Can Atheists be Moral? Can the Religious?

[Purple Knight]

Question for Debate: Can Atheists be Moral? Can the religious be moral?

I've heard the idea that atheists can't be moral, because physically, we're all just selfish apes, protecting and increasing our genes, and without some supernatural addition to this formula, good is not possible. The ape mother protects her child because that increases her genes. This act, the idea goes, is not moral, but selfish. Any time a human helps another human, this idea would apply.

I've also heard that religious people can't really be moral because whatever they do that is supposedly moral, they don't do it for its own sake, but for the reward. I've even heard that religious people can't be moral because their morality is unthinking. Random total obedience is morally neutral at best, so, the idea goes, if you're just blindly trusting somebody, even a powerful entity, that's not really morality.

Both of these ideas frankly seem to hold water so I'm curious if anyone can be moral.

[The Tanager]

But it does make it fun. You decide what is and isn't fun for yourself. While Goodyear did design a ball with a specific nature and for a specific purpose, he doesn't get to decide what is and isn't fun for you.

My point was that I wouldn’t find playing a game of football with a sledgehammer fun; me thinking “this will be fun” doesn’t override the nature of the game, which would actually not be fun.

I can choose to do something different, but I don’t get to decide if it is good or harmful; that comes from the nature of the objects/events involved.

Harmfulness comes from the object, sure. But what's so different between "good" and "fun" that lead you to say "fun" is up to you, but "good" isn't?

My point here was that the nature of reality decides whether something is good or harmful, not my decisions about it. Something isn’t good simply because I decide to do it.

Because being optimal requires a goal. And free will agents has the ability to set goals, which in turn decides how optimal is to be measured.

Setting a goal doesn’t mean that goal will lead to what is optimal to you. Yes, you can optimally reach that goal, but being optimal compares one goal versus all the rest as to what is best. Atheism cannot objectively compare those goals against each other.

If atheism is true, ignoring consent is as 'moral' as choosing an ice cream flavor (i.e., not moral at all) because there is no "should" with specific ice cream flavors.

That's like saying liking vanilla is as "tasty" as liking a painting (i.e. not tasty at all) because there is no "tasty" with specific painting.

"Should" is to moral, as "tasty" is to ice-cream flavor, as "pretty" is to paintings. Morality is a measure for what one should do; food taste is measure for what is tasty; aesthetics is a measure for what is pretty. You wouldn't expect a "pretty" in food taste anymore than you would expect a "tasty" in judging paintings, right? But "tasty" and "pretty" are direct equivalents, correct? And if subjectivism is true, then you can add "should" to that list of equivalents.

That’s my point. ‘Tasty’ is saying “I like this flavor.” ‘Pretty’ is saying I like this painting. ‘Moral’ or ‘should’ (on atheism) is saying “I like this action”. Thus, ignoring consent is logically the same (in this way) as eating pistachio ice cream.

But that’s not what people mean when they use the term ‘should’. They are conveying that not only do "I like X" but that you should do X. They don't do the same with pretty and tasty.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #19]

Us existing within a creation is a different thing than us thinking that we exist within a creation. You said theism encompassed “those who think we exist within a created thing”. It doesn’t. Theism is that we exist within a created being no matter what we think about that (according to all accepted definitions of theism).

Let's unpack that.

We may be able to agree that.
"Us existing within a creation" means that we don't have to acknowledge this is the case, (we actually exist within a created thing), because whether we agree we are or not, makes no difference to any (apparently unverifiable) fact that we actually do.
Further to that, theism acknowledges that we do exist in a created thing and that it actually is a fact that the universe is a created thing.

Further to that, this means that any human personality which does not know this fact, is a non-theist. (Sometimes referred to - and perhaps confused with being?) an atheist.

This is why you also wrote "is a different thing than us thinking that we exist within a creation" emphasising the difference.

a)We exist within a creation therefore theism acknowledges we exist with a creation.
b)We don't know that we exist within a creation, therefore we don't think we exist within a creation, is non-theism (aka "atheism".)

