Is it rational to be a theist?

[harvey1]

According to an atheist, there are few, if any, reasons to believe that God exists, and the God belief has been passed down from pre-scientific times in the guise of religion. The atheist often believes this in itself is good reason to reject the existence of God. The atheist might even say it is not rational to believe in God. Is it rational to be a theist?

[QED]

How can an logical interpretation (i.e., math theorem) exist unless there is mind attached to that interpretation?

Now that seems more sensible to me, yes -- if there is to be an interpretation of some Axiom, then that would require a mind.

Alrighty then, are we agreed that if we are talking about laws as existing that we are talking about theorems derived from some axiom? If so, then it seems we must accept that these theorems require some level of interpretation.

Interpretation, as I was trying to pin-down in my last post, is what happens when our minds contemplate observations of laws being acted out in nature. That's a reasonable thing to agree upon is it not? But you seem to be dragging this concept kicking and screaming all the way over to the actual act itself

After all, computers can't produce new theorems of mathematics. The reason they cannot is that they cannot understand (or interpret the meaning of a mathematical statement), and without this attribute a computer cannot prove a theorem (or derive many statements rich in intuitive thinking).

Too bad for the computer. Maybe one day when it gets smarter maybe? But all this only refers to the ability of interpreters to interpret the acts going on in nature. It has nothing to do with how those acts are carried out.

Without being able to prove a theorem, there's no way to know the theorem is true, hence no way to build laws upon the theorems that you just proved. You would have many universes based on contradictory theorems. Even Ramanujan, as brilliant at being able to derive theorems from mathematics was wrong in some of his deductions! It is why mathematicians insist on proofs and not conjectures to their arguments.

Meh, interpretations are always fallible. Good job nature never gets it wrong!

Therefore, since we exist in a universe where the laws largely share the structure of mathematical derived theorems, and those theorems are all consistent with the whole body of mathematics, it would seem that an atheist is precluded from believing that the laws of nature are non-regularities of nature.

What doe this mean I wonder? Mathematical theorems certainly appear to be able to capture the essence of natural laws, so while they are never more than models, they also reflect the evident regularity of nature. But what is a non-regularity of nature? Surely nobody but a supernaturalist would want to believe in non-regularities of nature!

If so, then the atheist must pin their hopes of describing nature on a nominalistic interpretation of the laws, and the causal tie between two material events is non-existent (as I mentioned).

Surely the best that anyone can do is entertain a nominalistic interpretation when attempting to describe nature? But this is our limitation as fallible interpreters. However you appear to conclude from this that "the causal tie between two material events is non-existent " which would be nonsense. Our inability to have a direct access to any given mechanism does not place any constraint on that mechanism and so your conclusion:

Therefore, atheism is wrong. Or, at the very least, it is rational to be a theist!

...Is equally nonsense.

[Curious]

It can't. But you are assuming that the mind that interprets this theorem is God and thus causes nature to act accordingly.

What other mind could interpret objective laws before there was a physical universe?

For the theory to exist requires only a single mind, in this case your own. Hard fact and logic are not subject to interpretation.

My mind doesn't make things come to exist. Therefore, I cannot be the mind that brings about a universe. But, thank you for your high consideration of my capabilities. I hate to disappoint, but I'm human just like you.

You misunderstand my point. The theory need not be antecedent to physical fact. The theory is your interpretation of the facts action. The theory that matter attracts matter is an attempt to explain this factual action. Matter cannot be shown to attract matter because it "wants" to adhere to the theory of gravitation.

[harvey1]

Interpretation, as I was trying to pin-down in my last post, is what happens when our minds contemplate observations of laws being acted out in nature. That's a reasonable thing to agree upon is it not? But you seem to be dragging this concept kicking and screaming all the way over to the actual act itself

I don't see why you would use that metaphor. It is what you believe an interpretation is, not what I believe. In my view, an interpretation occurs when a web of beliefs must be applied to a fuzzy situation. It doesn't mean that an interpretation cannot be a fact, nor does it mean the situation must be in the context of nature. It could be the interpretation of a mathematician that the axiom of choice (AC) is correct to be used in coming up with a mathematical proof. The interpetation could be correct, but in that situation it is fuzzy because a different mathematician has a different interpretation of the use of the AC.

Too bad for the computer. Maybe one day when it gets smarter maybe? But all this only refers to the ability of interpreters to interpret the acts going on in nature. It has nothing to do with how those acts are carried out.

Mathematical proofs aren't acts of nature, or at least, that's not what is being pre-supposed when someone says the laws of physics can be described as something other than a regularity of nature. What I want to know is, if the laws exist and are mathematically stateable (as they are in practice), then what makes them true if you rule out interpretation? Remember, in mathematical practice the reason the theorems are held true is because they are derivable and provable within the rules of the formal system. This requires a mind to derive and prove. If the laws exist (i.e., not regularities only), then the atheist should be able to say how it is that they are true without referring to an interpretation. If you say there is an interpretation that makes them true, then you are advocating a mind. That's a no-no for an atheist.

