How Brutish are Brute Facts?

[harvey1]

QED and I started discussing this subject on the nature of brute facts on another thread in the Christianity sub-forum. However, I wanted to make this discussion a separate thread so we can fully explore this subject matter:

The cost of atheism is that we have to believe something is a brute fact that happens to be the most complex object we have ever observed. In fact, so complex is it, that we can't come anywhere close to emulating such a design using supercomputers and the like, yet you expect us to believe such a departure from parsimony as being parsimonious!

I have pointed out to you often that this argument carries no weight because the nature of discovery and human understanding is fickle. It is an indisputable fact that we frequently miss that which is right-in-front-of-our-noses because we are often using the wrong tools or mindset. This is, after all, what we keep accusing each other with in many of our discsussions. So I am adamant that we cannot use our lack of savvy to assess the possibility or complexity of an unknown entity.

Let me put your argument in a more formal form so it is easier for me to point out the fallacious nature of that argument:

1. Brute facts are needed in every ultimate explanation of the world
2. The brute fact for atheism is that there is a (meta)universe
3. There are no prescriptive laws that determine or restrict brute facts
4. We have no way to evaluate the complexity, likelihood, or probability of this (meta)universe brute fact to bring about universes such as our own
5. There's no reason based on (4) to believe that it ought to be obvious or simple to simulate a world which naturally produces complexity that in principle can bring about universes such as our own
6. The observable universe can naturally be explained in terms of a brute fact (meta)universe that is allowed to evolve over time such that at some point in this process our universe naturally appears
7. The brute fact (meta)universe, according to (6), is a natural explanation
8. Occam's razor requires that we believe the most parsimonious explanation--which translates into a natural explanation

...9C. The universe is a consequence of a brute fact (meta)universe needing no God to explain its existence: God is unlikely to exist

Now, I'm sure you would like to make changes to the above argument, however I think no matter how you change it, it is a faulty argument. For example, (3) appears to contradict (4). If there are no prescriptive law limitations that determine the brutish nature of your brute fact (meta)universe, then absolutely anything is possible even brute fact scenarios that do not lead to universes with sophisticated structures. However, if anything is possible, then we do have a means to gauge likelihood. We have many conceptions of behaviors that the (meta)universe could have exhibited as a brute fact behavior. There are literally thousands or millions of behaviors that we can imagine that would never produce a universe such as our own. Hence, it appears the likelihood of a (meta)universe having a behavior that evolves sophisticated structures as our own looks diminishing small compared to the large number of brute fact (meta)universes that would not do anything of the sort. Hence, (4) is false. If (4) is false, the (5) is false. If (5) is false, then this is not a parsimonious solution (7), and hence it violates Occam's razor ( 8 ), and therefore not only is your conclusion false, but any explanation that doesn't violate Occam's razor should be more likely to be considered true (e.g., a belief in an Omniscient Interpeter, God).

If the [meta]universe was to evolve, it had to allow complex structures to evolve. This behavior cannot be programmed, not anything close. I realize you think that there might be a set of behaviors out there that a 1-billion line cellular automata algorithm could accurately simulate which does the trick, but that still doesn't answer why the metauniverse didn't have a behavior that a 10 line cellular automata algorithm would describe (e.g., a "beacon" metauniverse). Why do we not live in a beacon universe? We know your answer: "because we don't." But, that is not a good answer.

Do you deny that the majority of the worlds cosmologists working today are willing to accept scenarios where this is not the only universe that ever existed? If it rarely came up for serious consideration, that might make it "not a good answer" but I think you'll find it is a better answer than that.

QED, you're mixing up this issue. Cosmologists proceed based on prescriptive laws that other universes are likely given those prescriptive laws (e.g., quantum cosmological laws, or inflationary laws due to quantum laws, etc.). What you are saying of a brute fact (meta)universe has absolutely nothing in common with these scientific theories. You aren't basing your views on any law. You are basing it on a brute fact that has no prescriptive law that determines its truth or falsity. In fact, it is very difficult for me to access how it is that a principle of parsimony is even a concern for you since a principle of parsimony would be a prescriptive law, and you say there are no prescriptive laws. So, why do you limit brute facts to a principle of parsimony as a prescriptive law? Of course, if you don't do that, then your view becomes an irrational view, and as we agree, if there is a rational explanation and an irrational explanation, we are obligated to give precedence to the rational explanation.

[QED]

Let me put your argument in a more formal form so it is easier for me to point out the fallacious nature of that argument.

