The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

[John J. Bannan]

[bluegreenearth]

I'll respond to the Kalam Cosmological Argument first because it is probably the most popular and most convincing among the apologists:

Numerous professional physicists, astronomers, and cosmologists continue to apply their expertise towards the discovery of a natural explanation for how the universe came into existence. Nevertheless, they continue to unanimously and honestly admit that there is no demonstrable evidence to support any claim regarding the state of universe prior to the "Plank Time." Meanwhile, theists seem to confidently assert that God was responsible for creating the universe as if the all the qualified scientists are just a wasting everyone's time.

The reason many apologists rely upon an argument like the Kalam is because it artificially resolves the need for cognitive closure. In general, people are discomforted by the lack of an answer to a profound question. This often motivates people to accept almost any explanation as long as it feels satisfactory. The tendency to settle for an easy answer over no answer is a form of cognitive bias we all share. To complicate things further, humans have evolved a habit of perceiving agency where none may actually exist. The cumulative effect is to stack the deck in favor of easily digestible propositions regardless of whether they can be tested or not.

Concluding that the universe had a cause is not necessarily controversial. Because we don't observe universes popping into existence from nowhere, the reasonable conclusion must be that our universe had a cause. The scientists who investigate the properties of the universe acknowledge that something caused the quantum material at hour zero to suddenly expand and subsequently evolve to become the observable universe. What makes the theistic versions of the Cosmological Argument controversial is the audacity required to assert that such a cause can be known through reasoning alone. Nevertheless, let's examine the Kalam Cosmological Argument for what it is.

In premise 1, the phrase "begins to exist" is strategically chosen to invoke the intuitive concept of something being created. For instance, a chair began to exist after it was assembled by a person. However, what actually happened was that the chair was constructed from previously existing and naturally occurring materials which were then rearranged by a person into a functional object. Everything observed in the entire universe exists as a rearrangement of pre-existing natural materials regardless of whether they were assembled by humans or through natural processes. This distinction is important because the Kalam intends for "begins to exist" to mean the creation of raw material from absolute nothingness despite the fact that such a phenomenon has no observable precedent.

While it may be intuitive to view the universe as resulting from a long causality chain, theists are drawing a conclusion about existence which has never been observed. So, apologists must first produce a comprehensive list of material things which were observed as having come into existence from absolutely no pre-existing substances. From there, they would have a baseline by which to compare and subsequently infer a possible cause. In other words, until we observe something cause a material substance to begin to exist from absolutely nothing, we can't simply assert such a thing is possible let alone serve as the cause for everything in the universe. Even if a God was demonstrated to exist, we couldn't know such a deity was responsible for creating the universe without first observing that it was possible for him to produce a material substance from absolutely nothing. At this point, apologists might be tempted to point out that God is defined as having the ability to create something from nothing. Unfortunately, though, we can't just arbitrarily define God into existence without the tactic being immediately identified as logically fallacious.

Apologists often respond by claiming the cause of the universe must exist beyond space and time because all space-time began with the universe. From there, they deduce the cause must either be an abstract object or intelligent mind since no other things could exist outside space-time. Apart from the fact that abstract objects don't exist anywhere outside a thinking brain, they can't be the cause of anything. Apologists capitalize on that fact to insist that the only possible option is for the universe to have been created by a transcendent intelligent mind. Of course, they conveniently ignore the fact that an intelligent mind has never been demonstrated to exist apart from a physical brain. Likewise, they fail to demonstrate how a disembodied mind is any more capable of being a cause than an abstract object. Last time I checked, there has never been a validated circumstance where a sentient being was able to cause something to happen in the external world just by thinking about it. Thus, the entire concept is incoherent. In any case, the whole argument is a non-sequitur because the potential existence of a space-time boundary for the universe does not require "nothing" to precede it. Our current inability to measure or understand the state of the universe prior to the Big Bang does not automatically validate the God hypothesis as the only alternative explanation. It doesn't follow that a supernatural intelligence was necessary.

So, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is revealed to be nothing more than a God of the gaps fallacy. It contradicts itself by first asserting that nothing existed prior to the formation of the universe then concludes God (a something) existed prior to the formation of the universe. Most importantly, it makes no verifiable predictions. Even if we irresponsibly accepted the fallacious argument, we are still no closer to understanding how the universe was created, what being or beings were responsible, or what functional impact it could have on any decisions we could make in the reality we all experience.

[Kylie]

I find all of those arguments to be quite weak. Most of them are just restating the same thing, and those that are different are just, "Something has to be responsible, let's say it's God."

[The Tanager]

I know this is old, but I'm just starting to get back more fully on this new version of the site.

