Is faith a reliable path to reality?

[Angry Ukulele Girl]

Hi there!

This is my first post
This is according to Hebrews 11:1
How exactly can "confidence in what we hope for"
and an "assurance about what we do not see"
be a reliable path to reality?
For example,
Would it be advisable to approach my bank account balance in such a way?

Thanks!

[historia]

I retract nothing.

But you cannot logically assert that there is no historical evidence while also saying there is historical evidence. You have to retract one of those assertions!

You did something similar in your last reply, as well:

ZERO contemporaneous first hand accounts and ZERO contemporaneous accounts by any identified person.

But earlier you said:

The only account from an identifiable, contemporaneous source comes from a man who admits it was a mere "vision" that he recounts as fact only after being blind and unconscious for three days with neither food nor drink

So which is it? Are there "ZERO" such accounts, or is there one?

You keep making these sweeping assertions only to then contradict them, and then complain when I point this out. It's as if you expect your interlocutors to just instinctively know to ignore half of what you're saying to focus on your "real" argument. But perhaps the better course of action here is to, you know, just stop making sweeping, inaccurate assertions.

Also, the "identifiable, contemporaneous source," Paul, never says that his encounter with the risen Christ was a "mere vision," nor does he himself say under what circumstances Christ appeared to him. If we want to approach this historically, we have to do so critically, and not simply read later, third-hand accounts into an earlier, first-hand one.

There is NO competent historical evidence for the resurrection.

Historians don't talk about "competent" historical evidence, so it's not clear what you're trying to argue here.

If you include as 'historical evidence' 70 year old claims by conflicting anonymous sources, than yes there is that sort of 'evidence,'

First of all, our earliest account from Paul was written probably 20-30 years after Jesus' death. Mark is maybe 30-40 years. No need to exaggerate to 70.

Second, historical sources are often conflicting on certain details. That's generally an indication they haven't been coordinated.

Third, much of what we know about ancient history comes from authors writing many decades after the events they describe relaying historical information that they themselves didn't witness, and so are based on anonymous sources.

In other words: the gospels and Pauline epistles are, on all the points you find problematic, like other ancient sources. This is simply a function of the fact that writing and preserving (which would have involved extensively copying by hand) literary texts was extraordinarily expensive in the ancient world. For that reason, the relatively small number of ancient sources that survive to this day tend to be summaries of historical events rather than a bunch of first-hand accounts -- although some do exist, as we just saw.

but it is of the claim not the fact

My friend, all historical evidence -- which is to say, historical documents -- consists of nothing but claims. That is what an historical document is, a person claiming what happened in the past. This merely demonstrates that these sources are, after all, historical evidence.

Yes, there is historical evidence of a 'Jesus' character living around 30 CE. He may have emerged as a composite of several individuals or of several competing legends, stories, myths. I personally believe Jesus of Nazareth was a real person, an extraordinary person, and I like to believe that most of the parables and sermons and arguments and jokes attributed to him were in fact authored by him. But none of that is evidence of a resurrection or any other supernatural claim.

I also don't think the sayings of Jesus are evidence of the Resurrection. But the Resurrection accounts are.

Now, there's a perfectly defensible position you can take toward that evidence. You can simply conclude that it is not sufficient to overcome the extraordinarily low prior probability that a miracle occurred. And therefore the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead does not sufficiently exceed other, competing hypotheses in explaining the evidence. Thus we cannot say, on historical grounds, that that hypothesis is objectively "true" or been "proven."

(I don't think Realworldjack was saying it was, either, as the rest of his post that you snipped out of your original reply shows, so you might even find agreement there.)

Instead, you've done what a lot of atheist critics of Christianity do: you left the epistemological high ground to rush into the rhetorical valley to try and argue that there is something especially problematic about the historical sources here that would lead historians to just ignore or reject them completely. But since historians don't do that, as I already noted above, that's a losing argument.

Now you're caught fighting a rear-guard action trying to take pot shots at the evidence in order to defend your earlier argument, only to reveal that your criticism of the gospels and epistles are true of other ancient sources, as well -- which doesn't really help your (already unnecessary) argument. Just go back to the high ground.

