Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

You said taste is subjective therefore one should do what they like. I want you to explain why. You can't because it does not follow.

Does it follow from saying it is objectively true that the shape of the Earth is spherical, that one should align their beliefs with that? If so, then why doesn't it follow from saying it is objectively true that food taste is subjective, that one should align their beliefs with that? If not, then (A) is just as much a non sequitur as (B).

Sure, I don't want you to trivially saying that I like X because I like X. I want you to affirm "I think one should do X" (where "one should do" is a synonym of "I like") "because I like X. That is our disagreement. So what exactly was the purpose in pointing out that you are trivially saying that I like X because I like X, when it does not capture my phrasing?

What does your phrasing mean? Are you making a semantical claim that those things are synonyms? If so, then I will work with that phrasing and we have no disagreement there. Our real disagreement isn't semantics.

Or do you mean something more like: "I like X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that"? If so, then your phrasing is incomplete. If so, then that is basing your like of X on your subjective feeling (your personal hallucination), not on the belief that X is a subjective feature of reality.

With the polar bear example are you saying you dislike the policy because you get an unexplainable feeling of liking polar bears?

No contest, I am judging Johnny's action, that's not the point. The point is, in judging Johnny's action (as opposed to judging my judgment of Johnny) in am not applying personal hallucination to Johnny.

What do you see as the personal hallucination in play here?

[Bust Nak]

Does it follow from saying it is objectively true that the shape of the Earth is spherical, that one should align their beliefs with that?

No. Instead it follows that one, being a rational person, would and does align their beliefs with that, as opposed to should; but this is probably besides the point.

If so, then why doesn't it follow from saying it is objectively true that food taste is subjective, that one should align their beliefs with that?

That's not even analogous with the above. With (A) the aligned beliefs are things like "the Earth is not flat" or "the shortest path between two points on Earth is not a straight line but an arc of a great circle."

With this, the aligned belief you have in mind is "one should do what they like," instead of the actual logical consequences of "taste is subjective," e.g. "Johnny isn't incorrect for liking chocolate." This (B) would still be non-sequitur even if I grant you that one should align their beliefs.

In short, I can explain why "the Earth is spherical" -> "the shortest path is an arc." Where as you cannot explain why "taste is subjective" -> "Johnny should eat chocolate."

What does your phrasing mean? Are you making a semantical claim that those things are synonyms? If so, then I will work with that phrasing and we have no disagreement there. Our real disagreement isn't semantics.

This is definitely more than semantic. You believe that "you shouldn't do this" does not mean the same thing as "I don't want you to do this;" where as they are the same thing to me. Even if you were to adopt my phrasing, and start using "you shouldn't do this" in place of "I don't want you to do this," you would still have your pre-existing concept that you previously used "you shouldn't do this" to express, but no longer have the words to.

In short, you have two concepts, I only have one. Messing around with the labels, would still leave you with two concepts and me with only one. I am trying to get to you to accept that what you thought of as two concepts are actually the same thing, regardless of label.

With the polar bear example are you saying you dislike the policy because you get an unexplainable feeling of liking polar bears?

Yes, the extra step of "this policy harms polar bears" just help to clarify what inexplicable feelings are relevant. In short, this is a (C).

What do you see as the personal hallucination in play here?

I don't like Johnny's action.

[The Tanager]

No. Instead it follows that one, being a rational person, would and does align their beliefs with that, as opposed to should; but this is probably besides the point.

That seems more precise. Maybe my should is the rational should, rather than either a synonym for "preference" or a "moral" should? If so, then that is the point. A rational person would and does align their beliefs with objective truth. This is true for anything that is objectively true, including objective features of reality (the shape of the Earth) and subjective features of reality (food taste).

That's not even analogous with the above. With (A) the aligned beliefs are things like "the Earth is not flat" or "the shortest path between two points on Earth is not a straight line but an arc of a great circle."

With this, the aligned belief you have in mind is "one should do what they like," instead of the actual logical consequences of "taste is subjective," e.g. "Johnny isn't incorrect for liking chocolate."

That's not a logical consequence of taste being subjective, it's saying the same thing in two different ways. Because food taste is subjective, (all else being equal) a rational person would and does eat the food that tastes good to them and a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them.

