If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[QED]

I consider this concept of 'net good' to be rather a joke. Curious offers us an example of a 1 million-year window within which any amount of awfulness can go on providing the whole term comes out at some minimal level. But this is of no benefit to the poor blighters that get caught-up in the machinery. Thousands of religions could come and go in this window and might have to conclude that the forces operating the universe were utterly malevolent. In point of fact, given that every living thing dies and entire species get wiped out as a matter of course (not to mention all the nasty things people spend their lifetimes trying to avoid) -- a more apt conclusion might be that god is 100% malevolent but only 80% effective (as I often point out).

The PoE is highly indicative of an indifferent universe in which life is battling up hill, in a head-wind, all the way. Any attempt to introduce a caring, loving god deserves to fail -- as it sometimes does for people who actually get caught up in the machinery.

[Curious]

I consider this concept of 'net good' to be rather a joke...

-- a more apt conclusion might be that god is 100% malevolent but only 80% effective (as I often point out).

The PoE is highly indicative of an indifferent universe in which life is battling up hill, in a head-wind, all the way. Any attempt to introduce a caring, loving god deserves to fail -- as it sometimes does for people who actually get caught up in the machinery.

That is my point. While it could be said that the observable universe might be indicative of this, it cannot be said to prove it. As for the concept of net good being a joke, it is a valid point nonetheless. I don't see how it can be shown that the end does not justify the means. My argument is not that there is an all-good all-powerful God, only that the arguments given showing that this cannot be the case due to the presence of evil (or "bad" events) does not exclude the possibility of such an entity existing. Not being omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient myself I find it impossible to deduce what might exclude the existence of such a thing, or why the existence of one thing would exclude the existence of another.

[harvey1]

Hey Spetey,

If something is stateable in terms of physical possibility, then it should be stateable in principle in terms of pure logical possibility, do we agree there?... For example, if there is a physical possibility for a particle to decay in the next 10 seconds, then this should be stateable in terms of mathematical (or logical) possibility, which is what the uncertainty principle does.

...I don't think it "should" be so statable. I can't even imagine how it would be statable as a mathematical or logical law. The uncertainty principle is a physical law which refers essentially to physical magnitutes like position, momentum, joules, and seconds. If those symbols did not stand for these magnitudes it would not be a physical law.

Position, momentum are stateable in pure mathematics as long as there is a metric defined on the space. Physical measurements are multiples of some constant.

So I don't see how something like the uncertainty principle, or for example the law that nothing goes faster than c (over macro distances in a vacuum etc), could be stated in pure logic. It's the nature of logic not to have any content about a particular world.

I think a number of physicists working on foundations of physics would like to find a reason for the value of c. For example, this paper uses "first principles" to find a reason for the constant value of c. Of course, there might be some indeterministic cause of it, but that alone does not mean that the indeterministic cause is in contradiction to logical necessity which I'll mention more below.

However, what is physically possible is still dependent on what is logically possible plus whatever other circumstances are peculiar to something being physical.

I could agree to something like this. But the supervenience claim insists physical possibility depends only on logical possibility. That's what I find so hard to swallow. Here you seem to agree that it depends on something more.

Supervenience does not rule out indeterminancy according to Davidson. "Depending only on" and "being wholly dependent on but indeterministic" are not incompatible statements. If there is some logical possibility proposition P in which the physical possibility proposition Q is dependent on, there still might exist some other logical possibility proposition R that brings indeterminancy to the physical system. This physical indeterminancy might not be a result of P, it might be a result of R. The physical system is wholly dependent on P+R, but it is not wholly dependent on P. This, after all, is the reason that there is a difference between P and Q. If Q was just solely derived from P, then there could be no indeterminancy entering Q.

I would still like to hear why you think the physical supervenes on the logical, since (again) this would be a truly revolutionary claim in metaphysics if it could be well-reasoned.

This claim is not needed at this stage to support my argument for how evil can co-exist with an all-good, all-powerful God. Perhaps, to simplify our discussion, we should drop this particular issue. However, if you think it is important, then we can discuss it.

Finally, I'm still interested in how any of this relates directly to what I have thought for some time is the current point of the thread.

Well, as I mentioned prior to all the flap about the use of the term "supervenience," your line of questions led to this. Remember your reconstruction of my position:

God can do whatever is logically possible and God should will; in this sense God is omnipotent. God's supreme will is to bring about the Omega State, which is an ending, and which is an ideally good state. Everything else God wills is as a means toward reaching this Omega State. In other words, God judges each potential action of God's on the basis of whether or not it will help bring about the Omega State.

