The Unchangeable Nature of the Future

[sofyst]

Hello all, I am new to this board; therefore you must be kind to me!

The question is dealing more so with determinism and free-will. While I understand it is a question that usually finds its home within Christian debate, it is nonetheless a question that can step out into the realms of secular thought, as it has quite often.

I do not know anyone here, save perhaps one, therefore I do not now the philosophies of most here. Therefore let me just shed light on my views.

I am a Christian, a reformed Southern Baptist (go ahead think of all the evil connotations involved with all of these labels...). I am a determinist, yet a soft-determinist as the label has been drawn. Given the idea that I believe God to be simple and perfect, knowing all that is to be known, I would likewise say that the future is as the future will be...therefore fixed and unchangeable.

I was just interested in a topic being started dealing with arguments for or against the nature of the future. Moreso interested in those who do not believe in the issue of free-will, strictly from an atheistic (or non-Christian) viewpoint.

Any takers?

[QED]

I would however like to discuss this statement:

For me this type of conundrum reveals god to be no more than the inevitable result of certain untestable propositions.

If I am understanding you correctly, I would have to disagree. If this idea of God's knowledge is indeed correct then it is not God who is the inevitable result of certain untestable propositions, rather it is the future that is the result of certain untestable propositions. God's knowledge is one of those certain untestable propostions that make the future an inevitable result.

I'm sorry to say that my statement was meant to convey something different: That the paradox of determinism is a necessary consequence of postulating an omnipotent god - therefore little wonder that determinism becomes yet another untestable postulate, beyond the reach of rational inquirery.

[sofyst]

But we have the means to determine that the tiny specks of light on the night sky actually are. With tools like Hubble and Keck and Spirit and Huygens, we can get up close and personal with those tiny lights in the night sky and falsify the hypotheses about their assumed tininess. To the contrary, I have no evidence which suggests that my choices are anything other than my own.

Do you not see where you are using faulty logic, or at least being unreasonable?

You see I would completely agree that we have means to determine that they are not in actuallity tiny specks, such means as Hubble and Keck...

I would likewise agree that we haven't any means to determine whether your choices are anything other than your own.

Yet if I were to give you the upper hand and say that given the fact we haven't any means to determine whether the choices are you own then we should consider that they are, I would be acting foolishly. Because the same thing could have been said thousands of years ago when a person was postulating that the stars were but tiny specks and nothing more. He could use the same argument and say that there were not means to determine whether they were anything but tiny specks, therefore they must be considered as tiny specks.

You see, just because you haven't a means now, doesn't not necessarily mean there will never be a means.

Do you understand what I am saying?

[QED]

You see, just because you haven't a means now, doesn't not necessarily mean there will never be a means.

Do you understand what I am saying?

I ought to check on this, I've got a suspicion that the resolution of the EPR paradox through the demonstration of its violation of Bells inequality may have a bearing on this. Is there anyone in the know that could save me the effort? It is after all at the heart of quantum determinism.

[mrmufin]

To the contrary, I have no evidence which suggests that my choices are anything other than my own.

Do you not see where you are using faulty logic, or at least being unreasonable?

Uh...

You see I would completely agree that we have means to determine that they are not in actuallity tiny specks, such means as Hubble and Keck...

Okay...

I would likewise agree that we haven't any means to determine whether your choices are anything other than your own.

Yep...

Yet if I were to give you the upper hand and say that given the fact we haven't any means to determine whether the choices are you own then we should consider that they are, I would be acting foolishly.

If "acting foolishly" means evaluating the available evidences and forming a working hypothesis, then feel free to join me by being foolish...

Because the same thing could have been said thousands of years ago when a person was postulating that the stars were but tiny specks and nothing more. He could use the same argument and say that there were not means to determine whether they were anything but tiny specks, therefore they must be considered as tiny specks.

And rather than running with the assumption that the tiny specks were just that, they decided to gather more evidence. They formed testable hypotheses and built and refined theories by evaluating an increasingly large number of evidences.

You see, just because you haven't a means now, doesn't not necessarily mean there will never be a means.

Did I ever suggest that there will never be a means? Read back through this discussion... I asked for some means to test your conjecture about determinism because the evidences (beta decay, lottery numbers, turbulence, double-slit experiments, Brownian motion, sensory experience) suggest at least some degree of indeterminism is at play. You have offered nothing to supoort your case. No evidences, no methodologies, no testable support for your claims. You even admit, "I would likewise agree that we haven't any means to determine whether your choices are anything other than your own."

