The Coherent Causality Argument

[William]

For years, I've seen Christians argue for a supernatural creator - an entity outside nature, beyond scientific understanding, uncaused and eternal.

But if "supernatural" means beyond understanding and evidence, how does that explain anything rather than simply labeling the unknown as unknowable?

Here is an alternative argument that retains a first cause but removes the incoherence of supernaturalism. I welcome thoughtful engagement, particularly from theistic perspectives, on the following:

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Definitions (Oxford Languages):

Supernatural: (of a manifestation or event) attributed to some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature.

Supernaturalism: the belief in a supernatural agency that intervenes in the course of natural laws.

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The Coherent Causality Argument

P1: Everything that begins to exist within nature has a natural cause.

P2: It is generally accepted in modern cosmology that this universe (our spacetime reality) had a beginning.

C1: Therefore, this universe has a natural cause.

P3: A “natural cause” means a cause that operates within some framework of consistent laws, is potentially understandable in principle, and is part of a broader causal reality.

P4: A supernatural cause, by definition, is beyond natural laws, understanding, and evidence, thus it cannot function as a causal explanation.

C2: Therefore, the cause of the universe is not supernatural - it is part of a broader natural reality (a “source reality”).

P5: This source reality may be eternal, timeless, or uncreated relative to our universe, but it is still natural in the sense of being coherent, consistent, and conceptually describable.

C3: Since an infinite regress of contingent causes provides no ultimate explanation, the source reality must be eternal (or necessary).

Overall Conclusion:
The universe was caused by an eternal natural entity - not by a supernatural one. This avoids the explanatory dead-end of supernaturalism while still satisfying the demand for a causal origin.
(By “natural,” I mean “operating within some consistent framework of cause and effect, even if outside our observable universe.”)

Note on Consciousness:
If the natural source-entity is intelligent and consciously creative, this would provide a coherent origin for consciousness itself, potentially resolving the "hard problem" by grounding subjective experience in a fundamental, conscious cause. This is not required by my argument, but it is a logically consistent possibility if one accepts both an intelligent source and the principle that consciousness cannot emerge from purely non-conscious substrates.

A Clarification on Terms:

If “supernatural” simply means existing outside our universe but still operating by consistent, higher-level laws, and is not being used in its strong, classical philosophical sense here, then it becomes a subcategory of the natural - understood broadly as any reality operating within a coherent framework of cause and effect.

If, however, “supernatural” means wholly beyond understanding, outside any consistent laws, and intrinsically inexplicable, then it cannot meaningfully explain anything—including the origin of the universe.

This argument proceeds under the second definition, which is both standard in philosophical discourse and necessary for the term “supernatural” to retain any distinct meaning. If you hold the first definition, then your “supernatural” cause aligns with what I term the eternal natural source-entity—and we are largely in agreement on the nature of the first cause, differing only in terminology.

Q1: If a cause is supernatural - beyond understanding and evidence - does it actually explain anything, or does it merely relabel an unknown as unknowable?

Q2: Can a Christian (or any theist) coherently define God as both supernatural (in its strong, classical philosophical sense) and personally interactive without contradiction?

[Difflugia]

Please propose edits, deletions, or additions to this formulation. If you reject a premise (e.g., step 2 or 3), state why. If you accept the logic but dispute the evidence for a premise, we can focus there.

This may be the impasse you were talking about, but your "Metaphysical Inference" can only be asserted if you already reject essentially any Copenhagen-type interpretation of quantum mechanics, essentially shaping the evidence by definition rather than by inference from the evidence itself.

Traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics treat quantum state changes within our universe as fundamentally uncaused. Quantum state changes do not require any reason, let alone a sufficient one. There are mathematically plausible models for our universe being the result of such an uncaused quantum event. As it is, therefore, the statement that there's "strong evidence" that our universe is contingent is false. You can claim that you're assuming that because you don't think the alternative makes sense or, since it's your argument, any other subjective reason you want, but the evidence doesn't support your assertion in an objective way.

