Ethics of transhumanist "immortality"

[GrumpyMrGruff]

Cloning and personhood are perennial favorites on internet message boards. Recently I read two science fiction novels, Charles Stross' Accelerando and Cory Doctorow's Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom (both available online), which offer a different perspective on personhood. A key technology in both books is (in Stross' words) the ability to "fork a copy of one's state vector." This involves invoking some hand-waving nano- and bio-technology to clone and copy the memories of an individual into a new body. This results in two individuals with the same memories up to the point of divergence.

In Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, restrictions appear to be in place on the use of this technology (though they are not explicitly stated). Individuals regularly record "back up" copies of their memories and maintain genetic information for cloning purposes; however, they only generate new copies of themselves when they die.

Accelerando provides more food for thought by exploring the adoption and abuses of this technology. Some early copies are made into indentured workers by their original selves, while later copies (created after the widespread adoption of the process) must settle questions of property rights and contractual obligations.

Considering the low resolution of our physical brain mapping technologies and the flawed animal clones we've produced thus far, this technology is a long way off (if it ever comes to be). However, it does raise some interesting questions:

1) Playing God? Accusations of researchers "playing god" are common in discussions of cloning. Would copying oneself to maintain functional immortality contradict god's will? Is it an example of extreme hubris or part of a normal desire to extend our lives?

2) Should it be allowed? Both of the aforementioned books take place in "post scarcity" societies without the limits on natural resources that we experience today. Considering overpopulation, would it be ethical to keep people alive indefinitely or to create multiple copies of people? Are there limitations which could make it ethical (eg, sterilization in exchange for immortality)? Would "forking vectors" be ethical in a "post scarcity" society?

3) Are they people too? Characters in DaOitMK (many of whom engage in risky leisure activities) have been copied many times and operate on the assumption that they are as "real" as the next guy. However, they do question whether they are the same people as their predecessors - memories are lost between their last backups and times of death. Accelerando chronicles the eventual attainment of human rights by copies. Early copies (who have some human rights but no claim to the property of their originals) are destitute and effectively forced to work for their original selves as indentured workers. Rights are gradually accumulated over the course of the book. A kneejerk reaction from me is that "of course they are people," but I realize that many people may not share this view.

4) Who gets what? If multiple copies are alive at the same time, who is entitled to what? Are copies entitled to anything belonging to the original? Are both individuals mutually entitled to whatever assets were held before the split? After the split? If so, how can these joint accounts be ethically managed by both individuals? If assets from the joint account are used to make successful investments by one individual, are both entitled to the profits? There are many questions to be addressed here.

There is also a question of certification and education. Are copies entitled to the same academic or professional credentials accrued by the original before the split? Stross has an amusing subplot of a rights savvy lawyer who makes multiple copies of a fresh-from-law-school recording of himself. Knowing that others will not recognize their professional credentials, he employs them as legal assistants with minimal pay.

5) Who owes who? Hand in hand with "who gets what" is the question of who owes who. Do copies share any of the obligations of the original? If copies maintain the pre-split contractual obligations of their originals, are the obligations divided evenly among copies or based on involvement? (To what extent has Copy X been involved with the execution of this contract?) If a copy lives independently of his/her original and waives rights to the profits of an undertaking, does this limit or remove obligations associated with that undertaking?

I don't know how many sci-fi fans we have here, but these were interesting questions for me. Hopefully they will be for you as well.

[McCulloch]

Read Mindscan by Robert J. Sawyer.

[Beto]

Creating self-aware copies of oneself is just plain silly. They're automatically new individuals that start accumulating new experiences, and they will all "feel" like they're the original... and they would all be right. That doesn't extend one's existence any more than children do. Bodies that aren't self-aware and only become so when you transfer your awareness to them, that's a different matter. I have no grounds to object to that in the slightest. And I surely wouldn't consider them people.

[GrumpyMrGruff]

Read Mindscan by Robert J. Sawyer.

Thanks for the recommendation.

[GrumpyMrGruff]

Creating self-aware copies of oneself is just plain silly. They're automatically new individuals that start accumulating new experiences, and they will all "feel" like they're the original... and they would all be right. That doesn't extend one's existence any more than children do. Bodies that aren't self-aware and only become so when you transfer your awareness to them, that's a different matter. I have no grounds to object to that in the slightest. And I surely wouldn't consider them people.

The strategy mentioned in Magic Kingdom - die, load backup memories into clone, repeat - addresses "immortality." Do you mean that you wouldn't consider them people before they had memories written to their brains, or you wouldn't consider them people at all?

The question I was trying to get at with the copies involved entitlement. You compared them to offspring of the original and said they would all be right to feel like the original. I agree that they're independent people, but are they on their own or do they have equal claim to the property/credentials of the original (and the original's obligations)? After all, they shared the same decisions (and consequences of those decisions) before they split.

