How do we know what is right, and what is wrong?

[Compassionist]

How do we know what is right, and what is wrong? For example, I think it is wrong to be a herbivore or a carnivore or an omnivore, or a parasite. I think all living things should be autotrophs. I think only autotrophs are good and the rest are evil. However, I am not certain that my thoughts are right. Can herbivores, carnivores, omnivores, and parasites become autotrophs at will? If so, why don't they? If they can't become autotrophs at will, is it really their fault that they are not autotrophs?

[boatsnguitars]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #569]

Just how this relates to the OP.

It relates to the idea that there is such a thing as objective morality. Morality appears to be a subjective thing and what we believe to be right or wrong is different from what we know to be right or wrong, but both belief and knowledge are things only related to consciousness, so if consciousness is perfectly subjective, anything which derives from consciousness is also subjective.

I don't see the problem saying that "it is true that you objectively exist"

Can you explain what you mean by using the word "you" to describe me.
If - as a materialist, you think of the mind (any mind) as being an hallucination of the brain, - or a "mirage" as you are arguing in the other thread - you can say that - like a mirage, that from your subjective perspective, I am an objective thing, yet you have no way in which to see yourself as an objective thing without being subjective, so why are you thinking that I am an objective thing?

I don't know why I'd have to question whether you, as an individual, exist when it seems obvious you do.

My argument is not that I don't exist. My argument is that I exist as a perfectly subjective mind, having a perfectly subjective experience, which is why I am also arguing that - to my knowledge - there is no such thing as an objective moral, while also being open to being shown such a thing.

Do morals exist objectively or are they simply subjective inventions of subjective minds?

Even if we accept for arguments sake, that knowing and believing are the same thing, we are still left with the truth that the knowledge/belief is perfectly subjective.

So it is not about what is being experienced as "real" but how we each subjectively view what is real, and whether that view is true, and how that shapes us as individuals.

The answer to the OP question might be that "how" we know/believe what is right and wrong is through subjective choosing what we want to about what is right and wrong and there is no objective way in which to test the truth as to whether that knowing/belief is actually right or wrong.

I suppose that is why we mirror off others. I might say something which causes emotional hurt to someone else and the person lets me know and I have choices as to how I will respond to that. The choices is still perfectly subjective as are the actions involved with the choices.
From the others perspective, my actions based upon my choices appear to be objective, but they are not from my own perspective, so it may be the better thing to understand that it is subjectivity driving the whole thing, and doing so through objects.

Yeah, i just don't think this conversation is fruitful. It's not that you're necessarily wrong - or right - it's just that I don't see the purpose.

I'm not disagreeing that morals appear to be subjective at times, it's just the reasoning you add seems irrelevant, perhaps? I can't put my finger on it.

For example, you say "My argument is that I exist as a perfectly subjective mind, having a perfectly subjective experience, which is why I am also arguing that - to my knowledge - there is no such thing as an objective moral, while also being open to being shown such a thing."

You phrased it as "this, ergo, that". And, I wouldn't say you have a "perfectly subjective experience" since you seem to experience gravity along with the rest of us, need to breathe, need to eat, had parents, etc.

You seem to have an awful lot in common with your fellow human; have an awful lot that is objectively true: you exist on planet Earth, part of a social species, etc... I don't think I need to list them all.

But, for example, if you are wondering if - subjectively - arsenic would kill you - I'd stop wondering. It's not a subjective truth that it will. It's an objective truth that it will and it's directly related to your existence. Same with jumping from a high building, or diving in a rickety submarine.

But, yes, in terms of the things unique to you, they are unique to you.

However, it appears the reason some moral values seem more 'objective' than other is because we all share in certain experiences. "Killing babies for fun" is often used as a good example of a pretty "objective" moral value. I can't think of a subjective experience that would lead them to think it's a good thing - maybe that's my lack of creativity?

It appears to me, "Killing babies for Fun" can only be Good under Theism - since if God deemed it so, it is so.

[William]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #571]

I wouldn't say you have a "perfectly subjective experience" since you seem to experience gravity along with the rest of us, need to breathe, need to eat, had parents, etc.

This is true, and like all others, I experience all those things subjectively. Perfectly subjectively. The very word "experience" is descriptive of a subjective outlook. Just because humans all experience effects which come from outside of our direct control and influence does not mean each and every one of us are not having a perfectly subjective experience.

The thing is, unlike gravity or the need to eat, or dress for weather, breathing or having fore-parents et al, knowing right and wrong as identifiable objects outside of us isn't as easily objectified. That is likely why examples cannot be given.