Before I even start to think about defending your interpretation of my argument I want to clear up a couple of matters with you. First I want a resolution of the matter concerning the lack of ability of our technologists being used as a measure of how complex or impossible something is. Putting your argument in a more formal form will help me point out the fallacious nature of your argument:

1. Our smartest geniuses can't figure out how to do X
2. X must be incredibly complicated or impossible

Clearly 2 does not follow from 1 as it took something in the order of two million years for our technologists to figure out the principles of aviation.

Next I would like to resolve the significance of unknowns in the assessment of parsimony...

parsimony is how we decide between unknowns.

I have expressed a strong disagreement with this statement of yours saying...

If there are two hypothesis up for consideration then they must both be complete if they are to be assessed for parsimony. The only "unknown" that is involved is which hypothesis is to be the chosen one. Any unknowns within the hypothesis themselves represent an opportunity to get a Trojan Horse through the gates, within which there might be excessive baggage that would evade being counted.

Your reply was...

Can you give me some examples of complete hypotheses? For example, is General Relativity a complete theory of gravity even at quantum scales? Is quantum mechanics a complete theory even in terms of explaining why it is that we are not all in superposition (i.e., Schrodinger's cat)?

Which hits the nail on the head exactly. All roads lead back to Rome eventually, so there is no such thing as a complete hypothesis. This is why I said this several pages earlier in that topic...

In order to compare levels of parsimony we have to be able to evaluate the 'cost' of a given explanation. I like to think of it in golfing terms... now you tell me how we figure out what's par for this course.

Naturally you would like to claim that God is a 'hole in one' but that's too easy. Like cheating. Of course it's impossible to assign an absolute cost to these concepts. But we can talk in relative terms which is why I say that by cancelling out the bute facts of the existence of God and the (meta)universe, in the theistic case, we are still left with the step of God creating the universe out of universe ingredients. This means the atheistic case will always win by a birdie.

Now you objected to this assessment of mine, but first I want to know if you agree that your statement "parsimony is how we decide between unknowns" is infact incorrect.

I'm really keen to see a resolution of these matters that both have a significant bearing on the question of brute fact

[harvey1]

Putting your argument in a more formal form will help me point out the fallacious nature of your argument:

1. Our smartest geniuses can't figure out how to do X
2. X must be incredibly complicated or impossible

Clearly 2 does not follow from 1 as it took something in the order of two million years for our technologists to figure out the principles of aviation.

Ah, I see why you misunderstand me, this is not my argument! Let me state my argument:

1. Y equals the complexity of a brute fact universe (low Y = extremely low complexity, high Y = medium to high complexity)
2. Low Y means that the complexity of the universe is probably too high for our smartest geniuses to quickly figure out how to do X
3. Our smartest geniuses can't quickly figure out how to do X
4. Therefore, by (2) and (3), our brute fact (meta)universe would require that we expect a high Y value
5. There are no restrictions that forbid Y from holding any value
6. The principle of parsimony requires that a brute fact (meta)universe more than likely possess a low Y value
7. Therefore, by (5) and (6), our brute fact (meta)universe is such that it is likely to have a low Y value
8. Therefore, our brute fact (meta)universe is unlikely given (7) and not to be expected (4)
9. The possible values for Y can conceivably be in the millions
10. The principle of parsimony requires that we rule out extremely unlikely possibilities

...11C. Thus, given ( 8 ), (9), and (10), we must rule out a (meta)brute fact universe as a reasonable possibility

Notice that there's a conclusion that shows that the required (meta) brute fact universe is unlikely and unexpected ( 8 ), and then another conclusion that shows that it is not even reasonable for us to postulate a (meta)brute fact universe (11C).

Which hits the nail on the head exactly. All roads lead back to Rome eventually, so there is no such thing as a complete hypothesis. This is why I said this several pages earlier in that topic...

I agree, there is no such thing as a complete hypothesis. So, does that mean that you agree that parsimony must decide between incomplete theories?

Now you objected to this assessment of mine, but first I want to know if you agree that your statement "parsimony is how we decide between unknowns" is infact incorrect.

I don't think it is incorrect. Parsimony is how we choose between two competing views that are incomplete. It is, of course, always possible to make any view complete by adding sub-theories to explain discrepancies, but sub-theories are needed because the theory is incomplete. For example, quantum mechanics does not explain why the classical world is not in superposition. There are sub-theories of quantum mechanics (e.g., decoherence) which attempt to provide that explanation. Quantum mechanics, though, as a theory, is incomplete. Perhaps someday someone will discover a quantum theory which will encompass quantum mechanics, and that theory will be complete in terms of why the classical world is not in superposition, but that theory is lacking. Therefore, when you have incomplete theories, you absolutely must use a parsimony principle to evaluate what you do when you have two competing incomplete theories that have daughter theories which try and explain the areas where they are each incomplete. If one is more parsimonious, then that theory is to be favored because it requires less ad hoc structure (i.e., less in the way of daughter theories).

