Is it possible to build a sapient machine ?

[Bugmaster]

Topic

Many threads regarding dualism, theism, and philosophy in general, often run into this topic. Is it even hypothetically possible to build a computer that will be sapient -- i.e., an artificial being that will think, feel, and socialize as humans do ? Well, here's our chance: to resolve this debate once and for all ! Smoke 'em if you got 'em, people, this post is gonna be a long one.

I claim that creating Strong AI (which is another name for a sapient computer) is possible. We may not achieve this today, or tomorrow, but it's going to happen sooner rather than later.

First, let me go over some of the arguments in favor of my position.

Pro: The Turing Test

Alan Turing, the father of modern computing (well, one of them), proposed this test in ages long past, when computers as we know them today did not yet exist. So, let me re-cast his argument in modern terms.

Turing's argument is a thought experiment, involving a test. There are three participants in the test: subject A, subject B, and the examiner E. A and B are chatting on AIM, or posting on this forum, or text-messaging each other on the phone, or engaging in some other form of textual communication. E is watching their conversations, but he doesn't get to talk. E knows that one of the subjects -- either A or B -- is a bona-fide human being, and the other one is a computer, but he doesn't know which one is which. E's job is to determine which of the subjects is a computer, based on their chat logs. Of course, in a real scientific setting, we'd have a large population of test subjects and examiners, not just three beings, but you get the idea.

Turing's claim is that if E cannot reliably determine which being -- A or B -- is human, then they both are. Let me say this again: if E can't tell which of the subjects is a computer, then they're both human, with all rights and privileges and obligations that humanity entails.

This seems like a pretty wild claim at first, but consider: how do you know that I, Bugmaster, am human ? And how do I know that you're human, as well ? All I know about you is the content of your posts; you could be a robot, or a fish, it doesn't really matter. As long as you act human, people will treat you as such (unless, of course, they're jerks who treat everyone like garbage, but that's another story). You might say, "well, you know I'm human because today's computers aren't advanced enough to post intelligently on the forums", but doesn't prove much, since our technology is advancing rapidly all the time (and we're talking about the future, anyway).

So, if you're going to deny one of Turing's subjects his humanity, then you should be prepared to deny this humanity to everyone, which would be absurd. Therefore, a computer that acts human, should be treated as such.

Pro: The Reverse Turing Test

I don't actually know the proper name for this argument, but it's sort of the opposite of the first one, hence the name.

Let's say that tomorrow, as you're crossing the street to get your morning coffee, you get hit by a bus. Your wounds are not too severe, but your pinky is shattered. Not to worry, though -- an experimental procedure is available, and your pinky is replaced with a robotic equivalent. It looks, feels, and acts just like your pinkie, but it's actually made of advanced polymers.

Are you any less human than you were before the treatment ?

Let's say that, after getting your pinkie replaced, you get hit by a bus again, and lose your arm... which gets replaced by a robo-arm. Are you human now ? What if you get hit by a bus again, and your left eye gets replaced by a robotic camera -- are you less human now ? What if you get a brain tumor, and part of your brain gets replaced ? And what if your tumor is inoperable, and the doctors (the doctors of the future, of course) are forced to replace your entire brain, as well as the rest of your organs ? Are you human ? If so, then how are you different from an artificial being that was built out of the same robotic components that your entire body now consists of ?

Note that this isn't just idle speculation. People today already have pacemakers, glasses, prosthetic limbs, and yes, even chips implanted in their brains to prevent epileptic seizures (and soon, hopefully, Alzheimers). Should we treat these people as less human than their all-natural peers ? I personally don't think so.

Ok, I know that many of you are itching to point out the flaws in these arguments, so let me go over some common objections.

(to be continued below)

[Bugmaster]

The subject matter for my question about your pain has nothing to do with whether I am justified in believing that you have pain or not. (I think that I am justified in believing that others, including QED and yourself, have pain so therefore I see no reason to explore whether this amounts to a solipsist belief on my part.)

Sorry, I'll have to stop you right there. Why do you feel justified in believing that QED and I feel pain ? I challenge you to provide an explanation that does not rely on dualism, or faith (or both). If you cannot, then you'll have to concede the point, and apply the principle of charity to all entities, be they fleshy or electric. That is the whole point of my original argument.

In other words, I am deliberately setting up a dilemma here: either you go with solipsism, and reject the notion that anyone but you feels anything -- or you go with Turing, and accept machines, aliens, and other non-human things into the category of "people", based on their behavior.

Asking me for a detailed algorithm for human cognition is pointless. I've already said that I can't do it. I'm not asking you for a Grand Unified Theory of Qualia that explains in exact detail how qualia operate and how they relate to the electroweak, strong, gravitational, and other forces (er... are there others ?) -- I don't think it's fair of you to demand a similar task of me.

Note, however, that my argument does not require such an algorithm, no more than your arguments require a GUToQ (tm) theory.

How do you convince someone that pain is nothing more than a computation who doesn't already share your faith that pain is a computational algorithm?

It depends on what you mean by "faith". If you mean, "a totally unfounded belief", then I think you're missing the point, as I've listed many reasons for why I believe it. I absolutely agree that someone who has faith in gods, spirits, or souls would not be convinced by my argument -- but I lack this faith, and I expect others who lack it to be persuaded by my reasoning alone.

I haven't heard of a good "in principle" explanation on why it is that we experience pain.

I guess I don't understand what you mean by "in principle". I think there are good evolutionary reasons for the existence of pain (in animals as well as humans), but I've went over them before. I've explained how my materialistic view of pain fits in with my materialistic view of cognition in general (actually, you've kind of done that for me, with your "logic gate" analogy). So... what else do you need ?

In my view, the term "observation" is based on what humans accept as a matter of convention.

I suppose that's true, but, philosophically and scientifically speaking, the only observations that are worth considering are verifiable, objective observations. I can observe all kinds of stuff after drinking a case of Egg Nog; but no one will take me seriously until I have witnesses or, better yet, a videotape of the weird stuff happening.

Consciousness, though, is something that we cannot objectively observe, because we're not telepathic (yet). I know I'm conscious, but I can only infer that you're conscious based on your behavior. I have no idea what pain really feels like for you. You can't observe what traffic lights feel like to a colorblind person. You can infer it, but you can not observe it.

Strings are theoretical entities and beyond observable status.

I don't think so. If you're saying that string theory cannot, in principle, have empirical evidence for it, then what you're saying is that strings are faith, not science. I don't think many scientists would agree. If you're merely saying that strings cannot be directly observed by our senses then... well... neither can electrons, so what's your point ?

Are you saying that because it mimics you that it must share your inward feelings?

Of course not. I'm merely saying that it is the most parsimonious explanation. The photos you've seen of the Moon's surface do not automatically say that the Moon must be made of rock (as opposed to green cheese); they merely make that explanation the most likely one.

BM, do you realize that this is behaviorism? It has been fully invalidated.

Er, ok. I don't actually know what behaviorism is; different people seem to mean very different things when they use the term. You say that it has been "completely invalidated", but I'm not going to take your word for it -- you'll have to convince me the old-fashioned way. Sorry.

[harvey1]

Why do you feel justified in believing that QED and I feel pain?

