If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[harvey1]

The argument put forward by THH is that God cannot be all-good if God is not something that God is not. The argument does not show anything paradoxical concerning God, it is paradoxical iself.

Let me reword THH's argument in a different context. You tell me what is wrong with this revised argument:

My thesis again, in a nutshell: [The writer] is all-powerful [with respect to the characters in her book]. [The writer] is all-good [with respect to how the characters will live their lives as the novel progress]. [If you are the writer and ] [g]iven the following solution set:

- [write the novel] and all that must (by your own thesis) go with it, good, bad and ugly,
- not create the [novel] and thereby avoid all the nastiness,

...an all-good [writer] MUST choose not to [write the novel]. Period. Being all-powerful [with respect to the characters in her book], [s]he would have the power NOT to [write the novel]. Being all-good, [s]he would be constrained from [writing this novel], or any [novel] in which physical [circumstances of the characters] would lead to the suffering of [her characters], GIVEN THAT [S]HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO [WRITE THE NOVEL AT ALL].

The existence of the [novel] therefore disproves the existence [that she is]all-good, all-powerful [writer].

Now, we both agree that the conclusion is bad. That is, there's lots of reasons why a writer might write a novel where her characters suffer that do not entail her being a bad person, or even compell her to write only good things for her characters. But, what doesn't seem to follow here is that she isn't all-powerful with her characters because she is an all-good person who must consider certain actions in light of their goodness. The thesis is that she is all-powerful with her characters yet despite this fact chooses to allow them to suffer rather than exercise that all-powerful ability. What you seem to want to say is that the thesis is wrong because she is all-powerful yet she must do something in order to be considered good. But, the fact that she must do something doesn't necessarily mean she is not all-powerful. You could have argued that the thesis is wrong because an all-good author could certainly allow their characters to suffer. You could reject the conclusion of the thesis, that's all. Instead, you rejected the possibility that an all-powerful writer ought to do something to be all-good, and I still don't understand that. Are you saying that she has no obligation to be good if she claims to be all-good? Is being all-powerful an excuse not to be all-good even though that's what she claims to be?

[bleedingisaac]

Perhaps there is another way to "sidestep" morally sufficient reasons for evil.

How about this argument:

1) If an all-powerful and all-wise God exists, then that God, by definition, could create a world in which all of his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering.


2) A world in which a God's goals can be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering is better than a world in which God's goals are carried out, but with evil pain and suffering.


3) If an all-powerful, all-wise God could create a world in which all of his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering, and a world in which this God's goals can be perfectly accomplished without evil pain and suffering is better than a world in which God's goals are accomplished with evil, pain, and suffering, then God should have created a world in which his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering.


4) If this God should have created a world in which all of his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering, but God did not create this kind of world, then God is not good (i.e. he does not do what he should).


5) If this God could not create a world in which his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering, then this God is not all-powerful and all-wise (i.e. there is something that is beyond the power and wisdom of an all-powerful, all-wise God).


6) The world in which we live contains evil, pain, and suffering.


7) Therefore, there can be no all-powerful, all wise, and all-good God who created this world.

[harvey1]

BA,

First, welcome to the forum. I'm glad that you decided to post...

1) If an all-powerful and all-wise God exists, then that God, by definition, could create a world in which all of his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering.

I would reject that premise. I think that God is omnipotent but not to the point to where God can control logic. I tried to provide a definition of omnipotence here.

2) A world in which a God's goals can be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering is better than a world in which God's goals are carried out, but with evil pain and suffering.

If a mathematical theorem is true, does it matter how the theorem is proved? Is one theorem more true than another if they are both true?

3) If an all-powerful, all-wise God could create a world in which all of his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering, and a world in which this God's goals can be perfectly accomplished without evil pain and suffering is better than a world in which God's goals are accomplished with evil, pain, and suffering, then God should have created a world in which his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering.