Or to say the exact same thing in a different way: Because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like (all else being equal) a rational person would and does eat the food that tastes good to them and a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them.

Now, the analogous beliefs: Because the Earth is spherical, a rational person would and does believe the Earth is spherical. Because the shortest path between two points on Earth is an arc, a rational person would not and does not teach that this is false.

This is definitely more than semantic. You believe that "you shouldn't do this" does not mean the same thing as "I don't want you to do this;" where as they are the same thing to me. Even if you were to adopt my phrasing, and start using "you shouldn't do this" in place of "I don't want you to do this," you would still have your pre-existing concept that you previously used "you shouldn't do this" to express, but no longer have the words to.

By adopting your phrasing, I mean adopting the concepts you tie to those phrases, while still maintaining extra concepts your phrases don't seem to cover.

In short, you have two concepts, I only have one. Messing around with the labels, would still leave you with two concepts and me with only one. I am trying to get to you to accept that what you thought of as two concepts are actually the same thing, regardless of label.

But just phrasing them as identical isn't going to do that. At times it seems to me the use of "I like" is the problem. I asked if you meant something like "I like X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that?" To use that first "like" may be (unintentionally) begging the question. It's already using the language of subjective preference. It may be more accurate to say something like: "I believe X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that."

I think people can believe something because they see it as an objectively true objective fact, because they see it as an objectively true subjective fact, or because they just have an unexplainable subjective feeling of liking the thing, regardless of the objective truth about it.

Yes, the extra step of "this policy harms polar bears" just help to clarify what inexplicable feelings are relevant. In short, this is a (C).

Okay. But just because you do that doesn't mean others do as well. I dislike environmental policies that harm the world because I think harm is an objective notion and that harming the world is objectively a bad thing to do. I don't see how those are reducible to (C)'s.

No contest, I am judging Johnny's action, that's not the point. The point is, in judging Johnny's action (as opposed to judging my judgment of Johnny) in am not applying personal hallucination to Johnny.

What do you see as the personal hallucination in play here?

I don't like Johnny's action.

I thought you said you do judge Johnny's child abuse by your unexplainable feeling, your (C), your personal hallucination, that "I don't like child abuse (i.e., Johnny's action)?"

[Bust Nak]

That seems more precise. Maybe my should is the rational should, rather than either a synonym for "preference" or a "moral" should? If so, then that is the point. A rational person would and does align their beliefs with objective truth. This is true for anything that is objectively true, including objective features of reality (the shape of the Earth) and subjective features of reality (food taste).

Okay, then please stick to "would" instead of "should" if you don't mean preferential or moral kind of should. In a topic about morality and subjectivity, it confuses matter needlessly.

That's not a logical consequence of taste being subjective, it's saying the same thing in two different ways. Because food taste is subjective, (all else being equal)... a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them.

Would they though? Why would they? That's the thing is consistently missing from your thesis. Someone would adopt a belief that is a logical consequence of a truth, e.g. Earth is round therefore shortest path is an arc. But why would they believe something that you admit isn't a logical consequence? There is a phrase for something that doesn't follow as a logical consequence - non sequitur.

Or to say the exact same thing in a different way: Because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like (all else being equal) a rational person would and does eat the food that tastes good to them and a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them.

I accept that "because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like, a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them" is the same thing as "because food taste is subjective, a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them." That doesn't help because both are non sequitur.

By adopting your phrasing, I mean adopting the concepts you tie to those phrases, while still maintaining extra concepts your phrases don't seem to cover.

Yep, and that won't do. There is still a disagreement over the supposed existence of this extra concept.

But just phrasing them as identical isn't going to do that. At times it seems to me the use of "I like" is the problem. I asked if you meant something like "I like X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that?" To use that first "like" may be (unintentionally) begging the question. It's already using the language of subjective preference. It may be more accurate to say something like: "I believe X because I just get an unexplainable feeling of liking X and go with that."

Something like, I believe we should not deploy this policy because I got an unexplainable feeling of liking polar bears and go with that? Sure, I can do that.

I think people can believe something because they see it as an objectively true objective fact, because they see it as an objectively true subjective fact, or because they just have an unexplainable subjective feeling of liking the thing, regardless of the objective truth about it.