Extreme skepticism also must be justified. It is easier for me to justify the principle of charity by accepting that others have real pain given our similarity, and lack of any alternative explanation for why they express in words and actions the very same reactions that I do when I'm in pain. I don't have any other parsimonious explanation other than that we all experience similar pains (and experiences of joy, humor, etc.).

[Y]ou'll have to concede the point, and apply the principle of charity to all entities, be they fleshy or electric. That is the whole point of my original argument.

If robots are eventually able to duplicate our actions of pain, why does this mean that I must attribute to them the experience of pain? I have a perfectly reasonable explanation that doesn't rely on hocus pocus happening inside their chips. All I have to say is that science has merely duplicated their reactions, and I have the hardware designs and algorithms to show that this is the case.

either you go with solipsism, and reject the notion that anyone but you feels anything -- or you go with Turing, and accept machines, aliens, and other non-human things into the category of "people", based on their behavior.

I don't see why I should accept that dichotomy. Evolutionary history is vast enough, and the organisms that exist(ed) are complex enough, that I don't have to be committed to a thesis that states that the strong AI task is solved by merely duplicating outward behavior. In fact, already many of the behaviors and adaptations of certain organisms have been duplicated (e.g., flight), however why should this alone convince us that we have duplicated the actual feelings of pain (joy, humor, etc.)? Afterall, we haven't provided any algorithms to do this, so why should we expect that we have duplicated evolution in this regard?

Again, it seems like you want outward behavior to be the only marker for achieving strong AI simply because you cannot think of a way that would show that we have achieved strong AI. Well, that is only to assume that strong AI is trivial. However, you've never given any evidence that it is trivial. You just assume that it is trivial without any reason for thinking that (other than that this is what you want to believe).

Asking me for a detailed algorithm for human cognition is pointless. I've already said that I can't do it. I'm not asking you for a Grand Unified Theory of Qualia that explains in exact detail how qualia operate and how they relate to the electroweak, strong, gravitational, and other forces (er... are there others ?) -- I don't think it's fair of you to demand a similar task of me.

I think it is fair since you are stating that pain is achieved by computational means. Well, how do you know that unless you can show in principle how such a computation can bring about the feeling of pain?

It depends on what you mean by "faith". If you mean, "a totally unfounded belief", then I think you're missing the point, as I've listed many reasons for why I believe it. I absolutely agree that someone who has faith in gods, spirits, or souls would not be convinced by my argument -- but I lack this faith, and I expect others who lack it to be persuaded by my reasoning alone.

Computations don't yield photosynthesis, for example. However, you would never expect me to believe that you can achieve photosynthesis from computational means alone, right? So, outside of your materialist beliefs, what evidence can you give that pain is a computation and not something more akin to photosynthesis?

I guess I don't understand what you mean by "in principle". I think there are good evolutionary reasons for the existence of pain (in animals as well as humans), but I've went over them before. I've explained how my materialistic view of pain fits in with my materialistic view of cognition in general (actually, you've kind of done that for me, with your "logic gate" analogy). So... what else do you need ?

By "in principle" I mean that you need to provide an account that shows how you can compute pain. All of your attempts to do so went no further than showing that pain was a register which could be used to turn on an LED indicator. That doesn't explain the feeling of pain--not even in principle.

My account of cognition wasn't a computational approach to pain. I explained pain as a physical happening inside the brain that is something akin to ferromagnetism (at least more so than computationalism). As the connections of neurons form block neuronic behavior, new classes of physical interactions take place that generate real virtual mindscapes. If computationalism is true, then there is no such thing as a virtual mindscape since all that computation is doing is moving electrons to achieve a certain kind of computational reaction (or behavior). There are no virtual worlds in this account. In my account, mindscapes exist just like photosynthesis exists. It is a physical happening that is totally dependent on the physical activity of the brain.

If you're saying that string theory cannot, in principle, have empirical evidence for it, then what you're saying is that strings are faith, not science. I don't think many scientists would agree. If you're merely saying that strings cannot be directly observed by our senses then... well... neither can electrons, so what's your point?

My point is that there are many physical phenomena which will never be observed (e.g., inside the horizon event of black holes). However, theoretically they are "observed" by knowing which aspect of the theory can be tested. If the theory is confirmed, then we can confidently say something about the unobservable aspects predicted by the theory. As with consciousness, we may never be able to observe a conscious state, but we might be able to develop a theory of the mind in terms of how conscious states form, and this may give us observables that can be predicted and tested.

BM, do you realize that this is behaviorism? It has been fully invalidated.

Er, ok. I don't actually know what behaviorism is; different people seem to mean very different things when they use the term. You say that it has been "completely invalidated", but I'm not going to take your word for it -- you'll have to convince me the old-fashioned way. Sorry.

I wish I had the time. My interest in these forums, though, is to argue against views that are legitimate options (i.e., established philosophers and/or scientists hold to or are sympathetic to those views). Of course, I'm willing to extend charity to a certain degree on this point. For example, QED has argued for microfunctionalism in his view of the mind, and I was willing to search the literature for a philosophical account that supports his view. I found such an account, and even bought the book. At times it is like reading QED word for word, so it is a very delightful book to read. But, on something like behaviorism, I know it's status and I know it's failings, so I feel like I lack good reasons to spend a great deal of time arguing against an already invalidated view. It is very time-consuming to prove a philosophical view wrong if someone is looking for some knock out argument. Most philosophical arguments are not knock out type arguments. They are much more subtle than that.

However, if you can show me a nuance of behaviorism that a reputable philosopher(s) is supporting, then I would be happy to reconsider this. I just don't want to go on a long-winded thread where I feel the effort is not really worth it. The reason that I debate on internet forums is to find intelligent people (such as yourself) who hold views that are challenging and interesting to contemplate. So, if I see a belief that is not reasonable (e.g., someone holding a creationist view), then I tend not to engage in those debates. I get bored and restless having to defend views that everyone is on the same page (at least in the philosophical community).

[Bugmaster]

Extreme skepticism also must be justified. It is easier for me to justify the principle of charity by accepting that others have real pain given our similarity...

Ah, but remember: under my original conditions, all you have to go on are the forum posts of the participants in question. You don't know how similar or dissimilar they are to you, on the inside -- all you see are the words they post. Under these conditions, your extreme skepticism is, IMO, unjustified.

If robots are eventually able to duplicate our actions of pain, why does this mean that I must attribute to them the experience of pain? I have a perfectly reasonable explanation that doesn't rely on hocus pocus happening inside their chips.

In other words, when you see two entities -- one biological, one electronic -- react to the same stimuli the same way (by acting out as though they were in pain), you nonetheless maintain that the biological entity has something that the electronic one lacks. This is a less parsimonious worldview, and now the burden of proof is on you.

In fact, already many of the behaviors and adaptations of certain organisms have been duplicated (e.g., flight), however why should this alone convince us that we have duplicated the actual feelings of pain (joy, humor, etc.)?

Again, here you are placing certain activities (joy, etc.) in their own, separate category -- as distinct from other activities (flight, etc.). You then use this dichotomy to prove that these activities are completely different. Sounds circular to me.

I should also point out that we have, indeed, duplicated many algorithms that the human nervous system implements. For example, we now understand fairly well how the human retina works; as it turns out, the retina does a lot of preprocessing for the brain, and most of this processing can now be done in Photoshop (actually, Photoshop does more). We now have video cameras that recognize images, cellphones that recognize spoken commands (very useful when driving), AI monsters in games that attempt to surround and confuse the player, spam filters that decide which mail is worth reading, search engines that aggregate news by topic, little virtual pets that act happy or sad or otherwise, depending on how you treat them, etc. The list goes on and on.