Am I understanding your position/argument re this? There is no "type of theism which also denies that we exist within a creation".
If so, we can agree that all theism/theists accept that we exist within a creation thing (a "creation").

It is not about lacking belief in creator(s) which (for reasons yet to be explained) mean that a planet of atheists would be without guiding morals. They still have morals which guide them, even if they don't acknowledge any particular (idea of a) creator(s).

I agree with you on that point.

Understood.

Here you appear to be arguing that nature does indeed mirror its creator(s). You also appear to be placing the nature of said creator to be the only or primary determining factor (as to why you think morality exists) and that, because of the nature of the universe, this creator has to make moral agents.

I am not sure if I am arguing what you mean by nature mirroring its creator.

Okay...are you not agreeing that the universe exhibits the nature of its creator?

I do place the nature of the creator as the only determining factor on whether morality is objective or not.

So then the nature of the creator IS a determining factor for you re morality. I was under the previous impression you said it was not something you were factoring into your argument re morality being objective. ("Objective Morality" as you refer to it.)

I’m definitely not arguing that the creator has to make moral agents because of the nature of the universe.

Assuming the universe exhibits the nature of its creator, and the nature of the universe is that it requires no moral agents, why then is it argued that moral agents are required and thus created?

Even so, how am I to tell that atheists are exempt from being identified as "moral agents" the creator(s) has had to make?

I am not saying atheists are exempt from being identified as moral agents.

Specifically, what creates moral agents? I think you are arguing that the creator of this universe does so.(?)
If that is the case, and atheists are not exempt from being identified as moral agents, are you arguing that the creator creates atheist moral agents. If not, what then creates atheist moral agents?

You also appear to be saying that the "not everyone follows or supports them" are atheists/the product of atheism.

No, I’m not saying that. Theists are not morally perfect.

(Let's not muddy the waters by introducing concepts requiring perfection.)
If theists and atheists are not being proper moral agents, (not exhibiting the necessary requirements of the creator which show proper behaviour) why name them either "atheists" or "theists" since niether position is exhibiting that which is useful moral agency. If they are not being proper moral agents, it appears not to be because of what they name themselves/are named by others.

What type of world do you think we would build should it were the case that we all were atheists? An immoral one?

It could be any manner of world. It would certainly contain immoralities, just like if we were all theists.

Would you agree then, that this only strengthens the idea that naming such "theism/theist's atheism/atheists" has no actual bearing/makes no noticeable difference on the matter of what type of world we should build?

I still am none the wiser as to what it is you are arguing, but it appears to me that you are saying 1. We exist within a creation.
2. The nature of the creator is both beside the point and relative to the point.
3. The nature of the creation shows us that "shoulds" have necessarily been put into place.
4. Shoulds are exhibited by both theists and atheists regardless of whether the atheists are motivated by different world-views/rule sets.
5.Theists (in recognising a creator mind re the creation) can be classed as "moral agents" useful to the creator(s).
6.Atheists (in failure to recognise a creator mind re existing within a creation) are not "moral agents" useful to the creator(s).

Yes, you aren’t understanding all I’m arguing. I agree with 1, I disagree with 2, I disagree with 3 because I don’t think they were necessarily put into place, I think I agree with 4, although the atheists are being logically inconsistent with their worldview, for 5/6 I think theists and atheists are both equally classed as moral agents (i.e., beings who can make moral choices, not in contrast to being an immoral agent)

I will unpack that later. I have a busy weekend.

(As usual I find interacting with you to be fruitful, even that we have not reached a place of "being on the same page" in all the many times we have been interacting.)

Cheers Tanager.

[Purple Knight]

I agree. I didn’t mean to sound like I was saying any harm is bad; I was meaning it in an overall balance kind of sense. But the value judgments are either subjective or objectively right/wrong. What I don’t get is the disconnect between people who say they believe morality is subjective, but act like it is objective. I understand someone liking free speech, like they like chocolate ice cream, but then they condemn governments that don’t allow free speech and don’t condemn people who like pistachio ice cream. It makes emotional sense, but not rational sense to me.

