If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[harvey1]

In a previous discussion between ourselves you put forward the argument that logic and mind were necessarily antecedent to the physical creation of the universe. I, on the other hand, put forward the argument that both logic and physical fact are inter-dependent. My position was that the physical fact determines the logical fact which in turn determines other physical fact. How is this position incorrect when stated by myself but correct when stated by you?

Physical possibility is a sub-domain of logical possibility. For example, it is logically possible to swim across Lake Michigan, but it is not physically possible (by most). You seemed to be saying the converse: logical fact supervenes on physical fact.

I agree that there is some interdependence since if there is physically "nothing," then this is something that the uncertainty principle forbids, hence "something" occurs. That's an interdependent relation. However, in this interdependent relation the physical world is ultimately undefined without the logical world, and its definition of nothing depends on logical possibility. The same is true if you swam across Lake Michigan. If there never was a Lake Michigan, then the physical lake is undefined and its definition of "no Lake Michigan" depends on that being a valid concept (e.g., what is a lake? where does it have to do with Michigan?, etc.). The logical possibility is what makes the term "nothing" or the term "Lake Michigan" hold any meaning. If it is a meaningless term, then you can't say it is either logically or physically possible to swim across Lake Michigan (btw, Lake Michigan is the body of water that exists between me and Spetey's physical locations).

Your position seems to give primacy to the physical world, and that's why I disagreed with you. I think the concepts of energy, momentum, etc., draw their meaning from a purely logical body in which God is brain of that body.

[spetey]

Hi again!

There are three claims that are (logically) inconsistent:

1. There is an all-good, all-powerful God.
2. If there is an all-good, all-powerful God, then all evil present is absolutely necessary.
3. There is unnecessary evil (indeed, in abundance, as the tsunami demonstrates).

You have to throw one of these out on pain of contradiction. Of course I think it's most reasonable to throw out (1). Most theodicists (defenders of God in the face of evil) want to throw out (3). But they owe us some reason for thinking that evils like the tsunami were necessary--that the tsunami was really (net) good. On the face of it this is a remarkable claim. Usually the defense for throwing out (3) ends up sounding just like Hitler Freak's defense: in essence, theodicists throw out (3) only because they can't bear giving up (1). But this begs the question against the atheist.

If a ball is all white does this mean that nothing else can be white or that a block cannot be black or white? If the block is a subset of ball then the block must be all white also but if not then it might be any colour. A white block could be white by divergence or black through design or necessity.

I don't understand your metaphors here, or how they relate to the point at hand.

• To answer your first question: no, just because one ball is white does not thereby mean nothing else could be white (ball or block).
• I don't know what it is for a block to be a "subset of" a ball. Do you mean a part of a ball? Like the block is lodged inside a ball?
• What does it mean to be white "by divergence"?

Perhaps if you explain these metaphors I can see how it is or might be a response to the Problem of Evil as I present it.

Perhaps if God was all-good, containing the subset principles of motivation,impetus and outcome, where method is an external set, how does the method reflect upon the characteristics of God?

Again, I can't answer this (perhaps rhetorical) question, because I can't understand it. What does it mean for being all-good to have "subset principles"? Motivation (for example) is probably necessary for action of any kind, but it seems one could do bad acts with (bad) motivation, too. Similarly it seems like outcomes can be bad. I don't know what it means for a "method" to be an "external set". If it is important to your point, perhaps you could explain some?

The conclusion that for evil to exist, there can be no-all powerful, all-good God, cannot be accepted unless it can be shown that method is a sub-set of God.

I don't know what you mean by a "method" being "a sub-set of God". God is not a set, according to most standard accounts, and so does not have subsets. Do you mean a part of God? Or a property of God?

I'm no longer clear on your position. Perhaps you could clarify. Do you believe there is an all-good, all-powerful being?

On this point I could be regarded as agnostic. In my experience, God seems beneficent in the extreme although I have not been without my own personal tragedy. As for omnipotence, I'd need to know a lot more than I do at present and be a hell of a lot smarter to even attempt to answer that one with any conviction.

Well good! I'm glad you reserve judgment until you have more reason. But the question isn't whether there is a sometimes-good or even an often-good God; that would be compatible with occasional tragedy. I guess I don't see why you're agnostic about whether there's an all-good (and all-powerful) God, given the senseless tragedies that abound.