I know what you're going to say: "these are just mimicking examples, give me an algorithm for the entire human mind all in one shot". However, I simply don't think that the problem is so "binary". We don't need the whole algorithm at once, we can build it up from individual pieces -- especially since these pieces have clear commercial applications.

You just assume that it is trivial without any reason for thinking that (other than that this is what you want to believe).

Quite the opposite -- I think Strong AI is very difficult, otherwise I would've implemented it myself by now. My claim is much more modest: all I'm saying is that if you cannot tell a human from an AI, then you might as well assume that they're both human, unless your religion says otherwise. Occam's Razor practically demands it.

I think it is fair since you are stating that pain is achieved by computational means. Well, how do you know that unless you can show in principle how such a computation can bring about the feeling of pain?

All right, I'll make you a deal. Show me how, "in principle", qualia interface with the known physical forces in order to (for example) make my arms move. Show me how qualia are acquired, how they relate to human behavior, how they are connected to the biology of the brain. Tell me how, given a human being, we can produce a list of all the qualia inside of that human being, along with all of their properties (assuming they have any, I don't even know). Do that, and I'll give you my algorithm... it should be done around the same time :-)

Computations don't yield photosynthesis, for example.

Eh, it depends on what you mean by "computations". The photosynthetic chain could be thought of as a computational pipeline, though that's not it's main function.

So, outside of your materialist beliefs, what evidence can you give that pain is a computation and not something more akin to photosynthesis?

I'm not sure what you mean here. There's no such thing as disembodied computation, so pain can't be "just" computation, assuming that's what you're saying. Furthermore, pain is a response to a stimulus, which could be externally caused (such as a rock falling on your foot), so, again, pain is not "just" computation. Now, granted, we could build an entire Matrix where everything is computation, even falling rocks, but again, I don't think this is what you mean.

I think the problem here is that you think of "computation" as something that calculators do: "2+2=4", etc. While this is technically correct, that's not the only kind of computation there is. Ultimately, computation is anything that is reducible to a Turing Machine (note: same Turing, totally different machine !), calculators and neurons included; this is a much more general concept.

In my account, mindscapes exist just like photosynthesis exists. It is a physical happening that is totally dependent on the physical activity of the brain.

Right, but remember that I don't believe in your multi-lism worlview (multilism > dualism > monism), and thus your analogy to photosynthesis is not persuasive. But that's our other thread, again.

As with consciousness, we may never be able to observe a conscious state, but we might be able to develop a theory of the mind in terms of how conscious states form, and this may give us observables that can be predicted and tested.

Whoa ! Did you just say that we can infer the presence of a "mind" by obseving behavior ? Welcome to my world :-) But, if behavior is not enough, what else do you propose that we observe ?

I wish I had the time. My interest in these forums, though, is to argue against views that are legitimate options (i.e., established philosophers and/or scientists hold to or are sympathetic to those views).

Ok, sure, you can label my argument as bein an "illegitimate option", and reject it a priori but I don't think many people here would be convinced by that kind of tactic. Cetainly not myself.

[harvey1]

Extreme skepticism also must be justified. It is easier for me to justify the principle of charity by accepting that others have real pain given our similarity...

...under my original conditions, all you have to go on are the forum posts of the participants in question. You don't know how similar or dissimilar they are to you, on the inside -- all you see are the words they post. Under these conditions, your extreme skepticism is, IMO, unjustified.

You mean my lack of extreme skepticism, right? I'm not extremely skeptical about other people's feelings of pain because I don't think I have good reason to be extremely skeptical. However, if you mean a world where robots mimic people having pain, then I would be extremely skeptical as I alluded to before. We don't live in that world, so I have no reason to doubt that other posters lack the feeling of pain.

If robots are eventually able to duplicate our actions of pain, why does this mean that I must attribute to them the experience of pain? I have a perfectly reasonable explanation that doesn't rely on hocus pocus happening inside their chips.

In other words, when you see two entities -- one biological, one electronic -- react to the same stimuli the same way (by acting out as though they were in pain), you nonetheless maintain that the biological entity has something that the electronic one lacks. This is a less parsimonious worldview, and now the burden of proof is on you.

Why is the onus on me? If an electronic entity exists, then it should be fairly easy to contact the designers and ask them how they programmed their robots to experience pain. If they can show me an algorithm that naturally leads to their robots experiencing pain, then I'm willing to extend the charity of robots experiencing pain as other biological entities. If they cannot, then I assume that their AI creatures can only display human expressions of pain much like a puppet expresses human movements by the manipulation of puppeteers.

As for biological entities, I cannot look inside their skulls very effectively, nor review the mechanisms that generate pain (or just the outward appearance of pain); therefore the most parsimonious assumption is that the feeling of pain evolved early on (i.e., prior to mammalian evolution). That parsimonious assumption leads me to conclude that neither I nor other humans are the only biological creatures that experience real pain. I am justified in my beliefs here.

In fact, already many of the behaviors and adaptations of certain organisms have been duplicated (e.g., flight), however why should this alone convince us that we have duplicated the actual feelings of pain (joy, humor, etc.)?

Again, here you are placing certain activities (joy, etc.) in their own, separate category -- as distinct from other activities (flight, etc.). You then use this dichotomy to prove that these activities are completely different. Sounds circular to me.

Are you suggesting that these are not separate categories? If they are not separate categories, then why are not the behaviors for each of these phenomena also identical?

I should also point out that we have, indeed, duplicated many algorithms that the human nervous system implements. For example, we now understand fairly well how the human retina works; as it turns out, the retina does a lot of preprocessing for the brain, and most of this processing can now be done in Photoshop (actually, Photoshop does more). We now have video cameras that recognize images, cellphones that recognize spoken commands (very useful when driving), AI monsters in games that attempt to surround and confuse the player, spam filters that decide which mail is worth reading, search engines that aggregate news by topic, little virtual pets that act happy or sad or otherwise, depending on how you treat them, etc. The list goes on and on.

Well, there are still conferences on how this stuff works, so vision science is still learning how it is that we see. However, I think you miss a vital point. All of the stuff that we use that mimics the functionality of certain biological processes is all algorithmically driven. We can see and know why this stuff works simply by analyzing algorithms and engineering drawings. However, when it comes to the experience of pain, you switch gears and say that this is a function that we are asked not to expect to see an algorithm or engineering drawing in order to explain how that function works. Why?.... Why?

I know what you're going to say: "these are just mimicking examples, give me an algorithm for the entire human mind all in one shot". However, I simply don't think that the problem is so "binary". We don't need the whole algorithm at once, we can build it up from individual pieces -- especially since these pieces have clear commercial applications.

I'm not asking for the algorithm in detail. I'm asking for the algorithm in principle. Imagine someone trying to sell stock into a company about to make a great gravity wave detection system that will soon be able to detect gravity once enough wave detection functions are written. However, no evidence is ever given as to whether it is really a gravity detection system that is being constructed. Whenever someone asks where the algorithms are to detect gravity waves, they change the subject and talk about electromagneticism. Shouldn't we be suspicious about such a gravity detector salesman? Shouldn't we wonder if they have a clue as to what they are doing? I for one would not buy stock in that company based on an idle dream having no "in principle" vision as to how such a device is going to work.