The 'hard problem' of consciousness is not the argument's driver, but a test for candidate models. A conscious ground solves it; a non-conscious ground does not.

This is where you lose me. Simply defining consciousness as a fundamental thing, independent of other aspects of our reality doesn't actually solve the problem. Saying that it's "fundamental" offers nothing more than the claim that it's "emergent." Your conscious ground fills the same role as God in standard Christian formulations of these kinds of arguments: it's just a placeholder for, "I don't know."

[William]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #41]

Difflugia, thank you. This is exactly the kind of principled disagreement I was hoping to isolate. We are now at the foundational level.

On Premise 2 (Contingency & Quantum Mechanics):
You are correct that if one interprets quantum indeterminacy as evidence of true metaphysical brute factuality, then the inference to cosmic contingency is weakened. However, my argument operates at a different level:

The quantum events you mention are processes within the universe, governed by the universe's pre-existing laws (quantum field theory in spacetime). They are not explanations for why those laws, spacetime, and the quantum fields themselves exist.

The 'contingency' I refer to is not about every event within the chain, but about the totality of physical reality—its existence and its specific, life-permitting fundamental parameters. A 'quantum fluctuation' model still requires a pre-existing quantum vacuum or manifold with specific laws to fluctuate from. The question is: what grounds that?
My premise asserts that the specific, fine-tuned, low-entropy nature of our cosmic beginning is best explained by the totality being contingent - i.e., not self-explaining. You assert it could be a brute fact. This is our fundamental disagreement. Let's table this for now as Point of Divergence A: The validity of applying the PSR to the cosmos-as-a-whole.

On the 'Conscious Ground' & Explanatory Power:
This is a serious objection, but I think it conflates two very different kinds of 'I don't know.'

The 'Emergent' Claim: Saying consciousness 'emerges' from non-conscious elements is to posit a causal or generative mechanism that is, by your own admission, completely mysterious and for which there is no model. It's an 'I don't know how.'

The 'Fundamental' Claim: Saying consciousness is fundamental is to posit it as a basic category of existence. It is not a claim about a mechanism but about the furniture of reality. The 'I don't know' here is of a different kind: 'I don't know why reality includes this fundamental property,' but crucially, it does not invent an inexplicable generative jump.
To say they offer the same explanation is like saying 'This tower is made of bricks' (fundamental) has the same explanatory value as 'This tower emerges from the surrounding air' (emergent). One states a basic composition; the other posits a magical transformation.

However, you have highlighted a weakness in stating it baldly. This is precisely why Mithrae's separate argument is crucial. His argument provides the reason for preferring the 'conscious fundamental' category. It's not a mere label because:

Evidence: Consciousness is our only indubitable datum.

Parsimony: It is more parsimonious to take this datum as a clue to reality's nature than to invent an unobserved, non-conscious substrate that then mysteriously generates it.

Explanatory Value: A conscious ground doesn't just 'stop' the inquiry; it provides a coherent foundation for the intelligibility of the universe (logic/rationality as aspects of mind) and for the existence of subjective experience (continuity of kind between ground and manifestation).

The 'conscious ground' is not a placeholder if it is inferred as the best explanation for the specific evidence we have (a structured cosmos + subjective experience). A 'non-conscious ground' is the placeholder, as it must hold a place for a future, inexplicable emergence.

Our second Point of Divergence B is therefore: Does identifying a fundamental property (consciousness) based on parsimony and evidence constitute an explanation, or is it a mere label?

I propose we focus on Divergence A first, as it is the core of the CCA. If we can't agree the universe is contingent, the rest is moot. If we agree it's contingent but you maintain the 'conscious ground' is an empty label, we can then debate the comparative explanatory power of fundamental vs. emergent models.