In premise 1, the phrase "begins to exist" is strategically chosen to invoke the intuitive concept of something being created. For instance, a chair began to exist after it was assembled by a person. However, what actually happened was that the chair was constructed from previously existing and naturally occurring materials which were then rearranged by a person into a functional object. Everything observed in the entire universe exists as a rearrangement of pre-existing natural materials regardless of whether they were assembled by humans or through natural processes. This distinction is important because the Kalam intends for "begins to exist" to mean the creation of raw material from absolute nothingness despite the fact that such a phenomenon has no observable precedent.

Some proponents may intend that meaning for "begins to exist," but it isn't necessarily so. Things can begin to exist both ex nihilo and as transformation of material already present.

While it may be intuitive to view the universe as resulting from a long causality chain, theists are drawing a conclusion about existence which has never been observed. So, apologists must first produce a comprehensive list of material things which were observed as having come into existence from absolutely no pre-existing substances. From there, they would have a baseline by which to compare and subsequently infer a possible cause.

Why is this required? We know there are two ways for something to begin to exist. The one way we have direct experience with is always caused. The other way takes away something from what we have experience with (material pre-existing). Why would taking that away make it more likely that there would be no cause involved? It seems it would make it less likely.

In other words, until we observe something cause a material substance to begin to exist from absolutely nothing, we can't simply assert such a thing is possible...

What is wrong with asserting something as logically possible? In doing so, one is not saying it actually exists, just that it isn't logically ruled out. We don't need to observe a unicorn before asserting the logical possibility of a horse-like creature with a horn.

...let alone serve as the cause for everything in the universe. Even if a God was demonstrated to exist, we couldn't know such a deity was responsible for creating the universe without first observing that it was possible for him to produce a material substance from absolutely nothing. At this point, apologists might be tempted to point out that God is defined as having the ability to create something from nothing. Unfortunately, though, we can't just arbitrarily define God into existence without the tactic being immediately identified as logically fallacious.

The Kalam does not simply assert God as the cause for everything in the universe; God is argued to. Neither does the Kalam beg such a definition of God.

Apologists often respond by claiming the cause of the universe must exist beyond space and time because all space-time began with the universe. From there, they deduce the cause must either be an abstract object or intelligent mind since no other things could exist outside space-time. Apart from the fact that abstract objects don't exist anywhere outside a thinking brain, they can't be the cause of anything. Apologists capitalize on that fact to insist that the only possible option is for the universe to have been created by a transcendent intelligent mind. Of course, they conveniently ignore the fact that an intelligent mind has never been demonstrated to exist apart from a physical brain.

They don't ignore that, they see it as irrelevant. The apologist is using a line of reasoning to reach a conclusion. Rather than showing the flaw in that line of reasoning you are saying they have to reach the conclusion in a different way. Why? Why does our observance of minds requiring physical brains, given our limits of observation, outweigh a separate argument that points to reality as we know it needing an unembodied mind to make sense?

Likewise, they fail to demonstrate how a disembodied mind is any more capable of being a cause than an abstract object. Last time I checked, there has never been a validated circumstance where a sentient being was able to cause something to happen in the external world just by thinking about it. Thus, the entire concept is incoherent.

A lack of observation is not the same thing as being incoherent. And you keep on requiring physical observation as the only way to establish something without any good argument as to why that is the case. Show this is more than an assumption on your part.

In any case, the whole argument is a non-sequitur because the potential existence of a space-time boundary for the universe does not require "nothing" to precede it.

There is nothing about the Kalam that requires a belief that there was no state of the universe prior to the Big Bang. Apologists sometimes appeal to Occam's Razor (and lack of scientific evidence to the contrary) to argue for no prior physical state, but if there is a prior state the Kalam doesn't fall apart.

Our current inability to measure or understand the state of the universe prior to the Big Bang does not automatically validate the God hypothesis as the only alternative explanation. It doesn't follow that a supernatural intelligence was necessary.

So, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is revealed to be nothing more than a God of the gaps fallacy.

Show where the formulations and explanations of the most prevalent academic treatments of the Kalam do such a thing.

It contradicts itself by first asserting that nothing existed prior to the formation of the universe then concludes God (a something) existed prior to the formation of the universe.

Where does it do that? Quote it.

Most importantly, it makes no verifiable predictions.

Why does it need to?

Even if we irresponsibly accepted the fallacious argument, we are still no closer to understanding how the universe was created, what being or beings were responsible, or what functional impact it could have on any decisions we could make in the reality we all experience.