Quite the opposite -- I think Strong AI is very difficult, otherwise I would've implemented it myself by now. My claim is much more modest: all I'm saying is that if you cannot tell a human from an AI, then you might as well assume that they're both human, unless your religion says otherwise. Occam's Razor practically demands it.

That assumption is not justified unless you have an inkling on how the algorithm of the strong AI is supposed to work in principle. For example, it would take me a few minutes to explain how a CPU works in principle. That doesn't mean that my explanation is suitable for someone to go out and build a CPU from scratch, but that explanation would convince someone who is modestly informed about digital devices that I'm not talking hokey pokey. Obviously if I said that a CPU works by behaving like a CPU, then I haven't explained anything. If I continued along those lines, eventually doubts will creep in on my ability to explain CPUs. Similarly, if merely immitating certain behaviors is the goal of strong AI, then no one should believe that anything about cognition has been explained. Puppeteers use their puppets to immitate human actions, and I don't see anyone thinking that puppets are really accomplishments of some AI project.

All right, I'll make you a deal. Show me how, "in principle", qualia interface with the known physical forces in order to (for example) make my arms move. Show me how qualia are acquired, how they relate to human behavior, how they are connected to the biology of the brain. Tell me how, given a human being, we can produce a list of all the qualia inside of that human being, along with all of their properties (assuming they have any, I don't even know). Do that, and I'll give you my algorithm... it should be done around the same time

Bugmaster, I think you completely misunderstand what it is that I'm saying. A quale is a dynamical system operating along other systems that collectively form a yet larger dynamical system called the mind. Raising your arm is a dynamical process that takes many dynamical systems working together to explain why it is that this action takes place. For example, there must exist a dynamic property called a "belief" that raising one's arm will achieve something desirable for the larger dynamical system (called the Self).

So, I don't see the mystery that you are trying to introduce. Arms might end up being raised because a dynamical system operating inside the brain feels pain. You can't explain why it is that the arm is being raised unless you understand the dynamical systems that explain the feeling of pain. This system is "running in the brain" which through some complex process interacts with the dynamical system called the nervous system. The nervous system controls the arm by physical process which are ultimately quantum mechanical in nature.

Computations don't yield photosynthesis, for example.

Eh, it depends on what you mean by "computations". The photosynthetic chain could be thought of as a computational pipeline, though that's not it's main function.

I'm not referring to a dynamical systems' ability to compute (of course!). I'm referring to Turing computation utilizing a Turing machine (in principle) as a type of computing mechanism.

So, outside of your materialist beliefs, what evidence can you give that pain is a computation and not something more akin to photosynthesis?

I'm not sure what you mean here. There's no such thing as disembodied computation, so pain can't be "just" computation, assuming that's what you're saying. Furthermore, pain is a response to a stimulus, which could be externally caused (such as a rock falling on your foot), so, again, pain is not "just" computation. Now, granted, we could build an entire Matrix where everything is computation, even falling rocks, but again, I don't think this is what you mean.

The stimulus feeds the Turing machine, and the TM treats the stimulus as an input. The computation is the processing of the inputs using a set of instructions (i.e., algorithm). Are you suggesting that pain is something other than the computing(/information processing) of stimulii?

I think the problem here is that you think of "computation" as something that calculators do: "2+2=4", etc. While this is technically correct, that's not the only kind of computation there is. Ultimately, computation is anything that is reducible to a Turing Machine (note: same Turing, totally different machine !), calculators and neurons included; this is a much more general concept.

I'm not saying that you are supporting computerism (the view that the brain is a computer). I have assumed all along that you are supporting computationalism (the view that the brain is a Turing machine). Notice, this is different than my position that the brain is a dynamical system (or dynamicism). Dynamicism holds that the brain can compute (duh!), but it differs from computationalism in saying that the brain is a static Turing device. According to dynamicism, the brain is a physical phenomena that produces emergent properties. (Most dynamicists would probably go one step further and say that the universe is mainly producing emerging properties of one sort or another....)

As with consciousness, we may never be able to observe a conscious state, but we might be able to develop a theory of the mind in terms of how conscious states form, and this may give us observables that can be predicted and tested.

Whoa ! Did you just say that we can infer the presence of a "mind" by obseving behavior ? Welcome to my world But, if behavior is not enough, what else do you propose that we observe ?

Well, human behavior is certainly one kind of observable that a good dynamical theory of the mind can produce. Other observables might be predicting the physical structure of the brain. So, for example, a good theory might explain how microtubules are used in the brain, and perhaps provide observables in how to verify that the theory is correct (e.g., neuro-chemical signatures, etc.). Other observables might include brain scanning and electrical signatures obtained from PET, fMRI, MEG, EEG, etc..

you can label my argument as bein an "illegitimate option", and reject it a priori but I don't think many people here would be convinced by that kind of tactic. Cetainly not myself.

I don't think it is a tactic. It is just common sense to avoid discussions where one of the participants is advocating a view that is commonly known to be debunked. I realize that you are very busy, and I don't mean to be rude. However, I don't see why I should go into a lengthy discussion on why behaviorism crumbled (e.g., Noam Chomsky's debunking argument, etc.). If anyone doesn't like that "tactic," then I suggest that they do some mild reading on the subject. It's not my intention to ruffle your feathers...

[QED]

I find this a fascinating and tricky topic. It's always interesting to be on the wrong end of Harvey's skepticism, and in this particular case I can understand where the skepticism is coming from. However, when I review what we know about our perception of pain etc; and what we know of the evolution of these phenomena, I have no choice but to return to the line that our experiences only seem grander than they actually are, and would emerge by different degrees in any model we might construct.

We know from referred and phantom pains that the sensation is 'virtual' i.e. not happening in a real sense in any particular limb in question. Rather, it is a signal received in the sensory cortex (a signal that can be spoofed through injury). The signal then triggers the sensation that grabs our attention and this all goes on within the brain. I think we all agree on this, but the sensation itself is the bit that we disagree about. The problem is that I can see no reason whatsoever to invent a tangible emergent or special algorithm to account for this. All we can measure from the outside is electro-chemical activity and to me the sensation of pain itself seems no different at a fundamental level to all other sensations: be they sound, light, taste etc.

Sure it does all seem very tangible to us but we already know how insubstantial things like vision really are. Of the 130 million light sensitive cells in the retina a huge data compression (over 100:1) takes place resulting in only 1 million cells carrying the compressed information to the visual cortex via the optic nerve. Clearly our experience of vision is a virtual reconstruction (with a lot of guesswork thrown in) and it seems to me as though Harvey is constantly looking for something more than there really is to experiences in general. I simply cannot think of or see the need for an algorithm that generates qualia. Just because we have invented a word for the experience of experiencing things doesn't mean that it ought to be something we can separate-out from the equipment that produces it and put in a bottle.