Our inability to have a direct access to any given mechanism does not place any constraint on that mechanism...

The problem, though, for the atheist is that we have an exposed contradiction. Why continue to believe something if there is an exposed contradiction? It's an act of blind faith, and as Spetey has shown, that can often lead to dangerous results. What if tomorrow atheists start believing that Hitler was an atheist, is alive, and is now instructing them to install the fourth installment of the Nazi government? Is that a good thing to believe something that is contradictory to what we know about Hitler? If we show that this is not valid reason, they might come back saying, "[o]ur inability to have a direct access to [Hitler being alive and wanting the fourth Reich]does not place any constraint on that [belief]." That sounds like a bad thing to me, don't you agree?

[QED]

Interpretation, as I was trying to pin-down in my last post, is what happens when our minds contemplate observations of laws being acted out in nature. That's a reasonable thing to agree upon is it not? But you seem to be dragging this concept kicking and screaming all the way over to the actual act itself

I don't see why you would use that metaphor. It is what you believe an interpretation is, not what I believe. In my view, an interpretation occurs when a web of beliefs must be applied to a fuzzy situation. It doesn't mean that an interpretation cannot be a fact

How can that be? The interpretation of (say) the collisions in a particle accelerator, going on the mind of a physicist are not the same sort of factas the collision itself. I thought we were contrasting the way nature acts on things with the way minds interpret those interactions -- which makes the following exchange...

Too bad for the computer. Maybe one day when it gets smarter maybe? But all this only refers to the ability of interpreters to interpret the acts going on in nature. It has nothing to do with how those acts are carried out.

Mathematical proofs aren't acts of nature, or at least, that's not what is being pre-supposed when someone says the laws of physics can be described as something other than a regularity of nature. What I want to know is, if the laws exist and are mathematically stateable (as they are in practice), then what makes them true if you rule out interpretation? Remember, in mathematical practice the reason the theorems are held true is because they are derivable and provable within the rules of the formal system. This requires a mind to derive and prove. If the laws exist (i.e., not regularities only), then the atheist should be able to say how it is that they are true without referring to an interpretation. If you say there is an interpretation that makes them true, then you are advocating a mind. That's a no-no for an atheist.

...nonsensical as well. To me it just sounds like nature is a student doing her classwork and we are the Maths teacher marking her work. For all we know she's pretty smart and is coming up with novel theorems, if we're not so smart we might not even be able to give her the appropriate marks.

Our inability to have a direct access to any given mechanism does not place any constraint on that mechanism...

The problem, though, for the atheist is that we have an exposed contradiction. Why continue to believe something if there is an exposed contradiction? It's an act of blind faith, and as Spetey has shown, that can often lead to dangerous results. What if tomorrow atheists start believing that Hitler was an atheist, is alive, and is now instructing them to install the fourth installment of the Nazi government? Is that a good thing to believe something that is contradictory to what we know about Hitler? If we show that this is not valid reason, they might come back saying, "[o]ur inability to have a direct access to [Hitler being alive and wanting the fourth Reich]does not place any constraint on that [belief]." That sounds like a bad thing to me, don't you agree?

I can't believe you'd stoop to slapping me with Hitler on this one. Methinks I'm getting dangeroulsy close to something precious or yours. You were concluding that the causal tie between two material events must be non-existent because the best that anyone could do was entertain a nominalistic interpretation when describing nature.

This is obviously nonsense -- hence my reply that our inability to have a direct access to any given mechanism does not place any constraint on that mechanism. Now it seems your best response to this perfectly reasonable statement is to draw a parallel with the Nazis. Do you wish to stand by this as a reasonably attempt to refute my claim?

[harvey1]

I can't believe you'd stoop to slapping me with Hitler on this one. Methinks I'm getting dangeroulsy close to something precious or yours. You were concluding that the causal tie between two material events must be non-existent because the best that anyone could do was entertain a nominalistic interpretation when describing nature.

I don't think it is stooping. I'm having trouble getting you to face the contradiction your beliefs are bringing upon you, so we're going through this period of dealing with issues that are off the subject from my perspective. Just have some patience here.

In my view, an interpretation occurs when a web of beliefs must be applied to a fuzzy situation. It doesn't mean that an interpretation cannot be a fact

How can that be? The interpretation of (say) the collisions in a particle accelerator, going on the mind of a physicist are not the same sort of factas the collision itself. I thought we were contrasting the way nature acts on things with the way minds interpret those interactions -- which makes the following exchange...