I, on the other hand, did suggest a test involving the gods picking tomorrow's winning lottery numbers on a globally simulcast television program, yet you seemed pretty certain that Yahweh wouldn't participate in such an event. Why do you think that doesn't surprise me? If that methodology could not provide evidence for your claims, what would? What type of event would Yahweh participate in?

Do you understand what I am saying?

Yep. Do you?

Regards,
mrmufin

[sofyst]

I still for some reason think that we are attacking this from two different understandings. And not necessarily understandings that can still further the discussion, but different understandings that will hinder the discussion in many ways.

If "acting foolishly" means evaluating the available evidences and forming a working hypothesis, then feel free to join me by being foolish...

Please do not take offense, I hope you have not. I only meant acting foolishly in the way of attempting to form a definate theory in which we believed to be true based upon the evidence that we cannot prove or disprove in any way. Such as if the theorist at the time before the hubble and other devices would have considered their theory of 'tiny specks' to be truth without therefore attempting to prove or disprove it. Understand? I hope you are not upset.

And rather than running with the assumption that the tiny specks were just that, they decided to gather more evidence. They formed testable hypotheses and built and refined theories by evaluating an increasingly large number of evidences.

Yes, as we should do here, as we have been attempting to do here.

Did I ever suggest that there will never be a means? Read back through this discussion... I asked for some means to test your conjecture about determinism because the evidences (beta decay, lottery numbers, turbulence, double-slit experiments, Brownian motion, sensory experience) suggest at least some degree of indeterminism is at play. You have offered nothing to supoort your case. No evidences, no methodologies, no testable support for your claims. You even admit, "I would likewise agree that we haven't any means to determine whether your choices are anything other than your own."

I understand completely what you are saying...

Yet this is where I think our confusion arises. Such things as beta decay, lottery numbers, turbulence, while these things may suggest at least some degree of indeterminism I do not think that this suggestion, or even proof, of indeterminism would necessarily discredit my idea of determinism...

Understand. Read back again where I made a distinction between the determinism in the sense where everything will occur based upon the cause and effect relationship, and the sense of determinism in which I speak based upon the actions being known by a higher power...

I guess when further speaking we should use distinctive words. Such as physical determinism (the sense that the future is determined by the past in the sense of cause and effect, a certain cause will equal a certain effect, therefore a certain past will equal a certain future) and religious determinism (the sense where a certain future is only determined by what past is only in an indeterministic way, yet the future is determined in the sense where there is but one actual future to be had).

This is so difficult, I am trying to formulate into words these thoughts. yet I still see misunderstanding on our parts.

Perhaps if you could define determinism as you see it. I do not think you have done so. Define indeterminism as well. Then let us continue.

Thank you for your discussion, I have enjoyed your patience in my learning.

[mrmufin]

If "acting foolishly" means evaluating the available evidences and forming a working hypothesis, then feel free to join me by being foolish...

Please do not take offense, I hope you have not. I only meant acting foolishly in the way of attempting to form a definate theory in which we believed to be true based upon the evidence that we cannot prove or disprove in any way. Such as if the theorist at the time before the hubble and other devices would have considered their theory of 'tiny specks' to be truth without therefore attempting to prove or disprove it. Understand? I hope you are not upset.

No problem at all; no offense taken; no upset felt. We're cool.

Yet this is where I think our confusion arises. Such things as beta decay, lottery numbers, turbulence, while these things may suggest at least some degree of indeterminism I do not think that this suggestion, or even proof, of indeterminism would necessarily discredit my idea of determinism...

Then my question remains, what could discredit determinism? Even if the evidences were strictly hypothetical, what, if anything, could discredit your concept of determinism? I can not answer that for you.

Understand. Read back again where I made a distinction between the determinism in the sense where everything will occur based upon the cause and effect relationship, and the sense of determinism in which I speak based upon the actions being known by a higher power...

How could we discern between a) an entity (of higher, lateral, or inferior power) who does know the outcome of all actions but does not communicate that information to us; and b) the nonexistence of an entity with the described foreknowledge?

