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Replying to The Tanager in post #272]
No, the concept of stealing relies on the concept of beings capable of ownership, intent, and social interaction. The reality of stealing relies on the reality of beings capable of such. This doesnt mean humans invented it, anymore than that computers invented their code.
I understand the distinction youre making between the concept of stealing and the reality of stealing. However, I think its difficult to argue that the reality of stealing can exist without the concept of it. Stealing, by definition, involves the idea of ownership and the moral judgment that taking something without permission is wrong. If the concept of ownership doesnt exist, then the act of taking something wouldnt be recognized as 'stealing'it would just be an action, not a moral violation.
This is where I think your computer analogy is a false analogy. Computers run on code that exists independently of their understanding of it, but stealing requires a shared human concept of ownership, intent, and moral judgment. These are human constructs that dont exist independently in the natural world in the way that code exists outside of a computer. Without that conceptual framework, the act of taking something wouldnt be recognized as 'stealing.' Computers dont need to 'know' about code to run it, but humans need to have a shared concept of ownership to define and recognize stealing.
Oxford Languages defines value judgment as assessing something as good or bad in terms of ones standards or priorities. If ones standard is an objective standard, then that value judgment would be objective.
I understand that if we assume a standard is objective, then a value judgment based on that standard could also be considered objective. However, the key question is whether such a truly objective moral standard exists. With scientific facts, like the speed of light or the force of gravity, we have empirical evidence that can be observed, measured, and tested in any context, and the facts remain the same regardless of who observes them.
In the case of morality, though, the standards themselves seem to be shaped by cultural, historical, and personal experiences. For instance, different societies have different standards regarding what constitutes 'good' or 'bad' behavior, and these standards often evolve over time. Without an external, universally agreed-upon standardlike we have in sciencemoral standards are often subjective and vary based on context.
If were to argue that theres an objective moral standard, we would need clear evidence of that standard existing independently of human interpretation. So far, I dont see how that kind of moral objectivity is demonstrated in the same way that scientific objectivity is.
Yes, moral objectivity is not physical objectivity. Why think physical objectivity is the only kind of objectivity? Why would morality need to be verifiable in the same way scientific facts are?
I understand your point that moral objectivity doesnt need to function like physical objectivity. However, the issue remains that we have yet to see a concrete example of objective morality that exists independently of human interpretation or cultural context. Without such an example, its difficult to fully assess your claim that moral objectivity operates differently.
Until we can clearly identify and demonstrate an objective moral principle, the argument for objective morality remains speculative. Could you provide an example of an objective moral principle that isnt shaped by subjective human experience?
Moral opinions arent necessarily the same thing as moral facts. While moral opinions are influenced by culture, experience, historical context, etc., so are scientific opinions like flat earth theory.
I understand the distinction youre making between moral opinions and moral facts, but the key issue remains: how do we establish what counts as a moral fact? While scientific facts can be empirically verified through observation and experimentation, the same doesnt hold true for moral judgments.
Even if we agree that certain actions, like stealing, can be observed, the moral evaluation ('stealing is wrong' or 'stealing is justified') depends on human judgment, cultural norms, and historical context. Unlike scientific facts, these value judgments are shaped by subjective experiences and lack the kind of empirical foundation that scientific facts have.
So, my question remains: how do we determine if a moral fact exists independently of human perception and cultural interpretation? What method would allow us to verify moral facts in the same way that scientific facts are verified?
Yes, that question is raised. Im suggesting the way to weigh it all out is just like any other inference to the best explanation. Take the data and evidence and use logical reasoning to assess it all.
I see what youre suggesting with the use of inference to the best explanation as a way to weigh the evidence for an objective purpose. I agree that this method can be useful for assessing complex questions by looking at the available data and using logical reasoning.
That said, Im curious about what specific data and evidence you think best points to an objective purpose for humans, and how you see that purpose shaping our understanding of morality. Since I view human purpose as something that emerges through subjective experiences, what evidence do you see that supports the idea of an objective human purpose that exists independently of those subjective factors?
Im not implying that your position/argument implies this, but the very definition of subjectivism necessarily implies it. This is what moral subjectivism is. If you think you can make an argument that negates this, then you dont understand moral subjectivism.
No, there is no middle ground. Something is either objective or subjective. If everyone just happened to share the same subjective morals, morality would still be subjective. Universal and objective are answers to two different kinds of questions.
Youve got to be able to defend your stance in every moral situation. If you cannot, then you are the one acting emotionally, rather than logically.