God establishes how God's lower self (physical laws) cannot behave for each world. God often acts in these worlds to bring about the Omega state, but never in ways that violate God's lower self, since doing so would not bring about the Omega state. Stopping the tsunami either would have violated God's lower self, or else restricting this lower self to prevent such events would have resulted in other effects that would provide a bad net tradeoff in progress toward the Omega state--making God paradoxically imperfect. Thus permitting the tsunami was the only way to reach the Omega state.

You might remember that I referenced physical constraints and logical constraints in the above reconstruction. The physical constraint is: "restricting this lower self to prevent such events would have resulted in other effects that would provide a bad net tradeoff in progress toward the Omega state--making God paradoxically imperfect." This composes unknown physical constraints. It is the P+R that I talked about above. P+R(+S+T...) form meta-laws that are a slightly different constraint than a Q derived solely from P. P+R(+S+T...) involve an interpretation. That is, there are P+R, P+S, P+T, P+U, P+V,... P+R+S, P+R+T, P+R+T+U, etc., etc.. These combinations place constraints on God's actions that must be considered over a period of time-events. So, for instance, if P+R are the significant variables during 1903-2003, then God can prevent a major tsunami during that period. However, if in 2004 the variable T becomes significant, then God should use P+R+T for the period starting and ending in 2004, in which case God must allow a major tsunami in 2004 because that's what the conclusion of considering P+R+T is for that period starting in 2004. If the December tsunami is the least destructive for items that can satisfy P+R+T, then God would allow the least destructive tsunami which is in fact the one that occurs.

[The Happy Humanist]

Hello, all, it's me, the Hit-and-Run-Humanist again...

I keep finding myself back in this same thread, even though the philosophy stuff is totally over my head. But I keep coming back to the same thesis...

Since it is impossible to know the final outcome of worldly existence it is also impossible to state with certainty that the events are either net good or net bad. If you are to assume that the tsunami is, as an event, unrelated to the environment or outcome as a whole then you could say it is net bad. This though has a problem of limited scope. If on the other hand you are willing to accept that the tsunami was a product of a dynamic environment which itself accelerates the evolutionary process, you might believe that the final outcome of more diversity and greater survivability could be thought of as net good.

The final outcome of worldly existence will be that bad things happened unnecessarily, i.e. sentient beings suffered enormously, and a purported creator-God will have been responsible for all of it/them. No amount of "net good" can overcome this.

My thesis again, in a nutshell: God is all-powerful. God is all-good. Given the following solution set:

- create the universe and all that must (by your own thesis) go with it, good, bad and ugly,
- not create the universe and thereby avoid all the nastiness,

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe. Period. Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe. Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO.

The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God.

Any questions?

Good to see you all again.

[Curious]

The final outcome of worldly existence will be that bad things happened unnecessarily, i.e. sentient beings suffered enormously, and a purported creator-God will have been responsible for all of it/them. No amount of "net good" can overcome this.

My thesis again, in a nutshell: God is all-powerful. God is all-good. Given the following solution set:

- create the universe and all that must (by your own thesis) go with it, good, bad and ugly,
- not create the universe and thereby avoid all the nastiness,

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe. Period. Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe. Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO.

The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God.

Any questions?

Good to see you all again.

I have a question for you. I would be interested in knowing how you conclude that an all powerful God could be COMPELLED NOT TO DO SOMETHING. While your argument might have some merit in excluding the existence of an all-good limited God, your argument is fallacious in respect to a God that is all powerful. To suggest that an all-powerful God would be compelled to either action or inaction is a dichotomy.

[The Happy Humanist]

My thesis again, in a nutshell: God is all-powerful. God is all-good. Given the following solution set:

- create the universe and all that must (by your own thesis) go with it, good, bad and ugly,
- not create the universe and thereby avoid all the nastiness,

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe. Period. Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe. Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO.

I have a question for you. I would be interested in knowing how you conclude that an all powerful God could be COMPELLED NOT TO DO SOMETHING. While your argument might have some merit in excluding the existence of an all-good limited God, your argument is fallacious in respect to a God that is all powerful. To suggest that an all-powerful God would be compelled to either action or inaction is a dichotomy.

I mean compelled by his very nature. "I am all-powerful, which means I can do anything I WANT to do. But I am also all-good, which means I only WANT to do good. If it ain't good, I won't do it. That's just the kind of deity I am."

"I'm also all-smart. I know that the choice of not-creating-the-universe is infinitely better than creating-the-universe, because it avoids all evil, both necessary and unnecessary, all of which I can foresee (because I am all-seeing). And, best of all, I can create beings to worship me right here in heaven, WITH free will and WITHOUT sin. Yes, much better that way. Have my cake and eat it too. Yes, yes, yes. I can do all that. Cuz' I'm God. "

But...it didn't happen that way. Which tells me Mr. Omni-Everything cannot exist.

[harvey1]

Hello,

Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe.