I guess when further speaking we should use distinctive words. Such as physical determinism (the sense that the future is determined by the past in the sense of cause and effect, a certain cause will equal a certain effect, therefore a certain past will equal a certain future) and religious determinism (the sense where a certain future is only determined by what past is only in an indeterministic way, yet the future is determined in the sense where there is but one actual future to be had).

This is so difficult, I am trying to formulate into words these thoughts. yet I still see misunderstanding on our parts.

That only a single chain of results happens (out of what appears to the casual observer as many possibilities) does not, as far as I can tell, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision. That is, those unrecognized possibilities could have been recognized; they were real possibilities, not illusions. One of the implications of strict determinism is its inconsistency with my will, which displays all of the symptoms of being under my jurisdiction; that is, when the options appear to be equivalently weighted, I assume they are equivalently weighted. However, in exercising my will, I accept the irreverseability of the decision.

Perhaps if you could define determinism as you see it. I do not think you have done so. Define indeterminism as well. Then let us continue.

Perhaps for the purpose of this discussion, we might start with the following definitions:

determinism: the belief that all outcomes are fixed, settled, or known in advance.
indeterminism: the belief that all outcomes are not fixed, settled, or known in advance.

The next question might be something like, "Is the set of that which is 'known in advance' limited to human knowledge?"

Thank you for your discussion, I have enjoyed your patience in my learning.

Anytime...

Regards,
mrmufin

[QED]

I only meant acting foolishly in the way of attempting to form a definate theory in which we believed to be true based upon the evidence that we cannot prove or disprove in any way.

[sofyst]

Then my question remains, what could discredit determinism? Even if the evidences were strictly hypothetical, what, if anything, could discredit your concept of determinism? I can not answer that for you.

I think that according to my description and definition of determinism the only thing that would discredit it is a philosophical theory that proved God could not know the future, and yet still be eternal and perfect. Yet then I think we would have to tackle the idea of eternality...which I think is already an open discussion (God and Time).

How could we discern between a) an entity (of higher, lateral, or inferior power) who does know the outcome of all actions but does not communicate that information to us; and b) the nonexistence of an entity with the described foreknowledge?

First I would like to say that if the entity (of higher, lateral or inferior power) who does know the outcome of all actions were to communicate His knowledge to us it would not matter if that being was perfect and incapable of error.

You see within the Christian teaching if God does know the future, and if He is perfect (incapable of knowing that which is false and incapable of being false) then His knowledge of the future acts of man would not necessarily 'force' man to make what God knows he will make; yet it would make it so that his it is logically necessary that he do that which God knew he would do.

Other than that I think that it boils down to the idea of whether or not you choose to believe option A or option B. I would opt for A, you would most likely opt for B. Perhaps our discussion must then evolve into discussing how to prove which one is true, yet I think that is an unattractive option.

That only a single chain of results happens (out of what appears to the casual observer as many possibilities) does not, as far as I can tell, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision. That is, those unrecognized possibilities could have been recognized; they were real possibilities, not illusions.

That only a single chain of results happens (determinism in the sense of Hawkins determism) would not, as far as I can tell either, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision.

YET, if only a single chain of results happens, and those results are known by an infinate and perfect God, this would, as far as I can tell, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision.

As if I were going to choose A, and a perfect God knew I would choose A; then I must choose A as the perfect God could not be wrong. If I were just as capable to choose both A and B the perfect God could not know that I would choose A, rather He would have to know that I 'could' choose either A or B. He could not know my future choice if both possibilities were as real as each other.

One of the implications of strict determinism is its inconsistency with my will, which displays all of the symptoms of being under my jurisdiction; that is, when the options appear to be equivalently weighted, I assume they are equivalently weighted. However, in exercising my will, I accept the irreverseability of the decision.

I would argue that the strict determinism (in the perfect God sense) would not be inconsistent with your will. You can will A even if a perfect God knew you would will A. You would still be the one willing it.

I would even go as far to say that this form of strict determinism would not be inconsistent with even a free-will. Granted the perfect God's knowledge of your willed decision made it so that your will was logically bound to do that which it would do, yet it still did it; it was not forced by outside forces. It was not with complete freedom (able to will to be a bird or cat...) yet it was not completely hindered either.

I would however state that this form of strict determinism is inconsistent with your free-choice. Able to equally choose both option A or option B.

Perhaps for the purpose of this discussion, we might start with the following definitions:

determinism: the belief that all outcomes are fixed, settled, or known in advance.
indeterminism: the belief that all outcomes are not fixed, settled, or known in advance.