Does this mean that if a theorem is true, that it should not be proved because proving the theorem as true is a difficult process? I could see why some might believe that, but if it is true then it needs to be proved regardless the cost.

4) If this God should have created a world in which all of his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering, but God did not create this kind of world, then God is not good (i.e. he does not do what he should).

Proving a theorem true doesn't make one a good mathematician? I would think the converse is the case. Proving theorems true makes one a good mathematician.

5) If this God could not create a world in which his goals could be perfectly accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering, then this God is not all-powerful and all-wise (i.e. there is something that is beyond the power and wisdom of an all-powerful, all-wise God).

Well, this is your premise which I reject. I think God can be all-powerful by being able to accomplish God's ultimate will (or an Omega state). Afterall, if there is a bigger kid on the block, that kid should be able to stop God from accomplishing that goal, but all the big kids lose against God.

6) The world in which we live contains evil, pain, and suffering.

Can't argue there. I agree wholeheartedly.

7) Therefore, there can be no all-powerful, all wise, and all-good God who created this world.

But, there can, and there is.

[bleedingisaac]

Curious,

Are you saying that because your god is all-powerful he has the capability of doing evil and still being "all-good"?

Words have meanings. The words "power" and "good" each have a meaning. You ascribe them both to your god. These words define your god. To "define" means to "limit"--i.e. to explain where god stops and something else starts. When you ascribe an adjective to a being, you limit it by necessity. When you say that god is "good" you are limiting that god to certain actions (viz. good ones). If you don't want any limits to your god, then don't use adjectives to describe him/her.

When you call anything "good," you are limiting it by the word.

For example:

Let's say that I told you that I have a "good" dog that I would like you to keep at your house and take care of for me while I was away. My dog, however, bites every person and other animal it sees, killed three infants, and urinates on every piece of furniture in the house.

Would you agree with my use of the adjective "good" to describe my dog?

In the same way, if you insist that your god is good, but unnecessarily created a world in which evil, pain, and suffering exists, then it seems that you are misusing the word "good" in the same way I misused the word in the example of my dog.

It seems to me that you are creating the paradox by suggesting that your god is free to do anything (even "evil" things) and still be called good.[/i]

[bleedingisaac]

First, welcome to the forum. I'm glad that you decided to post...

Thank you.

I think that God is omnipotent but not to the point to where God can control logic.

I guess you are assuming that logic is something other than language. I consider the 'laws of logic' to be grammatical, not metaphysical. There are certain ways that we define words like "if," "then," and "therefore" that determine the 'laws of logic.' A change in language can change these so-called laws.

But let's not get distracted by that point.

I don't think I suggested that your god needs to 'control logic' in the first place. But you would agree that your god was free to control reality, right? You believe that your god gave humans certain natural abilities--e.g. an immune system that can fight certain diseases. Could your god have given humans a greater immune system? Could your god have created humans without the need for oxygen? Could your god have created humans in such a way that we were all born with equal strength and knowledge?

I think you would have to agree with this because (as I explained to "Curious") words have meaning and the words "all-powerful" and "all-wise" have meanings as well.

So, couldn't your god create a world in which his goals (whatever they may be--e.g. demonstration of glory [Calvinists] or free-will [Arminians]) could be accomplished without human suffering?

I don't think I followed the rest of your argument with the mathematical theorem (sorry). Are you saying that a world in which god accomplishes his goals without evil, pain, and suffering is not better than a world in which god accomplishes the same goals with evil, pain, and suffering? Sorry, I don't follow.

[harvey1]

But you would agree that your god was free to control reality, right?

I believe that God is free to create universes. However, I also believe God's character is to do so according to rules that God deems as necessary to accomplish God's will. I don't believe God is free to define those rules any way that God would like. God must conform to some implications of bringing about an Omega state.

You believe that your god gave humans certain natural abilities--e.g. an immune system that can fight certain diseases. Could your god have given humans a greater immune system?

