Free-will

[sofyst]

Whether it be a label given by Christians or non-Christians, Atheist or Agnostics, I think that the idea of 'free-will' is thrown around far too much, without further realizing or knowing what exactly is the nature of this horrid beast (I say horrid because I do not agree with it ).

Therefore, may I ask that we discuss what exactly free-will is? I would first like someone, anyone, to posit their definition of what free-will is. Then I think we should all discuss this definition to see if it is satisfactory. If not, we'll try another. Then we can, hopefully, come to a working definition of what free-will is. Then we can debate on whether or not it truly exists.

[Corvus]

I'll keep it simple and say; "The capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause".

I'm playing it very safe. I believe the human mind works mainly as a type of inference engine or fuzzy logic system, and as more information is gained, whatever is flagged as "do" or "do not do" changes or the one's certainty about them becomes more pronounced.

[Corvus]

I'll keep it simple and say; "The capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause".

I'm playing it very safe. I believe the human mind works mainly as a type of inference engine or fuzzy logic system, and as more information is gained, whatever is flagged as "do" or "do not do" changes or the one's certainty about them becomes more pronounced.

[sofyst]

"The capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause".

Very good.

Would you then say that it can be the capacity to make choices that are affected by internal causes, and yet still be labeled as free will? Or must it be free from external as well as internal causes?

[mrmufin]

Therefore, may I ask that we discuss what exactly free-will is?

I pretty much agree with the answer Corvus gave. I arrived at the capacity to make wholly individual choices.

Perhaps the freedom of our will is at its purest when the significance of the decision appears to approach zero. When I can pick up to three flavors out of thirty-one for a triple-scoop cone, I'd say my freedom of will is right there in its sweet zone. There are no rules to guide me, no ethical or moral codes to respect in the matter, the outcomes all appear to be delicious.

As the significance of the decision increases, our freedom of will is impacted in a not-so-linear fashion. For example, I could march right into the human resources office tomorrow and cancel my health benefits package. That choice would put some extra dough into the take-home portion o' the donut, and a few extra take-home dollars never hurt anyone, eh? Again, there are no rules to guide me in the choice, and it might even be a wholly individual choice, but you'd probably agree that the significance of the decision is increased. Either way, I think significance pollutes free will.

Generally, when I refer to free will, I'm refering to will in its purest, most unfettered form: triple-dip ice cream choices.

Regards,
mrmufin

P.S. I hope I'm not the only one here who recalls the Rush song "Free Will". I would feel so much better about that band if it was a girl singing that high...

[sofyst]

Mr. Muffin, I would tend to disagree with you. I would ask why you equate significance with freedom. I do not see the parallel.

Granted your choosing a particular flavor of ice cream over another has absolutely not significance in the large scheme of life, your life, your day, even the minute in which the choice is made. This 'choice' is a very simply insignificant one.

And also noting that you choosing to quit your benefits package has very extreme consequences on your life down the road, this is very significant.

Yet I do not see how you then make the leap and say that your choosing your flavor of ice cream, because of its insignificance, was more 'free' than your choosing to quit your benefits package.

Unless of course. You were to understand that your choice of ice-cream flavor was determined by your specific desires and taste. You chose homemade vanilla because you like it most, and you refrained from choosing mint-chocolate chip because it was so wholly disguisting to you. Yet these are the only influences in your decision.

Whereas in the scenario of your benefits package you either stop the package or not based upon so many different factors. Whethere more money now is more imporatant than having the assurance of safety later. Whether having more money now, enough to spend on the 'extras' in life now, is more important than whether or not you'll be able to pay for your hospital visit later.

You understand?

These influences in the benefits package have such more devasting/rewarding consequences; as opposed to vanilla over chocalate.

If it is meant in that sense, and if you understand that the significance is derived by weight and lasting effect, then I would understand the option with the least amount of significance (and therefore least amount of long-term effect) to be more free.

the capacity to make wholly individual choices.

"The capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause".

Could we perhaps agree that these definitions would be better suited if the words choices and were replaced with 'will'? After all, we are discussing whether the will is free or not, or a suitable definition for this 'freedom of the will'; therefore would it not be best to stick with what is 'willed' rather than venturing off into what is chose. Or do you see this as a insignificant replacement.

The definitions would read:

The capacity to wholly individually will.

The capacity to will that is not a direct result of an external cause.

In these senses we would understand the 'willing' to be free, and hence free-will would be used. However if we maintained the use of choice, I think that we would have to then discuss that it is freedom of choice that is being addressed. As the choice is what is not a result of an external cause.

I think this to be a minor issue, yet one which will have lasting effects later...could we agree on this?

[mrmufin]

Mr. Muffin, I would tend to disagree with you. I would ask why you equate significance with freedom. I do not see the parallel.

I think the last line of my post sums up the distinction, and why I make it. Simply speaking, when I refer to free will, I am refering to it in a sitiuation with minimal consequence or significance. The examples I use are (apparently) devoid of specific or differntiating consequence. This is not a distinction that I'm asking others to necessarily embrace, just a clarification of my concept of free will.