[fredonly]

[Replying to fredonly in post #263]

When one does not know, and cannot say, "Well, we don't know.", but builds a "theory" on presumptions - believing upon probable evidence; assuming or taking for granted; belief upon incomplete proof, or evidence, that person, or such persons are not demonstrating rationality.
When we start off irrational, we cannot end rational, because our foundation is faulty.

You've just implied that theism is irrational, since all theistic arguments depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions.

But actually, I think you're overlooking abductive reasoning, which entails considering explanatory hypotheses to explain some body of facts and selecting the hypothesis that best explains those facts. I would grant that this is a weaker justification than deduction from uncontroversial facts, but this just means we need to qualify the conclusion. So we could compare various metaphysical systems for explanatory power, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness and make a valid selectoin, but should qualify that choice as being no more than the best explanation of available facts.

Regarding the appropriateness for this thread: any "path to reality" must be grounded in valid reasoning, and this includes faith - particularly the way you define it. So it fits.

My question is: can you rationally justify your belief in Chrstianity? Identifying the belief as "faith" doesn't fix weak reasoning.

The question was answered, and your last comment ignores what is actually said.

I guess you more or less said that you think you CAN rationally justify your belief, since I can't find a post of yours that provides the reasoning. Can you go ahead and provide your justification?

I'll turn my other statement into questions:
1) The way you define faith implies that if you have faith in X, then X is a justified belief. Is that correct?
2) The unique aspects of a belief that earns it the designation of "faith" doesn't appear to have any bearing on its use in justifying a belief in Christianity. Do you agree?

[TRANSPONDER]

Yes, it seems to come down to two things (or maybe two legs of the same pants) the validation of any theistic argument is flawed, whether Cosmic origins, Morality or indeed Bible veracity. Without that, the explanation is unknown.

"To the theist, a draw is a win". Specifically, 'My belief is as good as yours'. But logically, or rationally, at least, it isn't, because of the materialistic default.

All the explanations we know of do not require a god'. All of them. So any as yet unknown explanation had more likelihood of being natural (not ID) than having god behind it, and that is without even getting to which one.

The Theists case falls apart very quickly indeed..

[TRANSPONDER]

Yes, it seems to come down to two things (or maybe two legs of the same pants) the validation of any theistic argument is flawed, whether Cosmic origins, Morality or indeed Bible veracity. Without that, the explanation is unknown.

"To the theist, a draw is a win". Specifically, 'My belief is as good as yours'. But logically, or rationally, at least, it isn't, because of the materialistic default.

All the explanations we know of do not require a god'. All of them. So any as yet unknown explanation had more likelihood of being natural (not ID) than having god behind it, and that is without even getting to which one.

The Theists case falls apart very quickly indeed..

[John17_3]

[Replying to fredonly in post #272]

You've just implied that theism is irrational, since all theistic arguments depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions.

I don't see how you arrived at that conclusion, since I don't believe your question was a "trick" question.
Even if it was, I answered, not a trick question, but your question. Which was, "do you believe a person could rationally believe naturalism - the metaphysical theory?"
Naturalism does start with presumptions.

As for Theism, I don't know of any presumptions theism starts with. Can you give me one or two, please?

But actually, I think you're overlooking abductive reasoning, which entails considering explanatory hypotheses to explain some body of facts and selecting the hypothesis that best explains those facts. I would grant that this is a weaker justification than deduction from uncontroversial facts, but this just means we need to qualify the conclusion. So we could compare various metaphysical systems for explanatory power, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness and make a valid selectoin, but should qualify that choice as being no more than the best explanation of available facts.

I believe your mistaken conclusion above, led you to this mistaken conclusion.
Your first conclusion would have to be correct, to lead to any other conclusion being correct.

Regarding the appropriateness for this thread: any "path to reality" must be grounded in valid reasoning, and this includes faith - particularly the way you define it. So it fits.

Fits what, may I ask?

I guess you more or less said that you think you CAN rationally justify your belief, since I can't find a post of yours that provides the reasoning. Can you go ahead and provide your justification?

Please explain how belief applies here, since the subject is faith. Are you putting the two as one?
In the Bible, the disciple James wrote, at James 2:18-20:

• But someone will say, "You have faith, and I have works." Show me your faith without your works, and I will show you my faith by my works. You believe that there is one God. You do well. Even the demons believe - and tremble! But do you want to know, O foolish man, that faith without works is dead?