I'm not sure. It's certainly possible that there is another physically possible world that God created humans and in that world they have a greater immune system. However, that's another world. For this world God commanded the earth to bring forth animals (see Gen.1), so the immune system developed as it did according to the natural evolutionary path that nature took. Had it evolved differently, then things might be quite different (or perhaps things couldn't be different for this to be this particular kind of world that God sought to create).

Could your god have created humans without the need for oxygen?

I imagine it's possible, however I wouldn't call those creatures human. They would be something other than human since humans are oxygen breathing creatures.

Could your god have created humans in such a way that we were all born with equal strength and knowledge?

I imagine it's possible, however that would be a different world than this one, and the path toward Omega might be quite different for that kind of world, assuming it is physically possible in the first place.

I think you would have to agree with this because (as I explained to "Curious") words have meaning and the words "all-powerful" and "all-wise" have meanings as well.

Sure, but what I mean by all-powerful and all-wise might be slightly different than your definition. I provided my definition for all-powerful here. I'm open to receive feedback on those terms.

So, couldn't your god create a world in which his goals (whatever they may be--e.g. demonstration of glory [Calvinists] or free-will [Arminians])?

That's not a complete sentence. Please restate it, thanks.

I don't think I followed the rest of your argument with the mathematical theorem (sorry). Are you saying that a world in which god accomplishes his goals without evil, pain, and suffering is not better than a world in which god accomplishes the same goals with evil, pain, and suffering? Sorry, I don't follow.

I don't know what you mean by "better." Do you mean they are more true? I don't think one true theorem is more true than another. If it is true, then that's all that matters. That is, God created a world that answers certain questions that naturally arise as a result of God's contemplation of the nature of existence. I can't imagine why one world would be better than another if this world helps in the progress to answer certain questions (if, btw, that is the purpose of God creating the world, which is my assumption that it is).

[Curious]

Are you saying that she has no obligation to be good if she claims to be all-good? Is being all-powerful an excuse not to be all-good even though that's what she claims to be?

My argument was not that the thesis was wrong because of this but that the argument was not logically consistent.
The all-goodness of a thing can and does have a bearing on the badness of it.
The level of power (or omnipotence) does have a bearing on its lack of power.
Omnipotence therefore has a bearing on nonomnipotence but not on goodness and likewise goodness bears on goodness but not on potency.
Now what THH does here is concludes that goodness has a bearing on potency which (theoretically) overrides the direct bearing derived from omnipotence. This attributes goodness as overriding potency when no such logical argument can be substantiated. The vague notion that an all-good God MUST not perform a said action (placing limitations on freedom of action and potency, when goodness has no relation to potency) is incorrect. An all-good, omnipotent God could allow the existence of seemingly evil events as I show in my response to THH main thesis. The point being, of my original argument concerning the logical inconsistency of the argument is that such a restriction of one property by an unrelated property is inconsistent with logic especially when the unrelated property is given primacy over a property that is known to directly bear upon it.

[harvey1]

This attributes goodness as overriding potency when no such logical argument can be substantiated.

So, can you define what you mean by "all-good"?

The vague notion that an all-good God MUST not perform a said action places limitations on freedom of action and potency, when goodness has no relation to potency, is incorrect. An all-good, omnipotent God could allow the existence of seemingly evil events as I show in my response to THH main thesis.

If an all-powerful being was fully evil, then would we be restricting its omnipotence by saying it must be evil to be fully evil?

The point being, of my original argument concerning the logical inconsistency of the argument is that such a restriction of one property by an unrelated property is inconsistent with logic especially when the unrelated property is given primacy over a property that is known to directly bear upon it.

Does an all-good attribute hold any restrictions on an omnipotent being? For example, could an all-good being also moonlight as the devil?

[bleedingisaac]

I'll need to rearrange the order of my responses here:

I provided my definition for all-powerful here. I'm open to receive feedback on those terms.