No problems here. That's the (A) (B) and (C) from before. This much we can agree on.

Okay. But just because you do that doesn't mean others do as well. I dislike environmental policies that harm the world because I think harm is an objective notion and that harming the world is objectively a bad thing to do. I don't see how those are reducible to (C)'s.

That's fine, that's an (A). It's a position that I reject because I am not an objectivist, but at least it's valid.

I thought you said you do judge Johnny's child abuse by your unexplainable feeling, your (C), your personal hallucination, that "I don't like child abuse (i.e., Johnny's action)?"

Yes, that's what I just said. Did I miss something?

[The Tanager]

Okay, then please stick to "would" instead of "should" if you don't mean preferential or moral kind of should. In a topic about morality and subjectivity, it confuses matter needlessly.

I can't read your mind and use the terms you do immediately. Your usage here is not the way to use terms. One could argue that the rational person would use "the moral person would and does align their actions with..." instead of "should," to avoid confusion. Your preference is noted here and I will try to keep using it now.

I accept that "because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like, a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them" is the same thing as "because food taste is subjective, a rational person would and does allow others to eat the food that tastes good to them." That doesn't help because both are non sequitur.

Three questions:

Do you think "because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like, a rational person would and does eat the food that tastes good to them" is a non sequitur? [I mentioned that and the one you used above, so I am wondering why you left out the first one: because you think it follows or because you didn't want to write both out, etc.]

If your answer to the first one is yes, then what do you see as a logical consequence of taste being subjective?

Do you think "because the Earth is objectively not flat, a rational person would and does believe and teach that the Earth is objectively not flat" is a non sequitur?

Something like, I believe we should not deploy this policy because I got an unexplainable feeling of liking polar bears and go with that? Sure, I can do that.

What does your "should" mean here?

No contest, I am judging Johnny's action, that's not the point. The point is, in judging Johnny's action (as opposed to judging my judgment of Johnny) in am not applying personal hallucination to Johnny.

What do you see as the personal hallucination in play here?

I don't like Johnny's action.

I thought you said you do judge Johnny's child abuse by your unexplainable feeling, your (C), your personal hallucination, that "I don't like child abuse (i.e., Johnny's action)?"

Yes, that's what I just said. Did I miss something?

I'm probably missing something. In the first bold you seem to be saying that you aren't applying your personal hallucination, but in the second bold you seem to be saying that you are applying your personal hallucination. Is it that you are judging Johnny's action, but not Johnny?

[Bust Nak]

I can't read your mind and use the terms you do immediately. Your usage here is not the way to use terms. One could argue that the rational person would use "the moral person would and does align their actions with..." instead of "should," to avoid confusion.

If they try that then I would counter by pointing out that "would and does" alone does not express moral duty.

Your preference is noted here and I will try to keep using it now.

Good.

Do you think "because one isn't incorrect for liking what they like, a rational person would and does eat the food that tastes good to them" is a non sequitur?

Non sequitur - while they would indeed do that, but it's not because one isn't incorrect. More to follow...

I am wondering why you left out the first one: because you think it follows or because you didn't want to write both out, etc.

Doesn't seem relevant when we are talking about judging others.

If your answer to the first one is yes, then what do you see as a logical consequence of taste being subjective?

Three direct logical consequences: Correctness does not apply; disagreement impossible; reasons and facts ultimately useless. Plus any further consequences on these three things. A relevant example: given that correctness does not apply, "being incorrect" is not be a valid reason for a rational person to refrain from eating the food that taste good to them, (as opposed to a justification for eating the food that tastes good to them.)

Do you think "because the Earth is objectively not flat, a rational person would and does believe and teach that the Earth is objectively not flat" is a non sequitur?

That follows just fine. A rational person would believe it, and act as if it is correct. Teaching others that the Earth is not flat is acting as if it is indeed not flat.

What does your "should" mean here?

The moral, preferential kind.

I'm probably missing something. In the first bold you seem to be saying that you aren't applying your personal hallucination, but in the second bold you seem to be saying that you are applying your personal hallucination.