Why is that a problem? The Kalam doesn't intend to explain how the universe was created (assuming you mean the scientific explanations of everything). And it does tell us some things about the being(s) responsible. Further analysis gives us some impact such a conclusion would have on some of our decisions (like that God exists).

[bluegreenearth]

Some proponents may intend that meaning for "begins to exist," but it isn't necessarily so. Things can begin to exist both ex nihilo and as transformation of material already present.

I'm not aware of something that began to exist ex nihilo. Would you please give an example? Without this demonstration, I cannot accept the assertion that "things can begin to exist both ex nihilo and as transformation of material already present."

Why is this required? We know there are two ways for something to begin to exist. The one way we have direct experience with is always caused. The other way takes away something from what we have experience with (material pre-existing). Why would taking that away make it more likely that there would be no cause involved? It seems it would make it less likely.

The theist who abuses the Kalam to support the empirical claim that God created the physical universe ex nihilo has a burden of proof to demonstrate the empirical possibility of creating a material substance from nothing.

What is wrong with asserting something as logically possible? In doing so, one is not saying it actually exists, just that it isn't logically ruled out. We don't need to observe a unicorn before asserting the logical possibility of a horse-like creature with a horn.

There is nothing wrong with acknowledging a logical possibility, but theists are making an empirical claim when they abuse the Kalam to conclude that God created the material universe. Empirical claims require support from empirical evidence. Logical possibility isn't enough.

The Kalam does not simply assert God as the cause for everything in the universe; God is argued to. Neither does the Kalam beg such a definition of God.

Allow me to clarify: The Kalam merely concludes that the observable universe had a cause, but theists abuse the Kalam to assert that this cause was the God they define as having the ability to create the observable universe.

They don't ignore that, they see it as irrelevant. The apologist is using a line of reasoning to reach a conclusion. Rather than showing the flaw in that line of reasoning you are saying they have to reach the conclusion in a different way. Why? Why does our observance of minds requiring physical brains, given our limits of observation, outweigh a separate argument that points to reality as we know it needing an unembodied mind to make sense?

First, the empirical claim that God created the physical universe does not necessarily follow from the conclusion of the Kalam. Second, the reason our observance of minds requiring physical brains limits what we can conclude about the cause of the universe is because we are engaged in an empirical investigation when considering what caused material substances to begin existing. Once someone demonstrates the empirical possibility of a mind existing without a physical brain of some type and an ability for that mind to create material substances from nothing, we will then have a justification to expand the list of candidate causes of the material universe to include an unembodied mind. Until then, we can merely entertain ourselves with endless speculation on the logical possibility in a philosophical context but have no mechanism by which to know if the claim corresponds with our physical reality or not. You are welcome to wax philosophical all you want, but I find it more helpful to investigate explanations that can be demonstrated to actually exist in our physical reality.

A lack of observation is not the same thing as being incoherent. And you keep on requiring physical observation as the only way to establish something without any good argument as to why that is the case. Show this is more than an assumption on your part.

Once again, we are investigating an empirical claim when considering the cause of the physical universe. As such, we should at least require implicit empirical evidence to support the claim as a possible candidate for the cause of the physical universe. Philosophical speculation is not enough.

There is nothing about the Kalam that requires a belief that there was no state of the universe prior to the Big Bang. Apologists sometimes appeal to Occam's Razor (and lack of scientific evidence to the contrary) to argue for no prior physical state, but if there is a prior state the Kalam doesn't fall apart.

Indeed, the Kalam does not require there to be nothing prior to the Big Bang, but most forms of theism make the empirical claim that God created the material universe ex nihilo. As such, the cosmological arguments theists derive from their abuse of the Kalam is a non sequitur.

Show where the formulations and explanations of the most prevalent academic treatments of the Kalam do such a thing.

I'm familiar with some of the "theistic" treatments of the Kalam but not sure if those are the same as the "academic" treatments you are referencing. However, I've already indicated that the Kalam, by itself, does not necessarily constitute a God-of-the-gaps fallacy because it merely concludes that the universe had a cause.

Where does it do that? Quote it.

The theistic cosmological arguments derived from an abuse of the Kalam contradict themselves by first asserting that something material cannot be created from nothing then concludes God created the material universe from nothing. Unless theists want to modify their argument to claim God created the material universe from uncaused material that co-existed with and separately from himself outside of space-time or that God is comprised of uncaused material from which he donated some portion of himself towards the creation of the material universe, their versions of the cosmological argument will remain self-contradictory.

Why does it need to?

Empirical claims must make novel testable predictions if they are to be accepted as the most reasonable explanation for an observed physical phenomenon. In this case, the observed physical phenomenon is the existence of the material universe. Philosophical claims need not make novel testable predictions, but philosophical arguments alone cannot demonstrate something exists outside the conceptual realm and in an empirical reality.