The next question might be something like, "Is the set of that which is 'known in advance' limited to human knowledge?"

I would first state that right now I think these definitions are quite satisfactory. Although I would state that these definitions, in my opinion, do not consider the form of determinism that would be posited by secular (those who do not believe in God...atheist/agnostic/physicist ). Because they would state, would they not, that a certain particle acting in a certain way will spin off a certain universe, and if this particle had acted in another way, another certain universe would be. Would this not be a form of determinism?

I would also say that the question is great, I do not think it would be the next logical one. As we have already discussed certain theories as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle; I would then think to discuss whether this principle disqualified the definition given of determinism.

If the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is indeed true, it would disqualify the kind of determinism that I mentioned two paragraphs above (the universe spinning off of the action of a particle); yet I do not think it would disqualify our definition of determism.

Consider this. The principle proves that the outcome of every equation is not always the same (and I say equation to speak as an ignorant man towards these principles. I mean when an atom combines with another; then an exact outcome is always produced. The principle would prove this idea false). If this principle proves this idea false, it would not disagree with our definition.

As our definition states that the outcomes are fixed; fixed by what, that is for future discussion. Yet we can state that they are fixed by the knowledge of a perfect being (as I have posited) and yet not disagree with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle as the outcomes are not fixed by some natural law (which would, methinks, reek of the Christian idea of Miracles: the dead do not always stay dead, man does not always sink when upon water...)

Understand?

[mrmufin]

Then my question remains, what could discredit determinism? Even if the evidences were strictly hypothetical, what, if anything, could discredit your concept of determinism? I can not answer that for you.

I think that according to my description and definition of determinism the only thing that would discredit it is a philosophical theory that proved God could not know the future, and yet still be eternal and perfect.

What if God is more of a "big picture" kinda guy, who doesn't concern himself with minutia like guiding thorium through its decay chain or determining the winning numbers for tomorrow's Pick-6? Heck, if God made the thorium in the first place, then he knows all about its impredicatbility. Perhaps God has better things to do, what with that whole Universal Expansion Project and all...

How could we discern between a) an entity (of higher, lateral, or inferior power) who does know the outcome of all actions but does not communicate that information to us; and b) the nonexistence of an entity with the described foreknowledge?

[...]
Other than that I think that it boils down to the idea of whether or not you choose to believe option A or option B. I would opt for A, you would most likely opt for B. Perhaps our discussion must then evolve into discussing how to prove which one is true, yet I think that is an unattractive option.

I don't deal in proofs too often; I'm more of an "evidence suggests" kinda guy.

Nor do I think that what we end up believing is really chosen.

Sooooo... under the auspices of determinism, I'm not really "choosing" A or B at all. If we just fast forward to the chase, are those of us who don't believe in (your version of) God, just pawns in his game? God would know that some would like to believe--perhaps they see virtue in the faith, and would like the comfort offered--but see a big, fat lack of convincing evidence keeping them from believing. What, do you suppose, are us non-believers (to God) in the wholly deterministic model? Kindling for hellfires?

That only a single chain of results happens (out of what appears to the casual observer as many possibilities) does not, as far as I can tell, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision. That is, those unrecognized possibilities could have been recognized; they were real possibilities, not illusions.

That only a single chain of results happens (determinism in the sense of Hawkins determism) would not, as far as I can tell either, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision.

Yep; pretty much what I said, but:

YET, if only a single chain of results happens, and those results are known by an infinate and perfect God, this would, as far as I can tell, imply that the unrealized possibilities were impossible prior to the decision.

This kinda makes it look like the thing that's gumming up the works is your need for a god with infinite foreknowledge.

As if I were going to choose A, and a perfect God knew I would choose A; then I must choose A as the perfect God could not be wrong. If I were just as capable to choose both A and B the perfect God could not know that I would choose A, rather He would have to know that I 'could' choose either A or B. He could not know my future choice if both possibilities were as real as each other.

Nope. Sorry. I've played this game before. If, right now, 6:48 EST God knows that I am going to shave at 7:15 EST, I have no real choice. I will be shaving at 7:15 EST and that's that. That's exactly what "infinite foreknowledge" is all about. Anything that has the appearance of choice is just illusion.

I would argue that the strict determinism (in the perfect God sense) would not be inconsistent with your will. You can will A even if a perfect God knew you would will A. You would still be the one willing it.