Okay. To clarify, in the first bold I saying that I am applying my personal hallucination, but not to Johnny, the second affirms that I am applying my personal hallucination.

[The Tanager]

Three direct logical consequences: Correctness does not apply; disagreement impossible; reasons and facts ultimately useless.

The first is not a logical consequence, but saying the same thing. You would be saying that "because one isn't incorrect (or correct) for liking what they like, correctness does not apply." That's redundant.

For the second, disagreement about what is impossible?

For the third, reasons and facts about what are ultimately useless?

A relevant example: given that correctness does not apply, "being incorrect" is not be a valid reason for a rational person to refrain from eating the food that taste good to them, (as opposed to a justification for eating the food that tastes good to them.)

What is the justification for eating food that tastes good to them?

That follows just fine. A rational person would believe it, and act as if it is correct. Teaching others that the Earth is not flat is acting as if it is indeed not flat.

If it was objectively true that the Earth's shape was subjective, would a rational person also believe it and act as if that is correct, teaching others that the shape is different to different people?

Something like, I believe we should not deploy this policy because I got an unexplainable feeling of liking polar bears and go with that? Sure, I can do that.

What does your "should" mean here?

The moral, preferential kind.

This sounds like you are saying "I believe that I prefer not deploying this policy...". If I (as the one with the power to enact the policy or not) asked you what choice ???should??? I make, what would you say? I'm struggling for what word to put in for should there. I'm not sure I am asking what you think it is rational for me to do because someone could say one should act irrationally at times. But I 'm also not just asking you what feeling you experience about polar bears or what feeling I experience about polar bears. Perhaps it's just the end of a busy day and I'll think clearer later. Feel free to help me out.

Okay. To clarify, in the first bold I saying that I am applying my personal hallucination, but not to Johnny, the second affirms that I am applying my personal hallucination.

Okay. What are you applying your personal hallucination to?

[Bust Nak]

The first is not a logical consequence, but saying the same thing. You would be saying that "because one isn't incorrect (or correct) for liking what they like, correctness does not apply." That's redundant.

Fine by me as long as you accept the truth value of "X is subjective" and "correctness does not apply to X" always matches.

For the second, disagreement about what is impossible?

Disagreement on taste. I like vanilla better while Johnny likes chocolate better is not a disagreement.

For the third, reasons and facts about what are ultimately useless?

About anything and everything. Likes and dislikes can ultimately be boiled down to instinct and that bypasses the reasoning part of our brains.

What is the justification for eating food that tastes good to them?

That they like the taste.

If it was objectively true that the Earth's shape was subjective, would a rational person also believe it and act as if that is correct, teaching others that the shape is different to different people?

Sure.

As in "this is Bust Nak's preference?"

Yep.

If I was asking for your advice on why I would be rational to not deploy this policy (assume I'm the one with the power to enact it or not), then what else would you say or do, and why?

Something along the lines of, "hey you like polar bears too, don't you?" I have to find out what your preferences are.

Okay. What are you applying your personal hallucination to?

To myself.

[The Tanager]

For the second, disagreement about what is impossible?

Disagreement on taste. I like vanilla better while Johnny likes chocolate better is not a disagreement.

I agree that is a logical consequence, but I don't think it's relevant to our discussion. One could still disagree about what to do about this fact.

For the third, reasons and facts about what are ultimately useless?

About anything and everything. Likes and dislikes can ultimately be boiled down to instinct and that bypasses the reasoning part of our brains.

Continuing from above, I think you would say that the disagreement over what to do about food taste boils down to an instinct about liking/disliking personal freedom in food taste. I still disagree there. I believe personal freedom is an objective good unless it causes objective harm, because I believe that we are made in God's image as free agents with intrinsic value. (All other things being equal) it is because exercising one's food taste does not cause objective harm that I think personal freedom in food taste is good.

What is the justification for eating food that tastes good to them?

That they like the taste.

How is that a justification? They are acting on the preference they have, but I'm asking for the justification for doing so.

Okay. What are you applying your personal hallucination to?

To myself.

So you are applying your personal hallucination [I don't like Johnny's action] to yourself and what is the result? What is the statement that follows that?

[jimtatertayte]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

Truth is the absolute of the existence of God.