I read your definitions in your first post and have no problem with them. I think I'm speaking in terms of what you call the 'Logically possible meaning.'

Is it logically possible for God to have created a world in which all of his goals should be accomplished without evil, pain, and suffering?

Now, I would agree that there are some goals that might require suffering. If god wants to show compassion, for instance, there must be some amount of suffering. In this case, however, we would have to ask if this god can be called "good."

Let's say that I wanted to do something "good" for people. Maybe I own a tire store and I want to give people free tires. So, what I do is I pour eight or nine boxes of nails on a heavily traveled road and wait a hundred yards down with my new tires. The people have a blowout and I give them a new set of Michelins. Can my act still be called "good"? Isn't this analoguous to a god who wants to show compassion so he puts people in pain so he can show it? Is that a "good" action?

I don't know what you mean by "better." Do you mean they are more true?

No, by "better" I mean the way in which we describe a "good" world. For example, I work at a tough, inner-city school in South Central, LA. There are many days that we have big gang fights and students are hurt. I wouldn't call that a "good" day at school. Some days, however, there are no incidents of violence and kids enjoy a program that we participate in. That is a "good" day. I would say that these days are better than the days in which there are violent incidents.

In the same way, I would say a world in which a god accomplishes his goals without evil, pain, and suffering is better than a world in which this god accomplishes the same goals with evil, pain, and suffering. Do you disagree with this?

God created a world that answers certain questions that naturally arise as a result of God's contemplation of the nature of existence.

Just trying to get my bearings straight with you. Do you mean that the world is answering certain questions that God has or that humans have? Did your god have certain questions that arose from his contemplation of the nature of existence? Are you are process theology guy?

If this is the case, I would have to go back to our definition of that word "good" again. Is it good to subject people to evil, pain, and suffering just to answer some questions that you have? I would say that that does not qualify as "good" according to the common defintion and if your god is good in a way that is not "good" according to the common definition, then it seems inappropriate to use that word for him/her.

[I caught my incomplete sentence too and corrected it, but you must have already started your response.]

[Curious]

Curious,

Are you saying that because your god is all-powerful he has the capability of doing evil and still being "all-good"?

Words have meanings. The words "power" and "good" each have a meaning. You ascribe them both to your god. These words define your god. To "define" means to "limit"--i.e. to explain where god stops and something else starts. When you ascribe an adjective to a being, you limit it by necessity. When you say that god is "good" you are limiting that god to certain actions (viz. good ones). If you don't want any limits to your god, then don't use adjectives to describe him/her.

When you call anything "good," you are limiting it by the word.

For example:

Let's say that I told you that I have a "good" dog that I would like you to keep at your house and take care of for me while I was away. My dog, however, bites every person and other animal it sees, killed three infants, and urinates on every piece of furniture in the house.

Would you agree with my use of the adjective "good" to describe my dog?

In the same way, if you insist that your god is good, but unnecessarily created a world in which evil, pain, and suffering exists, then it seems that you are misusing the word "good" in the same way I misused the word in the example of my dog.

It seems to me that you are creating the paradox by suggesting that your god is free to do anything (even "evil" things) and still be called good.[/i]

You seem to want to get into semantics here so fine, I will play.
I do not limit God by definition. The understanding of the "definition" may though be limited. to say something has power does not limit the power of the something. In fact, the term all-powerful means without limit of power.
You say that to say God is good is to limit God to being good. This is not the case. If there is good and evil then good is that in conformity with God's action and will. Evil is that which is against it. To say that God is limited by what is good is therefore incorrect as it is good that is limited by the will and action of God. To say that God cannot perform an action that you see as evil is incorrect because if such an action was performed it would be in conformity with His will and action and therefore would be good.
You are quite right to point out that goodness is relative to us, but if good and evil are not some imaginary construct of our own minds then we must find the reference point or yard stick. As I said, I believe the yardstick is set by God so there is no paradox.