I think here though that the tsunami is being thought of as evil. The tsunami was a natural phenomenon and cannot be imbued with the characteristic of intent. The tsunami itself cannot seriously be considered to have been motivated by the desire to destroy.

No, but I agree with Harvey's response to a similar recent point. The tsunami was not itself evil in intent, of course. But it caused a lot of horrible suffering and other bad things, and we have to stop and wonder: why didn't God stop that tsunami? Because God couldn't, or because God didn't feel like it, or what? That is the problem of evil.

Physical possibility is a sub-domain of logical possibility. For example, it is logically possible to swim across Lake Michigan, but it is not physically possible (by most). You seemed to be saying the converse: logical fact supervenes on physical fact.

Careful, please; you suggest here that the converse of "A is a sub-domain of B" is that "B supervenes on A". But "A is a sub-domain of B" and "A supervenes on B" are two very different relations; each could be true without the other (given the right A and B). Curious did not mention any supervenience thesis, and none seems to be implied by his comment. Harvey, we agree that physical possibility is a stricter notion than logical possibility--that is, everything physically possible is logically possible, but not conversely. You might say, then, that the former is a "sub-domain" of the latter, but that is very different from saying the former supervenes on the latter.

Incidentally Harvey, I dug up a review of the McCall book. From what I can tell, if the "branches" are logical possibilities, and if the physical laws are determined by the actual path through the branches (as time proceeds), then it seems to me that what's physically possible could be different while what's logically possible remains the same--simply take a different path through the (fixed) logically possible branches. (This seems roughly equivalent to the standard possible-worlds formulation.) If so, then it seems the former can't supervene on the latter. Put in your favored Davidsonian terminology, the entities that can be determined by physical-possibility predicates (in this case, "true in every actual branch" and such) can't be distinguished in purely logical predicates, since the logical predicates (the description of the branch structure, it seems) do not themselves specify which path was (is being) taken. This coincides with the intuition that logic alone cannot tell us what is physically possible (it is not a matter of logic that we cannot go faster than c).

But I'm not sure I understand his theory well, based only on this short review (which incidentally was not favorable--Philosophical Quarterly 47.186 p113). Perhaps you'd like to say more about how, according to McCall's theory, physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility. I also remain curious about how you would justify the claim that the physical supervenes on the logical.


spetey

[harvey1]

Hello Spetey,

Careful, please; you suggest here that the converse of "A is a sub-domain of B" is that "B supervenes on A". But "A is a sub-domain of B" and "A supervenes on B" are two very different relations; each could be true without the other (given the right A and B). Curious did not mention any supervenience thesis, and none seems to be implied by his comment. Harvey, we agree that physical possibility is a stricter notion than logical possibility--that is, everything physically possible is logically possible, but not conversely. You might say, then, that the former is a "sub-domain" of the latter, but that is very different from saying the former supervenes on the latter.

I agree with your comments here. I didn't mean to suggest that.

Incidentally Harvey, I dug up a review of the McCall book. From what I can tell, if the "branches" are logical possibilities, and if the physical laws are determined by the actual path through the branches (as time proceeds), then it seems to me that what's physically possible could be different while what's logically possible remains the same--simply take a different path through the (fixed) logically possible branches. (This seems roughly equivalent to the standard possible-worlds formulation.) If so, then it seems the former can't supervene on the latter.

On page 56 (paperback edition) McCall describes the relationship between the physical laws and physical possibility:

Instead of laws determining physical possibility, the branched structure of the universe comes first. It is our ontological primitive. Laws supervene upon it.

So, my understanding of McCall is that physical laws supervene on physical possibility, and "the branched model ... provides a physical interpretation of probability values in terms of proportions of sets of branches..." (p.58 ). "At each branch point, then, the branches of the universe tree comprise the set of all physically possible courses of events, relative to the conditions obtaining at the branch point."