Why is that a problem? The Kalam doesn't intend to explain how the universe was created (assuming you mean the scientific explanations of everything). And it does tell us some things about the being(s) responsible. Further analysis gives us some impact such a conclusion would have on some of our decisions (like that God exists).

Here again, my objection applies to the theistic cosmological arguments that are derived from an abuse of the Kalam. Concluding God as the cause of the universe is a pragmatic problem because the primary reason for investigating any empirical claim is to use that knowledge to inform our decisions on the expectation of predictable outcomes. This is what ensures our survival. It is reliably consistent empirical knowledge that allows us to avoid a premature death and plan ahead for a desirable future. Even if theists were to irrefutably show the universe was created by an intelligent supernatural agent, that Information neither explains how the universe was created nor demonstrates whether the creator does or does not have a personal interest in our individual lives. Sure, in that scenario, atheists would no longer have a justifiable reason to lack belief in the existence of a creator. Nevertheless, there would equally be no justification for concluding that Christianity or any other theological model is accurate or reliable. Meanwhile, despite having the irrefutable evidence of the universe being a creation, science would remain our best and most dependable method for acquiring new empirical knowledge about the physical properties of the "created" universe.

[The Tanager]

There is nothing wrong with acknowledging a logical possibility, but theists are making an empirical claim when they abuse the Kalam to conclude that God created the material universe. Empirical claims require support from empirical evidence. Logical possibility isn't enough.

The Kalam does not rely on logical possibility for its conclusion. It relies on things like empirical observations about causation, an analysis of the nature of spacetime, and an analysis of what a cause of spacetime would logically have to be like.

Allow me to clarify: The Kalam merely concludes that the observable universe had a cause, but theists abuse the Kalam to assert that this cause was the God they define as having the ability to create the observable universe.

Theists largely do not simply assert God is the cause through such a definition. They analyze what the cause of the universe would have to be like. They then take these characteristics and see the God of classical theism as the concept that shares these characteristics.

Second, the reason our observance of minds requiring physical brains limits what we can conclude about the cause of the universe is because we are engaged in an empirical investigation when considering what caused material substances to begin existing. Once someone demonstrates the empirical possibility of a mind existing without a physical brain of some type and an ability for that mind to create material substances from nothing, we will then have a justification to expand the list of candidate causes of the material universe to include an unembodied mind. Until then, we can merely entertain ourselves with endless speculation on the logical possibility in a philosophical context but have no mechanism by which to know if the claim corresponds with our physical reality or not. You are welcome to wax philosophical all you want, but I find it more helpful to investigate explanations that can be demonstrated to actually exist in our physical reality.

I may not be understanding your exact point here. You don't seem to be asking for the empirical possibility, but the empirical actuality. It is not empirically impossible for a mind to exist without a brain. We can't rule such a thing out. You seem, therefore, to be asking for empirical proof that X exists before considering evidence for whether X exists. That's incoherent.

Or perhaps you are saying physical empirical evidence is the only kind of evidence that holds any weight? If so, I would ask: why do you assert that?

I'm familiar with some of the "theistic" treatments of the Kalam but not sure if those are the same as the "academic" treatments you are referencing.

I'm referring to things like peer-reviewed treatments (books, journals, etc.) rather than just anyone on the internet. Books and journals won't catch all the bad philosophy, but hopefully it will catch a good amount of it.

The theistic cosmological arguments derived from an abuse of the Kalam contradict themselves by first asserting that something material cannot be created from nothing then concludes God created the material universe from nothing. Unless theists want to modify their argument to claim God created the material universe from uncaused material that co-existed with and separately from himself outside of space-time or that God is comprised of uncaused material from which he donated some portion of himself towards the creation of the material universe, their versions of the cosmological argument will remain self-contradictory.

The theists (and non-theists, for that matter) worth listening to reason to conclusions, they don't simply assert things like you keep claiming they do. They do not claim that material cannot be created from nothing. Therefore, they aren't contradicting themselves like you claim. There is nothing illogical about material being created ex nihilo. The Kalam is an argument (not an assertion) that spacetime must have been created ex nihilo at some point. Theists claim that if such a thing is true, then it is not rational to believe it just popped into existence without any cause. They claim that it is not rational to think an impersonal force would do such a thing, either.

Empirical claims must make novel testable predictions if they are to be accepted as the most reasonable explanation for an observed physical phenomenon. In this case, the observed physical phenomenon is the existence of the material universe. Philosophical claims need not make novel testable predictions, but philosophical arguments alone cannot demonstrate something exists outside the conceptual realm and in an empirical reality.