[Beto]

Creating self-aware copies of oneself is just plain silly. They're automatically new individuals that start accumulating new experiences, and they will all "feel" like they're the original... and they would all be right. That doesn't extend one's existence any more than children do. Bodies that aren't self-aware and only become so when you transfer your awareness to them, that's a different matter. I have no grounds to object to that in the slightest. And I surely wouldn't consider them people.

The strategy mentioned in Magic Kingdom - die, load backup memories into clone, repeat - addresses "immortality." Do you mean that you wouldn't consider them people before they had memories written to their brains, or you wouldn't consider them people at all?

I don't consider human bodies as human beings, or people, before they become self-aware. In this regard, "memories" aren't relevant to me, what matters is self-awareness.

The question I was trying to get at with the copies involved entitlement. You compared them to offspring of the original and said they would all be right to feel like the original. I agree that they're independent people, but are they on their own or do they have equal claim to the property/credentials of the original (and the original's obligations)? After all, they shared the same decisions (and consequences of those decisions) before they split.

From my perspective, all self-aware copies should have equal claim to the property/credentials of the original.

Personally, I can't see the logic in thinking that a different body with the same memories would constitute an extension of the original awareness. Isn't it obviously a different person with the same memories?

[GrumpyMrGruff]

I don't consider human bodies as human beings, or people, before they become self-aware. In this regard, "memories" aren't relevant to me, what matters is self-awareness.

In this case, I think it's one in the same. The bodies were grown as needed and presumably weren't aware before they were activated/uploaded.

From my perspective, all self-aware copies should have equal claim to the property/credentials of the original.

Personally, I can't see the logic in thinking that a different body with the same memories would constitute an extension of the original awareness. Isn't it obviously a different person with the same memories?

This seems to hinge on whether or not copies are made serially or simultaneously. I agree that self-aware copies that exist at the same time have to be treated as different persons. There's no way to get around the differing experiences they would accumulate from the point of divergence.

But if a person is "backed up" minutes before death and then wakes up afterward having lost an hour to a week of subjective time, is that a new person in the sense of personhood, or is it someone who has undergone an extreme medical procedure? Hypothetically speaking, if you could transplant a living brain into a different body, does that cross the line of new/old personhood (for the original owner of the brain)? If there is a destructive recording method the could copy one's mental "software" while sacrificing the substrate, would installing that software in a new body qualify it as a new person? To bring up another corny sci-fi example, do Star Trek transporters create new persons? They rip people into piles of atoms and then reassemble them based on a digital recording. For a while there, those disintegrated people seem to be clinically dead. I would be inclined to accept serial copies which only exist one at a time as the same person.

How closely is the concept of personhood tied to a specific material body (considering that questionable bit of "common knowledge" that bodies completely turnover their molecular contents every seven or so years)? How important is uninterrupted subjective experience in determining personhood?

[Beto]

But if a person is "backed up" minutes before death and then wakes up afterward having lost an hour to a week of subjective time, is that a new person in the sense of personhood, or is it someone who has undergone an extreme medical procedure?

I have a recurrent thought... when I go to sleep, do I wake up the same person, or is this body the host of a new individual every morning? I suppose I can't know yet. Perhaps that study in Great Britain will turn up something new.

Hypothetically speaking, if you could transplant a living brain into a different body, does that cross the line of new/old personhood (for the original owner of the brain)?

In case of brain transplants, I would guess it is the same awareness in a different body.

If there is a destructive recording method the could copy one's mental "software" while sacrificing the substrate, would installing that software in a new body qualify it as a new person? To bring up another corny sci-fi example, do Star Trek transporters create new persons? They rip people into piles of atoms and then reassemble them based on a digital recording. For a while there, those disintegrated people seem to be clinically dead. I would be inclined to accept serial copies which only exist one at a time as the same person.

As far as I understand the transporter technology, it works like the food replicators. People aren't disassembled and reassembled with the same particles, they're disintegrated on one end of the transporter, the data pattern (not the actual matter) is transmitted and "replicated" on the other end of the transporter. I would say these are exact copies of the original, but the original is destroyed. Humanity wouldn't care, but I personally would. McCoy had the right idea all along.

How closely is the concept of personhood tied to a specific material body (considering that questionable bit of "common knowledge" that bodies completely turnover their molecular contents every seven or so years)?

Neurons too?

How important is uninterrupted subjective experience in determining personhood?

Which, brings me back to the sleep (or general loss of consciousness) issue.

[Simon_Peter]

Hey guys! and Gals..

umm whats the question..

if someone can make me immortal i would want it.