So, the physical possibilities (branched model) aren't the actual path, it represents all the paths that nature takes. The proportionality of these branches determines the probabilities. So, McCall summarizes it nicely:

Suppose we are trying to define laws of nature in terms of the notions of physical possibility and physical necessity, and advance the following suggestion: L is a law of nature in a world w if L is true in all worlds w' which are possible relative to w. The question then arises, which relation among worlds is the relation of relative possibility-the access relation? If no such relation can be clearly picked out, then the identification problem for laws defined in this modal way will be unresolved. Now a branching structure of worlds--where a 'world' is defined as a path through the branching structure, i.e. what I would call a complete possible history of the world--does contain a clear and unambiguous relationship of accessibility, as van Fraassen points out. [Note on bottom of page: it should be noted that the definition of 'world' as a single path through the branched model is <only for discussion purposes>. On the branched model there is only one 'world', namely the whole branched structure. The distinction is important for the definition of laws: see p.81 below.] Call two worlds w and w' t-equivalent if and only if z are all t-equivalent. The time-indexed relation of t-equivalence can serve as the access relation in the definition of law:

A general proposition L is a law of nature in x at t (or, in van Fraasen's terminology, settled in x at t) if L holds in every world which is t-equivalent to x.

(ibid, p. 78-79)

Put in your favored Davidsonian terminology, the entities that can be determined by physical-possibility predicates (in this case, "true in every actual branch" and such) can't be distinguished in purely logical predicates, since the logical predicates (the description of the branch structure, it seems) do not themselves specify which path was (is being) taken. This coincides with the intuition that logic alone cannot tell us what is physically possible (it is not a matter of logic that we cannot go faster than c).

You're gonna get mad, but using Davidsonian terminology the branched universe just becomes part of Tarski's recursive technique. Instead of possibilities being existent, they become propositions which require the satisfaction relation in order to be physically true in our world. If our world satisfies this (physical) possibility proposition, then it becomes not only logical possible, it is physically possible as well. In order for the proposition to be satisfied, it must be decided upon by the omniscient interpreter (to use Davidson's phrase), and then it is possibly true. If nature takes that course (i.e., nature follows that branch), then the omniscient interpreter records that information as true as well.

I also remain curious about how you would justify the claim that the physical supervenes on the logical.

Well, there's lots to be said about this subject...

[spetey]

Hullo!

Careful, please; you suggest here that the converse of "A is a sub-domain of B" is that "B supervenes on A". But "A is a sub-domain of B" and "A supervenes on B" are two very different relations...

I agree with your comments here. I didn't mean to suggest that.

Thanks! Good. It is more fun to work on parts where we agree, isn't it.

On page 56 (paperback edition) McCall describes the relationship between the physical laws and physical possibility:

Instead of laws determining physical possibility, the branched structure of the universe comes first. It is our ontological primitive. Laws supervene upon it.

So, my understanding of McCall is that physical laws supervene on physical possibility ...

Another point of agreement! It sounds eminently plausible to me that there could be no change in physical laws without a change in what's physically possible, and I happily grant this supervenience claim for our discussion, if you wish to use it.

Physical possibility supervening on logical possibility, though--that's another matter. I would like to hear more about how you, McCall, or anyone would support that claim.

You're gonna get mad, but using Davidsonian terminology the branched universe just becomes part of Tarski's recursive technique.

I'm practicing not getting mad, and feeling good about that. But you're right that this sorely tempts me--so first, I ask you to help out by being extra careful when you make comments that you know could make me mad.

Put it this way: what about this comment do you suspect could make me mad? Next time, please try to anticipate it, and pre-empt the factors that might make me mad.

To my knowledge, Davidson never wrote about McCall's branched universe model--indeed, Davidson was nearly dead when it came out. So from what I know, there is nothing in "Davidsonian terminology" about "branched structure". You're right that Davidson talks about Tarski, of course. But Davidson's take on Tarskian semantics, on the surface, has nothing in common with McCall's model for the universe. So perhaps you could explain in your own words how McCall's model becomes "a part" of "Tarski's recursive technique". At the moment I don't see how a model of the universe and time's flow can be a part of a technique, let alone the particular technique of resursive definitions.

Instead of possibilities being existent, they become propositions which require the satisfaction relation in order to be physically true in our world.