Again, we have to stay consistent with the ontology that we are using. Let's remember our choices:

1. The laws of physics are ultimately regularities of nature
2. The laws of physics are ultimately nomic structures that provide the causal explanation for why things happen as they do

In case of (1), we both agree that the laws are interpretations of how nature acts. We both agree that these interpretations "are not the same sort of fact as the collision itself." If you want to talk about (1), then we need to see if you have a reason to think that nature can have a cause in principle for its actions. If you cannot provide a reason except that such in principle causation may be "out there" beyond our ability to know, then this is an act of blind faith on your part. You can have blind faith, but to those who don't share that faith, they have no reason to accept that faith. You are the creationist who believes a traditional literal reading of Genesis should be taken as fact regardless of the contradiction.

In the case of (2), then we are saying that the laws of physics are ultimately interpretations that exist "out there." It doesn't matter whether we know those interpretations or not, we still must explain how it is that propositions can exist without there being a mind. You seem to agree that a mind is necessary if interpetations exist, so it seems that you agree that only option (1) is open for the atheist to believe. If so, then in order to avoid a belief based on blind faith, you must show in principle how there can be a material cause to events.

To me it just sounds like nature is a student doing her classwork and we are the Maths teacher marking her work. For all we know she's pretty smart and is coming up with novel theorems, if we're not so smart we might not even be able to give her the appropriate marks.

Are you talking in terms of (1) or in terms of (2)? If in terms of (1), then you don't have to mention "nature's theorems." Let's just talk about nature's regularities so our conversation is not confusing. If you are talking in terms of (2), then it isn't a matter of nature being "pretty smart in coming up with novel theorems." What I want to know is how can nature be smart if there is no mind in order to be smart (i.e., in terms of (2)). What can explain how nature can produce a world that has theorems which require minds in order to prove and derive? If you merely want to say that it magically can be the case without nature being intelligent at all, then please show me how you can put forth an argument requiring magic and still believe that this is a natural solution.

This is obviously nonsense -- hence my reply that our inability to have a direct access to any given mechanism does not place any constraint on that mechanism. Now it seems your best response to this perfectly reasonable statement is to draw a parallel with the Nazis. Do you wish to stand by this as a reasonably attempt to refute my claim?

I'm not drawing the Nazi argument as an attempt to discredit your argument unless you wish to argue (1) or (2) based on blind faith. If you are really arguing (1), then let's forget about (2) for a second and talk only about (1). I think your argument is running back and forth between (1) and (2) and that's why my argument here looks nonsensical to you. When I'm talking about (1), you switch to talking about (2), and when I then talk about (2), you switch back to talking about (1). Let's discuss one option at a time. Which do you wish to talk about (1) or (2)? I realize this is a complex and abstract issue, but materialist philosophers have no solution to it (and they know they have no solution for it), so I think it is important that we discuss this issue.

[Curious]

Again, we have to stay consistent with the ontology that we are using. Let's remember our choices:

1. The laws of physics are ultimately regularities of nature
2. The laws of physics are ultimately nomic structures that provide the causal explanation for why things happen as they do

In case of (1), we both agree that the laws are interpretations of how nature acts. We both agree that these interpretations "are not the same sort of fact as the collision itself." If you want to talk about (1), then we need to see if you have a reason to think that nature can have a cause in principle for its actions. If you cannot provide a reason except that such in principle causation may be "out there" beyond our ability to know, then this is an act of blind faith on your part. You can have blind faith, but to those who don't share that faith, they have no reason to accept that faith. You are the creationist who believes a traditional literal reading of Genesis should be taken as fact regardless of the contradiction.

Why is it not consistent with observation to argue that physical laws are the structure imposed by the nature of the fact itself? You seem to be saying that the nature of the fact is separate from, is responsible for, but not dependent upon, the fact.
I don't see how you conclude that the action needs interpretation rather than the action being dependent upon the fact alone (ie. physical nature set by the physical fact). If we are to strive towards the most simple explanation that fits (which you have previously advocated) then it seems that the incorporation of interpretation is an unnecessarily complex explanation of a far more simple and consistent theory.

[harvey1]

Why is it not consistent with observation to argue that physical laws are the structure imposed by the nature of the fact itself?

It is a consistent approach to try and argue that physical laws are regularities of nature (or the "nature of the fact itself"), but then you have the problem of how causality is possible in principle. Causal ties are not physical themselves as David Hume made well-known, and therefore you are left with no reason for an occurrence. This is extremely problematical for materialists since now there is no way to account for intent. For example, are you responding to my post because of no real cause, or are you replying to my post because you believe there is a point that I missed? If you agree with the latter, then it seems your approach is no longer consistent since the basis of your argument assumes that there is real causality in the world, something that a consistent materialist approach would have you deny.

