What exactly is wrong with Liberal Christianity?

[Athetotheist]

In discussing Christian scripture with others, I sometimes encounter the assertion that "interpretation" is a legitimate factor in assessing the nature of said scripture.

According to Google, Liberal Christianity "interprets Christian teachings by prioritizing modern knowledge, science, and ethics over traditional doctrinal authority".

If even the more conservative apologist defends Christian scripture by allowing for interpretation of it, how much criticism is it fair to level at more liberal interpretations of Christianity?

[Athetotheist]

[Replying to RBD in post #69]

You're accusation was that the law of Moses was without mercy.

Wrong. My observation is that there are laws in the Mosaic code for which violation is afforded no mercy.

You asked where the law says there is mercy.

I asked where there the law says there is mercy where it prescribes death for violation. And I gave examples of such infractions.

Is the law of Moses merciful or not?

That's like asking, "Are dogs friendly or not?" You're setting up a false dichotomy.

[Difflugia]

I think you're seriously underestimating the number of people that reconcile theism with, for lack of a better word, reality. Episcopalians, Lutherans, and Methodists are Protestant denominations that tend to skew theologically liberal ...

I agree that many people will attempt to embrace both modern views and traditional religious views. This is perfectly reasonable, to some degree.
But, with respect to points where real contradictions lie, I think it is fairly obvious why the particular churches you mention are loosing membership.

According to this set of surveys, the largest decline in membership is in denominations that identify as white, evangelical Protestants. That's just the first one I found that seemed to be backed by some sort of data, though, so maybe you had something different in mind.

Whether they expressly acknowledge it or not, a lot of people operate within a worldview where science and religion are considered to be what Stephen Jay Gould called non-overlapping magisteria.

That is not really to the point I was trying to get at. I tend to agree that science and religion are mostly difference subjects, and don't interact much. I was referring much more to modern cultural claims.

Since the post you responded to mentioned "modern knowledge, science, and ethics" and I don't think you differentiated that from "modern cultural claims," I assumed we were talking about the same things. Since you still haven't differentiated them, but seem to think the difference should be self-explanatory, I'm guessing you mean accepting gay people? At this point, I'm just playing the odds, though. You still haven't clarified, so it could be something like eating pork or interracial marriage. You'll probably need to be more specific.

The overall conversation hardly matters; it just changes specifically which prooftexts with which one must negotiate.

One would be left wondering why (if one accepts those cultural assumptions) one should be christian at all.

If you're not an Appalachian snake-handler that believes in a flat Earth, you already do this. The rest is just haggling.

Now I'm confused. I'd thought we were discussing liberal churches which promoted modern cultural attitudes over christian doctrine,

We were, but you apparently have a specific, but unmentioned set of cultural attitudes and Christian doctrine in mind. Whether a church is liberal or conservative theologically is based in general on how many theological traditions they keep, modify, or jettison. If you don't think that an approach to science (explicitly mentioned in the question to which you originally responded) is a valid proxy for your set of "modern cultural attitudes, you'll have to let us know what you mean.

but there is definitely a middle ground between that and the theology of Appalachian snake handlers.

That's why I used that example. I expected that you didn't share their reading of Mark 16:17-18, so it would effectively make my point. The "middle ground" is exactly the space of Christian tradition with which you're willing to negotiate to arrive at what you feel is a reasonable balance between Christian tradition and participating in modern society.

The only way I can make sense of this is if by "haggling", you mean "the actual debate".

In the same way that arguing over the price of a horse is "the actual debate" once you've decided to buy one, yes. Modern Christians have to decide which Christian traditions are more costly than they're willing to accept. For some Christians, believing that the Universe was created about a thousand years after the founding of Uruk is just fine. On the other end, some Christians can't reconcile their idea of God with rigid gender assignment. The specific traditions might be different, but the process is still the same.

[Jester]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #72]

According to this set of surveys, the largest decline in membership is in denominations that identify as white, evangelical Protestants. That's just the first one I found that seemed to be backed by some sort of data, though, so maybe you had something different in mind.

I was thinking of reports like Vanco, Pew Research and Religion Unplugged.

I'm unsure, but I suspect that your source including race as a factor might be skewing the data with respect to that particular point.

Since the post you responded to mentioned "modern knowledge, science, and ethics" and I don't think you differentiated that from "modern cultural claims," I assumed we were talking about the same things. Since you still haven't differentiated them, but seem to think the difference should be self-explanatory, I'm guessing you mean accepting gay people? At this point, I'm just playing the odds, though. You still haven't clarified, so it could be something like eating pork or interracial marriage. You'll probably need to be more specific.

Fair enough, and apologies for not being more clear.
I meant something fairly broad (though outside of science). Really, any point at which modern popular culture contradicts the traditional religious view will work. Yes, things like ordaining gay ministers would fit that category, as would openly promoting the transgender movement—but also things like moral and theological relativism. An important point, though: I was actually referring less to the particular stance a church takes than to the volume with which it takes it. Liberal churches tend to signal that they offer politics, rather than theology. But politics is available anywhere.

The overall conversation hardly matters; it just changes specifically which prooftexts with which one must negotiate.

This is exactly what I was driving at: any church that is obsessed with prooftexts (whether to negotiate or wield them) isn't really offering anything different than one can find outside that church. It isn't surprising, therefore, why people are less interested.

Now I'm confused. I'd thought we were discussing liberal churches which promoted modern cultural attitudes over christian doctrine,

We were, but you apparently have a specific, but unmentioned set of cultural attitudes and Christian doctrine in mind. Whether a church is liberal or conservative theologically is based in general on how many theological traditions they keep, modify, or jettison. If you don't think that an approach to science (explicitly mentioned in the question to which you originally responded) is a valid proxy for your set of "modern cultural attitudes, you'll have to let us know what you mean.