This is just restating your claim. Why must the conclusion of the apologists, working off of the Kalam, make novel, testable prediction to be accepted as the most reasonable explanation?

Concluding God as the cause of the universe is a pragmatic problem because the primary reason for investigating any empirical claim is to use that knowledge to inform our decisions on the expectation of predictable outcomes. This is what ensures our survival.

You seem to be saying scientific knowledge is the only thing worth pursuing. If so, then why? I'm not saying science isn't great or that we shouldn't seek scientific knowledge to inform those kinds of decisions. It's not the only end in life, though. Certainly we shouldn't ignore science, but we can do other things along with science and still survive.

It is reliably consistent empirical knowledge that allows us to avoid a premature death and plan ahead for a desirable future.

Science can't tell us what future to plan for, what purpose we have in life. Science is a tool. It's not the only tool in life.

Even if theists were to irrefutably show the universe was created by an intelligent supernatural agent, that Information neither explains how the universe was created nor demonstrates whether the creator does or does not have a personal interest in our individual lives. Sure, in that scenario, atheists would no longer have a justifiable reason to lack belief in the existence of a creator. Nevertheless, there would equally be no justification for concluding that Christianity or any other theological model is accurate or reliable.

So? We don't need to know everything about the beginning of the universe to live and thrive. I still applaud scientific investigations into this. No theist claims the Kalam tells us the desires of the creator beyond that it wanted to create us. But it's a step towards such an answer. Other arguments and reasonings follow that train further.

Meanwhile, despite having the irrefutable evidence of the universe being a creation, science would remain our best and most dependable method for acquiring new empirical knowledge about the physical properties of the "created" universe.

I completely agree. I don't see why you think it is an either/or kind of thing.

[bluegreenearth]

The Kalam does not rely on logical possibility for its conclusion. It relies on things like empirical observations about causation, an analysis of the nature of spacetime, and an analysis of what a cause of spacetime would logically have to be like.

I've already indicated that my objection applies to the theist's cosmological argument and not the Kalam itself. It is my understanding that the Kalam merely concludes that the material universe had a cause. It does not identify the cause as a personal God or anything else.

Theists largely do not simply assert God is the cause through such a definition. They analyze what the cause of the universe would have to be like. They then take these characteristics and see the God of classical theism as the concept that shares these characteristics.

It doesn't logically follow from the Kalam that the cause of the material universe had to be a personal agent, but I can understand how confirmation bias could lead a theist to that conclusion. This is why it is important for people to critically examine their own reasoning processes and ask the hard questions before claiming to know things such as the most likely cause of the universe. Having once been a theist myself, I understand how an emotional investment in a religious ideology could tempt people to overstate their case. However, as much as they want a justification for their belief in a divinely created universe, theists should demonstrate some humility and accept that the Kalam isn't going to give it to them. I don't know if we will ever discover the cause of the physical universe, but settling on a philosophical argument for the sake of propping up theism or satisfying an urgent need for cognitive closure would be intellectually lazy and dishonest.

I may not be understanding your exact point here. You don't seem to be asking for the empirical possibility, but the empirical actuality. It is not empirically impossible for a mind to exist without a brain. We can't rule such a thing out. You seem, therefore, to be asking for empirical proof that X exists before considering evidence for whether X exists. That's incoherent.

Or perhaps you are saying physical empirical evidence is the only kind of evidence that holds any weight? If so, I would ask: why do you assert that?

We determine the most reasonable explanation for an observed phenomenon by first evaluating if anything known could plausibly serve as an explanation. In other words, we explain the unknown in terms of the known. Imagine that I walk into my kitchen to find a broken ceramic cup on the floor by the table. The broken cup is the observed phenomenon that requires an explanation. Do I immediately presume an invisible gremlin caused the cup to fall and break on the floor? After all, it is logically possible for an invisible gremlin to break my ceramic cup. No. I have no empirical evidence for the existence of invisible gremlins to know if they could cause anything to happen in the physical universe. Instead, I begin by considering what I already know to be empirically possible. I know my cat exists and has been previously observed jumping onto the kitchen table. I also know that bears exist and have been previously observed scavenging for food in people's homes where they could easily knock a cup off the table. Given the three logically possible explanations, only two of them have an implicit empirical basis and only one is the most reasonable to believe. I reject the invisible gremlin explanation because it has no implicit empirical basis and ruled-out the scavenging bear explanation because no bears have ever been observed in my neighborhood. This leaves the cat as the most reasonable explanation for the broken cup. Does this reasoning prove the cat did it? No, but it demonstrates the cat to be the most reasonable explanation.