There is a disconnect there, you're right. It results, I think, from the necessity to pretend that morality is objective to get the subjective benefit.

Let's say I'm a supervillain and I take over the world. First thing I do is give people the right to live under policies they like. So I might, for example, split the US up into two countries because conservatism and liberalism are foundationally different. What I don't want is people from one side coming into the other side and saying, "My morality is just as good so don't mess with me as I break your laws." So even though I'm just doing pragmatism, to get that practical benefit, I want people to think their way is objective morality. Then, they can feel they are in the right when they tell people to stay on their own darn side.

Why does having free will allow us to decide what is our optimal? If a car was given free will, why would that decide what is optimal for the car rather than how it was made and what it was made to do? Why would free will give the car the ability to decide its optimal involves pouring orange juice into the gas tank? It’s optimal is still decided by its design (nature and purpose), not it’s own will. Having a free will allows it to go against its design and face the natural consequences, but not decide what is best for it.

I would tend to agree that pouring orange juice in the gas tank is bad for even the sentient car. There may be one optimal as far as fuel. But there will no longer be one optimal as far as route. He may now decide he likes seeing a certain landscape or even another car. Or he may want to avoid a particular car that makes him upset. Using 2% more gas and giving him the psychological benefit and making him happy is now on the table, and it's not wrong. He can now decide for himself whether each of these benefits is worth the extra fuel.

In pursuit of a currently perceived greater benefit, perhaps, but that doesn’t mean it’s actually a greater benefit or that you will end up liking your choice. The car may think it wants to sit in a field, but it’s not going to truly be happy because it was made for something else. If that is part of its nature, it’s going to be a desire unfulfilled and will eventually rear itself in frustration.

Then maybe he sits in a field and finds that out. Or maybe he thinks that some other car's life is worth more than his, and he deliberately decides to be used for parts. With free will comes value judgment. We can make our own. Sometimes, because we're not perfect, we may misjudge our own carnal happiness - what it will be in response to this or that stimulus. But because we're sentient beings, sometimes it isn't even about carnal happiness and it's pure value judgment. It's possible that he misjudges here too, maybe he thinks the other car is exceptionally moral and virtuous when it isn't, but the potential misjudgment is just a red herring because it's totally separate from making our own value judgments. Sometimes we will misjudge, but sometimes we won't. And sometimes, the apparently more righteous being is just lying. My parents told me getting in fights wouldn't make me happy. They lied. If I'm defending someone I don't see as being in the wrong, then it does.

They made me for the purpose of getting beat to a pulp or watching others being beat to a pulp, and "being the bigger person" (arguably so did God) but that doesn't make me happy. I had to do it to find that out. And even then, if I decide God's values are worth more, I can sacrifice my happiness and follow them. This is a case where I probably should. I should also avoid murdering people even if it does make me happy. See: I value something more. But that's up to me. And it doesn't mean I don't know my own valuations just because I'm capable of misjudging how much carnal happiness a stimulus will bring me before I experience it.

Let me make sure I’m understanding you. Why do you hate being told X is selfish and will end up leading to frustration and not the happiness you really want? Or did you mean something else?

It does lead to frustration. And I've tried changing my behaviour but the castigation never stops, so the frustration never stops. Being happy, for me, involves not putting value on other people's value judgments when they're just going to call me selfish no matter what I do. Yes, every bite of food I take could go to a starving child in Africa who needs it more. Every resource I consume is better spent on someone else. What can I do about it but die? And if I do kill myself so there is more for others, I doubt that will make me happy, since experience leads me to estimate that all people will say is, "Why couldn't he have done that sooner?" Since I universalise and don't get upset when others are selfish, my value judgment is that despite being a loathsome piece of trash, it's okay for me to live too. I decided this for myself. It makes me happy. The idea that others deserve to live and I don't, does not make me happy, so I don't put value on it.