Life has evolved an enormous variety of sensory systems ranging from the simple sorts of things that we too can emulate in robotics all the way up to natures most recent developments. One of these is revealed to us by the phenomenon called blindsight:

It's almost as if the patient is using ESP. He can see and yet cannot see. So it's a paradox, it's almost like science fiction. How is this possible? Well, if you look at the anatomy, you can begin to explain this curious syndrome. It turns out from the eyeball to the higher centers of the brain where you interpret the visual image, there's not just one pathway. There are two separate pathways, which subserve different aspects of vision. One of these pathways is the evolutionarily new pathway, the more sophisticated pathway, if you like, that goes from the eyeball through the thalamus to the visual cortex of the brain. Now, you need the visual cortex for consciously seeing something. The other pathway, which is older evolutionarily, and is more prominent in animals like rodents, lower mammals, birds and reptiles, goes to the brain stem, the stalk on which the brain sits. And, from the brain stem, gets relayed eventually to the higher centers of the brain. Specifically, the older pathway going through the brain stem is concerned with reflexive behavior orienting to something important in the visual field, making eye movements, directing your gaze, directing your head toward something important.

In these patients, one of these pathways alone is damagedthe visual cortex is damaged. Because that's gone, the patient doesn't see anything consciously. But the other pathway is still intact. And he can use that pathway to guess correctly the direction of movement of an object that he cannot see.

Here evolution has started out with the essential vision system required for reflexive survival but has then gone on to develop a more subtle form of conscious vision. Notice however, that in the above account the brain stem vision still enters the patients conscious mind in the form of "blindsight".

Harvey worries that we are asking him not to expect to see an algorithm or engineering drawing in order to explain how all the various functions of perception work, but I think he would agree that we could not reasonably be expected to do that for the simplest of perception systems (e.g. the Paramecium's reaction to acid) and by building on this in a stepwise fashion, evolution has delivered us with infinitely more complex systems -- but still systems based on the same fundamental principles, and as a consequence I firmly believe that all life experiences a degree of consciousness and the only explanation required for perception is the description of the sensor/motor loops and the values/meanings afforded by evolution. At no point on the evolutionary journey do I think something magic was invented which transformed robots into sentient beings. I think we are all robots. I also think we are all sentient beings.

[harvey1]

I have no choice but to return to the line that our experiences only seem grander than they actually are, and would emerge by different degrees in any model we might construct.

But, how do they emerge? Are you saying that this emergence is the result of a Turing computation? If not, then how does it emerge? Layout a description of how it is that the feeling of pain emerges.

The problem is that I can see no reason whatsoever to invent a tangible emergent or special algorithm to account for this. All we can measure from the outside is electro-chemical activity and to me the sensation of pain itself seems no different at a fundamental level to all other sensations: be they sound, light, taste etc.

There's two different phenomena. There is the acting on a register, and there is the feeling that the register has been activated. Is it not reasonable to suggest that we can have one without the other? If not, then why not?

Clearly our experience of vision is a virtual reconstruction (with a lot of guesswork thrown in)... Just because we have invented a word for the experience of experiencing things doesn't mean that it ought to be something we can separate-out from the equipment that produces it and put in a bottle.

But, why suppose that there must be a sensation if there is no functionality provided to feel a sensation? Why can't thermostats just react to temperature changes without feeling the temperature change? Why unnecessarily add functionality to a thermostat just because it makes our job of explaining the sensation of pain all that much easier?

[Bugmaster]

I'm not extremely skeptical about other people's feelings of pain because I don't think I have good reason to be extremely skeptical. However, if you mean a world where robots mimic people having pain, then I would be extremely skeptical as I alluded to before.

Yeah, that's the extreme skepticism I mean, and "...we don't live in that world..." doesn't do it for me, because my original post sets up a hypothetical situation where we do live in a world where intelligent robots exist.

What you're saying, essentially, is, "if I knew that intelligent robots existed, I'd be extremely skeptical about anybody I met online, regardless of how human they seemed". That level of extreme skepticism seems unjustified to me.

Think about it this way. Let's say that you post some argument online, and an anonymous user responds with a profound, well-written, and insightful comment (*), which causes you to seriously re-evaluate the way you view life, and makes you a happier person. If you find out that this anonymous poster is, in fact, a robot, will you go back to your old way of life and pretend that his post never existed ?

If your answer is "yes", then I'd like to see some serious justification. If your answer is "no", then you're supporting my position. If your answer is, "a robot could never post such a comment in the first place", then you need to explain what makes robots categorically different from humans (i.e., you need to explain why robots cannot be infused with qualia).

(*) Yes, I am aware that very few humans are able to post such comments, but bear with me here.

Why is the onus on me? If an electronic entity exists, then it should be fairly easy to contact the designers and ask them how they programmed their robots to experience pain.

Again, you are holding the robotic entity to a much higher standard than the biological one. You don't know how the biological entity experiences pain, besides some vague notions that pain must have evolved. Even modern neurobiologists do not have a full understanding of the human brain -- far from it. We do not have a "full algorithm" (or a Grand Unified Qualia Theory) for the biological humans, yet you're perfectly willing to grant them humanity, nonetheless:

As for biological entities, I cannot look inside their skulls very effectively, nor review the mechanisms that generate pain (or just the outward appearance of pain); therefore the most parsimonious assumption is that the feeling of pain evolved early on (i.e., prior to mammalian evolution).

So, you're granting humans their humanity, even though you can't look directly inside their skulls; you just assume that pain must have evolved, somehow. But, you're denying the same humanity to robots who act like humans do, and you justify this denial by your inability to look inside the robots' "skulls". That's inconsistent.

If they cannot, then I assume that their AI creatures can only display human expressions of pain much like a puppet expresses human movements by the manipulation of puppeteers.

Careful, here, you're changing the conditions of the experiment. In all of my examples, this one included, the robotic entity is fully independent, and fully interactive. It is responding to stimuli, not following a hardcoded track like a movie; and it is not externally controlled by anyone (at least, not more so than us humans are).

Are you suggesting that these are not separate categories? If they are not separate categories, then why are not the behaviors for each of these phenomena also identical?

Huh ? Obviously, flying and walking are very different behaviors. However, they are both in the same category: purely material behaviors produced by physical muscles and feathers and such. All I'm saying is that cognition is another such behavior, not that cognition is equivalent to flight. Duh.

All of the stuff that we use that mimics the functionality of certain biological processes is all algorithmically driven. We can see and know why this stuff works simply by analyzing algorithms and engineering drawings. However, when it comes to the experience of pain, you switch gears and say that this is a function that we are asked not to expect to see an algorithm or engineering drawing in order to explain how that function works. Why?.... Why?

Huh ? I never said that we can never see an "algorithm" (*) for pain; in fact, my entire argument states that such an algorithm will eventually be developed ! All I'm saying is that I can't give you such an algorithm now. Again, I'm arguing that Strong AI is possible in principle, not that it already exists. However, you keep saying, basically, "Strong AI is impossible in principle because Bugmaster can't give me a working Strong AI", which sounds a bit irrational to me.

More importantly, I don't understand your distinction between a process and the "functionality of the process". Is oxidation different from the functionality of oxidation ? In the end, you still have H + OH --> H2O, right ?

Anyway, as I've repeatedly stated, I believe that an algorithm for pain is "in principle" possible, because our existing human bodies do indeed embody such an algorithm. You, on the other hand, believe that humans are powered by dualistic qualia, which cannot be understood in physical or algorithimic terms, in principle.

What's happening here is that we're going back and forth: I'd say, "show me evidence for qualia", and you'd respond with, "no, you show me evidence for no qualia". Seeing as you're positing the existence of a new entity (qualia), I still think the onus is on you to show that they exist.

This applies to any new entity you propose, be it irreducibly complex emergent properties, qualia, souls, whatever.