"Killing babies for fun" is often used as a good example of a pretty "objective" moral value.

Perhaps in your experience this appears true. Such a thing is not often used as an example of an objective moral value in my experience. Indeed, the "value of the moral" cannot be truthfully referred to as "objective", because - like "experience", "value" is also descriptive of a perfectly subjective outlook.

[boatsnguitars]

I've tried my best. Good luck to you

[Bust Nak]

What is the built in morality?

That you've already made a judgement on the person facing the prospect of being killed as "innocent."

I didn’t ask you about “vanilla is better”. Is “food taste is subjective” a factual claim?

Yes, and a true one at that.

What’s wrong with hindsight. We aren’t talking about predictions but about what is actually the case. This isn’t about us seeing but about the original purpose actually altering what the physical nature turns out to be.

I am talking about seeing and prediction because that's how you test hypothesis.

And, sure, a bad designer won’t be able to accomplish their purpose but, again, so what? That’s not the issue.

So you can't tell the difference between two hypotheses that seeks to explain the same phenomena.

What do you mean that it is an opinion but that it’s not the same as “Person X thinks vanilla is better”? I gave that option as one of my 3 and you said “vanilla is better” wasn’t any of those 3. What you say above is that an opinion is a belief/preference someone holds. Well, that’s the Person X in that statement. So, what do you mean by distinguishing that?

I meant "Person X thinks vanilla is better" is not an opinion, but a factual claim about an opinion. It doesn't tell me what whether you prefer vanilla or not, if you answered "Person X thinks vanilla is better" I'd have no idea which ice-cream favor to serve you.

So, by knowingly equivocating? I try to avoid equivocations as they aren’t part of rational discussions.

You say tired to, but you were the one who equivocated on "nonsense" and "making sense of."

So, I say my point is X is not true in sense Y, not sense Z, and your counterpoint is “but it’s true in sense Z”? And you think that is a good counterpoint to make? Addressing the sense I explicitly said I didn’t mean it in?

Yeah, I think that's a great counterpoint: X is not true in sense Y, but not sense Z, that's two senses tied to one statement. That's confusing, better to have X and X' each with one sense, then they have have different truth values. You wouldn't have to clarify when sense you meant, had you separate the two concepts. What do you say to that counterpoint?

No, I was talking about its purpose, not utility.

Nah, you were talking about hard head vs cloth head - that's utility.

No, the confusion there is from mixing up which question is being asked. Does pantheism correspond to reality? Does person X believe pantheism is true?

Two questions have two answers, not one.

My apologies, oh great ruler of phrasings, for not more immediately cowing to your pronouncements on what phrases are acceptable and which are not.

That's not really the problem. The problem was not addressing my counter-argument and carrying on as before. If you had made counter-counter-arguments then it would have been a debate.

I say two things about food taste: (1) vanilla objectively tastes good (to me) and (2) vanilla objectively tastes differently to different people so that one cannot say vanilla tastes good (stripped of the “to me”), in the same sense one can say the shape of the Earth is a ball.

It’s (2) that is food subjectivism.

Just to be clear, I asked you what you meant by "vanilla tastes good." That (2) stuff looks like a far too much excess baggage tied into that litter sentence. Did you meant to say all that by "vanilla tastes good," or were you explaining your whole views on subjectivism.

While I am here, as great ruler of phrasings, please say "objectively vanilla tastes good to me" because "objectively tastes good" just flies in the face of subjectivism.

In (1), I’m simply talking about my specific preference. In the same way that I can talk about my belief that the Earth is a ball…not that the Earth really is a ball, but just that it’s the belief I hold...and, by saying that, I'm not a physical subjectivist.

Here you say you talk about your specific preference, is that different from expressing your specific preference? Sounds very odd to me, you are speaking of an objective fact, as a subjectivist.

Either way, did my answer re: agree/disagree satisfy you that moral subjectivists treats all subjective matters of reality in the same way, whether it's moral, taste, music or aesthetics?

[boatsnguitars]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #571]

I wouldn't say you have a "perfectly subjective experience" since you seem to experience gravity along with the rest of us, need to breathe, need to eat, had parents, etc.

This is true, and like all others, I experience all those things subjectively. Perfectly subjectively. The very word "experience" is descriptive of a subjective outlook. Just because humans all experience effects which come from outside of our direct control and influence does not mean each and every one of us are not having a perfectly subjective experience.

The thing is, unlike gravity or the need to eat, or dress for weather, breathing or having fore-parents et al, knowing right and wrong as identifiable objects outside of us isn't as easily objectified. That is likely why examples cannot be given.