Objective morality allows for differences like becoming an artist or an athlete or a caregiver, etc. It just says that, for example, murdering this person for money may seem like it will bring you joy and feel like that for a moment or two, but that you would have had more or deeper joy if you didn’t make that choice whether you are an artist, athlete, or caregiver.

Then why doesn't objective morality allow for differences in policy? Someone might like free speech. Someone else might value his own free speech less than he values the harm he might suffer being insulted. In cases like these why can't the two sides just live where the law is different and not bother one another?

[The Tanager]

a)We exist within a creation therefore theism acknowledges we exist with a creation.
b)We don't know that we exist within a creation, therefore we don't think we exist within a creation, is non-theism (aka "atheism".)

Am I understanding your position/argument re this? There is no "type of theism which also denies that we exist within a creation".
If so, we can agree that all theism/theists accept that we exist within a creation thing (a "creation").

Basically; I was just making a technical distinction between theism and being a theist (and between atheism and being an atheist) that wasn't clear in how I understood your phrasing. Theism is the claim that we exist within a creation. A theist is one who believes that claim is true.

Okay...are you not agreeing that the universe exhibits the nature of its creator?

I believe that the universe exhibits certain aspects of that nature (intelligibility, order, some exhibit rationality and morality), if that is what you mean.

So then the nature of the creator IS a determining factor for you re morality. I was under the previous impression you said it was not something you were factoring into your argument re morality being objective. ("Objective Morality" as you refer to it.)

Maybe we aren’t on the same page as what “the nature of” refers to? I am saying that God’s nature, who God is, determines what kind of world God creates, nothing outside of that. God decides to create and the way He creates comes from who He is.

Assuming the universe exhibits the nature of its creator, and the nature of the universe is that it requires no moral agents, why then is it argued that moral agents are required and thus created?

I’m NOT arguing that moral agents are required. I believe God made a choice to make moral agents, but didn’t have to.

Specifically, what creates moral agents? I think you are arguing that the creator of this universe does so.(?)

Yes.

If that is the case, and atheists are not exempt from being identified as moral agents, are you arguing that the creator creates atheist moral agents. If not, what then creates atheist moral agents?

God creates moral agents. Moral agents have free will and so can choose to be theists or atheists.

If theists and atheists are not being proper moral agents, (not exhibiting the necessary requirements of the creator which show proper behaviour) why name them either "atheists" or "theists" since niether position is exhibiting that which is useful moral agency. If they are not being proper moral agents, it appears not to be because of what they name themselves/are named by others.

Correct, but these are two different issues. We name them atheists if they don’t believe in a god; we name them theists if they believe in a god; not because of their moral choices (although their moral choices will be affected by other beliefs including whether they are theist or atheist).

Would you agree then, that this only strengthens the idea that naming such "theism/theist's atheism/atheists" has no actual bearing/makes no noticeable difference on the matter of what type of world we should build?

The theism/atheism question definitely makes a difference on what type of world we should build. The theist/atheist question does not.

(As usual I find interacting with you to be fruitful, even that we have not reached a place of "being on the same page" in all the many times we have been interacting.)

Cheers Tanager.

The same to you.

[The Tanager]

There is a disconnect there, you're right. It results, I think, from the necessity to pretend that morality is objective to get the subjective benefit.

That makes sense.

I would tend to agree that pouring orange juice in the gas tank is bad for even the sentient car. There may be one optimal as far as fuel. But there will no longer be one optimal as far as route. He may now decide he likes seeing a certain landscape or even another car. Or he may want to avoid a particular car that makes him upset. Using 2% more gas and giving him the psychological benefit and making him happy is now on the table, and it's not wrong. He can now decide for himself whether each of these benefits is worth the extra fuel.

I agree. I think objective morality is one piece of what is optimal for us. We don’t have to take one route in life, but if we run over a squirrel during our route when we could have avoided it, we have driven that route in a less than optimal way.