I think I've largely clarified above, but let me address science directly.
Support for science is the traditional theological view. I don't see any way that it is remotely a valid proxy for modern cultural attitudes, as science rarely has much to do with the moral sentiments of any particular cultural moment. The difference between liberal and conservative churches has very little to do with science, and is much more about cultural assumptions.

but there is definitely a middle ground between that and the theology of Appalachian snake handlers.

That's why I used that example. I expected that you didn't share their reading of Mark 16:17-18, so it would effectively make my point. The "middle ground" is exactly the space of Christian tradition with which you're willing to negotiate to arrive at what you feel is a reasonable balance between Christian tradition and participating in modern society.

Reading this, I suspect that we've found the crux of our disagreement: the twin assumption that groups like Appalachian snake handlers properly represent the Christian tradition, while modern cultural views are, in some unspecified way, the reasonable center.

I'll grant that, if we start with those assumptions, then it will seem as if:
1. All more reasonable-seeming sects are somehow compromising with contemporary views, and
2. That contemporary views have little to no burden of proof to uphold.

If, however, we start from the actual traditional views which have been popular over the centuries, and recognize that there are many cultural and moral views which various societies have held, we're much more likely to conclude that:
1. Small outlier groups are small outliers, not the paradigmatic example, and
2. Those supporting modern cultural views have as much burden of proof as do those supporting traditional views.

The only way I can make sense of this is if by "haggling", you mean "the actual debate".

In the same way that arguing over the price of a horse is "the actual debate" once you've decided to buy one, yes. Modern Christians have to decide which Christian traditions are more costly than they're willing to accept.

This helps to cement my thought that our real disagreement is over the presumption of contemporary culture.
I would have thought that modern Christians (like those of any age) have to decide which Christian traditions are more likely to reflect the truth. This comment reads as if it is modern culture, not truth, that is the standard by which a tradition should be measured.

I have no broad opinion about traditional versus contemporary views. For any given case, one or the other may be the more correct. I do, however, reject the implicit assumption that contemporary views have no need for support. In the case that the contemporary view is wrong, it may be that a traditional person isn't "haggling" over what the tradition will cost, but simply refusing to accept a popular untruth.

For some Christians, believing that the Universe was created about a thousand years after the founding of Uruk is just fine. On the other end, some Christians can't reconcile their idea of God with rigid gender assignment. The specific traditions might be different, but the process is still the same.

I'm aware of a number of key differences in the process of how one would answer these questions respectively. All of them, however, require the rejection that the entire goal is to determine how accepted one wants to be by a specific view of the zeitgeist.

In order to accept your claim that this is all basically a matter of haggling, then, I need to see some support for one of two things:
1. The modern cultural worldview is the correct one, or
2. In spite of not being correct, people (including Christians) have some degree of responsibility to accept the modern cultural worldview.

I don't see a reason to accept either of these claims. Please make the case.

[Difflugia]

I was thinking of reports like Vanco, Pew Research and Religion Unplugged.

I'm unsure, but I suspect that your source including race as a factor might be skewing the data with respect to that particular point.

Looking through the Pew data, I'm not sure they tell a significantly different story. Overall, Protestant denominations have lost ground to those that consider themselves non-denominational. Since your point was that it's obvious to you that the loss to theologically liberal denominations is specifically because they're liberal, then I guess I don't see it. If you want to discuss the data themselves, we can, but I didn't think that was really your greater point.

I meant something fairly broad (though outside of science). Really, any point at which modern popular culture contradicts the traditional religious view will work. Yes, things like ordaining gay ministers would fit that category, as would openly promoting the transgender movement—but also things like moral and theological relativism. An important point, though: I was actually referring less to the particular stance a church takes than to the volume with which it takes it. Liberal churches tend to signal that they offer politics, rather than theology. But politics is available anywhere.

I'm not sure this is true. I've been to churches that are liberal and political, as well as those that aren't. The same is true about conservative churches. I'm not sure your particular distinction between broad classes of churches actually holds.

This is exactly what I was driving at: any church that is obsessed with prooftexts (whether to negotiate or wield them) isn't really offering anything different than one can find outside that church. It isn't surprising, therefore, why people are less interested.

I'm not sure how you think this distinction works. Any Christian church that holds to a particular set of doctrines has reasons for holding them. If those aren't derived from some tradition of textual interpretation, then whence these differences? You seem to be claiming that there's some sort of self-explanatory Christianity that, though it can be modified by examining the biblical text, can nevertheless be divined in some way independent of the texts.

I think I've largely clarified above, but let me address science directly.
Support for science is the traditional theological view. I don't see any way that it is remotely a valid proxy for modern cultural attitudes, as science rarely has much to do with the moral sentiments of any particular cultural moment. The difference between liberal and conservative churches has very little to do with science, and is much more about cultural assumptions.

That's an interesting thought. My impression is that there is significant overlap between things like creationism, status of gay church members, and verbal inerrancy of the biblical text. In my personal experience, there's a high correlation between thinking that the Earth is 6000 years old, Moses wrote Genesis, and that trans people's drivers licenses shoujld show their birth genders. In fact, I often use, "who wrote First Timothy," as a shibboleth for how a conversation about climate change might go.

Reading this, I suspect that we've found the crux of our disagreement: the twin assumption that groups like Appalachian snake handlers properly represent the Christian tradition, while modern cultural views are, in some unspecified way, the reasonable center.

"Properly" seems to be doing a lot of heavy lifting here and I think it might be circular. My claim is that the Appalachian snake handlers are theologically more conservative than nearly all other modern Christian denominations, at least in their approach to Scripture. Treating Mark 16:17-18 as inerrant, literally true, and a legitimate part of the canon is Christian tradition dating back to at least the fourth century (the Vulgate includes the long ending of Mark). I'm not claiming they're more proper or less, I'm claiming they're more conservative.