Now, let's imagine that a cat doesn't live in my house. Does the scavenging bear become the most reasonable explanation in this scenario? No. While there is empirical evidence for the existence of bears in other areas of the country, I have no empirical evidence of bears existing in my neighborhood. Therefore, I must search for other more reasonable and empirically possible explanations to consider. For instance, I know that there have been moments in my past where I would carelessly place something fragile on the edge of a table while rushing out the house. Therefore, it isn't unreasonable to believe that I could have been the cause of the broken cup without realizing it. Once again, this reasoning doesn't prove I was responsible for accidentally and unknowingly breaking my own cup, but it demonstrates it to be the most reasonable explanation. Of course, if I discover new empirical evidence later indicating a bear had found its way into my house (i.e. bear claw marks, fur, and paw prints), the bear explanation would then become the more reasonable explanation.

Finally, I'll change the scenario to where I am unable to identify an empirically possible explanation for the broken cup. Does the invisible gremlin now become the most likely explanation? Well, what about a magical pink unicorn or an extra-terrestrial alien invader causing the cup to break? How do we rule-out those as candidate explanations? Could God have been responsible for breaking my cup as a clue to his existence? How could we rule-out that explanation? There are an infinite number of other logically possible but nondemonstrable explanations for how the cup could have been broken, and none of them can be ruled-out. At this point, you should be able to comprehend why it would be intellectually dishonest for me to endorse any one of those logically possible but nondemonstrable explanations.

So, I'm not "asking for empirical proof that X exists before considering evidence for whether X exists." I'm asking for empirical evidence for the existence of X as a possible cause of Y because the argument is making the empirical claim that X is the cause of Y. Otherwise, X is no more reasonable than Z , W, or any other non-demonstrable candidate for the cause of Y.

I'm referring to things like peer-reviewed treatments (books, journals, etc.) rather than just anyone on the internet. Books and journals won't catch all the bad philosophy, but hopefully it will catch a good amount of it.

I evaluate any argument someone gives me in defense of a belief. If you have a particular version of the Kalam you would like me to consider, by all means, present it in this thread.

The theists (and non-theists, for that matter) worth listening to reason to conclusions, they don't simply assert things like you keep claiming they do. They do not claim that material cannot be created from nothing. Therefore, they aren't contradicting themselves like you claim. There is nothing illogical about material being created ex nihilo. The Kalam is an argument (not an assertion) that spacetime must have been created ex nihilo at some point. Theists claim that if such a thing is true, then it is not rational to believe it just popped into existence without any cause. They claim that it is not rational to think an impersonal force would do such a thing, either.

You indicate that theists worth listening to "do not claim that material cannot be created from nothing." Opinion noted, but I evaluate the arguments people give me and have received the "something cannot come from nothing" premise from theists more times than I can count on all my fingers and toes. Also, the Kalam only argues that space-time and matter had a cause but nothing about anything being created ex nihilo.

This is just restating your claim. Why must the conclusion of the apologists, working off of the Kalam, make novel, testable prediction to be accepted as the most reasonable explanation?

Because, without making novel testable predictions, apologists can't know if their conclusion is anything more than something they are imagining. There are many imaginary but logically possible explanations that could function as the most reasonable explanation for something, but we have no way to know if those imaginary explanations correspond to realty if they can't be used to make novel testable predictions. In my earlier analogy, I could have concluded that the invisible gremlin was the most reasonable explanation for the broken cup in the absence of a more reasonable empirically possible explanation, but how would I be able to know the invisible gremlin isn't just an imaginary concept that was created to explain the broken cup? At least with the cat explanation, I could make a prediction that the cat would knock another cup off the table and then observe if the prediction was accurate. When the cat does eventually knocks another cup off the table, I'll know that the cat explanation was more than just something I imagined as being the most reasonable explanation.

You seem to be saying scientific knowledge is the only thing worth pursuing. If so, then why? I'm not saying science isn't great or that we shouldn't seek scientific knowledge to inform those kinds of decisions. It's not the only end in life, though. Certainly we shouldn't ignore science, but we can do other things along with science and still survive.

It was not my intention to imply that scientific knowledge was the only thing worth pursuing. Science is just the most demonstrably reliable method we have for acquiring knowledge about the physical universe.

Science can't tell us what future to plan for, what purpose we have in life. Science is a tool. It's not the only tool in life.

I neither recall making those claims nor understand their relevance to this discussion. Nevertheless, your perspective is noted.

So? We don't need to know everything about the beginning of the universe to live and thrive. I still applaud scientific investigations into this. No theist claims the Kalam tells us the desires of the creator beyond that it wanted to create us. But it's a step towards such an answer. Other arguments and reasonings follow that train further.