Then maybe he sits in a field and finds that out. Or maybe he thinks that some other car's life is worth more than his, and he deliberately decides to be used for parts. With free will comes value judgment. We can make our own. Sometimes, because we're not perfect, we may misjudge our own carnal happiness - what it will be in response to this or that stimulus. But because we're sentient beings, sometimes it isn't even about carnal happiness and it's pure value judgment. It's possible that he misjudges here too, maybe he thinks the other car is exceptionally moral and virtuous when it isn't, but the potential misjudgment is just a red herring because it's totally separate from making our own value judgments. Sometimes we will misjudge, but sometimes we won't. And sometimes, the apparently more righteous being is just lying. My parents told me getting in fights wouldn't make me happy. They lied. If I'm defending someone I don't see as being in the wrong, then it does.

They made me for the purpose of getting beat to a pulp or watching others being beat to a pulp, and "being the bigger person" (arguably so did God) but that doesn't make me happy. I had to do it to find that out. And even then, if I decide God's values are worth more, I can sacrifice my happiness and follow them. This is a case where I probably should. I should also avoid murdering people even if it does make me happy. See: I value something more. But that's up to me. And it doesn't mean I don't know my own valuations just because I'm capable of misjudging how much carnal happiness a stimulus will bring me before I experience it.

I completely agree. It’s free will, a glorious gift. I would choose that and getting it wrong sometimes over programmed moral perfection any day because that wouldn’t be free and we’d lose not only the happiness of being free, but any ability to truly love (which I see as freely willing the good of another). But omniscience will never misjudge and omniscience (if Juedo-Christian theism is correct) would know what is moral and what is immoral in every situation.

It does lead to frustration. And I've tried changing my behaviour but the castigation never stops, so the frustration never stops. Being happy, for me, involves not putting value on other people's value judgments when they're just going to call me selfish no matter what I do. Yes, every bite of food I take could go to a starving child in Africa who needs it more. Every resource I consume is better spent on someone else. What can I do about it but die? And if I do kill myself so there is more for others, I doubt that will make me happy, since experience leads me to estimate that all people will say is, "Why couldn't he have done that sooner?" Since I universalise and don't get upset when others are selfish, my value judgment is that despite being a loathsome piece of trash, it's okay for me to live too. I decided this for myself. It makes me happy. The idea that others deserve to live and I don't, does not make me happy, so I don't put value on it.

So, even if omniscience told you, X would make you the most happy (at least in the long run), you’d be frustrated that you were told that and could now reach your highest level of happiness?

Then why doesn't objective morality allow for differences in policy? Someone might like free speech. Someone else might value his own free speech less than he values the harm he might suffer being insulted. In cases like these why can't the two sides just live where the law is different and not bother one another?

Why can’t that happen with objective morality?

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #24]

Theism is the claim that we exist within a creation. A theist is one who believes that claim is true.

Therefore, a theist believes that we exist within a creation.

I am not sure if I am arguing what you mean by nature mirroring its creator.

Okay...are you not agreeing that the universe exhibits the nature of its creator?

I believe that the universe exhibits certain aspects of that nature (intelligibility, order, some exhibit rationality and morality), if that is what you mean.

Why only "Certain aspects" and what do you believe those aspects are?
Specific to the "mirroring" I am referring to the universe displaying the attributes, motivations, attitudes et al of its creator.

As an example, assuming the earth is a mindful entity, we can ascertain from that assumption, how the mind of the earth thinks, based upon what we observe in what it creates and how it creates. How the earth thinks is mirrored in/through what it creates.

So then the nature of the creator IS a determining factor for you re morality. I was under the previous impression you said it was not something you were factoring into your argument re morality being objective. ("Objective Morality" as you refer to it.)

Maybe we aren’t on the same page as what “the nature of” refers to? I am saying that God’s nature, who God is, determines what kind of world God creates, nothing outside of that. God decides to create and the way He creates comes from who He is.

Yes, that is what I am meaning. One can ascertain the overall attitude et al of the creator based upon what the creator creates.

Assuming the universe exhibits the nature of its creator, and the nature of the universe is that it requires no moral agents, why then is it argued that moral agents are required and thus created?

I’m NOT arguing that moral agents are required. I believe God made a choice to make moral agents, but didn’t have to.