Although, I really don't want to discuss the philosophy of science in this new thread I just made. I want to discuss your assertion that I am using an invalid argument with respect to the complexity of a (meta)universe as being unlikely given our inability to easily demonstrate a cellular automata program or simulation to show how straightforward the brute fact world should evolve in principle to start worlds like our own. I hope it is not your intent to use this PoS issue as a diversion.

[QED]

Putting your argument in a more formal form will help me point out the fallacious nature of your argument:

1. Our smartest geniuses can't figure out how to do X
2. X must be incredibly complicated or impossible

Clearly 2 does not follow from 1 as it took something in the order of two million years for our technologists to figure out the principles of aviation.

Ah, I see why you misunderstand me, this is not my argument!

No Harvey, it is your argument. That's where I got it from Do you want me to trawl back through all the instances of you using it in other debates? You frequently use something like the fact that we cannot kick-off our own evolving universe in a computer simulation as a measure of probability or complexity.

If this is as close as one can get to a resolution of an argument with you then I get the feeling that I'm just being strung-along here. I don't think there is much doubt in anyone's minds here that you are one of the most skillful debaters on these forums. Your skills run circles around my own. But this is not what should win the day if we are to come to some sort of truth. You want me to see it your way, that's fine. I'm not quite the caricature that you make of me. I am a (retired) scientist so I am used to latching onto ideas and unlatching just as readily. But paradigm shifts aren't going to come through to me on the back of your clever methods of maintaining your position. Rather than feed me 11 premises to demonstrate your skill in repairing an invalid argument, why not build my confidence by conceding that our lack of ability to program computers to emulate something is no useful measure of how complex or impossible that something is (although it is useful if we do actually manage to do it -- this is not an unwarranted bias, it is simply a question of proof positive at work).

Let me state my argument:

1. Y equals the complexity of a brute fact universe (low Y = extremely low complexity, high Y = medium to high complexity)

And so you go on, but this is a specific case that you are attempting to construct. I am determined to get you to address the general case that our "inability to tie our own shoelaces in a mirror" (remember that?) should not be used as a measure of anything.

Which hits the nail on the head exactly. All roads lead back to Rome eventually, so there is no such thing as a complete hypothesis. This is why I said this several pages earlier in that topic...

I agree, there is no such thing as a complete hypothesis. So, does that mean that you agree that parsimony must decide between incomplete theories?

No, this is the whole point: Parsimony can't be used as a measure of an 'open ended' system. I really think this is just too obvious. To close a system can be reasonable in some cases, if we are considering classical events for example, then we don't have to consider Joe's homework quantum tunneling its way into the dog as an excuse. Joe's teacher could rightly use parsimony to conclude that Joe simply couldn't be bothered to do his homework. But in the case of t<=0 we are, by definition, considering an open system so parsimony has to be applied with great care.

Now you objected to this assessment of mine, but first I want to know if you agree that your statement "parsimony is how we decide between unknowns" is infact incorrect.

I don't think it is incorrect. Parsimony is how we choose between two competing views that are incomplete.

There is obviously some confusion here. Let's take this slowly: Parsimony is a measure of the complexity of any given explanation. Occams razor uses this as input when deciding between alternative explanations agreed?

[harvey1]

No Harvey, it is your argument. That's where I got it from

It's the kernel of my argument, that is, (3) and (4) of my last post. Without those statements being true, I cannot justify my conclusions. However, you have not commented in detail on either of my arguments I made in this thread. Why don't you look it over and get back to me? I think it is very important that you understand what I'm saying here.

...I am used to latching onto ideas and unlatching just as readily.

In this case it is your philosophy that is at stake. It is very rare for someone to change their fundamental philosophy, even with very good argument. Unfortunately this is why ideological mindsets are very tough to change.

Rather than feed me 11 premises to demonstrate your skill in repairing an invalid argument, why not build my confidence by conceding that our lack of ability to program computers to emulate something is no useful measure of how complex or impossible that something is (although it is useful if we do actually manage to do it -- this is not an unwarranted bias, it is simply a question of proof positive at work).