I understand the logical elements in your points, particularly about how moral subjectivism depends on individual perspectives and that morality is either objective or subjective in the technical sense. However, I think the use of certain fallacies weakens the overall argument:
In your critique of subjectivism, you seem to be misrepresenting my position by suggesting it would justify harmful acts like child abuse. While subjectivism recognizes that moral judgments are shaped by experience, this doesnt mean anything goes. Shared human values, like empathy, play a key role in guiding behavior.
While morality can be objectively or subjectively classified, presenting it as a binary choice between extreme opposites (objective morality or moral chaos) overlooks the possibility of shared values within subjective systems. This creates a false dilemma that simplifies the argument.
Using emotionally charged examples, like child abuse, risks shifting the conversation away from logical analysis of moral systems. Its important that we focus on logical reasoning across a range of moral situations, not just extreme cases.
Id like to continue this conversation by focusing on the broader principles of morality rather than narrowing it to extreme examples that dont fully capture the nuances of the discussion.
Then you are an objectivist, not a subjectivist. The next question is what makes it an objective truth.
Im still trying to understand how you define objective morality, especially in relation to shared human intuitions. Ive asked for a concrete example of objective morality several times, but so far, we havent explored a specific case that demonstrates this idea.
From my perspective, shared human intuitions reflect common experiences but are still shaped by subjective realities. Im not sure how these intuitions could point to objective morality, as Im unclear on what criteria make a moral principle objective. Could you provide an example of what you consider to be an objective moral truth so I can better understand your position?
This attempts to show us that the moral frameworks humans hold as their beliefs evolve over time. Just like our scientific frameworks evolve over time. It doesnt speak to whether there are moral truths or not.
The point I was making is precisely that moral frameworks evolve over time and dont function in the same way as scientific frameworks. Scientific facts are empirical and staticsuch as the chemical composition of waterwhile moral values shift with human consciousness, culture, and historical context.
So, while our understanding of morality changes, this doesnt mean there are universal moral truths in the same way there are scientific facts. The evolution of moral frameworks shows us that morality is shaped by human experience and isnt fixed or objective like scientific facts. Im still trying to understand how you differentiate between evolving moral frameworks and what you consider to be moral truths.
I think you are describing the evolution of our moral understanding, not moral laws themselves. (If morality is objective) our moral understanding can get closer to or farther away from the moral truth (that X is good or bad). The question of morality is not necessarily the same thing as our moral understanding, though.
It seems like youre assuming that objective moral laws exist outside of human experience without providing any evidence or examples of these laws. This is a form of begging the question, where the existence of objective moral laws is taken as a given without being demonstrated.
Youre arguing that our moral understanding can get closer to or farther away from these supposed moral truths, but Im still waiting to see an example of an objective moral law that isnt shaped by human experience or interpretation. Without such an example, there is no possibility afforded to evaluate the idea that these moral truths exist independently of our moral evolution.
Sure, but that question being moot (which your view leads to) and that question being wrong (which my view leads to) doesnt tell us which of our views is correct; its just a difference.
I understand that our views on morality may be different, but its important to recognize that Ive provided evidence and reasoning to support my position, whereas you have yet to provide an example or evidence for objective morality. Claiming that our views are simply 'just different' without engaging with the need for evidence creates a false equivalenceit suggests that both positions are equally valid without addressing the disparity in how theyve been supported.
Im still interested in understanding how you support the idea of objective morality beyond simply asserting that it exists. Without that evidence, its hard to treat both views as equally valid.
Its not imposed externally as a punishment in my view either.
Im glad we agree that harm and suffering are not externally imposed as punishment. However, I think theres an important distinction in how we understand GODs role in relation to suffering. My view isnt just about avoiding the idea of external punishment; its about how GOD, being omnipresent, experiences the world through us, sharing in our pain and suffering as part of the human experience.
This means that suffering isnt something GOD allows from an external, detached standpoint, but rather, its a part of the subjective, lived experience that GOD shares intimately with every individual. Im curious how you see this distinction in comparison to your view.
I think that when I try to hurt someone, that Im definitely not seeking their good. Im not doing it to help them (unless Im a dentist, or other such instances, but lets bracket those as different from what we are talking about here). Whereas our ability to be hurt, to comfort each other, the need it creates for us to work together and care for each other, etc. seems to be a good thing for us. This is what Hicks soul-making theodicy gets at.
I appreciate the way the soul-making theodicy frames suffering as part of moral growth, but the key distinction Im making goes beyond natural harm. Its about an external creator placing humans into a harmful world, where suffering is inevitable, whether from natural causes or from other humans.
If moral growth is part of this process, then both natural harm and human-caused harm should be seen as part of the same category of experience. Under this framework, humans are here to learn how not to intentionally harm others as part of the soul-growing process. The fact that we are placed in an environment where harm is inevitable suggests that moral growth comes from learning to overcome harm, whether its naturally occurring or inflicted by human actions.