I don't know what you mean by all-powerful, but that's not what I mean by it. When I use that term, I mean that if something is physically possible, then nothing can prevent God from obtaining God's will. If something is not logically possible, then it is absolutely meaningless to apply that term since a logically inconsistent universe would not be able to apply a meaningful use of the term "all-powerful." Contradictions would quickly emerge (e.g., can God lift a rock that God says cannot be lifted).

I say that God cannot do other than what God would want to do, and if God would want to create a universe such as ours, that is to mean that our universe is physically possible. Nothing can stop God from creating a universe that is physically possible (e.g., one that ultimately conforms to God's will), hence God is all-powerful.

Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO.

God's choice is that God wants to create a physically possible universe that conforms to the ultimate will of God--period. If such a universe is possible, then God will create that universe. The "choice not to" is assuming that there are physically possible universes that ultimately conform to God's will in which God would not create despite wanting to create those universes because God sees them as necessary to accomplish the divine will. If God wants to do so because God sees them as necessary, then God will choose to create those universes. Or, if you prefer, God must create those universes because God wants to create those universes. God wants to create those universes because they meet a unique need that God has which "not creating" those universes would not provide. God is all-powerful in this scenario since what God ultimately wants, God ultimately obtains--nothing can stop that will from being ultimately accomplished. God does not want what God cannot ultimately achieve, so there is no goal that God ultimately wants that God does not ultimately achieve.

The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God. Any questions?

Yeah, why is it that you lurk on this thread but not on the ones that clearly show that atheism is faulty? Such as this one. This thread is just to wrap things up against the atheist. That is, we're just considering all of the minor objections before we once and for all conclude that atheism is completely without merit. However, the main arguments to abandon atheism are happening in these other threads.

Good to see you all again.

Good to "see" you too. I hope you stop by more often.

[Curious]

I mean compelled by his very nature. "I am all-powerful, which means I can do anything I WANT to do. But I am also all-good, which means I only WANT to do good. If it ain't good, I won't do it. That's just the kind of deity I am."

"I'm also all-smart. I know that the choice of not-creating-the-universe is infinitely better than creating-the-universe, because it avoids all evil, both necessary and unnecessary, all of which I can foresee (because I am all-seeing). And, best of all, I can create beings to worship me right here in heaven, WITH free will and WITHOUT sin. Yes, much better that way. Have my cake and eat it too. Yes, yes, yes. I can do all that. Cuz' I'm God. "

But...it didn't happen that way. Which tells me Mr. Omni-Everything cannot exist.

But this still does not solve the problem of the arguments dichotomy. To state that an all-powerful God would have restrictions contradicts the notion of God being all-powerful. As the argument is itself obviously seriously flawed how can you draw any meaningful conclusions from it?

[harvey1]

But this still does not solve the problem of the arguments dichotomy. To state that an all-powerful God would have restrictions contradicts the notion of God being all-powerful. As the argument is itself obviously seriously flawed how can you draw any meaningful conclusions from it?

This is a key point in talking about omnipotence. I gave my shot at defining the term here and I'm open to some suggestions. I would say that God is omnipotent in the physically possible sense for our world, which is applicable to each and every world. I don't say God can do whatever is metaphysically possible because, in my view, that would mean what is possible in one world God can do in this world too, which is not how I see omnipotence. The omnipotence that you and The Happy Humanist seem to share is a conceptual possible omnipotence. Most supernaturalists would think that God is limited to logically possible omnipotence. Or, some supernaturalists might think God has metaphysically possible omnipotence which gives God a few more restrictions, but allows God to break the laws of physics, or at least change laws locally someplace for a shorttime (e.g., Joshua stopping the sun).

[Curious]

This is a key point in talking about omnipotence. I gave my shot at defining the term here and I'm open to some suggestions. I would say that God is omnipotent in the physically possible sense for our world, which is applicable to each and every world. I don't say God can do whatever is metaphysically possible because, in my view, that would mean what is possible in one world God can do in this world too, which is not how I see omnipotence. The omnipotence that you and The Happy Humanist seem to share is a conceptual possible omnipotence. Most supernaturalists would think that God is limited to logically possible omnipotence. Or, some supernaturalists might think God has metaphysically possible omnipotence which gives God a few more restrictions, but allows God to break the laws of physics, or at least change laws locally someplace for a shorttime (e.g., Joshua stopping the sun).

The problem with putting limits on omnipotence is that it ceases to be omnipotence which means it is unlimited. To say that God is limited to logical possibility misses the point somewhat. It is not a redefinition of omnipotence that is required but an understanding of what is a valid argument. If I was to ask if it was possible for God to simultaneously exist and not exist then that question would itself be paradoxical.This question cannot be used as a basis for logical conclusion as the question is erroneous. It is the argument that is inconsistent and not the nature of God. The argument itself is unsupportable and therefore not applicable. It is not possible to draw logical conclusions from questions that are not logically consistent.