You could take a propositional view of possible worlds--say, that possible worlds are simply all maximal sets of consistent propositions. (As I remember, that's Stalnaker's position.) But I thought earlier on this thread that you claimed to be a modal realist? Also, I don't see how this take needs Tarski or Davidson in particular. Why use such old-fashioned semantics? And what do you mean by "requir[ing] the satisfaction relation" for a proposition to be "physically true in our world"?

In order for the proposition to be satisfied, it must be decided upon by the omniscient interpreter (to use Davidson's phrase), and then it is possibly true.

I know "omniscient interpreter" is Davidson's phrase. But you here you seem to conflate it with God. An "omniscient interpreter" is a mere idealization, not taken actually to exist. For example, a tennis instructor might talk about what the "ideal tennis player" would do. That doesn't mean the tennis instructor is committed to God's existence, because only God would be the ideal tennis player. The tennis instructor isn't committed to the actual existence of such a player at all. It's just a useful way of speaking about what's best for a tennis player to do. Davidson is not committed to the existence of an actual omniscient interpreter who "decides" whether a proposition is satisfied (presumably, by making the world to satisfy the truth-conditions). Only an all-powerful being could "decide" to make the world conform to the truth-conditions of any logically possible proposition. That's why it looks like you mistake Davidson's omniscient interpreter for God.

I also remain curious about how you would justify the claim that the physical supervenes on the logical.

Well, there's lots to be said about this subject...

Please! Start saying! This is the particularly striking claim that would stand the history of philosophy on its head if there were good arguments for it. I am inclined to think that it was a mistake on your part, perhaps a slip of the pen that you didn't feel you could concede while I was being so insensitively "vehement". If you too are starting to agree that it was a mistake, I hope you won't feel as bad about saying as much now. I promise to be polite with such an admission--just as you were polite with my confession of misreading that McCall passage. On the other hand, if it's something you'll really stand by, then I'm very eager to hear your arguments.

I'm also still left wondering how this all relates to the point as we last left it.


spetey

[harvey1]

Physical possibility supervening on logical possibility, though--that's another matter. I would like to hear more about how you, McCall, or anyone would support that claim.

I'm not sure exactly why you find that so different than any other quantum cosmology. Not every logical possibility is a physical possibility, but every physical possibility is a logical possibility, so we agree with that. Every physical possibility is not actualized in our particular universe, and neither is every logical possibility actualized in our particular universe either, I assume we agree on that. If something is stateable in terms of physical possibility, then it should be stateable in principle in terms of pure logical possibility, do we agree there? For example, if there is a physical possibility for a particle to decay in the next 10 seconds, then this should be stateable in terms of mathematical (or logical) possibility, which is what the uncertainty principle does. In logic and in math there are constants and variables, but there can exist a branch for every logically possible value of these constants and variables. Similarly, in physics there are constants and variables, but there can exist a branch for every physically possible constant and variable. There is a decrease in the possible options when going from logically possibility to physical possibility. However, what is physically possible is still dependent on what is logically possible plus whatever other circumstances are peculiar to something being physical. Logically possible scenarios are ideal situations. Physically possible scenarios are practical situations. Logical possible scenarios aren't concerned, for example, what a person could possibly want to do, it is only concerned about what a person could possibly do. It is not physically possible for me to swim across Lake Michigan tomorrow because it is not something I want to do, even if I had to do it. Is it logically possible, yes, would I in fact do it even if I had to? No. Why? Because it is logically impossible? No. Because physically I'm not up to it even if in theory science were to tell me that I could do it. Physical possibility must consider physical variables such as indeterminancy, free will, intent, desire, etc.. These kind of conditions are not reducible to logical possibility. However, they are dependent on logical possibility since I cannot exceed the limits of the logical structure that determines what is logically possible in that scenario.

Put it this way: what about this comment do you suspect could make me mad? Next time, please try to anticipate it, and pre-empt the factors that might make me mad.

I can't step on egg shells, Spetey. You are asking questions that involve concepts that I have spent considerable time in thinking about. If you want to know the answer to your questions, then I have just come out with it.

So perhaps you could explain in your own words how McCall's model becomes "a part" of "Tarski's recursive technique". At the moment I don't see how a model of the universe and time's flow can be a part of a technique, let alone the particular technique of resursive definitions.