I'll grant that, if we start with those assumptions, then it will seem as if:
1. All more reasonable-seeming sects are somehow compromising with contemporary views, and

I'm saying that all sects, reasonable and unreasonable alike, must negotiate in some way with the contemporary culture within which they sit.

2. That contemporary views have little to no burden of proof to uphold.

I'm pretty sure that this isn't true, but I think we're still arguing over what we each mean by conservatism.

If, however, we start from the actual traditional views which have been popular over the centuries, and recognize that there are many cultural and moral views which various societies have held, we're much more likely to conclude that:
1. Small outlier groups are small outliers, not the paradigmatic example, and
2. Those supporting modern cultural views have as much burden of proof as do those supporting traditional views.

I'm trying to follow, but I'm not sure what relationship you're trying to forge between conservatism and popularity. I'm also not sure what you think a burden of proof has to do with whether particular views are conservative or not.

Modern Christians have to decide which Christian traditions are more costly than they're willing to accept.

This helps to cement my thought that our real disagreement is over the presumption of contemporary culture.
I would have thought that modern Christians (like those of any age) have to decide which Christian traditions are more likely to reflect the truth. This comment reads as if it is modern culture, not truth, that is the standard by which a tradition should be measured.

You're talking about "truth" as though it's something independently discernable without some sort of evaluation. The evaluation itself is what leads particular Christians or denomination leaders to decide between traditional Christian doctrine, modern cultural values, or something else entirely. I'm pretty sure that "God is real" doesn't qualify as truth by any reasonable definition of the word, but I'd hardly consider that to be self-evident, especially considering the cultural heritage that we've inherited. How do you distinguish between, "I won't be injured is a poisonous snake bites me," and, "Jesus thinks homosexuality is a sin?"

I have no broad opinion about traditional versus contemporary views. For any given case, one or the other may be the more correct. I do, however, reject the implicit assumption that contemporary views have no need for support. In the case that the contemporary view is wrong, it may be that a traditional person isn't "haggling" over what the tradition will cost, but simply refusing to accept a popular untruth.

I'm not sure what you think the difference is. If the decision that the contemporary view isn't true isn't for a religious reason, then it's not a conflict between Christian tradition and contemporary values in any sense. If it is, then your "burden of proof" is just about the method behind the negotiation, not whether or not it's happening.

Let's use the snake handling as an example. I think that venomous snakes have met a pretty high burden of showing that they kill people bitten by them a respectable amount of the time, no matter how pious the biting victim. A potential snake handler (or the denomination overall) must decide the value of her religious conviction in the face of secular opinion and evidence.

As another example, let's use believing that homosexuality is sinful. One still has to make the same calculus. Is the value of the religious position worth the cost? If the culture hasn't sufficiently (whatever that means) supported a particular value, there is still a cost associated with the religious view. It might be dissonance at dealing with a gay child. It might be missing out on fun, sexy Pride parades. It might be no more than feeling judged. In any case, though, Christians must negotiate with the text and traditions to find a place in which they're comfortable.

Each example bears a cost. The metaphorical cost of letting snakes bite you might be a hundred thousand dollars or more. The metaphorical cost of silently judging gay people might be twelve dollars. That's the haggling that every Christian does.

I'm aware of a number of key differences in the process of how one would answer these questions respectively. All of them, however, require the rejection that the entire goal is to determine how accepted one wants to be by a specific view of the zeitgeist.

Or how these things reflect one's own values. Being convinced by cultural inertia is non-trivial. There are relatively few people that now consider antebellum slavery to have been justified by "proper" Christianity, but that wasn't always true. An argument that relies on the truth being self-evident or running counter to the zeitgeist as a matter of course isn't very defensible.

In order to accept your claim that this is all basically a matter of haggling, then, I need to see some support for one of two things:
1. The modern cultural worldview is the correct one, or
2. In spite of not being correct, people (including Christians) have some degree of responsibility to accept the modern cultural worldview.

That's like saying that haggling over a horse requires some objective proof that the money and the horse both have value in order for it to in fact be haggling. Your two points can certainly be valid considerations as part of your haggling, but they aren't themselves necessary. If I think your horse has no value, I might offer zero moneys. The fact that I don't end up with a horse doesn't mean I wasn't haggling. The horse seller might also decide that my moneys have no value, in which case she might reject my offer of a jillion billion moneys. Just because you think your valuation is correct, even if it's a degenerate case, doesn't somehow eliminate the process by definition.

I don't see a reason to accept either of these claims. Please make the case.

I don't see a reason to accept either of your claims, either. In fact, I think they don't apply.

[RBD]

[Replying to RBD in post #69]

You're accusation was that the law of Moses was without mercy.

Wrong. My observation is that there are laws in the Mosaic code for which violation is afforded no mercy.

Now that we've established the law of Moses shows mercy, then the LORD showing mercy for adultery, does not contradict His law. Nor for stoners showing mercy for adultery, for which they were not rebuked.

The pattern of confession and forgiveness was already codified into the law of Moses with sacrifices for sin and trespass. Now the law of Moses is replaced by that of Christ, where confession and forgiveness is now law:

1Jo 1:9
If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.

[Jester]

Replying to Difflugia in post #74

To open with the elephant in the room, my general thought is that we're drifting into a form of nihilism that doesn't take concern for truth or facts seriously.

Since your point was that it's obvious to you that the loss to theologically liberal denominations is specifically because they're liberal, then I guess I don't see it.

It seems that neither of us are probably interested enough to debate this particular point. I'm happy to drop it.

I'm not sure your particular distinction between broad classes of churches actually holds.

I agree that there are all kinds. But my point is that any church which leaves people with the impression that its reasons for holding doctrines is to be more in line with the surrounding culture isn't using the search for truth as its north star. Any church which treats interpretation via the "haggling" paradigm is doing that.