"Killing babies for fun" is often used as a good example of a pretty "objective" moral value.

Perhaps in your experience this appears true. Such a thing is not often used as an example of an objective moral value in my experience. Indeed, the "value of the moral" cannot be truthfully referred to as "objective", because - like "experience", "value" is also descriptive of a perfectly subjective outlook.

I'll try again...

While we have subjective experiences, we also have objective experiences. People watching a football game can all agree on the final score, and on violations of the rules (often, there are gray areas, obviously)- these things are objective. They are outside the subjective experiences we have.

[William]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #575]

While we have subjective experiences, we also have objective experiences. People watching a football game can all agree on the final score, and on violations of the rules (often, there are gray areas, obviously)- these things are objective. They are outside the subjective experiences we have.

Nope.

What is happening is that people have subjective experience of objective things.

They are not objective experiences.

[boatsnguitars]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #575]

While we have subjective experiences, we also have objective experiences. People watching a football game can all agree on the final score, and on violations of the rules (often, there are gray areas, obviously)- these things are objective. They are outside the subjective experiences we have.

Nope.

What is happening is that people have subjective experience of objective things.

They are not objective experiences.

It was objective fact that a tsunami wiped out hundreds of thousands of people. That was not a subjective experience for them or their families. It was an objective experience.

We can experience objective facts. We have enough in common that lends us to similar experiences. It's how we are able to drive on the highway at high speeds without dying every time.

[The Tanager]

If you or anyone else can give an example of objective consciousness then do so and we can then examine a case for there being objective morality. That is the only reason I asked you to do so - not because I want to "shift the burden" but because I adhere to the truth that Consciousness is perfectly subjective and until shown otherwise, that truth remains the thing to hold over all contrary philosophies.

Subjective consciousnesses create objective realities. We create stories. We invent new machines. Those are objective realities that come about because of choices from subjective consciousnesses. Why can’t something like human morality be an objective reality created by a subjective consciousness?

Of course. That would be your right as a perfectly subjective consciousness.
I take it you grant the same for others who see no reason to believe all beings don't have to be sentient.
If so, then the statement you made, has no impact on whatever is the truth.
I think the statement is untrue, but it may be because we have different definitions of what beingness requires in order for it to be "beingness".

Either you are claiming that all beings are necessarily sentient or you are not claiming that. Could you clarify which of those you are claiming? If the second, then I grant you the same. If the first, then you’ve gone beyond that into a positive claim that needs support.

[The Tanager]

That you've already made a judgement on the person facing the prospect of being killed as "innocent."

Whether one judges Person X as guilty or innocent of Y is a different matter than how one thinks one ought to treat Person X for being guilty or innocent. There are still options for people in that; the first doesn't hamstring the moral judge on the second.

I am talking about seeing and prediction because that's how you test hypothesis.

We aren’t testing a scientific hypothesis. We are philosophically analyzing the act of creation and if specific purposes would alter an object’s physical nature. It’s a logical question.

Here you say you talk about your specific preference, is that different from expressing your specific preference? Sounds very odd to me, you are speaking of an objective fact, as a subjectivist.

Either way, did my answer re: agree/disagree satisfy you that moral subjectivists treats all subjective matters of reality in the same way, whether it's moral, taste, music or aesthetics?

Yes, my odd phrasing meant the same. And, no, your answer didn’t satisfy. When someone says food taste is subjective they are not simply expressing their specific food preference but making a broader statement about all food preferences. You aren’t expressing your specific food preference (vanilla over pistachio) when saying food taste is subjective.

[Bust Nak]

Whether one judges Person X as guilty or innocent of Y is a different matter than how one thinks one ought to treat Person X for being guilty or innocent. There are still options for people in that; the first doesn't hamstring the moral judge on the second.

Sure, but my point was the level of agreement is to be expected due to this built in morality I spoke of.

We aren’t testing a scientific hypothesis. We are philosophically analyzing the act of creation and if specific purposes would alter an object’s physical nature. It’s a logical question.

So why prefer one philosophical position over the other when they have the same empirical appearance?

And, no, your answer didn’t satisfy. When someone says food taste is subjective they are not simply expressing their specific food preference but making a broader statement about all food preferences. You aren’t expressing your specific food preference (vanilla over pistachio) when saying food taste is subjective.

That's right, when I say food taste is subjective, I'm not simply expressing my specific food preference but making a broader statement about all food preferences. When I say vanilla is tasty, I am simply expressing their specific food preference but not making a broader statement about all food preferences. I am still left wondering why my answer didn't satisfy, nor do I see what this has to do with consistency re: morality vs food.