[alexxcJRO]

[Replying to alexxcJRO in post #30]

Alexx,

Your analogy to Newtonian physics misses the mark. The Coherent Causality Argument is not an extrapolation of local physics; it is an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason - a foundational metaphysical principle, not a physical theory. It states: for any contingent fact (including the existence of a universe or a multiverse), there must be an explanation.

If there are layers of reality (cacaverse, luluverse, etc.), each is either contingent or necessary. If contingent, it requires an explanation beyond itself. An infinite stack of contingent layers is still contingent as a whole and does not provide its own reason for existing. For the chain to be self-explanatory, it must terminate in a reality that exists necessarily - whose essence implies existence. That is exactly the “eternal natural source” my argument concludes.

You suggest an infinite set might exist necessarily. If so, that set is a necessary being, which aligns with my conclusion. But a mere collection of contingent things, however large or infinite, does not become necessary by accretion. Necessity is a different metaphysical category.

Your epistemic humility, while cautious, risks collapsing into total skepticism: if we cannot apply basic logical principles (like “contingent things require a ground”) beyond our local universe, then we cannot reason about ultimate reality at all. That is indeed an admission of explanatory failure - functionally equivalent to positing an unintelligible mystery.

You have not engaged with the hard problem of consciousness. My framework allows the necessary ground to be conscious, providing a coherent origin for subjectivity. Whether your model is an infinite regress or a necessary infinite set, it offers no explanation for why consciousness exists. This is a decisive explanatory advantage for my model.

So, clarify: Do you accept that contingent reality (however layered) requires a necessary ground? If not, how do you avoid an infinite explanatory regress? And how does your model account for consciousness?

Sir you are doing what the medieval man X was doing: you are extrapolating from known logic, principles, and science that may apply only to our local universe and try to apply them universally to all existence-reality/omniverse.
Also we have the well known God of the gaps.
The medieval did not knew what lay beyond Earth and he put God in the knowledge gap.
You do not know what lays beyond our space-time universe and you put God in the knowledge gap.

Although things in it are contingent and need an explanation the omniverse might be infinite and necessary and does not require an explanation. May it be through an infinite set, or a stop gap at some point( maybe at the quantum level ).
The problem of consciousness may not be a problem. It is not universally accepted is a problem. 40 % of philosophers believe it is not.

[Mithrae]

Although things in it are contingent and need an explanation the omniverse might be infinite and necessary and does not require an explanation.

I forget who on this forum introduced me to the idea (got a feeling it was ThatGirlAgain, back in the day) and I'm not sure how well they argued it since I didn't give it much thought at the time, but there's something to be said for the idea that the most fundamental and necessary thing is existence itself in the sense that anything which can exist must exist.

1 - There is a phase space of 'possible worlds' different from our own (eg. where radioactive decay of an atom happens an instant earlier or later), regardless of whether or not we can know the exact extent or variety of worlds which are possible.
2 - Either there is a point/s of differentiation between those possible worlds or there is not.
3 - Introducing a point of differentiation between them reduces parsimony, unless substantiated by evidence or required by logic.
4 - If we suppose other possible worlds don't also exist, that requires a point of differentiation since ours obviously does exist.
C - Absent evidence to the contrary, the most parsimonious view is that they do exist; that the most fundamental and necessary thing is being itself and all 'possible worlds' must exist. If it can be, it is.

Multiverse speculations from theoretical physics such as the M-theory or the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics could be viewed as more specific instances supporting the general principle. Of course trying to think things into existence doesn't necessarily get us very far.

The problem of consciousness may not be a problem. It is not universally accepted is a problem. 40 % of philosophers believe it is not.

