Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

Not sure if it’s doing the same for you, but I don’t see my latest post and it shows your response to that as me responding to you.

Yes. It is about the content of one's personal opinion, in a manner different from factual statements about those personal preferences, such as "it is true that Bust Nak likes vanilla ice-cream."

When I say that I like chocolate, I am saying that it is true that I like chocolate. I don’t see how this distinction is helpful.

Okay, but would you be against the kinds of music that does not align with the objective music standard, even if you 'liked' them?

I would be against them in the sense that I think one shouldn’t listen to them, even if I liked listening to them, yes.

[Bust Nak]

Not sure if it’s doing the same for you, but I don’t see my latest post and it shows your response to that as me responding to you.

Probably my fault, might have clicked "edit" instead of "quote."

When I say that I like chocolate, I am saying that it is true that I like chocolate. I don’t see how this distinction is helpful.

One is an opinion, the other ia a factual statement. I was under the impression that you accepted the distinction when you affirmed that it does not make sense to say things like it is correct to like chocolate.

I would be against them in the sense that I think one shouldn’t listen to them, even if I liked listening to them, yes.

Right, so why doesn't the same apply to liking people exercising their aesthetic freedom? Along the lines of against exercising freedom (given that it is objectively wrong,) even if you like people exercising it?

[The Tanager]

One is an opinion, the other ia a factual statement. I was under the impression that you accepted the distinction when you affirmed that it does not make sense to say things like it is correct to like chocolate.

I didn’t accept that “I like chocolate” and “it is true that I like chocolate” refer to different things. To me they mean the same thing. I guess one could say the former is a statement that leaves open the possibility that I’m lying, but that’s not a helpful distinction for our conversation because we simplified our discussion to ignore such possibilities. When I say I like chocolate, I’m saying it is a factual statement that I like chocolate (i.e., it is a factual statement that my opinion/preference on chocolate is “yum!”).

I do agree that it isn’t objectively correct to like/eat chocolate. That is the reason why I’m okay with people liking/eating different flavored ice cream. If it was objectively correct to like/eat chocolate, then I would not be okay with people liking/eating different flavored ice cream.

Right, so why doesn't the same apply to liking people exercising their aesthetic freedom? Along the lines of against exercising freedom (given that it is objectively wrong,) even if you like people exercising it?

It would. There being an objectively correct answer is the only reason why I would be against something that I may naturally like. Why do you think I was saying differently?

[Bust Nak]

I didn’t accept that “I like chocolate” and “it is true that I like chocolate” refer to different things...

I do agree that it isn’t objectively correct to like/eat chocolate.

How do you reconcie these two statements? "I like chocolate" is objectively correct, yet it isn't objectively correct to like chocolate.

It would. There being an objectively correct answer is the only reason why I would be against something that I may naturally like. Why do you think I was saying differently?

Because you said liking music isn't objectivism/subjectivism proper, yet liking freedom of people exercising their aesthetic freedom is objectivism/subjectivism proper. So presumably you were giving me distinctions, where the things you said about one would not apply to the other topic? Yet you are saying they do apply equally, so what's exactly is stopping music from being objectivism/subjectivism proper?

[The Tanager]

How do you reconcie these two statements? "I like chocolate" is objectively correct, yet it isn't objectively correct to like chocolate.

The first concerns whether it is true that person A likes X. The second concerns whether person A should like X.

Because you said liking music isn't objectivism/subjectivism proper, yet liking freedom of people exercising their aesthetic freedom is objectivism/subjectivism proper. So presumably you were giving me distinctions, where the things you said about one would not apply to the other topic? Yet you are saying they do apply equally, so what's exactly is stopping music from being objectivism/subjectivism proper?

I'm not following. In one we are talking about what we want to listen to, or what we like, and in the other we are talking about whether we should listen to it, where those mean different things. Just like there is a difference between what Johnny believes about the shape of the Earth and whether Johnny should believe it has that shape.

[Bust Nak]

The first concerns whether it is true that person A likes X. The second concerns whether person A should like X.

Correctness refers to truths, what is and isn't, instead of what ought to be.

I'm not following. In one we are talking about what we want to listen to, or what we like, and in the other we are talking about whether we should listen to it, where those mean different things.

No, we were talking about what we like in both instances, that's why I spoke of liking something even if it is objectively wrong.

[The Tanager]

Correctness refers to truths, what is and isn't, instead of what ought to be.

Oughts are affected by truths.

No, we were talking about what we like in both instances, that's why I spoke of liking something even if it is objectively wrong.

We were talking about what music I like and whether I like aesthetic freedom, right? The first like is about what I want to listen to; the second like is about whether I think I should listen to it or not. Objectivists believe one's actions should match up with the objective feature of reality. If aesthetic taste were objective, then aesthetic choices should be limited.

[Bust Nak]

Oughts are affected by truths.

Sure, but that sounded a lot like you agree with me that there is a difference between "I like chocolate" and "it is true that I like chocolate." The first is merely affected by truth, while the second is the truth.

We were talking about what music I like and whether I like aesthetic freedom, right?

Exactly, like I said: we were talking about what we like in both instances.

The first like is about what I want to listen to; the second like is about whether I think I should listen to it or not. Objectivists believe one's actions should match up with the objective feature of reality. If aesthetic taste were objective, then aesthetic choices should be limited.

If aesthetic taste (what music you want to listen to in this case) were objective, then aesthetic choices should be limited. So why doesn't that mean it is a matter of objectivism/subjectivism proper, when whether the choices are limited or not, depends on if it is objective or not?

[The Tanager]

Sure, but that sounded a lot like you agree with me that there is a difference between "I like chocolate" and "it is true that I like chocolate." The first is merely affected by truth, while the second is the truth.

Yes, but not the difference I've been interested in.

We were talking about what music I like and whether I like aesthetic freedom, right?

Exactly, like I said: we were talking about what we like in both instances.

Yes, but that is on a more general level than the issue we've been talking about.

If aesthetic taste (what music you want to listen to in this case) were objective, then aesthetic choices should be limited. So why doesn't that mean it is a matter of objectivism/subjectivism proper, when whether the choices are limited or not, depends on if it is objective or not?

It is. And the alternative is that if it were subjective, then the aesthetic choices should not be limited. You don't believe that, though. That is why I don't think you are doing subjectivism proper.

[Bust Nak]

It is.

You do remember telling me it wasn't objectivism/subjectivism back in post#676, right? That's what lead up to this particular line of questioning. Are you discarding that old claim or are these somehow still compatible?

And the alternative is that if it were subjective, then the aesthetic choices should not be limited. You don't believe that, though. That is why I don't think you are doing subjectivism proper.

But it's all the more unclear what your reasoning is, when you are now seemingly accepting that liking a certain type of music is as much objectivism/subjectivism proper as liking the exercise of aesthetic freedom is objectivism/subjectivism proper.