These influences in the benefits package have such more devasting/rewarding consequences; as opposed to vanilla over chocalate.

If it is meant in that sense, and if you understand that the significance is derived by weight and lasting effect, then I would understand the option with the least amount of significance (and therefore least amount of long-term effect) to be more free.

So there! Simply put, I see the added weight of potential consequence as a hinderence on free will. You need not see things that way.

Could we perhaps agree that these definitions would be better suited if the words choices and were replaced with 'will'? After all, we are discussing whether the will is free or not, or a suitable definition for this 'freedom of the will'; therefore would it not be best to stick with what is 'willed' rather than venturing off into what is chose. Or do you see this as a insignificant replacement.

If you want to include will within the definition, then perhaps you're just looking for a definition of "free"?

Regards,
mrmufin

[sofyst]

I think the last line of my post sums up the distinction, and why I make it. Simply speaking, when I refer to free will, I am refering to it in a sitiuation with minimal consequence or significance. The examples I use are (apparently) devoid of specific or differntiating consequence. This is not a distinction that I'm asking others to necessarily embrace, just a clarification of my concept of free will.

Actually the last line of your post was:

I would feel so much better about that band if it was a girl singing that high...

Am I then to understand that this statement some how sums up the distinction??

I'm only kidding. I think I came to an understanding of the distinction, and would quite naturally agree with this distinction made. Significance that is determined by weight of potential consequences very much so affects the freedom of the will.

So there! Simply put, I see the added weight of potential consequence as a hinderence on free will. You need not see things that way.

Oh but I do see it that way. Although I think I would word it as you just have, rather than using significance as you originally did. It may just be me, but I think using significance seems to give the false idea tha some manner of value (which may or may not be subjective) is a determining factor on the freedom of the will in question.

Yet, all in all, I think I understand what you meant by significance and agree completely...I was just working it out for my own clarification really.

If you want to include will within the definition, then perhaps you're just looking for a definition of "free"?

Yes. I think that is an astute observation. No one would disagree that all humans have a will. We must have a will to act, as we will to act. Yet, the debate is really over how free or hindered this will is from outside influences as well as inside.

Therefore, I do believe discussing what is meant by 'free' would be the next step having established a working definition.

Obviously you think that the idea of what you will (flavors of icecream/whether or not to cancel your benefits package) is determined somewhat by a consideration of the consequences of that decision. You would not cancel the benefits package if you were to truly value the long term effects over that of the short term extra pocket change; no more than you would choose mint chocolate chip knowing full well that it is utterly repulsive to you.

Therefore I think we could establish that our desires determine what is willed. Would you agree?

I would hope that you would not assume that the will is so completely unaffected by anything at all; much like Alice at the crossroads (desiring to go no which way in particular, therefore not going at all). As if the will was unaffected and undetermined by no thing in particular it would be random chance that would decide which direction the will 'chooses' to go. You would not choose vanilla over chocolate because you like it more, you would rather choose vanilla over chocolate because the random fall of the die fell upon that choice rather than the latter.

Would we agree that this type of completely free will is incomprehensible?

I would also think we would agree that the will is not so determined as to be nothing more than a secondary action of a higher force or greater being. God (and I use God as I am a Christian, you may think of this label as a higher force if you so desire not to believe in God) is not moving your will in either direction based upon His desires or upon some outside purpose.

I would deny this because of reasoning that the Scripture portrays God as a perfectly good being, therefore incapable of sinning; and moving a will in the direction of sin would be classified as sinning.

Yet, while I assume you would not agree with this manner of completely determined will, I would ask why not. Why would you find this complete hindrence to be incomprehensible (if in fact you think so)?

If we can eliminate the two outside extremes, I think it would narrow our working idea of the freedom of this beast in question.

[The Happy Humanist]

I think you fellas are missing the essence of free will. Free will has less to do with action than with pure thought. Can you not see that the total absence of volitional activity would require that all thoughts be imposed upon an individual from an external source...effectively rendering the individual a non-sentient entity? Free will may in fact just be a synonym for consciousness. "I think, therefore I am. Someone else thinks for me, therefore I am not."

Think about it. If you can....

==JJS==

[sofyst]

I think that the will would have just as much to do with the action as it would have to do with the mind. The mind can control the will which in turn controls the body, which is action. Yet the body can likewise control the will which then controls the mind.

If I understand that it is not good for me to gorge myself upon food, I can reason within my mind that this is a horrid practice. Then I can will myself not to continually eat until I am gordo. This would be mind controlling will controlling body.

I can likewise be so driven by my desire towards sex that I will myself to attempt to justify my actions of 'baning' whatever moves. Therefore I willed my mind, which was affected by my lust towards self gratification.

Therefore, I think it be just as important to discuss what the will is in reference to the action (which I do not think we are solely doing here) as it would be to discuss it in reference to the thoughts of the mind.

awaiting the hope,
Adam