Obviously if I said that a CPU works by behaving like a CPU, then I haven't explained anything.

This is a false analogy, because you're describing a CPU to someone who has no idea what a CPU does, whereas I am talking about human behaviors, which everyone has experience with.

A better analogy might be as follows: when you, an Intel user, ask me how an AMD CPU works, I'd say, "I don't know the details, but I imagine it still has an ALU that can perform binary operations on registers". And if you asked, "how do I build my own CPU that works like this Intel one I've got ?", I'd say, "make sure it can perform the following binary operations on registers: or, and, add with carry, not, etc. Also, make sure it can be plugged into an Intel motherboard". In other words, if your CPU duplicates the functionality of the Intel CPU, then you can use them interchangeably. If your robotic mind duplicates the functionality of the human mind, then they're equivalent for all practical purposes.

Bugmaster, I think you completely misunderstand what it is that I'm saying. A quale is a dynamical system operating along other systems that collectively form a yet larger dynamical system called the mind.

Ok, so you're once again introducing a new term: "dynamical system". What are dynamical systems ? And why can't we construct them out of spare parts ? You haven't really explained anything; all you've done is replace your mysterious qualia with another mysterious dynamical system. I still have no idea how it works, how it interacts with eloectromagnetic forces, etc.

The stimulus feeds the Turing machine, and the TM treats the stimulus as an input. The computation is the processing of the inputs using a set of instructions (i.e., algorithm). Are you suggesting that pain is something other than the computing(/information processing) of stimulii?

No, you've summed it up pretty well. Of course, the result of the computation might be to change the algorithm, but I assume you know that.

I have assumed all along that you are supporting computationalism (the view that the brain is a Turing machine).

Ah good, we're clear then. Yes, this is exactly what I'm supporting. The brain might be a nondeterministic Turing machine, or a Turing machine with a random input (due to some quantum effects), but it's a Turing machine nonetheless.

Whoa ! Did you just say that we can infer the presence of a "mind" by obseving behavior ? Welcome to my world :-) But, if behavior is not enough, what else do you propose that we observe ?

Well, human behavior is certainly one kind of observable that a good dynamical theory of the mind can produce. Other observables might be predicting the physical structure of the brain...

So, you're saying that we should assume that "dynamic" (is that the same as "dualistic" ?) minds exist, and infer human behavior and physical structure from that. This is not a scientific approach. In science, we first observe something (such as behavior or physical makeup of the brain), and then attempt to provide an explanation.

However, I don't see why I should go into a lengthy discussion on why behaviorism crumbled (e.g., Noam Chomsky's debunking argument, etc.).

Hey, it's a free country -- I'm certainly not going to force you to argue if you don't feel like it ! That said, I personally don't care why this or that philosophical movement crumbled; I only care about my own reasoning being correct.

[harvey1]

What you're saying, essentially, is, "if I knew that intelligent robots existed, I'd be extremely skeptical about anybody I met online, regardless of how human they seemed". That level of extreme skepticism seems unjustified to me. Think about it this way. Let's say that you post some argument online, and an anonymous user responds with a profound, well-written, and insightful comment (*), which causes you to seriously re-evaluate the way you view life, and makes you a happier person. If you find out that this anonymous poster is, in fact, a robot, will you go back to your old way of life and pretend that his post never existed?

No, I wouldn't go back to my former lifestyle anymore than I would go back to a former lifestyle without the use of cellphones. I'd chalk it up to another gadget changing my life for the better, so I have no qualms about that.

you're supporting my position.

How am I? A gadget does very useful things, that's why gadgets are invented and manufactured. I see great use of gadgets that can act as debate sparing partners, or even psychologists. However, if I am supposed to believe that these gadgets have feelings, then I might as well start sweet talking my car to save gas, or throwing shoes at my television when it doesn't skip commercials. You see, I don't see a reason to impart human feelings to inanimate objects, no matter how sophisticated the engineering design. I don't see why you would either.

...you are holding the robotic entity to a much higher standard than the biological one. You don't know how the biological entity experiences pain, besides some vague notions that pain must have evolved. Even modern neurobiologists do not have a full understanding of the human brain -- far from it. We do not have a "full algorithm" (or a Grand Unified Qualia Theory) for the biological humans, yet you're perfectly willing to grant them humanity, nonetheless

Of course, and that's because I have good reason to do so. It is non-sensical to believe that I'm unique in experiencing pain. It is extremely parsimonious to believe in biological evolutionary theory where these functions of feeling pain evolved long before the Cretaceous. I believe that is the most sensible view, don't you?

On the other hand, I don't have any reason to believe that thermometers are having an orgasm whenever I turn it up, do you? So, why should I believe that this imparted functionality of feeling pain somehow happens magically to digital devices? I know that evolution is complex enough to produce this imparted function from the shear amount of evidence that evolution can bring about complex things. So, why should I doubt that the feeling of pain is one of those emergent phenomena that evolutionary processes caused millions upon millions of years ago? BM, you are asking me to doubt evolutionary theory, do you see how ridiculous and hypocritical that is for your position?

So, you're granting humans their humanity, even though you can't look directly inside their skulls; you just assume that pain must have evolved, somehow. But, you're denying the same humanity to robots who act like humans do, and you justify this denial by your inability to look inside the robots' "skulls". That's inconsistent.

No, it's not. If there were a phenomena that I was unfamiliar with, e.g., astral projection, then I would be skeptical that artificial and biological life could possess such a phenomena. However, unlike astral projection, I know that I do feel pain even though I don't travel around the world while sleeping (as far as I know). So, I immediately conclude that evolution caused the feeling of pain, and I also immediately conclude that evolution did not cause astral projection.

The situation is also reversed in favor of human technology. I know that we can create TeV particle accelerators since one of the world's largest accelerators is an easy drive from where I live. But, I don't see TeV particle accelerators as a biological adaptation in the wild. So, I would be extremely skeptical if someone said that they have discovered a biological version of Fermi Labs or CERN (wouldn't you?). It's not that I think it is logically impossible, I just think that it is physically unlikely given the limitations of biological structures in making particle accelerators equivalent to Fermi's capabilities (or CERN's capabilities). If someone was convinced that such structures existed, then I would ask for an in principle description--that leading biologists and physicists could agree upon--which met the requirements of being a pure biological structure and being a TeV particle accelerator equivalent to Fermi's capabilities.

I think the same applies to gadgets. Before we can accept that they have the same biological functionality with regard to feeling pain, we should have good reason to think this. We don't have any reason to think this. In fact, we have some good reasons not to think it since we know the algorithms and engineering designs so well with the gadgets that are manufactured in the world.

I never said that we can never see an "algorithm" (*) for pain; in fact, my entire argument states that such an algorithm will eventually be developed! All I'm saying is that I can't give you such an algorithm now. Again, I'm arguing that Strong AI is possible in principle, not that it already exists. However, you keep saying, basically, "Strong AI is impossible in principle because Bugmaster can't give me a working Strong AI", which sounds a bit irrational to me.

Well, since we're clarifying things, I never said that strong AI is impossible in principle. What I've said is that we have no reason to believe that a Turing machine in principle is capable of bringing about the feeling of pain. In fact, we have good reasons for thinking that Turing machines are not capable in principle of doing it. However, I wouldn't say it is impossible (just like I wouldn't say that biological adaptations of TeV particle accelerators are impossible).