As I previously indicated, it is my understanding of the Kalam that it doesn't conclude the cause of the universe was a personal creator at all. It merely concludes that the observable universe had cause.

I completely agree. I don't see why you think it is an either/or kind of thing.

I don't recall claiming it was an either/or kind of thing.

[The Tanager]

First, I want to note that I was not trying to put words in your mouth that you weren't meaning. I was trying to understand your points, sharing how they seemed to me (for instance "You seem to be saying scientific knowledge is the only thing worth pursuing. If so..." with the remainder of my post still within that conditional understanding), and offering you a chance to correct any misunderstandings.

It doesn't logically follow from the Kalam that the cause of the material universe had to be a personal agent, but I can understand how confirmation bias could lead a theist to that conclusion. This is why it is important for people to critically examine their own reasoning processes and ask the hard questions before claiming to know things such as the most likely cause of the universe. Having once been a theist myself, I understand how an emotional investment in a religious ideology could tempt people to overstate their case. However, as much as they want a justification for their belief in a divinely created universe, theists should demonstrate some humility and accept that the Kalam isn't going to give it to them. I don't know if we will ever discover the cause of the physical universe, but settling on a philosophical argument for the sake of propping up theism or satisfying an urgent need for cognitive closure would be intellectually lazy and dishonest.

Theists like Craig make arguments, though. It is important to critically examine the arguments they give for their conclusions. I see you sharing a conclusion (it's confirmation bias), but not the exact reasons that have gotten you there.

We determine the most reasonable explanation for an observed phenomenon by first evaluating if anything known could plausibly serve as an explanation....

But what if we find that nothing known can plausibly serve as an explanation? Now, I don't mean this allows one to put one's desired answer into the gap. I mean that the known things are ruled out.

Finally, I'll change the scenario to where I am unable to identify an empirically possible explanation for the broken cup. Does the invisible gremlin now become the most likely explanation? Well, what about a magical pink unicorn or an extra-terrestrial alien invader causing the cup to break? How do we rule-out those as candidate explanations? Could God have been responsible for breaking my cup as a clue to his existence? How could we rule-out that explanation? There are an infinite number of other logically possible but nondemonstrable explanations for how the cup could have been broken, and none of them can be ruled-out. At this point, you should be able to comprehend why it would be intellectually dishonest for me to endorse any one of those logically possible but nondemonstrable explanations.

The theists rule out various candidates through their argument. They may be wrong, but I want to see your specific reasons for thinking so. I realize this requires a specific argument to counter and that you have been talking on a more general level so far.

So, I'm not "asking for empirical proof that X exists before considering evidence for whether X exists." I'm asking for empirical evidence for the existence of X as a possible cause of Y because the argument is making the empirical claim that X is the cause of Y. Otherwise, X is no more reasonable than Z , W, or any other non-demonstrable candidate for the cause of Y.

The theistic argument is that the cause of Y would need to have the characteristics of A, B, C, etc. This rules out certain possibilities for X, such as material options among others. After this ruling-out process, the theist says the best/only alternative left is what humans have traditionally called God (in the classical theist since). To counter them, one needs to find a flaw in the ruling out process or offer other alternatives that fit just as nicely.

I evaluate any argument someone gives me in defense of a belief. If you have a particular version of the Kalam you would like me to consider, by all means, present it in this thread.

I would love to explore the argument with you. I think we will both be challenged. Craig's formulation would be my suggestion to guide our exploration:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
4. If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.
5. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.

Are you wanting to cover all five premises, or assume the Kalam's three are true and just analyze the theistic extensions into 4 and 5? Once I know that, I can provide the supports for you to specifically object to.

[bluegreenearth]

Theists like Craig make arguments, though. It is important to critically examine the arguments they give for their conclusions. I see you sharing a conclusion (it's confirmation bias), but not the exact reasons that have gotten you there.

Since the Kalam concludes that the observable universe has a cause and nothing about what the cause could be, confirmation bias is the most reasonable explanations for how a theist concluded the cause was their God.

But what if we find that nothing known can plausibly serve as an explanation? Now, I don't mean this allows one to put one's desired answer into the gap. I mean that the known things are ruled out.

When all the known things are ruled out, the next logical step is to test other falsifiable hypotheses. For example, imagine a group of wildlife biologists come across an animal's footprint in the mud. First, they consider if any known animal could make a footprint like that but find no match. Next, they consider the possibility that the footprint was made by an unknown species. They may not know precisely what this new species of animal might be but could speculate based on the properties of the footprint. After measuring the size, shape, and depth of the footprint, the scientists predict that they will discover a new species of rodent in the area with a foot that matches this print. After some time, they finally observe the animal and discover their prediction was correct.