If we convert McCall's branched model from referring to some structure that exists "out there" to referring to some branched model that refers to propositions that are "true," then Tarski's T-theory model has relevance since propositions are semantical structures. We need a theory of truth in that kind of model, and therefore I have good reason to call upon Tarski. However, Tarski didn't apply his theory to a concept outside of object language semantics, and that's why we need Davidson's help. Davidson used Tarski's T-schema to produce a theory of truth within the context of natural language. Davidson hoped this approach would take him a step closer to a theory of meaning for language. However, if propositions actually exist "out there," then this approach should be elevated to a much higher step. It is a real theory of truth and not just in the semantic sense that is needed under those new assumptions of truth. Davidson's effort should be considered, I think.

It should spell out in technical terms how these proposition (that exist "out there") can be true propositions. To do that, these propositions must refer to something. That's not to say that the proposition exists after the references exist. Rather, the proposition exists as a result of being logically derived from some axiom, and this new proposition needs to refer to what the proposition is about in order to be true and meanful proposition. This involves an act of creation in the world. As each new proposition is derived, the content of the proposition is created as a means to make the proposition true and meaningful.

I'd like to add more, but you disagree with everything I type so I don't see the sense in adding more detail at this point. I'm sure your response will be hefty just from these few paragraphs.

[Curious]

Hi again!

If a ball is all white does this mean that nothing else can be white or that a block cannot be black or white? If the block is a subset of ball then the block must be all white also but if not then it might be any colour. A white block could be white by divergence or black through design or necessity.

I don't understand your metaphors here, or how they relate to the point at hand.

• To answer your first question: no, just because one ball is white does not thereby mean nothing else could be white (ball or block).
• I don't know what it is for a block to be a "subset of" a ball. Do you mean a part of a ball? Like the block is lodged inside a ball?
• What does it mean to be white "by divergence"?

Perhaps if you explain these metaphors I can see how it is or might be a response to the Problem of Evil as I present it.

Sorry if I was unclear. I will attempt to clarify my points.
By saying block is a sub-set of ball I mean in the same way as doors or windows might be sub-sets of house or vowels might be a sub-set of alphabet. In my example you might imagine that the white ball could be made up of blocks and prisms, each category being a sub-set of ball.
I do realise that strictly speaking vowels would be a sub-set of letters and not alphabet as vowels are still letters but not alphabet but I am using the term in reference to a holy entity and so no sub-set or even all combined sub-sets would equate with the total.

What I mean by white by divergence can be shown by the followimg example:
2 red balls are on a production line, ballA and ballB.
BallA is treated with a pigment which reflects yellow and blue light. This ball is now reflective of all colours and is seen as white.
BallB is dipped in bleach to destroy all red pigment and underlying pigment. this ball is now seen as white.
Both balls are essentially seen to be the same but arrived at this point from completely different processes which diverged at a particular point in the production line. In the same way, something that is seen as good need not necessarily be seen as having to emanate from God's direct action. Similarly, evil need not be seen to emanate from God's action either.

Again, I can't answer this (perhaps rhetorical) question, because I can't understand it. What does it mean for being all-good to have "subset principles"? Motivation (for example) is probably necessary for action of any kind, but it seems one could do bad acts with (bad) motivation, too. Similarly it seems like outcomes can be bad. I don't know what it means for a "method" to be an "external set". If it is important to your point, perhaps you could explain some?

An all-good entity might have motivation to do all-good actions, the impetus applied and the ultimate outcome might also be all-good. The impetus might not necessarily be geared to prevent catastrophies but could be sufficiently powerful or well designed to overcome any subsequent interruption or calamity. In the same way, a good firewall does not actively attempt to prevent the existence of viruses or trojans but rather attempts to prevent such instances from infecting and destroying your computer.
By using the term method as an external set I mean that events might not necessarily be directly attributable to God. If you were to believe that the tsunami was caused directly by God for the purpose of killing people then it would be reasonable to assume that God is malevolent. If you believe that God could have stopped it but didn't, you might think him not particularly beneficent, but what is the alternative to oceanic quakes? If all quakes were inland then more people would probably die. If there were no quakes then the plates would either move more rapidly so no tension would ever build up (which itself would cause huge problems) or the tension would build up to such an extent that the world would eventually pop. Believe it or not, as a species we have more than sufficient resource and expertise to build earthquake proof housing and the scientific knowhow to have picked up this quake and communicated it to, and evacuated most, if not all coastal inhabitants. This type of disaster is not unprecedented by any means yet the governments of the world who could easily afford such preventative measures do nothing to help except after the event. If we cannot be bothered to at least attempt to avoid such terrible outcomes to events, what gives us the right to expect God to?