This leads to the question of why, under an objective moral framework, human-caused harm is judged differently from natural harm. If both contribute to the same soul-growing process, why is intentional harm considered morally wrong, while harm from the world is part of a 'greater good'?
From my perspective, under a subjective GOD, theres no need for such justifications. GOD experiences with us, sharing in both our suffering and our growth. We are not following an external, prescriptive lawgiver; rather, moral growth is a shared experience where we learn, through our subjective interactions, how not to harm others intentionally.
This difference may mean something if one could show that scientific verification was the only kind or far superior to all others. I dont think that is the case. Scientific truth cant be far superior to philosophical truth because it rests on philosophical truths for it to be taken as truth. In science, all we can do is go with inferences to the best explanation. We do the same in philosophical matters (like morality).
I see your point that scientific truth rests on certain philosophical foundations, and I agree that we use inference to the best explanation in both science and philosophy. However, I think theres an important distinction between scientific verification and philosophical inference, especially when it comes to morality.
In science, we use empirical observation and experimentation to verify facts in a repeatable and observable way, regardless of who conducts the experiment. This gives scientific truth a level of reliability that is hard to match in philosophical matters.
In the case of objective morality, I feel the inference youre making rests on an assumption that objective moral truths exist, but Im still waiting to see an example of such a moral truth. Without a concrete example, it seems that objective morality is being treated as a given without providing the same kind of evidence or even an inferential argument that we apply in science. If were going to use inference to the best explanation here, there needs to be some support for the claim beyond just asserting that its true.
For humans to determine it, yes. Just like with scientific facts. Humans try to determine the scientific context itself, but that context isnt determined by humans to be what it is.
I see the analogy youre drawing between scientific facts and objective morality, but I think theres an important distinction. In the case of scientific facts, we have an established methodempirical observation and experimentationthat allows us to determine the context in a verifiable and objective way. Even though humans interpret data, the facts remain the same regardless of the observer.
However, with morality, the context seems less straightforward. If moral principles are said to adapt to context, and that context is not directly observable in the same empirical way as scientific facts, how do we ensure that the context is understood objectively and not through human interpretation? It feels like moral context is still subject to human experience, making it more difficult to pin down as purely objective.
Child abuse is wrong. Regardless of any human thinking otherwise. Regardless of any society that would try to make it okay. I think we recognize this deep down. I think it is a universal moral intuition we all have. All human societies are against child abuse. They may believe certain things about reality that lead to them actually abusing a child, but they dont think they are abusing the child. Not all cases are as clear, in my opinion.
But there is another way to recognize what morals are true. Its a longer road that involves many steps, involving arguments for Gods existence, arguments about Gods character, etc.
I understand your point about universal moral intuition (UMI), and I agree that many people share the intuition that child abuse is wrong. However, I think that a subjective GOD, working through each and every human experience, is a more than adequate explanation for why this intuition exists without needing to resort to an external, objective creator as the source.
In my view, a subjective GOD, who is real and active in relation to human experience, can explain why certain moral intuitions emerge as universal. These shared intuitions are shaped by the experiences and consciousness of individuals interacting with the world. At the same time, this view allows for the possibility of willful resistance or even natural inability to connect with these intuitionssomething that we observe in certain cases of moral disconnect.
I see this as part of the longer road you mentioned, involving discussions about God's existence and God's character. Even though this idea of a subjective GOD hasnt been traditionally sanctioned or seriously considered by some religious institutions, and has even been resisted throughout history, it offers a compelling framework for understanding moral intuition without the need for an external creator.
But without the creator doing that, Id come to a different conclusion?
Thats an interesting question. Its possible that without the creator's influence intertwined with our experiences, the moral intuitions we developlike the feeling of disgust toward child abusecould indeed be different, but its hard to say exactly how.
From my perspective, the creator doesnt impose an external set of rules but rather works through the complexity of our experiences as minds/souls/spirits. So, even if personal, cultural, and societal factors play a role, the creator is still part of that process, helping to guide the development of our shared moral intuitions. Without that guiding influence, those intuitions might not emerge in the same way, but its not just about the creator 'doing something' externally; its about the creators role in shaping the way we relate to the world through our lived experiences.
You just keep stating this is the case. Im asking for your support for that. I dont think it seems any more reasonable, especially if humans have free will.
I understand the role of free will in allowing individuals to resist or act against moral intuitions, and Ive been recognizing this idea in my perspective of subjective morality and a subjective GOD. From my viewpoint, free will allows each individual to choose whether to listen to and act upon the Universal Moral Intuition (UMI), even though that intuition is present.