More importantly, I don't understand your distinction between a process and the "functionality of the process".

We can duplicate certain results of a natural process without using that process to duplicate the result. So, for example, we can create natural sunlight lamps without using nuclear fusion to create that natural light. It would, of course, be a very significant error to believe that sunlight lamps use processes that are equivalent to the processes going on in yellow stars. Similarly, just because a future robot can be easily visualized to exactly imitate outward human expressions of pain does not mean it is also duplicating our feeling of pain.

Anyway, as I've repeatedly stated, I believe that an algorithm for pain is "in principle" possible, because our existing human bodies do indeed embody such an algorithm. You, on the other hand, believe that humans are powered by dualistic qualia, which cannot be understood in physical or algorithimic terms, in principle.

BM, how could you possibly think that given the very detailed description I provided of how I think dynamic systems can cause the emergence of qualia?

What's happening here is that we're going back and forth: I'd say, "show me evidence for qualia", and you'd respond with, "no, you show me evidence for no qualia". Seeing as you're positing the existence of a new entity (qualia), I still think the onus is on you to show that they exist.

You already agreed that you feel pain. So, the onus is now off of me. Your response was that I am not justified in believing you, but that argument is not valid since there is no reasonable reason why I should doubt that there are other people other than myself.

And if you asked, "how do I build my own CPU that works like this Intel one I've got ?", I'd say, "make sure it can perform the following binary operations on registers: or, and, add with carry, not, etc. Also, make sure it can be plugged into an Intel motherboard". In other words, if your CPU duplicates the functionality of the Intel CPU, then you can use them interchangeably. If your robotic mind duplicates the functionality of the human mind, then they're equivalent for all practical purposes.

Okay, let's add to this analogy. Just for fun, let's say that we do not know that Intel made a deal with the NSA in 2002 to receive all of our memory contents downloaded on a nightly basis by modulating the A/C power of the motherboard (note: unbeknownst to us the NSA collects this Intel data from nearby power substations). From our perspective the AMD chip does everything that the Intel chip does, but it doesn't send our computer's memory contents on a nightly basis to the NSA. If you worked at NSA, then you might be concerned by AMD manufacturing Intel chips since all of that information is no longer being collected. The people walking around saying that the AMD chip is exactly like the Intel chip have been duped, but they do not know it. The NSA feels the pain.

What this clarified analogy demonstrates is that outward functionality is not a very good indicator of identity between machine mimicing of pain and human sensations of pain. Just as in the NSA example, the two chips can be made to behave exactly the same while unbeknownst to those who make the AMD/Intel identity: the AMD chip lacks key internal properties.

Ok, so you're once again introducing a new term: "dynamical system". What are dynamical systems ? And why can't we construct them out of spare parts ? You haven't really explained anything; all you've done is replace your mysterious qualia with another mysterious dynamical system. I still have no idea how it works, how it interacts with eloectromagnetic forces, etc.

Dynamical systems are real-world systems that are described by state spaces. Movement through the state space reflects a change in the system. For example, the heating and cooling of water is a dynamical system. Liquid water (system) if cooled to 0 deg C (at sea level), undergoes a first-order phase transition where it becomes ice. Liquid water if heated to 100 deg C (at sea level), undergoes another first-order phase transition where it turns into steam.

We can construct dynamical systems out of spare parts, but we cannot compute them into existence using Turing machines. We can only simulate dynamical systems with Turing machines. These models are not the dynamical system, they are models of dynamical systems.

The dynamical system(s) that comprises the mind is fully composed of biological structure. However, and this is a key point, the structure is dynamic which means that the individual biological components (neurons, synapses, etc.) are not sufficient to explain the dynamic system without an understanding of the system as a whole. Therefore, when we raise our arm, the raising of the arm is explained by the system working as an emergent entity (called the mind) that intends for the arm to be raised. The biological components conform to the emergent entity because these components are part of the dynamic system. These components evolved to respond to the emergent behavior which has been self-organized as key evolutionary adaptations.

So, you're saying that we should assume that "dynamic" (is that the same as "dualistic" ?) minds exist

As I said, I think the whole duality thing is not an accurate representation of my views. In a certain sense, I think dynamical systems are dualistic since there is something other than biological components that are responsible for mental phenomena: namely, there is also system dynamics that are responsible for mental phenomena. Dualism is a very misleading label since it sounds as if I'm advocating a ghost in the machine, which is far from my position.

and infer human behavior and physical structure from that. This is not a scientific approach. In science, we first observe something (such as behavior or physical makeup of the brain), and then attempt to provide an explanation.

BM, Newton's theory is a dynamic system approach. QED is a dynamic system approach. So is the standard model and string theory. If you want to think this is not scientific, then you'd be ruling out most of the scientific breakthroughs in the 20th century (not to mention the 17th century...).

Hey, it's a free country -- I'm certainly not going to force you to argue if you don't feel like it ! That said, I personally don't care why this or that philosophical movement crumbled; I only care about my own reasoning being correct.

I thought you didn't live in the United States? Anyway, I appreciate your confidence in your views. However, look at it from my perspective, behaviorism has been fully and completely invalidated, so why should I entertain a long-winded discussion where someone hasn't the time to investigate it themselves? I'm not comparing behaviorism to creationism, but certainly you can understand if I said that I didn't want to debate creationism because it has been fully and completely invalidated, right?

[Bugmaster]

No, I wouldn't go back to my former lifestyle anymore than I would go back to a former lifestyle without the use of cellphones. I'd chalk it up to another gadget changing my life for the better, so I have no qualms about that... How am I? A gadget does very useful things, that's why gadgets are invented and manufactured.

Wow ! So, even though you carry on a meaningful conversation with a forum user, are impressed by his intelligence and wit, perhaps even befriend him (insofar as it's possible to befriend anyone online), once you find out that he could potentially be robotic in nature, that's it -- from that moment on you'd consider him (it) to be nothing more than a useful gadget. I can almost admire this level of extreme skepticism. This is exxtreme skepticism to the max, right there.

So, in a world where robotic philosophers exist, you'd potentially consider everyone to be a useful gadget, nothing more. And, since you can never truly examine anyone's qualia -- especially not when they're posting from thousands of miles away -- you'll treat everyone you meet as a bot.

Again, this level of extreme skepticism needs to be justified. Under my worldview, I just conseider everyone who acts human to be human, and move on. I think it makes a lot of sense.

Of course, and that's because I have good reason to do so. It is non-sensical to believe that I'm unique in experiencing pain. It is extremely parsimonious to believe in biological evolutionary theory where these functions of feeling pain evolved long before the Cretaceous.

Why ? I mean, I can certainly see the evolutionary advantage of pain, but, when seen in these terms, pain is just a mechanism that fullfills a function. As I'd mentioned before, there's nothing magical about any particular mechanism; its functions can be duplicated or even improved upon by us clever humans. But, presumably, you believe that there's something more to pain than mere functionality. Thus, it's up to you to show me what these additional features are, and how they've evolved, since natural selection as I understand it only "cares" about functionality.

On the other hand, I don't have any reason to believe that thermometers are having an orgasm whenever I turn it up, do you?

This, again, is a false analogy, since thermometers do not behave as humans do (orgasmic or not). My hypothetical Strong AI bots do behave as humans do.