There is a distinction between faith and belief.

True. One who has faith has beliefs Hebrews 11:6, but surely, you can see why those beliefs are not faith.
Perhaps we need to be clear on this before we move on. I don't think we are clear as yet.

I'll turn my other statement into questions:
1) The way you define faith implies that if you have faith in X, then X is a justified belief. Is that correct?
2) The unique aspects of a belief that earns it the designation of "faith" doesn't appear to have any bearing on its use in justifying a belief in Christianity. Do you agree?

Answer for #1:
No. No to the faith you have in mind, and no, having faith in something does not make it correct.
The evidence for "things of a spiritual nature", and the substance (reality), or guarantee, of that thing, does justify ones belief in it.

Let me give an example.
If I have faith the sun will burn out, my faith does not justify that belief.
Actually, that is very wrongly stated, in my opinion.
I would say, that should be... If I believe the sun will burn out, my belief does not justify that belief.

You see, having a belief, is not faith. Perhaps in dictionaries today,
Today, faith is defined as belief, and some add, "without proof".

In the Bible, while in some contexts, faith may seem to be used to represent beliefs, faith varies in its application, and goes beyond belief, as I pointed out earlier.
You might read in the Bible, someone is asked, if they believe, and the person is commended for their faith, but the faith is not the mere belief. The faith is the substance - the proof or evidence, which the person has, and has simply demonstrated.
The woman who touched Jesus' garment and was healed, for example. Matthew 9:19-22
What led her to believe that she would be healed, is the evidence, which furnished a guarantee - the substance, or reality, of what she could not see.

Does this sound confusing to you? I understand.
I'm sorry, we cannot help that. "These things we also speak, not in words which mans wisdom teaches but which the Holy Spirit teaches, comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But the natural man does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; nor can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he who is spiritual judges all things, yet he himself is rightly judged by no one. For "who has known the mind of the Lord that he may instruct Him?" But we have the mind of Christ." 1 Corinthians 2:13-16

Answer for #2:
Based on what I have tried explaining above, question 2 would be rendered a loaded question. I'm sorry, but in scripture a belief does not earn it the designation of "faith".
If you do not yet understand, you'll have to wait until if you get the "sensus divinitatus".

[fredonly]

You've just implied that theism is irrational, since all theistic arguments depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions

I don't see how you arrived at that conclusion. As for Theism, I don't know of any presumptions theism starts withCan you give me one or two, please?

Ill give 5:
1. "why is there something rather than nothing" depends on the presumption that nothingness should be expected, by default, in the absence of a cause or explanation.
2. The argument from contingency assumes "necessity" is a de re property that some existent can have
3. Aquinas argument depends on his metaphysical theory (including a robust essentialism)
4. The Kalam Cosmological Argument assumes something can "begin to exist" even when there is no time at which it did not exist.
5. The argument for God based on objective moral values, depends on the assumption objective moral values exist transcendently

Naturalism does start with presumptions.

The form of naturalism I hold to starts only with the properly basic belief (PBB) that there is an actual, natural world external to ourself that we perceive in a functionally accurate way. A PBB is not an assumption, it is a warranted belief. Beyond that, I embrace new beliefs IFF they have adequate warrant. For example, provisional belief in accepted science is warranted, because its developed with a valid epistemological approach (abductive reasoning). As an example of non-scientific beliefs, I embrace the truthmaker theory of truth (a form of correspondence theory) because I judge it the best account of truth that Ive encountered (it addresses the fundamental issue of what truth means, has a demonstrated relation to reality, and is parsimonious). I judge supernaturalism to lack sufficient warrant, and Ive done my deontological duty to test that by examining every theistic argument Ive encountered and Im open to considering new ones if they are brought to my attention.

Regarding the appropriateness for this thread: any "path to reality" must be grounded in valid reasoning, and this includes faith - particularly the way you define it. So it fits.

Fits what, may I ask?

It fits the topic of this thread. You suggested I consider Forum Rule number 4 (Stay on the topic of debate. If a topic brings up another issue, start another thread.)

Please explain how belief applies here, since the subject is faith. Are you putting the two as one?