However, I also think theres a challenge with how free will is typically understood. I think that we existed before this human experience, and by our own free will, we consented to take on the role of living this temporal life. We understood that we would forget about our prior existence and enter a subjective experience shaped by interactions, emotions, and societal influences.
This idea empowers individuals by shifting the focus inwardrecognizing that our power lies within our subjective reality. Rather than seeking authority or validation from external sourceswhether religious, political, or even an external GODwe can find strength in the choices we made before entering this life. This perspective fosters self-empowerment, allowing us to navigate our subjective experiences without reliance on external neediness.
That said, I think the variation we see in moral codes across cultures can be explained by this subjective framework, where individuals exercise free will in choosing whether to follow or resist the moral intuitions that arise. How do you see free will working within the context of objective morality, and do you think resistance to these intuitions could explain the variations we see in cultural moral codes?
Could you give some examples of this significant variation?
Ive already touched on examples of how moral beliefs vary, such as differing cultural practices regarding what is considered morally acceptable. Throughout history, societies have disagreed on issues like slavery, womens rights, or the death penalty, to name a few. What one culture may have considered morally acceptable at one point in timelike slaverywas later recognized by many as deeply immoral.
I think its important to point out that while Ive been providing examples of moral variability, I have yet to receive a concrete example from you of what constitutes an objective moral truth. Without such an example, its hard to evaluate the claim that objective morality exists.
Then I would say the creator does both.
I understand that youre suggesting the creator operates both subjectively, through human consciousness, and objectively, as an external lawgiver. If thats the case, Im interested in seeing an example where the creator has imposed an objective moral truth in a way that is universally recognized across cultures, independent of subjective human experience.
Ive been discussing how the creator can work through subjective experience, but I have yet to see a clear example of how the creator operates in an objective way that transcends individual or cultural perspectives. Could you provide an example where this objective influence is evident?
This seems like objective morality to me. Yes, taught in a different way than Christianity says, but still objective.
I see that you think my view sounds like objective morality, but I want to make sure were understanding each other clearly. When I talk about morality being influenced by the creator through subjective experiences, Im emphasizing that it evolves with culture, history, and individual perception. In this sense, morality is shaped by context rather than existing as a fixed, external law.
Could you clarify what you mean when you say this sounds like objective morality to you? I want to avoid any misunderstanding so that were talking about the same thing.
Its not about which way is more likely, but about which way is more valid. On subjectivism, neither is more valid than the other.
I think there might be some confusion here regarding how were using the term subjectivism. When I talk about Subjective Morality and a Subjective GOD, Im not suggesting that all moral directions or traits are equally valid or arbitrary. In my view, morality is shaped by human experience, consciousness, and the influence of a Broader sourcethe Subjective GODwho is actively involved in the process.
This differs from a more philosophical subjectivism, where morality is seen as entirely relative, with no guidance or influence from a Broader source. Im curious whether youre interpreting subjectivism in this more traditional sense, and if so, how that fits with your view of objective morality?
Exactly! They apply moral principles differently due to these things that influence their beliefs about fact. This is the societal development, but not necessarily a development of the morality (the moral principle) itself.
Even if a society were to reject that principle completely, this doesn't mean morality is evolving, but just human's like or dislike of it.
Given what youve said about societies applying moral principles differently based on cultural and social influences, Im curious how you see objective morality fitting into this. If objective morality isnt absolute, then why refer to it as objective? It seems like this would align more closely with relative or contextual morality, as its shaped by factors like societal beliefs about facts.
If the application of moral principles is so heavily influenced by context, how does the supposed objective nature of morality remain consistent? And how do you distinguish it from the other types of morality youve listed, like relative or subjective morality?
I completely agree. I had to bring that in because there was talk about morality being relative to circumstances as though that meant subjective morality. It doesn't.
I understand that you brought up relativism to clarify that morality being relative to circumstances doesnt necessarily imply subjective morality. However, I think there may be some conflation here between subjectivism and what Ive been saying about subjective morality and a subjective GOD.
In my view, subjective morality involves morality being shaped by human experiences, consciousness, and the influence of a subjective creator, not that morality is purely relative or arbitrary. To help clarify things further, could you provide a concrete example of what you mean by objective morality? Its hard to fully engage with the concept without a clear example to work from.
It seems that weve touched on objective morality several times without landing on a clear example or diving into the concept in detail. Perhaps I can take the initiative here and suggest something like The Ten Commandments as a potential example of what you might consider objective morality
If you agree, we can examine that in more detail and see how this might align with the concept of objective moralityor if theres another example that you feel better illustrates your position, Id be happy to explore that instead.