I don't know what you mean by a "method" being "a sub-set of God". God is not a set, according to most standard accounts, and so does not have subsets. Do you mean a part of God? Or a property of God?

I mean as an attribute.
I mean that an all-good God whose concern is the ultimate outcome due to the impetus, guided by all-good motivation, cannot be said to be not all-good because of events that appear to be bad. An ambulance might speed at 100 miles an hour and save a persons life but the fuel economy might be less than ideal. The driver however had no concern regarding the fuel economy but was concerned with getting to hospital and the most advantageous outcome for the patient.

Well good! I'm glad you reserve judgment until you have more reason. But the question isn't whether there is a sometimes-good or even an often-good God; that would be compatible with occasional tragedy. I guess I don't see why you're agnostic about whether there's an all-good (and all-powerful) God, given the senseless tragedies that abound.

I don't know whether God is all-good because I don't know the net result or whether an alternative would be net "better". I don't know that God is all-powerful because I don't know how I could prove this. I do not accept the arguments though that suggest God cannot be these things because the arguments are not good and extremely limited in regard to scope. I am not agnostic concerning the existence of God though but all I know is that God is extremely beneficent in my experience and extremely powerful. If I had the ability to comprehend what "all" really was I would have more to go on.

The tsunami was not itself evil in intent, of course. But it caused a lot of horrible suffering and other bad things, and we have to stop and wonder: why didn't God stop that tsunami? Because God couldn't, or because God didn't feel like it, or what? That is the problem of evil.

I hope I have given a reasonable argument somewhere above.

[Curious]

Your position seems to give primacy to the physical world, and that's why I disagreed with you. I think the concepts of energy, momentum, etc., draw their meaning from a purely logical body in which God is brain of that body.

I see how my last post might have given that impression, I really shouldn't have used the term "in turn" as it suggested this. I did not mean that physical fact preceded logical fact as shown in part of my original discourse:

Without these properties and relationships, logic is based on nothing and can "describe" nothing. If mind is behind the fact, then the mind is not limited by the logic as it has not yet gained any definition. Logic is set only after, or to be more precise, at the same time as, factual instantiation.

[spetey]

Hi everyone...

Physical possibility supervening on logical possibility, though--that's another matter. I would like to hear more about how you, McCall, or anyone would support that claim.

I'm not sure exactly why you find that so different than any other quantum cosmology.

I don't think of it as a quantum cosmology at all--that seems to be a contingent theory of physics. Whether physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility is a necessary matter, it seems, and a matter of metaphysics.

Not every logical possibility is a physical possibility, but every physical possibility is a logical possibility, so we agree with that.

Yup!

Every physical possibility is not actualized in our particular universe, and neither is every logical possibility actualized in our particular universe either, I assume we agree on that.

Yup, of course! (Well, strictly speaking, I agree that "not every physical possibility is actualized", which I assume is what you mean; I don't think every p-poss is not actualized--I think exactly one is! Same with the logical possibility.)

If something is stateable in terms of physical possibility, then it should be stateable in principle in terms of pure logical possibility, do we agree there?

Nope! This is where we start to diverge sharply. I'll try to explain why.

For example, if there is a physical possibility for a particle to decay in the next 10 seconds, then this should be stateable in terms of mathematical (or logical) possibility, which is what the uncertainty principle does.

No, I don't think it "should" be so statable. I can't even imagine how it would be statable as a mathematical or logical law. The uncertainty principle is a physical law which refers essentially to physical magnitutes like position, momentum, joules, and seconds. If those symbols did not stand for these magnitudes it would not be a physical law. So I don't see how something like the uncertainty principle, or for example the law that nothing goes faster than c (over macro distances in a vacuum etc), could be stated in pure logic. It's the nature of logic not to have any content about a particular world.

However, what is physically possible is still dependent on what is logically possible plus whatever other circumstances are peculiar to something being physical.