If there was no reason/requirement for God to make moral agents, why argue God had a choice to make at all?

If you have no reason to make a choice about something/anything, then why would you make a choice about that something/anything? It makes no sense to do so if one doesn't have to .

If that is the case, and atheists are not exempt from being identified as moral agents, are you arguing that the creator creates atheist moral agents. If not, what then creates atheist moral agents?

God creates moral agents. Moral agents have free will and so can choose to be theists or atheists.

What has moral agency got to do with choosing to be theist or atheist?

Going back to the idea of the earth being a mindful entity...if the earth has it that an animal can get stuck in the mud and suffer a prolonged and agonising death, and also creates humans with free will and these humans decide that they will help the poor animal by freeing it from its (otherwise) sure-slow-death situation, by choosing to do so are those humans exhibiting morality/being moral agents?

If they are, then why should it matter/what evidence is there that the humans first have to be "theists" or "atheists" before they can exhibit such behaviour?

If theists and atheists are not being proper moral agents, (not exhibiting the necessary requirements of the creator which show proper behaviour) why name them either "atheists" or "theists" since niether position is exhibiting that which is useful moral agency. If they are not being proper moral agents, it appears not to be because of what they name themselves/are named by others.

Correct, but these are two different issues.

Then expand on that statement...

We name them atheists if they don’t believe in a god; we name them theists if they believe in a god; not because of their moral choices (although their moral choices will be affected by other beliefs including whether they are theist or atheist).

Believing in a god is different from believing we exist within a creation.

The most obvious difference is that there is one creation (the universe) but many ideas of god/the nature of the creator.

(I have even seen it argued by atheists, that in theory, they can believe they exist within a creation without having to believe in any particular god which created it. It may well be that they can, although I have not seen any argument from atheists as to why that could be the case.)

Would you agree then, that this only strengthens the idea that naming such "theism/theist's atheism/atheists" has no actual bearing/makes no noticeable difference on the matter of what type of world we should build?

The theism/atheism question definitely makes a difference on what type of world we should build. The theist/atheist question does not.

You will also have to expand on that statement...

[Bust Nak]

My point was that I wouldn’t find playing a game of football with a sledgehammer fun; me thinking “this will be fun” doesn’t override the nature of the game, which would actually not be fun.

That too is up for you to decide, it's fine to change your mind after trying it with sledgehammer, it's not built into the game.

My point here was that the nature of reality decides whether something is good or harmful, not my decisions about it. Something isn’t good simply because I decide to do it.

But something is fun simply because you decide that it is, so what's so different between fun and good?

Setting a goal doesn’t mean that goal will lead to what is optimal to you. Yes, you can optimally reach that goal, but being optimal compares one goal versus all the rest as to what is best. Atheism cannot objectively compare those goals against each other.

Sure, that's because there is no way what-so-ever to objectively compare goals against each other, not under atheism, not under theism, because goals are chosen by preference.

That’s my point. ‘Tasty’ is saying “I like this flavor.” ‘Pretty’ is saying I like this painting. ‘Moral’ or ‘should’ (on atheism) is saying “I like this action”. Thus, ignoring consent is logically the same (in this way) as eating pistachio ice cream.

Close, "you should to X" is saying "I like it when you do X." Liking it when you do X, is logically the same as liking pistachio ice cream.

[The Tanager]

Why only "Certain aspects" and what do you believe those aspects are?
Specific to the "mirroring" I am referring to the universe displaying the attributes, motivations, attitudes et al of its creator.

I don’t think bits of creation are omniscient, omnipresent for instance. I think it’s obvious that aspects display conflicting motivations, attitudes with each other (the rapist and the ones who hate rape, for instance) and, therefore, could not logically be the motivation or attitude of the Creator. That this happens mean that it was set up with that possibility, due to free will, for instance.

As an example, assuming the earth is a mindful entity, we can ascertain from that assumption, how the mind of the earth thinks, based upon what we observe in what it creates and how it creates. How the earth thinks is mirrored in/through what it creates.