If my thermometer could carry on an online conversation half as well as you or QED could, I'd consider it human for all intents and purposes. Of course, in that case, it wouldn't be a thermometer anymore, it'd just be a human with a very refined sense of temperature.

I know that evolution is complex enough to produce this imparted function from the shear amount of evidence that evolution can bring about complex things. So, why should I doubt that the feeling of pain is one of those emergent phenomena that evolutionary processes caused millions upon millions of years ago?

What, that's it ? Well then, by your logic, we should definitely be able to produce Strong AI, since we have a proven ability to create complex things, and this ability is rising exponentially (Moore's Law).

It's not that I doubt that evolution can produce consciousness; I doubt that biological evolution is the only thing that can produce consciousness. There's a difference there.

But, I don't see TeV particle accelerators as a biological adaptation in the wild. So, I would be extremely skeptical if someone said that they have discovered a biological version of Fermi Labs or CERN (wouldn't you?).

I don't quite understand your point here (and I don't get where you were going with astral projection, either). Are you saying that humans cannot create any functionality that animals have evolved ? That's silly, because we have machines that fly and breathe and see and do all kinds of other things that animals do. Or, are you saying that consciousness is about as useful, evolutionary speaking, as a TeV accelerator -- i.e., not at all ? That's silly too, because we've both already agreed that consciousness is a very useful evolutionary adaptation (and that seems kind of obvious to me). So... what are you saying ?

Before we can accept that they [gadgets] have the same biological functionality with regard to feeling pain, we should have good reason to think this. We don't have any reason to think this. In fact, we have some good reasons not to think it since we know the algorithms and engineering designs so well with the gadgets that are manufactured in the world.

Ah ! This sounds exactly like biological naturalism: "only biological creatures can feel pain, therefore it's impossible to create a device that feels pain". But all you've done is push the problem down a level. Why is it that only biological creatures can feel pain ? Because pain has evolved ? Ok, what's so special about pain that it absolutely must evolve and cannot be constructed, as opposed to other human functions (breathing, etc.) that have evolved but can be constructed as well ? Is the answer, "because pain requires qualia" ? But then, what are qualia, how do they cause pain, and why is it that they absolutely must evolve and cannot be constructed ? Is it because qualia are emergent properties ? Why can't we construct a machine that will generate such properties ?

All you're doing is renaming your mystery factor, you're never actually explaining how it works or why it is necessary at all.

What I've said is that we have no reason to believe that a Turing machine in principle is capable of bringing about the feeling of pain. In fact, we have good reasons for thinking that Turing machines are not capable in principle of doing it.

What are these reasons, other than the above ?

It would, of course, be a very significant error to believe that sunlight lamps use processes that are equivalent to the processes going on in yellow stars.

But who cares ? If an artificial lamp (and it'd have to be a pretty big lamp) outputs the same exact spectrum and intensity of light as our Sun, why would you prefer one over the other ? I mean, plants certainly won't care...

I do not think we need to duplicate the entire functionality of a human being in order to construct Strong AI. In fact, we have some human beings today -- paralyzed people, autistic people (with varying degrees of autism), blind people, people with pacemakers, etc. -- who lack certain functions that the majority of us possesses. Are you saying that they're not human ?

What is the minimum set of functionality you'd require in order to accept someone as human -- provided that you're not telepathic, and can't sample their internal thoughts and feelings directly ?

BM, how could you possibly think that given the very detailed description I provided of how I think dynamic systems can cause the emergence of qualia?

Huh ? I just re-read your post, and your description wasn't detailed at all. You just stated that these "dynamical systems" produce emergent entities, and that they cannot be computed, only simulated (what's the difference ?). You've also hinted that solid water is a completely different substance from liquid water, and that their relationship is irreducible to H2O molecules -- which, to me, sounds fairly wrong.

How do "dynamical systems" emerge ? What makes a system dynamical, or are all systems potentially dynamical ? What is the mechanism by which dynamical systems give rise to emergent properties, and why are emergent properties irreducible to the underlying systems ? How does evolution produce dynamical systems ? Which parts of our brain house which dynamical systems, and how did they evolve ? Which dynamical systems produce the feeling of pain when I stub my toe, and how are they related to the neural structures in my body ?

I could go on and on but I think you see my point. All you've done is replace your mystery factor called "qualia" with a mystery factor called "dynamical system" (which is actually even more mysterious because it makes chemistry not work, at least as far as water is concerned). You haven't explained anything.

Yes, I know that you've repeatedly stated that you do not advocate a "ghost in the machine", but the rest of what you're saying sounds suspiciously like such a ghost to me.

You already agreed that you feel pain. So, the onus is now off of me.

What ? No. I've agreed that I feel pain, but I've also provided a purely materialistic explanation for why I feel pain, which also allows me to justifiably believe (with a high degree of certainty) that other humans feel pain, as well. However, under your worldview, you are not justified in believing that other humans feel pain, because your worldview depends on things that are not observable in principle. So, my worldview explains more and it's simpler to boot... A clear winner.

Just for fun, let's say that we do not know that Intel made a deal with the NSA in 2002 to receive all of our memory contents downloaded on a nightly basis by modulating the A/C power of the motherboard (note: unbeknownst to us the NSA collects this Intel data from nearby power substations). From our perspective the AMD chip does everything that the Intel chip does, but it doesn't send our computer's memory contents on a nightly basis to the NSA. If you worked at NSA, then you might be concerned by AMD manufacturing Intel chips since all of that information is no longer being collected. The people walking around saying that the AMD chip is exactly like the Intel chip have been duped, but they do not know it. The NSA feels the pain.

Essentially, what you're saying is that there could be some functionality that humans have but robots lack. Ok, what is that functionality, and why can't it, in principle, be constructed ? Note that, in your example, the NSA data collection is still a purely materialistic process, and it is still a function that Intel chips perform but AMD chips do not (they don't modulate the power supply correctly). If AMD really wanted to implement this functionality, they could. You, however, are saying that only Intel has the magical power to implement NSA's spying, and no one else does. So, there's something magical about Intel's chips that cannot, in principle, be duplicated by anyone. So... what is it ?

I would go one step further, and claim (as I've done before) that humanity is a gradient, and not a true/false condition. Even biological humans that we have today have a very different range of behaviors and personalities (compare, for example, and average forum troll and QED). So, I don't require bots to be 100% human, because even natural humans aren't 100% human. 99.9999% is close enough.

BM, Newton's theory is a dynamic system approach. QED is a dynamic system approach. So is the standard model and string theory.

Ah, now we're getting somewhere. Let's stick to the nice and simple Newton for now. Show me which parts of Newton's theory explicitly prove the existence of irreducible emergent properties. Then, contrast Newtonian Mechanics with some other scientific theory, which is not dynamical in nature.

Personally, I don't see anything in "F=ma" that is irreducible, but that's me.

Again, I don't know exactly what you mean by "behaviorism", but it doesn't matter. You can opt out of this discussion at any time, but you can't persuade anyone that my views are wrong merely by stating that they've been invalidated by someone. After all, that's the same tactic that the Creationists use: "everyone knows that evolution is wrong, but the scientific mafia doesn't want come out and say it. Trust us." That's just not very convincing.

[Bugmaster]

I think we are all robots. I also think we are all sentient beings.

For the record, this sums up my view exactly. As usual, QED expressed my beliefs better than I could :-)