Your numbers seem to be off a little:
"According to a 2020 PhilPapers survey, a majority (62.4%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine problem, while 29.7% said that it does not exist.[25]"

Note that the question was about the "hard problem" of consciousness; in contrast to the "easy" problems of mental functions like sensory input, learning, memory and decision-making which neuroscientists can probably finish cracking within the century (significant inroads having already been made), the "hard problem" of mental experience, qualia or subjectivity itself is characterized by proponents as seemingly unsolvable under the assumption of physicalism. So those 29.7% can't be interpreted saying that there isn't a problem of consciousness at all, merely that they believe qualia like the rest to be solvable which (short of straight-up dogmatism) presumably means they believe there's a coherent path towards it potentially being solved within the next century or two. There are a small fraction of philosophers who are apparently eliminative materialists (~4%) under which view the problem is presumably 'resolved' by asserting that if subjective experience can't be reduced to the material then it simply doesn't exist, but I think we can safely ignore those folk

As for the other ~25%... There's a helluva lot of things that could potentially be solved within the next century or two, but if that's the kind of ballpark that a problem is in it's obviously still a pretty major problem even if it's not the "hard problem" as outlined by Chalmers. A model which mitigates that problem - by rejecting the baseless assumption of nonconscious reality and supposing consciousness to be a fundamental feature of reality - is comparatively more reasonable by virtue of that fact. That holds true even if the problem introduced by positing nonconscious reality is not an absolute "hard problem" (which philosophers on a greater than 2:1 ratio seem to think it is), and even if the supposition of a conscious reality doesn't provide a complete answer. If a phenomenon is partially explained under theory A and unexplained but potentially explainable under theory B, all else being equal A is obviously the preferable theory.

And in this case all else is not equal by any stretch of the imagination.

[Mithrae]

Part 2: Anticipating and Addressing Key Objections
Objection 1:

Objection 2:

Objection 3:

You haven't addressed the objection which Alexx previously raised and I highlighted, that even assuming the argument's validity it still doesn't provide us with any specific theory or any additional explanation or understanding, because it cannot tell us how many steps beyond our universe this 'coherent cause' would be.

We could grant all the assumptions of William Lane Craig's version of the argument, that it somehow proves "an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who... is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful"... and it still means basically nothing if this 'creator' started the chain of existence anywhere from zero to trillions of universes back and is likely to have essentially no connection with or bearing on reality as we know it. It's a long walk to nowhere.

[William]

Part 2: Anticipating and Addressing Key Objections
Objection 1:

Objection 2:

Objection 3:

You haven't addressed the objection which Alexx previously raised and I highlighted, that even assuming the argument's validity it still doesn't provide us with any specific theory or any additional explanation or understanding, because it cannot tell us how many steps beyond our universe this 'coherent cause' would be.

We could grant all the assumptions of William Lane Craig's version of the argument, that it somehow proves "an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who... is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful"... and it still means basically nothing if this 'creator' started the chain of existence anywhere from zero to trillions of universes back and is likely to have essentially no connection with or bearing on reality as we know it. It's a long walk to nowhere.

Mithrae, you have integrated your consciousness argument with Alexxs argument...and likely had this idea from before the time you brought it into the public debate setting on the other thread...
Specifically it denotes Deism by promoting that this Conscious Ground is a trillion times removed from human consciousness, thus squashing any ability for the ground consciousness to even know of the existence of human consciousness.

Even putting "trillion" as a number could be a gross understatement since Alexxs theory implies a mindless infinity but no reason is given by you as to why this should somehow act as a barrier to your Ground Consciousness.

At this point Alexx hasn't argued for any Ground Consciousness, and I see by your post replying to him that you are attempting to integrate that with his argument - perhaps trying to get him to agree with you there as a means of integrating the two arguments, much in the same way I am doing with you re your Ground Consciousness Argument and my Coherent Causality Argument.

However, I do not see how integrating your argument with Alexxs solves the hard problem of consciousness by distancing the Ground Consciousness with human consciousness, whereas CCA provides a doorway to that so-called distance by NOT assuming distance is a problem for the Ground Consciousness due to that promoting Deism through separating human consciousness from the Ground Consciousness - which incidentally - is the problem with Supernaturalism which the CCA in the opening post, focused upon successfully debunking.