I see no reason to believe the earth is a mindful entity but even then, it could still give freedom to some of its creations which would mean that we can’t necessarily draw a conclusion about it just from observing its creations’ actions. There could be some similarities but not everything is a mirror.

If there was no reason/requirement for God to make moral agents, why argue God had a choice to make at all?

If there was no reason/requirement for God to make moral agents, why argue God had a choice to make at all?

Reason and requirement aren’t synonyms. There is a reason to and reasons not to. God faced that choice (and wasn’t required to choose a certain way) and decided to create moral agents and non-moral agents (not immoral, but non-moral, like trees, dogs, etc.)

What has moral agency got to do with choosing to be theist or atheist?

I didn’t say it did. I connected their freedom with being able to choose to be a theist or atheist.

Going back to the idea of the earth being a mindful entity...if the earth has it that an animal can get stuck in the mud and suffer a prolonged and agonising death, and also creates humans with free will and these humans decide that they will help the poor animal by freeing it from its (otherwise) sure-slow-death situation, by choosing to do so are those humans exhibiting morality/being moral agents?

If they decide to help instead of just instinctually are determined to help, then, yes, they are exhibiting their moral agency.

If they are, then why should it matter/what evidence is there that the humans first have to be "theists" or "atheists" before they can exhibit such behaviour?

I didn’t claim their belief about theism/atheism has to come first.

Believing in a god is different from believing we exist within a creation.

The most obvious difference is that there is one creation (the universe) but many ideas of god/the nature of the creator.

(I have even seen it argued by atheists, that in theory, they can believe they exist within a creation without having to believe in any particular god which created it. It may well be that they can, although I have not seen any argument from atheists as to why that could be the case.)

I think believing in a specific god is different from believing that we exist within a creation based on how I thought you were defining creation as necessarily the result of a mind(s).

The theism/atheism question definitely makes a difference on what type of world we should build. The theist/atheist question does not.

You will also have to expand on that statement...

If theism is true and God loves us, then He made us in specific ways with specific purpose(s) and to reach our full happiness we should build a world that follows that pattern. If atheism is true, anything we want goes in the sense that it is equally our “purpose” as anything else others want. The Nazi desires are no better or worse than our own.

Whether one is a theist or an atheist doesn’t change the above, no matter which one is true.

[The Tanager]

That too is up for you to decide, it's fine to change your mind after trying it with sledgehammer, it's not built into the game.

What is up for me to decide? What game I want to play or whether I find certain actions fun or not?

But something is fun simply because you decide that it is, so what's so different between fun and good?

No, I don’t just decide what is fun to me and what isn’t.

Sure, that's because there is no way what-so-ever to objectively compare goals against each other, not under atheism, not under theism, because goals are chosen by preference.

No, under certain forms of theism there is an objective way to compare. It’s based on our given nature, which may include something like moral agency.

Close, "you should to X" is saying "I like it when you do X." Liking it when you do X, is logically the same as liking pistachio ice cream.

So you are saying that morality (moral shoulds) is different from your personal tastes in that moral situation?

[Bust Nak]

What is up for me to decide? What game I want to play or whether I find certain actions fun or not?

I was referring to what you find fun or not, but you also get to decide what game you want to play, this much isn't relevant to my point.

No, I don’t just decide what is fun to me and what isn’t.

You don't just decide that? Sounds like you accept that you do decide what is fun to you and what isn’t.

No, under certain forms of theism there is an objective way to compare. It’s based on our given nature, which may include something like moral agency.

How do you go from this purpose/goal matches the the given nature the best, to this is objectively the best purpose/goal? I am guessing it would require some sort of premise along the lines of "given purpose is objectively the best." If so, then why can't an atheist appeal to something like "self-assigned purpose is objectively the best" to ground objective morality under atheism?

So you are saying that morality (moral shoulds) is different from your personal tastes in that moral situation?

I think so, if I understand you correctly... To be clear, here is an example: I am saying "you shouldn't be lazy" is the same as "I don't like it when you are lazy," yet I like being lazy.