That is definitely a problem.

That's an interesting thought. My impression is that there is significant overlap between things like creationism, status of gay church members, and verbal inerrancy of the biblical text.

When science is brought in, my experience is that liberal and conservative churches take turns holding the position that lines up with scientific consensus. On Young Earth Creationism, science favors the liberal view. On the issue of abortion, biology would seem to switch sides to the conservative view. We can't treat science as a football in a team sport.

My claim is that the Appalachian snake handlers are theologically more conservative than nearly all other modern Christian denominations, at least in their approach to Scripture. Treating Mark 16:17-18 as inerrant, literally true, and a legitimate part of the canon is Christian tradition dating back to at least the fourth century (the Vulgate includes the long ending of Mark). I'm not claiming they're more proper or less, I'm claiming they're more conservative.

I would disagree here.
The Vulgate includes the long ending of Mark, but that is very different from claiming that the snake handlers' interpretation of this ending is the traditional one. This seems to be the argument that the vast majority of churches have held snake handling services from the fourth century up until the modern era. That is simply untrue; it is a 20th century innovation, and therefore a break with tradition.

We are conflating "theologically conservative" with "culturally conservative". These should be kept distinct.

I'm saying that all sects, reasonable and unreasonable alike, must negotiate in some way with the contemporary culture within which they sit.

This fails to support two ideas vital to the case here:

1. That we can consider a church as having paid a lower cost for their views based on how closely those views conform to the outside culture.
2. That the "haggling" analogy is the right one in the first place.

Both would be true if we assumed that surrounding cultural views were closer to the truth than those of a given sect. But we've yet to see even an attempt to support this.

You're talking about "truth" as though it's something independently discernable without some sort of evaluation.

If it reads that way, then I apologize. I definitely agree that we need to evaluate truth claims carefully and systematically.

Rather, I was asserting that the evaluation process should be centered around the question "is this claim true", rather than "does this claim allow me to haggle a lower cost in terms of disagreeing with modern culture".

I'm pretty sure that "God is real" doesn't qualify as truth by any reasonable definition of the word

Whether God exists is obviously a disputed truth claim. We can't simply start from the assumption that it is not true. We'd need to see an actual case for that.

Let's use the snake handling as an example. I think that venomous snakes have met a pretty high burden of showing that they kill people bitten by them a respectable amount of the time, no matter how pious the biting victim. A potential snake handler must decide the value of her religious conviction in the face of secular opinion and evidence.

And in deciding whether snake handling is a good idea, should one ask "How thoroughly does the surrounding culture reject the religious claim?" or "Is the religious claim true?" I'm inclined to ask the second question.

As another example, let's use believing that homosexuality is sinful. One still has to make the same calculus. Is the value of the religious position worth the cost?

I'd be far more interested in whether that position is true. I'm making no claims about whether it is. I'm simply rejecting the idea that one should choose beliefs based on whether it is worth the social cost of believing them.

If the decision that the contemporary view isn't true isn't for a religious reason, then it's not a conflict between Christian tradition and contemporary values in any sense. If it is, then your "burden of proof" is just about the method behind the negotiation, not whether or not it's happening.

If I agree that all groups negotiate somewhat with the outside culture, will you agree that pointing this out really doesn't answer the question of whether its claims are true?

In any case, though, Christians must negotiate with the text and traditions to find a place in which they're comfortable.

I notice a complete absence of any suggestion that Christians should, at some point, wonder whether a position is actually true.

As far as I can tell, the only way this approach avoids presuming that modern cultural moral claims are correct is by being openly nihilistic.
In which case, I'd simply ask for support for nihilism.

Or how these things reflect one's own values. Being convinced by cultural inertia is non-trivial.

I agree that the bandwagon effect is real, but this is hardly a reason to promote it as the basis for all decision making. How will that not lead to both nihilism and the problems of group think?

Your two points can certainly be valid considerations as part of your haggling

I'm trying to imagine a situation in which I could haggle over whether or not to believe 1 + 1 = 2.

If there were some severe social cost to that belief, I may be careful about how I announced it. I'd like to think I wouldn't lie about it (but perhaps I would). What I couldn't do is actually decide to believe that 1 + 1 = 4 on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.

That's not how beliefs work.

There are relatively few people that now consider antebellum slavery to have been justified by "proper" Christianity, but that wasn't always true.

This is a good example, but it cuts both ways.

Early abolitionists held a deeply unpopular and culturally costly view. On the haggling paradigm, they should have deferred to the surrounding culture, which clearly would have been wrong. The lesson is neither "zeitgeist good" nor "zeitgeist bad", but "think critically about what is actually true."

I don't see a reason to accept either of your claims, either.

I'm not sure which two claims you mean, but I've tried to make a case. I'd genuinely appreciate it if you'd make your case.

Please either explain why the modern cultural view is correct, or explain why anyone has an obligation to accept a dominant view that they honestly believe to be false.
If one thinks a claim is false, why should one decide to believe it, and how would that even be possible?

[Athetotheist]

[Replying to RBD in post #75]

Now that we've established the law of Moses shows mercy, then the LORD showing mercy for adultery, does not contradict His law.

Yes it does, because adultery is one of the laws for which no mercy is prescribed, only a death sentence.

You're employing a fallacy of composition by trying to argue that some offenses being mitigated means that all of them are.

The pattern of confession and forgiveness was already codified into the law of Moses with sacrifices for sin and trespass.

As I mentioned earlier, those sacrifices were only for unintentional sins.

Now the law of Moses is replaced by that of Christ, where confession and forgiveness is now law

Jesus doesn't consider any of the law of Moses replaced when he's endorsing every jot and tittle of it in Matthew 5.

[Difflugia]

To open with the elephant in the room, my general thought is that we're drifting into a form of nihilism that doesn't take concern for truth or facts seriously.

