The Tanager wrote: ↑Tue Sep 29, 2020 2:53 pm
That seems more precise. Maybe my should is the
rational should, rather than either a synonym for "preference" or a "moral" should? If so, then that is the point. A rational person would and does align their beliefs with objective truth. This is true for anything that is objectively true, including objective features of reality (the shape of the Earth) and subjective features of reality (food taste).
Okay, then please stick to "would" instead of "should" if you don't mean preferential or moral kind of should. In a topic about morality and subjectivity, it confuses matter needlessly.
That's not a logical consequence of taste being subjective, it's saying the same thing in two different ways. Because food taste is subjective, (all else being equal)... a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them.
Would they though? Why would they? That's the thing is consistently missing from your thesis. Someone would adopt a belief that is a logical consequence of a truth, e.g. Earth is round therefore shortest path is an arc. But why would they believe something that you admit isn't a logical consequence? There is a phrase for something that doesn't follow as a logical consequence - non sequitur.
Or to say the exact same thing in a different way: Because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like (all else being equal) a rational person would and does eat the food that tastes good to them and a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them.
I accept that "because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like, a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them" is the same thing as "because food taste is subjective, a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them." That doesn't help because both are non sequitur.
By adopting your phrasing, I mean adopting the concepts you tie to those phrases, while still maintaining extra concepts your phrases don't seem to cover.
Yep, and that won't do. There is still a disagreement over the supposed existence of this extra concept.
But just phrasing them as identical isn't going to do that. At times it seems to me the use of "I like" is the problem. I asked if you meant something like "I like X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that?" To use that first "like" may be (unintentionally) begging the question. It's already using the language of subjective preference. It may be more accurate to say something like: "I believe X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that."
Something like, I believe we should not deploy this policy because I got an unexplainable feeling of liking polar bears and go with that? Sure, I can do that.
I think people can believe something because they see it as an objectively true objective fact, because they see it as an objectively true subjective fact, or because they just have an unexplainable subjective feeling of liking the thing, regardless of the objective truth about it.
No problems here. That's the (A) (B) and (C) from before. This much we can agree on.
Okay. But just because you do that doesn't mean others do as well. I dislike environmental policies that harm the world because I think harm is an objective notion and that harming the world is objectively a bad thing to do. I don't see how those are reducible to (C)'s.
That's fine, that's an (A). It's a position that I reject because I am not an objectivist, but at least it's valid.
I thought you said you do judge Johnny's child abuse by your unexplainable feeling, your (C), your personal hallucination, that "I don't like child abuse (i.e., Johnny's action)?"
Yes, that's what I just said. Did I miss something?