No, I wouldn't be the one willing it. If God knew in advance what I would do, I have no real choice in the matter. You can't have it both ways.

Perhaps for the purpose of this discussion, we might start with the following definitions:

determinism: the belief that all outcomes are fixed, settled, or known in advance.
indeterminism: the belief that all outcomes are not fixed, settled, or known in advance.

The next question might be something like, "Is the set of that which is 'known in advance' limited to human knowledge?"

I would first state that right now I think these definitions are quite satisfactory. Although I would state that these definitions, in my opinion, do not consider the form of determinism that would be posited by secular (those who do not believe in God...atheist/agnostic/physicist ). Because they would state, would they not, that a certain particle acting in a certain way will spin off a certain universe, and if this particle had acted in another way, another certain universe would be. Would this not be a form of determinism?

No, not unless a specific "universal outcome" is known in advance.

If the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is indeed true, it would disqualify the kind of determinism that I mentioned two paragraphs above (the universe spinning off of the action of a particle); yet I do not think it would disqualify our definition of determism.

I think that "can be known" or "is known" is the operative phrase; we can know that the next five card poker hand (dealt from a standard deck of 52 cards) will be one of 2,598,960 possible hands, so the outcome is probablistic, rather than deterministic. Once the cards are dealt, whether or not the hand is known in advance is (arguably) irrelevant beyond the domain of the game. If the holder if the knowledge is not local to the poker game (and the gods seldom are ), one could safely argue from the position, "it doesn't really matter, since we can't tell. The game appears fair." However, any appearance of "randomosity" is just an illusion, as is "fair" unless "fair" is redefined as "whatever the gods have already decided."

As our definition states that the outcomes are fixed; fixed by what, that is for future discussion.

What disciplines do you think would be most useful toward trying to determine what, if anything, is fixing the outcomes?

Regards,
mrmufin

[sofyst]

What if God is more of a "big picture" kinda guy, who doesn't concern himself with minutia like guiding thorium through its decay chain or determining the winning numbers for tomorrow's Pick-6? Heck, if God made the thorium in the first place, then he knows all about its impredicatbility. Perhaps God has better things to do, what with that whole Universal Expansion Project and all...

What if...what if not? I believe He is so very concerned with the minutia. And I would base this on Scripture (useful if you believed Scripture), yet since you do not, I cannot 'prove' one way or the other now can I?

Sooooo... under the auspices of determinism, I'm not really "choosing" A or B at all. If we just fast forward to the chase, are those of us who don't believe in (your version of) God, just pawns in his game? God would know that some would like to believe--perhaps they see virtue in the faith, and would like the comfort offered--but see a big, fat lack of convincing evidence keeping them from believing. What, do you suppose, are us non-believers (to God) in the wholly deterministic model? Kindling for hellfires?

I would say that if God knew some would like to believe...then they would believe. However, if their desire towards faith is so built upon need for evidence, it is not truly a desire towards faith, but a desire towards proof. And that would be exactly what they are given, the proof they so require (which is not there, which is why faith is required )

Pawns...spare the thought, players in His orchestra, actors in His play.

You non-believers (to God) in a wholly deterministic model, what are you to Him? I cannot speak for God.

Nope. Sorry. I've played this game before. If, right now, 6:48 EST God knows that I am going to shave at 7:15 EST, I have no real choice. I will be shaving at 7:15 EST and that's that. That's exactly what "infinite foreknowledge" is all about. Anything that has the appearance of choice is just illusion.

Granted...your choice is taken away. You ability to choose differently than that which you would choose (and God knew you would choose) is completely erradicated, yet you still have the ability to 'choose' that which you do choose. (And it is so difficult to say choose because this word automatically implies a like ability towards a second option.)

No, I wouldn't be the one willing it. If God knew in advance what I would do, I have no real choice in the matter. You can't have it both ways.

Let me ask you this. And bare with me for the time being. If I 'knew' you would shave...and I could honestly say I was correct in my knowledge, would you not still be the one who willed yourself to pick up the razor and touch it to your skin? Would my knowledge, by being true and prior to the fact, somehow transport myself willing your hand to move and shave your face?

What disciplines do you think would be most useful toward trying to determine what, if anything, is fixing the outcomes?

Faith...I do not know, good question.

awaiting the hope,
Adam