I absolutely disaagree. I assure you that I'm not a nihilist and you've given me no reason to think that you are, either, at least consciuosly. I don't think that an honest and informed search for the truth can lead to the conclusion that Jesus was born of a virgin, suffered under Pilate, died on the cross, and was raised again on the third day. On the other hand, I'm willing to accept that at least some Christians are both well-intentioned and well-informed. To at least partially reconcile that dissonance, I further accept that we each have different ways of evaluating evidence writ large, including such things as personal experience and cultural inertia under the broad umbrella of evidence.

I'm not sure your particular distinction between broad classes of churches actually holds.

I agree that there are all kinds. But my point is that any church which leaves people with the impression that its reasons for holding doctrines is to be more in line with the surrounding culture isn't using the search for truth as its north star. Any church which treats interpretation via the "haggling" paradigm is doing that.

That is definitely a problem.

To continue my previous response, I'd argue that this is uncharitable to Christians that would prioritize attibutes of God over interpretation of Scripture. Returning to homosexuality as our example, a Christian that just knows that God loves and cherishes a homosexual person and the path (whether nature, nurture, or some combination) that led them there, might reasonably draw the conclusion that Leviticus 18:22 or 1 Corinthians 6:9 might be mistaken about our relationships with God, either in our interpretations or the text itself. Negotiating with a flawed text in a way that prioritizes the love of Christ that Paul found, yet struggled with is hardly an abrogation of the search for truth, even though its priorities aren't the ones that you think are self-evident.

When science is brought in, my experience is that liberal and conservative churches take turns holding the position that lines up with scientific consensus. On Young Earth Creationism, science favors the liberal view. On the issue of abortion, biology would seem to switch sides to the conservative view. We can't treat science as a football in a team sport.

I'm pretty sure that I disagree about how evenly balanced you think things are, but I'm willing to accept that science as an endeavor isn't part of this discussion.

My claim is that the Appalachian snake handlers are theologically more conservative than nearly all other modern Christian denominations, at least in their approach to Scripture.

I would disagree here.
The Vulgate includes the long ending of Mark, but that is very different from claiming that the snake handlers' interpretation of this ending is the traditional one. This seems to be the argument that the vast majority of churches have held snake handling services from the fourth century up until the modern era. That is simply untrue; it is a 20th century innovation, and therefore a break with tradition.

I think we're using different definitions of "conservative" as it applies to theology. Regardless of conclusion, conservative theology has, by definition, a "high view" of Scripture, such that as an ideal, Scripture alone is authoritative. Trusting Mark 16:17-18 to be true in a literal sense despite worldly evidence to the contrary is, again by definition, a more conservative view than the converse, even if the first person that drew this conclusion did so yesterday.

We are conflating "theologically conservative" with "culturally conservative". These should be kept distinct.

I'm not sure we are; I think we just have slightly different ideas about what theologically conservative means in this context.

I'm saying that all sects, reasonable and unreasonable alike, must negotiate in some way with the contemporary culture within which they sit.

Both would be true if we assumed that surrounding cultural views were closer to the truth than those of a given sect. But we've yet to see even an attempt to support this.

Why is that necessary? Aside from my mild snark early on about Christianity engaging with reality, I'm not making claims about where in this negotiation ontic truth lies. In fact, my claim is that this negotiation exists specifically because we can't know a priori which claims are true. If one places higher value on traditional ways of engaging with Scripture, particularly things like inerrancy and the theological unity of Scripture, then one is more conservative. If one is more willing to prioritize more of our shared cultural experiences as evidence for truth conclusions over Scripture, one is more liberal. Your insistence that I show that cultural values are indeed ontically true is just you asserting that my horse might be worth zero moneys.

Rather, I was asserting that the evaluation process should be centered around the question "is this claim true", rather than "does this claim allow me to haggle a lower cost in terms of disagreeing with modern culture".

I think I was using a broader definition of "cost" without making that clear. in the cost, I was including things like the personally calculated probability of being wrong. If my extended social group is comprised entirely of super judgemental creationists, but I think evolution might be true in an ontic sense, that tension reflects several potential costs. Those costs are somewhat orthogonal, which makes the decision less straightforward. Even so, the creationist choice isn't only about social consequences, since presumably one would have opinions about the influence of Scripture on ontic truth. Conversely, believing that natural evolution in fact happened also carries some social benefit within our current culture. I'm not using cost as opposed to ontic truth, but am instead saying that the risk/reward calculus includes both social acceptance and probable alignment with ontic truth, as well as a number of other considerations that can be valued.

Whether God exists is obviously a disputed truth claim. We can't simply start from the assumption that it is not true. We'd need to see an actual case for that.

And that is exactly my point. You seem to be worried that I'm smuggling in a preference for non-conservative ways of evaluating truth claims, but I think instead, you're privileging a conservative Christian point of view, perhaps unconsciously.

And in deciding whether snake handling is a good idea, should one ask "How thoroughly does the surrounding culture reject the religious claim?" or "Is the religious claim true?" I'm inclined to ask the second question.

So are snake handlers and in fact, they're so convinced that their high view of Scripture will lead them to the truth that they're willing to risk grave injury if they're wrong. I, on the other hand, think that a much lower view of Scripture will lead me (and would lead them) to conclusions that would align more closely with ontic truth.

As another example, let's use believing that homosexuality is sinful. One still has to make the same calculus. Is the value of the religious position worth the cost?

I'd be far more interested in whether that position is true. I'm making no claims about whether it is. I'm simply rejecting the idea that one should choose beliefs based on whether it is worth the social cost of believing them.