I agree that if we are talking about an issue far removed from a basic concept (e.g., science), then you are entirely correct. However, we are talking about a situation where the set of brute facts for the (meta)universe only gets one chance at it. If the set of brute facts don't give an evolving universe of a certain level of sophistication, then that's it. There's no second chance to come back and try a different set of brute facts. This is why your argument is not applicable.

And so you go on, but this is a specific case that you are attempting to construct. I am determined to get you to address the general case that our "inability to tie our own shoelaces in a mirror" (remember that?) should not be used as a measure of anything.

Well, we have a very fundamental difference in our views. And, perhaps it we'll need to address this somehow. Perhaps another thread on just this one point might help.

No, this is the whole point: Parsimony can't be used as a measure of an 'open ended' system. I really think this is just too obvious. To close a system can be reasonable in some cases, if we are considering classical events for example, then we don't have to consider Joe's homework quantum tunneling its way into the dog as an excuse. Joe's teacher could rightly use parsimony to conclude that Joe simply couldn't be bothered to do his homework. But in the case of t<=0 we are, by definition, considering an open system so parsimony has to be applied with great care.

There has to be boundaries to a proposed theory. If a theory doesn't stay within a certain bounds, then it cannot be considered a real theory. However, this is what defines a theory, so I don't think your objection even applies. Science can't very well consider open ended proposals unless the bounderies of those proposals are roughly known. This doesn't mean they are complete theories by any stretch. They might leave many issues unknown or unbroached, but that does not affect the theory for consideration insomuch as those issues are seen as not critical. For example, quantum theory didn't have an explanation for Schrodinger's cat, and it was Bohr who formulated the Copenhagen interpretation and Feynman who formulated the null interpretation ("shut up and calculate!"). These interpretations were to ease the concerns over the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. Therefore, completeness is not a major concern if the areas where the completeness is lacking is considered largely irrelevant to the success of the model.

Parsimony is how we choose between two competing views that are incomplete.

There is obviously some confusion here. Let's take this slowly: Parsimony is a measure of the complexity of any given explanation. Occams razor uses this as input when deciding between alternative explanations agreed?

Right you are. I meant to say by [gauging] parsimony we choose between two competing views that [can] be incomplete [to some extent].

[QED]

I agree that if we are talking about an issue far removed from a basic concept (e.g., science), then you are entirely correct. However, we are talking about a situation where the set of brute facts for the (meta)universe only gets one chance at it. If the set of brute facts don't give an evolving universe of a certain level of sophistication, then that's it. There's no second chance to come back and try a different set of brute facts. This is why your argument is not applicable.

Hence the topic you started. This whole thing has the anthropic principle written all over it. Isn't it obvious that we will never be able to determine the amount of luck involved in creating "just the right brute fact". Sure we can dismiss the world stocked full of memories five minutes ago, but as we roll back the temporal component to the inception of the ultimate 'meta' there is no such estimate of probability available (i.e. the 'N' in 1 in N). All we know is that the probability was 1. Even your one dimensional beacons or two-dimensional squiggles have unknown Ns so why are you entitled to say they are any more likely? It might seem like a daft question to you, but you have to realize the inordinate number of assumptions that are being made in the proposal of any brute fact.

[Bugmaster]

Stupid question... what's a "brute fact" ? How's it different from a normal fact ?

[harvey1]

Stupid question... what's a "brute fact" ? How's it different from a normal fact ?

A brute fact is a fact that you start reasoning from. For example, if it is a brute fact that space is black, then there is no reason why space is black, it just so happens to be black.

A brute fact is sort of cheating if you need too many of them to justify what you believe to be true. This is my argument against QED. He needs a lot of brute facts in order to describe the world we see. Therefore this is not a parsimonious solution and violates Occam's razor.

[QED]

Stupid question... what's a "brute fact" ? How's it different from a normal fact ?

Good question. We are talking about causality and obviously if we rule-out an infinite past (which I'm not entirely convinced we should) then there would have to be some initial uncaused cause of everything. This is what we term a brute fact (or naked fact).

[Bugmaster]

A brute fact is sort of cheating if you need too many of them to justify what you believe to be true. This is my argument against QED. He needs a lot of brute facts in order to describe the world we see. Therefore this is not a parsimonious solution and violates Occam's razor.

Well, by that definition, I find it difficult to justify anything at all as a brute fact, except:

1). I exist (note: I, not you), and
2). I appear to have senses that appear to be feeding me information about an external world

Everything else could be a Matrix-esque virtual reality, or a hallucination in my head, or whatnot. That, by itself, doesn't prove anything, though...