I could agree to something like this. But the supervenience claim insists physical possibility depends only on logical possibility. That's what I find so hard to swallow. Here you seem to agree that it depends on something more.

I could say a great deal about your passages on Davidson and Tarski, but since it didn't seem directly relevant to the topics of physical and logical possibility (let far alone the problem of evil!), I'll let it go for now. If you have particular arguments or points in mind that you'd like to hear my thoughts on, let me know.

I'd like to add more, but you disagree with everything I type so I don't see the sense in adding more detail at this point. I'm sure your response will be hefty just from these few paragraphs.

I don't disagree with everything you type Harvey! In my last few posts I've started off by agreeing with a great deal. Now, yes, I do disagree with many things you type. When you type "there is a God", I disagree, state reasons against, and ask for your reasons for. When you type "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", I disagree, state reasons against, and ask for your reasons for. When you type "the physical supervenes on the logical", I disagree, give reasons against, and ask for reasons for.

We have made some progress discussing physical possibility and logical possibility, and seem to be coming toward an agreement. I would still like to hear why you think the physical supervenes on the logical, since (again) this would be a truly revolutionary claim in metaphysics if it could be well-reasoned. Finally, I'm still interested in how any of this relates directly to what I have thought for some time is the current point of the thread.


spetey

[spetey]

Hullo Curious,

I hope I have given a reasonable argument somewhere above.

I think the part of your post that suggests some argument is here:

If you believe that God could have stopped it but didn't, you might think him not particularly beneficent, but what is the alternative to oceanic quakes? If all quakes were inland then more people would probably die. If there were no quakes then the plates would either move more rapidly so no tension would ever build up (which itself would cause huge problems) or the tension would build up to such an extent that the world would eventually pop.

Why think there must be earthquakes? God is purported to be very powerful--indeed, all powerful. God could have made the plates more soft and giving at the edges. God could have made the plate tectonics of earth different, or perhaps a planet without a molten core. God could have permitted the tsunami but calmed the waves before they reached any humans. God had countless options available. Why didn't God take any of them? If you think it is impossible for God to prevent natual disasters on a planet God made, why do you think God is all-powerful?

Believe it or not, as a species we have more than sufficient resource and expertise to build earthquake proof housing and the scientific knowhow to have picked up this quake and communicated it to, and evacuated most, if not all coastal inhabitants. This type of disaster is not unprecedented by any means yet the governments of the world who could easily afford such preventative measures do nothing to help except after the event. If we cannot be bothered to at least attempt to avoid such terrible outcomes to events, what gives us the right to expect God to?

This sounds like the response that everyone who died in the tsunami deserved to die because they didn't take the proper precautions. This includes the children and the like. Is this your stance?

Consider the natural disasters that occur near where you live--tornadoes perhaps, or some such. Now, suppose that unbeknownst to you, a huge one is heading for your house--a [tornado] that would kill you. And suppose furthermore that someone is in a position to save you--someone who knows that the tornado is coming and could warn you in time. But suppose that person decides, "eh, I could help, but really Curious should have prepared for that tornado by not living right there, or by living entirely underground, so really Curious deserves to die." Do you think that would be a good person, a just person? I sure don't! But how is the God who lets innocent people die in a tsunami any different?

I don't know whether God is all-good because I don't know the net result or whether an alternative would be net "better".

But this seems easy. Do you think it was (net) good or (net) bad that the tsunami happened? To me it seems obviously net bad. If you think it might have been net good, for what reason (other than that you believe in an all-good, all-powerful God)?

I don't know that God is all-powerful because I don't know how I could prove this. I do not accept the arguments though that suggest God cannot be these things because the arguments are not good and extremely limited in regard to scope.

Now I don't think this counts as a response: in effect you say "I do not accept the arguments against my position because I think the arguments aren't good." The question at hand is: why are they bad arguments? What reason do you have against them?

I am not agnostic concerning the existence of God though but all I know is that God is extremely beneficent in my experience and extremely powerful.

But the question here is: how do you know this given all the horrendous events in the world?


spetey

[Curious]

Hello again.