Of course! I don't think you're a nihilist, remember? On the other hand, if you choose the religious view, you might be responsible for causing proximate social harm, even if God is real and is as offended by homosexuality as He is by bacon and cheese sandwiches. The social cost isn't necessarily just to oneself, but can be a cost to others. As social animals, that carries its own weight. I would expect that a conservative is simply so sure that she's right, that she's willing to risk social harm in the near term to embrace a long-term truth. I hope I'm not inappropriately projecting, but I suspect that your professed dismissal of social costs isn't quite as absolute as you claim. If you thought that God maybe wants you to forego tattoos, but you aren't quite sure, the social cost is negligible. If, however, you think God maybe wants you to kill witches, the potential social costs are likely to carry more weight.

To offer a perhaps more practical example, God might want you to tithe. He also might want you to sell everything you have and give the money to the poor. Both have both literal economic and subsequent social costs. Can you claim that you're ignoring those in your ongoing negotiations with Christianity?

If I agree that all groups negotiate somewhat with the outside culture, will you agree that pointing this out really doesn't answer the question of whether its claims are true?

I'll agree that it doesn't answer the question alone. That's the negotiation.

In any case, though, Christians must negotiate with the text and traditions to find a place in which they're comfortable.

I notice a complete absence of any suggestion that Christians should, at some point, wonder whether a position is actually true.

I absolutely expect them to. My objection is your apparent claim that cultural reality has no (or should have no) bearing on a Christian's search for truth.

As far as I can tell, the only way this approach avoids presuming that modern cultural moral claims are correct is by being openly nihilistic.
In which case, I'd simply ask for support for nihilism.

I'm simply claiming that theologically conservative values don't belong in an a priori privileged position. You repeatedly discuss particular theological positions leading to ontic truth without qualification. I personally think that this is desperately and woefully misguided, but for the purposes of this discussion, I'll temper it to merely suggest that even a committed Christian might have some valid reasons for doubt. Appropriate risk analysis isn't nihilism.

Or how these things reflect one's own values. Being convinced by cultural inertia is non-trivial.

I agree that the bandwagon effect is real, but this is hardly a reason to promote it as the basis for all decision making. How will that not lead to both nihilism and the problems of group think?

Considering that we're discussing the bandwagon effect and religion, I think there might be a bit of unintentional irony in your statement. I do mean a little more than simple popularity by "cultural inertia," but at the moment, it doesn't matter. In practice, popularity of a belief is often quite effective as a heuristic for alignment with truth. Everybody knows that the Beltway sucks at rush hour and that too much cheese is bad for arterial health. There are other ways of arriving at these conclusions and points of view that offer disagreements, but the popularity of a conclusion is its own evidence, even if not itself dispositive. I think, though, that characterizing the choice as "the basis for all decision making" is both hyperbole and misrepresenting my position. The choices aren't binary. That's my overall claim, in fact. Your position seems to be trying to find a way to pit conservative Christian values as the unitary source of truth as opposed to current cultural norms. I'm definitely not claiming that the choice is binary. While I do personally believe that conservative Christianity has nearly zero access to ontic truth, that's not the argument I'm making now.

Your two points can certainly be valid considerations as part of your haggling

I'm trying to imagine a situation in which I could haggle over whether or not to believe 1 + 1 = 2.

If there were some severe social cost to that belief, I may be careful about how I announced it. I'd like to think I wouldn't lie about it (but perhaps I would). What I couldn't do is actually decide to believe that 1 + 1 = 4 on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.

That's not how beliefs work.

I'd argue that they do and you are actually going through that same cost-benefit analysis when deciding that 1 + 1 = 2. The reason that works as a degenerate example is that mathematics is not only culturally ingrained, but empirically supported constantly. Let's assume for the moment that the Bible gave a different answer than mathematics. According to 1 Kings 7:23, the ratio of the circumference to diameter of a perfectly round basin is exactly 3 ("... ten cubits from brim to brim ... and a line of thirty cubits compassed it round about."). How do you negotiate that? Is the Bible exactly inerrant as the text has been received by us and mathematics is wrong? Does modern mathematics have priority and we assume that the Bible is inerrant to one decimal place? I think you and I know that pi isn't exactly three, but is that what a snake handler would tell you?

On the other hand, do you believe in your heart of hearts that Paul wrote the Pastorals? That John the Evangelist and John the Revelator are the same person? That Matthew and Acts are both describing the same death of Judas? I'm utterly convinced that none of those propositions is true and that can be shown beyond any reasonable probability. I don't, however, assume that Christians that assert those as truth are dishonest. I think the conservative truth claims of all three are objectively false by any reasonable standard and believing otherwise is equivalent to believing that 1 + 1 = 4. Yet, there are people that arrive at that conclusion in good faith. You've said that science sometimes tips both ways between conservative and liberal interpretations of the Bible. How do you feel about math?

Early abolitionists held a deeply unpopular and culturally costly view. On the haggling paradigm, they should have deferred to the surrounding culture, which clearly would have been wrong. The lesson is neither "zeitgeist good" nor "zeitgeist bad", but "think critically about what is actually true."

I agree. I don't think I've tried to make the case that received cultural tradition is infallible.

I don't see a reason to accept either of your claims, either.

I'm not sure which two claims you mean,

These two:

1. The modern cultural worldview is the correct one, or
2. In spite of not being correct, people (including Christians) have some degree of responsibility to accept the modern cultural worldview.[/lis]

but I've tried to make a case. I'd genuinely appreciate it if you'd make your case.

I have been. I just don't think my case is the one you wish I were making.

Please either explain why the modern cultural view is correct,

That's not one of my claims.

or explain why anyone has an obligation to accept a dominant view that they honestly believe to be false.

Nor is that.

If one thinks a claim is false, why should one decide to believe it, and how would that even be possible?