Now, let's consider a scenario where the footprint was so strange that the wildlife biologists have no clue at all about what kind of creature could have left a footprint like that. In this case, the only thing the scientists can do is wait around to see if they can observe the creature making this type of footprint. Speculating on the existence of an imaginary creature is of no practical value. Until the creature is observed, the only intellectually honest thing to do is remain agnostic about the identity of the animal who made the footprint.

The theists rule out various candidates through their argument. They may be wrong, but I want to see your specific reasons for thinking so. I realize this requires a specific argument to counter and that you have been talking on a more general level so far.

The theistic argument is that the cause of Y would need to have the characteristics of A, B, C, etc. This rules out certain possibilities for X, such as material options among others. After this ruling-out process, the theist says the best/only alternative left is what humans have traditionally called God (in the classical theist since). To counter them, one needs to find a flaw in the ruling out process or offer other alternatives that fit just as nicely.

It only rules out the material option where the material is that which emerged within the observable universe immediately after the Big Bang. Even then, we can't know what the state of the universe was prior to the Big Bang. We have no idea what (if anything) exists outside the boundaries of the observable universe. What it means for something to exist outside of space-time doesn't even make sense because the concept of existence entails space and time.

I would love to explore the argument with you. I think we will both be challenged. Craig's formulation would be my suggestion to guide our exploration:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
4. If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.
5. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.

Are you wanting to cover all five premises, or assume the Kalam's three are true and just analyze the theistic extensions into 4 and 5? Once I know that, I can provide the supports for you to specifically object to.

Unfortunately, there are some nuances I need clarified in a few of the premises.

1. Everything that we subjectively declare as having begun to exist has a cause. Technically, everything we perceive as having begun to exist is composed of fundamental particles that were already in existence. We've never actually observed the fundamental particles beginning to exist to know they began to exist. We just colloquially refer to the reconfiguration of existing fundamental particles as something beginning to exist. Is there evidence to suggest the fundamental particles of which everything is composed began to exist (not a rhetorical question; I really don't know)?

2. How can we know the universe began to exist? If we can't know the state of the universe or cosmos prior to the Big Bang, what is the justification for presuming that it began to exist? Are we just focusing on the state of the universe at the moment of the Big Bang and declaring it to be the beginning of the universe? If so, what is the logical justification for ignoring the unknown state of the universe or cosmos prior to the moment of the Big Bang?

3. If we are actually asking what caused the Big Bang rather than what caused the universe, doesn't the inability to know the state of the universe or cosmos prior to the Big Bang make it impossible for us to determine the cause of the Big Bang with any level of confidence?

4. It doesn't follow from the premises that the cause of the Big Bang was a personal creator.

5. Therefore, it doesn't follow that a personal creator of the universe exists.

[The Tanager]

Unfortunately, there are some nuances I need clarified in a few of the premises.

That's not unfortunate at all; it is needed and expected. I have kept every point you made and will address them in time, but I prefer analyzing an argument methodically, one point at a time. So:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

1. Everything that we subjectively declare as having begun to exist has a cause. Technically, everything we perceive as having begun to exist is composed of fundamental particles that were already in existence. We've never actually observed the fundamental particles beginning to exist to know they began to exist. We just colloquially refer to the reconfiguration of existing fundamental particles as something beginning to exist.

I don't see this premise as making that distinction. Even though the fundamental particles were already in existence, the chair begins to exist. Logically, things can begin to exist in (at least) two ways: ex nihilo and as reconfigurations of more fundamental particles. This premise isn't specifying one of those two ways.

One of your objections is that we don't even know if ex nihilo beginnings can actually occur. I don't see how this is relevant to this premise. If the first premise was claiming that such beginnings do actually occur, then this would be relevant, but the first premise isn't claiming that. Or if you could prove such beginnings can't happen, then that would be relevant.

The other possible objection you may be making is that even if an ex nihilo beginning could happen, it is logically possible that causation works differently with them than with re-configuration beginnings. But, as you've rightly said, logical possibilities aren't enough. Therefore, to uphold your objection here you need to support why it is more rational to believe they would act differently in regards to causation. All of our empirical observations are that existing material does not re-configure without a cause of some kind. Why is it more rational to think that when we take the existing material away, that absolute nothingness, which has no actual characteristics at all, might be able to pop into existence without any cause of some kind? If anything, it seems that already existing material would be more likely to reconfigure without a cause then that nothing would become something without a cause because at least there is something there to be re-configured randomly.