Why think there must be earthquakes? God is purported to be very powerful--indeed, all powerful. God could have made the plates more soft and giving at the edges. God could have made the plate tectonics of earth different, or perhaps a planet without a molten core. God could have permitted the tsunami but calmed the waves before they reached any humans. God had countless options available. Why didn't God take any of them? If you think it is impossible for God to prevent natual disasters on a planet God made, why do you think God is all-powerful?

Perhaps because evolution is driven most strongly by environmental conditions, an environment that was less dynamic would actually hinder evolution in the long term. If the earth was always static then what would drive a primitive lifeform to become a more complex one?

This sounds like the response that everyone who died in the tsunami deserved to die because they didn't take the proper precautions. This includes the children and the like. Is this your stance?

I am disappointed that your opinion of me is so low that you even suggest that I might support such a monstrous proposition. Of course those who died did not deserve to die. What I was saying is that, as a species, as a whole, we have the ability to ensure such natural events do not cause such devastation to the lives of innocents. The blame does not rest on the victims but on the governments who were told by geologists that this was a very real danger and yet did nothing to ameliorate the situation.

I don't know whether God is all-good because I don't know the net result or whether an alternative would be net "better".

But this seems easy. Do you think it was (net) good or (net) bad that the tsunami happened? To me it seems obviously net bad. If you think it might have been net good, for what reason (other than that you believe in an all-good, all-powerful God)?

Since it is impossible to know the final outcome of worldly existence it is also impossible to state with certainty that the events are either net good or net bad. If you are to assume that the tsunami is, as an event, unrelated to the environment or outcome as a whole then you could say it is net bad. This though has a problem of limited scope. If on the other hand you are willing to accept that the tsunami was a product of a dynamic environment which itself accelerates the evolutionary process, you might believe that the final outcome of more diversity and greater survivability could be thought of as net good.
Let me put it another way. For the sake of argument lets give a time span of 1 million years from inception to final outcome.

A static environment would show little diversity in the organisms it supported after the term ended. There might be no deaths due to war, famine or natural disaster but at the end of the term all organisms that ever lived would still die.

A dynamic environment, after the same amount of time would show far greater diversity and development in the organisms it supported. In addition, the organisms would, as a whole, show far greater adaptability. While there may have been many deaths due to war, famine and disasters, these numbers do not increase the number of deaths to a number greater than the number of total lives. Those who live must by necessity also die. Those organisms that died due to events would still have died due to natural causes had they been spared.

So what is better from your point of view? Both scenarios have an outcome that all those who lived in the past have also died in the past, but in the dynamic environment there are more diverse, complex, survivable and adaptable organisms. To reach the same level of complexity might be achievable in a static environment but might also take 100 times longer and so ultimately might also mean more total deaths. If it is the number of deaths that is seen as bad then the first scenario, while in the short term seems more conducive to life, in the long term appears more conducive to death.

I don't know that God is all-powerful because I don't know how I could prove this. I do not accept the arguments though that suggest God cannot be these things because the arguments are not good and extremely limited in regard to scope.

Now I don't think this counts as a response: in effect you say "I do not accept the arguments against my position because I think the arguments aren't good." The question at hand is: why are they bad arguments? What reason do you have against them?

I am not taking a position regarding the omnipotence or omnibenevolence of God, I am taking the position that the arguments that attempt to disprove this possibility are unconvincing. I disagree with the assumption that an all-powerful, all-good God must necessarily be compelled to avert all seemingly bad events unless it can be proven that it is not the final outcome which is the primary (or even only) consideration. I could say that my buying a lottery ticket is net bad as I am down a pound before the draw is made. I could say that this changes to net good if my numbers come up and I win a fortune. This again might change to net bad if due to my new wealth I am kidnapped and murdered. To say the tsunami is net bad (I do not dispute that it is bad but link it here to a dynamic environment) is rather like saying that buying the lottery ticket is net bad before the numbers have been drawn. This is the problem, as I see it, with the argument because it is limited by scope.

I am not agnostic concerning the existence of God though but all I know is that God is extremely beneficent in my experience and extremely powerful.

But the question here is: how do you know this given all the horrendous events in the world?

Because I do not necessarily attribute all these events to God. Just because tragedies occur or evil exists in the world is not in itself evidence of God's characteristics. Why do you believe that it is?