You said, "Faith goes beyond belief. It demonstrates belief." That sounds like an entailment: faith in x entails belief in x. Did I misunderstand? My questions pertained to this.

I'll turn my other statement into questions:
1) The way you define faith implies that if you have faith in X, then X is a justified belief. Is that correct?
2) The unique aspects of a belief that earns it the designation of "faith" doesn't appear to have any bearing on its use in justifying a belief in Christianity. Do you agree?

Answer for #1:
No. No to the faith you have in mind, and no, having faith in something does not make it correct.

The "faith I have in mind" is your definition of faith, and relating it to your claim that your Christian belief is justified. I was asking if I was correct in saying "if you have faith in X, then X is a justified beliief [of yours)".

You see, having a belief, is not faith.

Yes, I understood that, but it sounded like (for you) faith entails belief.

Answer for #2:[/b]
Based on what I have tried explaining above, question 2 would be rendered a loaded question. I'm sorry, but in scripture a belief does not earn it the designation of "faith".

I wasnt trying to trick you, I was trying to dig deeper into your definition of "faith" and how it relates to justifying ones Christian beliefs. As noted above, I inferred from your comments that faith entails belief, but its more than belief. The "more than" part seems entirely personal and seems to have no bearing on justifying the belief (important though it may be to you). I was testing this understanding by asking those 2 questions.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #276]

1. "why is there something rather than nothing" depends on the presumption that nothingness should be expected, by default, in the absence of a cause or explanation.

What are the alternative presumptions and do any of them assume the default position. If so, why?

If not, then one must accept that no default position has yet been discovered.

4. The Kalam Cosmological Argument assumes something can "begin to exist" even when there is no time at which it did not exist.

At the very least then, it can be said that regarding all the various theories/arguments "time" itself began to exist.

The material can be thought of as having always existed, (in sub-atomic state, for example) and there is the appearance that "something" happened which disturbed that state to the point of densifying matter into forms and bringing time into the equation.

That thing appears to have had a beginning, but the detailed cause is unknown except as a cause.
The idea such happened spontaneously seems less intuitive and contrary to the patterns of evidence we see in the object's/overall object (universe), which is why spontaneity as a theory sits in the same subset as causation theory - that of Unjustified Fact (UF) (aka "belief")

[fredonly]

[Replying to fredonly in post #276]

1. "why is there something rather than nothing" depends on the presumption that nothingness should be expected, by default, in the absence of a cause or explanation.

What are the alternative presumptions and do any of them assume the default position. If so, why?

If not, then one must accept that no default position has yet been discovered.

Agreed: no default assumption can be assumed. But this negates the argument.

4. The Kalam Cosmological Argument assumes something can "begin to exist" even when there is no time at which it did not exist.

At the very least then, it can be said that regarding all the various theories/arguments "time" itself began to exist.

Yes, that's entailed by a finite past.

The material can be thought of as having always existed, (in sub-atomic state, for example) and there is the appearance that "something" happened which disturbed that state to the point of densifying matter into forms and bringing time into the equation.

Do you agree that "always" means existing at all times? This is the only way it can be consistent with a finite past. An initial state is not the same thing as a static state, because static implies being unchanged over a period of time.

That thing appears to have had a beginning, but the detailed cause is unknown except as a cause.
The idea such happened spontaneously seems less intuitive and contrary to the patterns of evidence we see in the object's/overall object (universe), which is why spontaneity as a theory sits in the same subset as causation theory - that of Unjustified Fact (UF) (aka "belief")

Lots of unjustified assumptions here, and I'm not going to use your weird definition of "belief" as an "unjustified fact". A belief may or may not be justified. You should try to learn the standard epistemolgy terminology if you want to participate in discussions.

If the past is finite, then from our perspective - there is necessarily an initial state, and subsequent states followed. All we can possibly do is guess at its nature, and what accounts for time. We do know that time is not what intuition suggests it should be. Consider that time is relative to a reference frame. There is no reference frame between the universe (as a whole) and anything outside it. So from a hypothetical external viewpoint, the universe may be timeless. That's what the Page and Wootters phenomenon implies.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #278]

At the very least then, it can be said that regarding all the various theories/arguments "time" itself began to exist.

Yes, that's entailed by a finite past.

How so? "Finite" and "past" concepts are derived from the experience of time. If time began, why should we assume there must be a finite past which occurred prior to time beginning?