So, can you explain the difference between a supernatural Ground Consciousness and a Deist Ground Consciousness and also why you think distance is a necessary factor in deducing the disconnect you are arguing for in relation to Human Consciousness?

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #93]

1. I don’t think your terms are defined clearly or accurately.

In P5 ‘natural’ means “being coherent, consistent, and conceptually describable”. I put that definition into chatgpt to see what word it thought you were defining and it gave back ‘intelligibility’ not anything close to ‘natural’. In your conclusion ‘natural’ means “operating within some consistent framework of cause and effect, even if outside our observable universe”. Chatgpt thought you were defining ‘nomological’ here, not anything close to ‘natural’. A supernatural cause would be ‘natural’ under these definitions, which shows that they aren’t good definitions to use for ‘natural’ since supernatural is defined against ‘natural’.

Your definition of ‘supernatural’ is not standard in philosophical discourse whatsoever. ‘Supernatural’ means beyond scientific understanding and outside physical laws (by definition of science).

‘Natural’ is traditionally used to mean something like “that which exists within the spatiotemporal universe and operates according to its physical laws”. And ‘supernatural’ means “that which exists outside of/independently of/beyond the spatiotemporal universe”

2. I also don’t think C1 follows from P1 and P2. You’d need an extra premise that says that the universe is something that begins to exist within nature. Following from (1) above, I don’t think that extra premise would be true because the universe is just a way to talk about all of nature, not something existing within some broader thing called ‘nature’.

Tanager, thank you for engaging. Your objections help clarify the necessary philosophical shift. Let me address them.

1. On Definitions: Refining the Metaphysical Core

You state my definitions aren't standard. This is correct, and intentional. Standard definitions are often philosophically inadequate.

A Note on AI and Context: You mentioned using ChatGPT to evaluate my definitions. This highlights a key limitation: LLMs are trained on conventional human usage. Out of context, they will naturally map "coherent, consistent, and conceptually describable" to words like intelligible or nomological. However, the entire argument provides the necessary context: I am redefining the metaphysical battlefield from "inside vs. outside the universe" to "coherent vs. incoherent causation." Isolated - out of context - AI analysis misses this deliberate philosophical move.

The Problem with the Standard Spatial Definition: Defining "natural" as "within the spatiotemporal universe" and "supernatural" as "outside it" reduces the debate to geography. It makes "supernatural" a trivial label for anything outside our universe, whether it's a lawless miracle or a deist coherent, necessary ground. This drains the terms of meaningful metaphysical content.

The Purpose of My Refinement: I refine the terms to their explanatory core.

Natural: Denotes causal coherence - operating within a consistent, intelligible framework of cause and effect. The key is how it operates, not where it is.

Supernatural (Strong): Denotes causal incoherence - being outside any framework of consistent causality, lawless, and intrinsically inexplicable.

You note that under my definition, a coherent "supernatural" God becomes "natural." Precisely. The argument isn't about preserving the label "supernatural"; it's about banishing incoherent explanations. If a cause is coherent, necessary, and conscious, it qualifies as the "eternal natural source-entity" my conclusion describes. The disagreement becomes largely terminological, not substantive.

2. On the Logical Inference: The Presupposition in Your Critique

Your objection, by denying the applicability of this explanatory principle to the universe itself, is essentially a defense of the Brute Fact.

My argument demonstrates that a coherent, necessary ground provides a superior, non-arbitrary terminus. The inference is valid if one seeks explanation over arbitrariness.

Core Invitation: Engage the Substance

Let's move beyond semantics. The CCA presents a fundamental metaphysical choice:

What is the ultimate terminus of explanation for our contingent reality?
A. A Brute Fact (The universe just is, (as with B-theory et al) with no further explanation).
B. An Incoherent Cause ("Supernatural" in the strong, lawless sense).
C. A Coherent, Necessary Ground (A "source reality" operating with causal consistency).