My claim is that in practice, all Christians, conservative and otherwise, negotiate between what Scripture seems to say through the lens of traditional exegetical methods and reality as viewed through the lens of inherited cultural values. Someone that has decided that 1 Kings is inerrant and pi equals exactly three, the mathematics of Satan be damned, is more conservative than you. Someone that thinks that at most one of Judas' biblical deaths can be historically true is (I presume without you explicitly telling me) more liberal than you. Both of those views have decided that some claims are true and competing claims are false. To bring things back around to the initial debate question and my broader claim, neither is necessarily better as a value judgement and in practice, even the most conservative Christians negotiate their views in exactly this way.

[Jester]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #78]

To open with the elephant in the room, my general thought is that we're drifting into a form of nihilism that doesn't take concern for truth or facts seriously.

I absolutely disaagree. I assure you that I'm not a nihilist and you've given me no reason to think that you are, either, at least consciuosly.

I certainly don't accuse you. I'm just concerned that this is where the argument is starting to drift.

But my point is that any church which leaves people with the impression that its reasons for holding doctrines is to be more in line with the surrounding culture isn't using the search for truth as its north star. Any church which treats interpretation via the "haggling" paradigm is doing that.

That is definitely a problem.

To continue my previous response, I'd argue that this is uncharitable to Christians that would prioritize attibutes of God over interpretation of Scripture.

I don't see how. If these people have a serious theological argument for their conclusions, then that is not about haggling with modern culture.
If they do not, and are simply adopting the views around them, then my summary was accurate.

even though its priorities aren't the ones that you think are self-evident.

Quickly, I haven't said anything about what properties I think are self-evident. Please try not to assume.

I think we're using different definitions of "conservative" as it applies to theology. Regardless of conclusion, conservative theology has, by definition, a "high view" of Scripture, such that as an ideal, Scripture alone is authoritative. Trusting Mark 16:17-18 to be true in a literal sense despite worldly evidence to the contrary is, again by definition, a more conservative view than the converse, even if the first person that drew this conclusion did so yesterday.

Yes, that is definitely different from my view.
I agree that conservative theology has a very high view of scripture (but does not automatically assume sola scriptura). I disagree that literal interpretations are the more conservative ones. I'd say that the history of theology over the centuries gives us the conservative view. At least, it needs to be included. We keep trying to frame this discussion in terms of cultural liberals vs cultural conservatives, which ends up pushing traditional theology aside.

Whatever terms we use, I want to avoid dismissing the majority view in favor of a relative fringe.

Both would be true if we assumed that surrounding cultural views were closer to the truth than those of a given sect. But we've yet to see even an attempt to support this.

Why is that necessary? Aside from my mild snark early on about Christianity engaging with reality, I'm not making claims about where in this negotiation ontic truth lies.

This is necessary because, if the popular culture turns out to be wrong, it is ultimately damaging for both the church and popular culture for the church to concede very much to it.

That, and I care what is true. I consider it the moral duty of any thinking person to adhere to the truth, rather than what is socially convenient.

Rather, I was asserting that the evaluation process should be centered around the question "is this claim true", rather than "does this claim allow me to haggle a lower cost in terms of disagreeing with modern culture".

I think I was using a broader definition of "cost" without making that clear. in the cost, I was including things like the personally calculated probability of being wrong.

I'd say that it needs to do more than include that—it should be focused on that.
The social setting might have a strong effect on how and when one should choose to express a belief. But this is not to say it is acceptable to let social convenience affect one's conclusions. That is simply motivated reasoning.

You seem to be worried that I'm smuggling in a preference for non-conservative ways of evaluating truth claims, but I think instead, you're privileging a conservative Christian point of view, perhaps unconsciously.

I didn't think I was. You may be surprised to learn what my actual beliefs are.
Either way, I need to see a case for the validity of your means of evaluation—rather than further descriptions of it.

So are snake handlers and in fact, they're so convinced that their high view of Scripture will lead them to the truth that they're willing to risk grave injury if they're wrong. I, on the other hand, think that a much lower view of Scripture will lead me (and would lead them) to conclusions that would align more closely with ontic truth.

That strikes me as a more honest and forthright approach. I'm much more aligned with this.

My only disagreement would be with the idea that it is a high view of scripture, rather than a high view of literal interpretation, that is the crux of the issue with snake handlers.

I'd be far more interested in whether that position is true. I'm making no claims about whether it is. I'm simply rejecting the idea that one should choose beliefs based on whether it is worth the social cost of believing them.

Of course! I don't think you're a nihilist, remember? On the other hand, if you choose the religious view, you might be responsible for causing proximate social harm

You keep repeating this, but I've never disagreed with it.
I'm only asking for some case to be made that we should focus our concern on the potential harms of the religious view while ignoring the potential harms of non-religious views.

That is the case I'm waiting to see.

If I agree that all groups negotiate somewhat with the outside culture, will you agree that pointing this out really doesn't answer the question of whether its claims are true?

I'll agree that it doesn't answer the question alone. That's the negotiation.

And we were doing so well. Bummer...

It doesn't answer the question at all. Popularity and social costs do not affect the truth of a claim.
If you'd like to debate that point—I don't need more exposition on the idea. I need you to make the case that reality bends to the will of social convention. I confess that I find that absurd, but this is what we will have to prove in order to support the idea that selecting beliefs is and should be a matter of negotiation, rather than deliberation.

I notice a complete absence of any suggestion that Christians should, at some point, wonder whether a position is actually true.

I absolutely expect them to. My objection is your apparent claim that cultural reality has no (or should have no) bearing on a Christian's search for truth.

Then there we have a clear point of disagreement. It should not. I see no reason to suspect that reality shifts to better reflect what is popular and convenient. Anyone who seeks truth is (by definition) concerned with reality, not convenience.

As far as I can tell, the only way this approach avoids presuming that modern cultural moral claims are correct is by being openly nihilistic.
In which case, I'd simply ask for support for nihilism.

I'm simply claiming that theologically conservative values don't belong in an a priori privileged position.