Do you agree that "always" means existing at all times?

I see no reason to agree with that.

"Always" is more to do with direction than with time.

Since time began from that state, only time has never always existed (as a state). The state itself can be thought of as having always existed, and can even be thought of as never-ending re direction.

We cannot even assume that the state completely changed in every direction throughout, into this one universe, or that this one universe is the result of a micro-portion of the overall state which developed into this universe and produced time re this universe.

An initial state is not the same thing as a static state, because static implies being unchanged over a period of time.

Implying anything re the state, to do with time before time began, would be unreasonable, yes.

Re that, "initial" also implies time, and we are discussing states which might have been, before the time of this universe's beginning.

The state could simply be described as "timeless", and "timeless could be agreed as the "default" state.

Sometimes I have also called it "inert". I would have to look into any reasoning that it moves rather than changes, if indeed we are to agree that any changes would signify a beginning of time.

That thing appears to have had a beginning, but the detailed cause is unknown except as a cause.
The idea such happened spontaneously seems less intuitive and contrary to the patterns of evidence we see in the object's/overall object (universe), which is why spontaneity as a theory sits in the same subset as causation theory - that of Unjustified Fact (UF) (aka "belief")

Lots of unjustified assumptions here

Critique if you can. Simply stating something is so, does not make it so or help in any constructive way toward reasonable rational discussion.

If the past is finite, then from our perspective...

The past is finite up to the point where time became. That is all we have to go on from our perspective.

...there is necessarily an initial state, and subsequent states followed.

I think the initial state can be reasonably referred to as "timeless" and all subsequent states as aspects of time and are are related to our perspective within it and what we do know/can ascertain about it within that experience of time which began this thing.

from a hypothetical external viewpoint, the universe may be timeless.

Assuming for the sake of argument this might be the case, we could imagine the universe in a glass container in a laboratory, and any consciousness walking it and viewing it as it currently is, may well observe no movement and think it is timeless.

However, we within it cannot pretend that it is timeless, since everything is moving around us constantly so we would have to say that any hypothetical viewpoint which thinks the universe is timeless, would be an incorrect assumption based upon a misleading point of view.

[fredonly]

[Replying to fredonly in post #278]

At the very least then, it can be said that regarding all the various theories/arguments "time" itself began to exist.

Yes, that's entailed by a finite past.

How so? "Finite" and "past" concepts are derived from the experience of time. If time began, why should we assume there must be a finite past which occurred prior to time beginning?

A finite past is an unstated premise of the Kalam. If the past is infinite, the argument is not sound. I'm showing that even if the past is finite, it depends on other debatable assumptions.

Do you agree that "always" means existing at all times?

I see no reason to agree with that.

Then your previous statement, "The material can be thought of as having always existed" is inapplicable to a finite past.

Since time began from that state, only time has never always existed (as a state). The state itself can be thought of as having always existed, and can even be thought of as never-ending re direction.

You just contradicted yourself. No state can have "always existed" if the past is finite, unless you use the definition you rejected.

We cannot even assume that the state completely changed in every direction throughout, into this one universe, or that this one universe is the result of a micro-portion of the overall state which developed into this universe and produced time re this universe.

Can we just agree that nothing should be assumed?

Re that, "initial" also implies time, and we are discussing states which might have been, before the time of this universe's beginning.

It's self-contradictory to speak of a "time before there was time".

The state could simply be described as "timeless", and "timeless could be agreed as the "default" state.

That could work, but it's making an assumption.

Critique if you can. Simply stating something is so, does not make it so or help in any constructive way toward reasonable rational discussion.

It would take too much work, and then you'd argue every point. Not worth it. I'm responding to enough other things that aren't so problematic.

Assuming for the sake of argument this might be the case, we could imagine the universe in a glass container in a laboratory, and any consciousness walking it and viewing it as it currently is, may well observe no movement and think it is timeless.

However, we within it cannot pretend that it is timeless, since everything is moving around us constantly so we would have to say that any hypothetical viewpoint which thinks the universe is timeless, would be an incorrect assumption based upon a misleading point of view.

This ignores special relativity: time is relative to a reference frame, and no reference frame is the correct one. The implication is that it is both temporal and timeless.