I argue (C) is rationally mandatory. If you prefer (A) or (B), please defend its explanatory virtue over (C). But to reject my argument solely by insisting on definitions that make (C) linguistically impossible is to avoid the metaphysical heart of the issue.

This framework's power is its ability to resolve other problems - like free will - by showing libertarian agency is not magical randomness, but the natural capacity of an agent (ultimately grounded in a coherent, agential reality) to be a coherent cause of its own choices.

I welcome your thoughts on this substantive choice.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #47]

I don’t see what your definitions gain, then. With them you are able to establish that the cause of the universe is a cause that operates within a consistent, intelligible framework of cause and effect. But that (i.e., your “C”) is trivially true. Of course the cause of the universe works within a causal framework or it couldn’t be rightly called a cause in the first place.

This still doesn’t answer the traditional conversation you seem to be saying you are entering into with a new answer. That question is whether the cause is a material or immaterial one.

And I don’t see how this resolves the problem over free will. You would be claiming free will is a cause that operates within a consistent, intelligible framework of cause and effect (as traditional supernatural libertarians always have), but simply saying it is ‘natural’ instead of ‘supernatural’ isn’t going to get the naturalists to agree because they will ask where the scientific evidence of it is, if it is truly 'natural' as they understand that term.

[alexxcJRO]

I forget who on this forum introduced me to the idea (got a feeling it was ThatGirlAgain, back in the day) and I'm not sure how well they argued it since I didn't give it much thought at the time, but there's something to be said for the idea that the most fundamental and necessary thing is existence itself in the sense that anything which can exist must exist.

1 - There is a phase space of 'possible worlds' different from our own (eg. where radioactive decay of an atom happens an instant earlier or later), regardless of whether or not we can know the exact extent or variety of worlds which are possible.
2 - Either there is a point/s of differentiation between those possible worlds or there is not.
3 - Introducing a point of differentiation between them reduces parsimony, unless substantiated by evidence or required by logic.
4 - If we suppose other possible worlds don't also exist, that requires a point of differentiation since ours obviously does exist.
C - Absent evidence to the contrary, the most parsimonious view is that they do exist; that the most fundamental and necessary thing is being itself and all 'possible worlds' must exist. If it can be, it is.

Multiverse speculations from theoretical physics such as the M-theory or the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics could be viewed as more specific instances supporting the general principle. Of course trying to think things into existence doesn't necessarily get us very far.

Speculation is fine and dandy as long as we know it is speculation.
The arguments of theists all look to me as speculation dressed more nicely and presented as fact.

Your numbers seem to be off a little:
"According to a 2020 PhilPapers survey, a majority (62.4%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine problem, while 29.7% said that it does not exist.[25]"

Note that the question was about the "hard problem" of consciousness; in contrast to the "easy" problems of mental functions like sensory input, learning, memory and decision-making which neuroscientists can probably finish cracking within the century (significant inroads having already been made), the "hard problem" of mental experience, qualia or subjectivity itself is characterized by proponents as seemingly unsolvable under the assumption of physicalism. So those 29.7% can't be interpreted saying that there isn't a problem of consciousness at all, merely that they believe qualia like the rest to be solvable which (short of straight-up dogmatism) presumably means they believe there's a coherent path towards it potentially being solved within the next century or two. There are a small fraction of philosophers who are apparently eliminative materialists (~4%) under which view the problem is presumably 'resolved' by asserting that if subjective experience can't be reduced to the material then it simply doesn't exist, but I think we can safely ignore those folk

As for the other ~25%... There's a helluva lot of things that could potentially be solved within the next century or two, but if that's the kind of ballpark that a problem is in it's obviously still a pretty major problem even if it's not the "hard problem" as outlined by Chalmers. A model which mitigates that problem - by rejecting the baseless assumption of nonconscious reality and supposing consciousness to be a fundamental feature of reality - is comparatively more reasonable by virtue of that fact. That holds true even if the problem introduced by positing nonconscious reality is not an absolute "hard problem" (which philosophers on a greater than 2:1 ratio seem to think it is), and even if the supposition of a conscious reality doesn't provide a complete answer. If a phenomenon is partially explained under theory A and unexplained but potentially explainable under theory B, all else being equal A is obviously the preferable theory.

