say you?

Your descriptions of Yahweh's actions are far too vague because there isn't any context. My contention is that it is in Yahweh's nature to avoid causing more suffering than necessary ultimately. Is it logically possible for Yahweh to do things which cause a lot of suffering that may seem unnecessary, and yet, for Yahweh to cause less suffering overall? Of course.

[Ionian_Tradition]

If objective morality exists and it is arbitrary and produced by chance, I still think that you would be obligated to do whatever that standard dictates. After all, moral oughts start with an 'ought', not an 'is'. They provide the basis for what we ought to do so it would only be rational to follow them, regardless of whether other universes could have a different standard.

Were lies the objective moral standard that provides human beings with an objective obligation to act in accordance with God's nature? God's nature might be "good" tautologically but you've yet to point to an objective obligation for a human being to strive to be like God? Perhaps the reply would be " God commands that we reflect his nature...therefore we ought to do so", but If God commands that men act in accordance with his nature, is this not merely the subjective mind of God subjectively desiring that men reflect his own nature? We've yet to see an objective reason why one "ought" to acquiesce to the desires of a fundamentally subjective being (God). The only motivation which might prompt man to fashion his conduct in conformance with God's nature would be acquired through some form of coercion...but such is anything but an OBJECTIVE obligation to be like God.

I believe this underscores the problem with appealing to God's nature as the source of human morality. When "good" is rendered little more than a descriptive label describing God's nature, it becomes meaningless in that it alone cannot instruct behavior. Without an objective obligation to act in accordance with God's nature we're left bereft of any objective reason why we ought to do "good" and not the contrary.