If that were all you were claiming, then I'd completely agree, but I find that difficult to square with other things that have already been said.

The demand that we largely defer to popular culture, the dismissal of the idea that God exists, the insistence that traditional theologies are costly both to their proponents and others have all been based on the presumption that theologically conservative views are false.

You repeatedly discuss particular theological positions leading to ontic truth without qualification.

I haven't promoted any particular theological position. I've only promoted the idea that we focus on truth, rather than social convenience. I've not made a point of correcting your assumptions about what I believe, but that is not the same as affirming them.

I agree that the bandwagon effect is real, but this is hardly a reason to promote it as the basis for all decision making. How will that not lead to both nihilism and the problems of group think?

Considering that we're discussing the bandwagon effect and religion

Were we? I had thought I was being told that people can and should believe things because the culture makes it easier—and was countering with the idea that we should stick to considering truth values.

In practice, popularity of a belief is often quite effective as a heuristic for alignment with truth.

I find that ideas which are well established don't need to lean on that heuristic—or long defenses about allowing one to go with social pressures. I very much prefer the heuristic that, when I challenge a view that is based in the truth, I tend to get a clear argument.

I think, though, that characterizing the choice as "the basis for all decision making" is both hyperbole and misrepresenting my position.

I'd be pleased to be shown to be wrong. If you don't think that negotiation for the lowest social cost is the basis of selecting beliefs, just let me know, and I'll be pleased to retract that.

Your position seems to be trying to find a way to pit conservative Christian values as the unitary source of truth as opposed to current cultural norms.

Now it is my turn to claim to have been misrepresented. I've not once argued this. I've not argued in favor of conservative Christian values—let alone for the idea that they should be the unitary source of truth. I've claimed three things:
1. The search for truth must, by definition, be based on what is actual (ontic truth, as you put it—or simply "truth" as I prefer).
2. Beliefs cannot legitimately be based on social convenience
3. The definitions of "liberal" and "conservative" that have been used tend to omit many live positions.

Please note how none of this is a promotion of conservative Christian views (by any definition). I'm not particularly interested in promoting that. My issue is with the various attempts to set up modern culture as the basis by which all other views are compared. One needn't be either a conservative or a Christian to see that point.

I'd argue that they do and you are actually going through that same cost-benefit analysis when deciding that 1 + 1 = 2.

If you'd argue that, you need to make the argument, not simply outline how we might describe belief formation in terms of personal gain.
We need actual reasons that alternative descriptions of deliberation are invalid before that case is made.

Early abolitionists held a deeply unpopular and culturally costly view. On the haggling paradigm, they should have deferred to the surrounding culture, which clearly would have been wrong. The lesson is neither "zeitgeist good" nor "zeitgeist bad", but "think critically about what is actually true."

I agree. I don't think I've tried to make the case that received cultural tradition is infallible.

That wasn't what I was saying.

But I was saying that you've insisted that people defer far too much to received cultural tradition for "think critically about what is actually true" to accurately describe your approach.

I don't see a reason to accept either of your claims, either.

I'm not sure which two claims you mean,

These two:

1. The modern cultural worldview is the correct one, or
2. In spite of not being correct, people (including Christians) have some degree of responsibility to accept the modern cultural worldview.

Those were the necessary support for your approach. I was not making or endorsing those claims. I was asking for support for them.

but I've tried to make a case. I'd genuinely appreciate it if you'd make your case.

I have been. I just don't think my case is the one you wish I were making.

Then I'm confused. I've not actually seen a case that belief formation is all a matter of negotiation. To be sure, I've read a lot of exposition detailing the idea. What I haven't seen is something like a syllogism leading to that conclusion.

I'm not telling you to make any particular case. Just please offer me an argument. If you wouldn't mind, could you actually write out the premises and the conclusion?

Please either explain why the modern cultural view is correct,

That's not one of my claims.

In that case, please offer me a reason why anyone who disagrees with it should adjust their beliefs toward it.

or explain why anyone has an obligation to accept a dominant view that they honestly believe to be false.

Nor is that.

In that case, then we have no reason why people should adjust their beliefs toward it (negotiate, as we've put it).

This really seems to bring us back to square one. If you aren't claiming either of these things, then you aren't claiming that anyone should negotiate with the modern cultural view. You also aren't presenting a case.

That being the case, I'm honestly not sure what it is you're claiming, or on what basis you're claiming it. Could you write out that syllogism? I think it would help a great deal.

If one thinks a claim is false, why should one decide to believe it, and how would that even be possible?

My claim is that in practice, all Christians, conservative and otherwise, negotiate between what Scripture seems to say through the lens of traditional exegetical methods and reality as viewed through the lens of inherited cultural values.

But that is neither an answer to the topic question nor a disagreement with my statements above. I've only spoken about what should be done. If you're only discussing what is done in practice, then this seems to have been a lot of talking past the point (in terms of the topic question).

Someone that has decided that 1 Kings is inerrant and pi equals exactly three, the mathematics of Satan be damned, is more conservative than you.

I try not to argue semantics, but pushing this hard on a definition reads as if we're trying to associate a caricature of fringe views with "real" Christianity. One needn't be either conservative or Christian to see that this is a very uncharitable take.

Someone that thinks that at most one of Judas' biblical deaths can be historically true is (I presume without you explicitly telling me) more liberal than you.

Setting aside my personal views on any of this. There is no legitimate reason equate this view with "liberal".

I begin to feel that this entire discussion has been a long poisoning the well fallacy, where we insist on definitions based more on how foolish they make a particular religion look than whether they are actually accurate.

To bring it back to the bulk of the discussion, this has (by your admission above) nothing to do either with what I believe, what the bulk of Christians (both today and historically) have believed, or with what is actually true. The only reason to insist on this paradigm is for its use in winning a debate.