You seem to be saying that the nature of the fact is separate from, is responsible for, but not dependent upon, the fact.

If you elect for option (2), then this is the assumption. The fact is based on some laws that make it possible for it to be a fact.

I don't see how you conclude that the action needs interpretation rather than the action being dependent upon the fact alone (ie. physical nature set by the physical fact).

I don't make this assumption if we approach the issue under (1). If we take a different approach to causality (i.e., (2)), then it is an aftermath of making the assumption of (2).

If we are to strive towards the most simple explanation that fits (which you have previously advocated) then it seems that the incorporation of interpretation is an unnecessarily complex explanation of a far more simple and consistent theory.

It might seem to be so, but the metaphysical considerations of causal ties prevent that for option (1). As I argued, there is no cause in that kind of setting, and therefore there is no reason for anything--which strikes me as absurd.

[Curious]

Causal ties are not physical themselves as David Hume made well-known, and therefore you are left with no reason for an occurrence.

I really don't see why. A physical alteration of parameter A might easily be shown to be the cause of an alteration in parameter B.

This is extremely problematical for materialists since now there is no way to account for intent. For example, are you responding to my post because of no real cause, or are you replying to my post because you believe there is a point that I missed? If you agree with the latter, then it seems your approach is no longer consistent since the basis of your argument assumes that there is real causality in the world, something that a consistent materialist approach would have you deny.

There you go trying to fit me into whatever compartment you feel I belong. I don't agree that my question is inconsistent. You posted a statement, I read it, was intrigued and therefore I replied. Had these things not occurred then I would not have posted my own questions. My intent to do so though only existed thanks to my material brain and the way it is wired owing to genetics and to experience. The materialist could easily say that intent is a characteristic of mind which itself is a function of the physical. It would be a mistake to attempt to lead me into the trap of defending a materialistic approach unless you believe that my particular philosophy is based upon a narrow dictionary based definition of materialism.

[harvey1]

Causal ties are not physical themselves as David Hume made well-known, and therefore you are left with no reason for an occurrence.

I really don't see why. A physical alteration of parameter A might easily be shown to be the cause of an alteration in parameter B.

As Hume showed, the connection between cause and effect is a result of experience and cognitivity. It is not a physical observable. We don't look in a microscope and see the "cause" of some effect. We see events occur, but we are interpreting certain events as the cause. Over the course of science, each generation of science invariable has a different explanation for the same cause. For example, immediately after Newton, gravity was seen as an action at a distance force responding according to Newton's law of gravitation. Later, the cause of objects being affected by gravity were seen as a result of gravity waves. Later still, gravitational force was descripted as graviton wave-particles. Now, they might be seen as 2-spin particles that are actually composed of strings perhaps moving in and outside of our D4-brane universe. There's a different cause but the same phenomena. The cause is directly related to our theory.

However, if all there are is matter-energy, then there is nothing "outside" the matter-energy quanta to influence the behavior or initiate the behavior of the quanta. The quanta follow their own rules which we observe and try to deduce what those rules are by theoretical musings. If there is a reason for those rules, then the reason would dictate the behavior, but that would be referring to something "outside" of the quanta itself. Hence, there is no cause for the behavior of quanta in a purely materialistic interpetation of the laws. They are reasons until themselves, or no reasons at all.

If you agree with the latter, then it seems...

There you go trying to fit me into whatever compartment you feel I belong.

You only fit inside a shared viewpoint if you agree with the latter...

It would be a mistake to attempt to lead me into the trap of defending a materialistic approach unless you believe that my particular philosophy is based upon a narrow dictionary based definition of materialism.

I'm not trying to lead you anywhere. I'm just pointing out where inconsistency exists within a materialist interpretation to the problem of causation.

[Curious]

As Hume showed, the connection between cause and effect is a result of experience and cognitivity. It is not a physical observable. We don't look in a microscope and see the "cause" of some effect. We see events occur, but we are interpreting certain events as the cause. Over the course of science, each generation of science invariable has a different explanation for the same cause. For example, immediately after Newton, gravity was seen as an action at a distance force responding according to Newton's law of gravitation. Later, the cause of objects being affected by gravity were seen as a result of gravity waves. Later still, gravitational force was descripted as graviton wave-particles. Now, they might be seen as 2-spin particles that are actually composed of strings perhaps moving in and outside of our D4-brane universe. There's a different cause but the same phenomena. The cause is directly related to our theory.

The differences in theories do not mean that the cause changes. The belief that certain diseases were due to the gods' displeasure cannot seriously be considered to have been the cause of diseases that that we now know to be due to the action of a virus or bacterium. I think here you are mistaking the cause with the perceived mechanism. You cannot seriously believe that such diseases were in the past actually caused by a bad tempered god.