And in this case all else is not equal by any stretch of the imagination.

For me is just another part of the same God of the Gaps phenomenon that seems to have plagued the Homo Sapiens Sapiens since its inception.

Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual in the Paleolithic era: OMG Hard Problem of Tress, Wind, Sun ergo God of Tress, Wind, Sun to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual in the Neolithic-Ancient Egypt era: OMG Hard Problem of apparent movement of the Sun across the sky ergo God of the Sun-RA to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual in the Medieval times: OMG Hard Problem of Earth seeming to be in the center of the Universe. We are special. Ergo God made Earth in the center of universe because we are special creations to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens in early 20th century: OMG Hard Problem The universe seeming to be finite in the past. Ergo God created the universe to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens now: OMG Hard Problem of consciousness. Ergo God to explain away "the problem".
The supposed "Hard Problem of Consciousness" if it is a real problem is most likely just a gap in our knowledge just like the rest of "problems" were during our history on Earth.

[Mithrae]

For me is just another part of the same God of the Gaps phenomenon that seems to have plagued the Homo Sapiens Sapiens since its inception.

Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual in the Paleolithic era: OMG Hard Problem of Tress, Wind, Sun ergo God of Tress, Wind, Sun to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual in the Neolithic-Ancient Egypt era: OMG Hard Problem of apparent movement of the Sun across the sky ergo God of the Sun-RA to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens individual in the Medieval times: OMG Hard Problem of Earth seeming to be in the center of the Universe. We are special. Ergo God made Earth in the center of universe because we are special creations to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens in early 20th century: OMG Hard Problem The universe seeming to be finite in the past. Ergo God created the universe to explain away "the problem".
Homo Sapiens Sapiens now: OMG Hard Problem of consciousness. Ergo God to explain away "the problem".
The supposed "Hard Problem of Consciousness" if it is a real problem is most likely just a gap in our knowledge just like the rest of "problems" were during our history on Earth.

If we're taking a big-picture view like that, I trust you understand that we haven't yet found let alone validated a comprehensive alternative answer for any of those things? We've situated more specific events or phenomena within broader observed patterns of how our reality behaves, but calling those patterns "laws" of universal gravitation and the like obviously doesn't mean that the case is closed until we discover, if ever, why those patterns occur. Our ancestors knew that much of their behaviour was caused by their conscious choices, so they not-unreasonably inferred that the behaviour of animals and streams and planets and so on must be caused by the conscious choices of other beings; to drastically over-simplify, over time parsimony refined animism into polytheism into monotheism or pantheism, but the core idea remains the same and in some format remains the most viable model. Choice is the only causal process which we experience and engage in directly, without mediation by our senses; every other causal process is merely inferred by observing correlation between ostensible cause and effect and... what is it that they say about correlation again?

'God of the gaps' is a problematic style of thinking not because it's been proven wrong again and again, or because it in a general sense has been proven wrong ever for that matter (specific iterations and anthropomorphisms aside), but simply because it creates a tendency to shut down rather than pursuing further enquiry. What you are doing here seems to be very much the same kind of problematic, a materialist faith-based 'science of the gaps'; science will most assuredly explain it within your framework of materialism, so alternative models should simply be shut down as misguided and irrelevant.

All without attempting to address the actual argument or provide any kind of evidence to substantiate an alternative view. The problem of consciousness is not even the focus of my argument, it's just the nail in the coffin. The fact is that we have no legitimate grounds at all to posit the existence of nonconscious stuff to begin with, whereas the existence of conscious stuff is the most certain thing we can possibly know.