Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

You do remember telling me it wasn't objectivism/subjectivism back in post#676, right? That's what lead up to this particular line of questioning. Are you discarding that old claim or are these somehow still compatible?

No, I misread what you were asking in the last post (and possibly previous posts). I thought you were asking me if our view of aesthetic freedom was objectivism/subjectivism. I think it is, which is what I also said in post 676. Personal aesthetic taste is not objectivism/subjectivism.

[Bust Nak]

No, I misread what you were asking in the last post (and possibly previous posts). I thought you were asking me if our view of aesthetic freedom was objectivism/subjectivism. I think it is, which is what I also said in post 676. Personal aesthetic taste is not objectivism/subjectivism.

Right, so the question is still, why can't the argument you gave for why "our view of aesthetic freedom was objectivism/subjectivism" also be used to show that "personal aesthetic taste" is also objectivism/subjectivism?

[The Tanager]

Right, so the question is still, why can't the argument you gave for why "our view of aesthetic freedom was objectivism/subjectivism" also be used to show that "personal aesthetic taste" is also objectivism/subjectivism?

My argument is that X (aesthetic freedom) is objectivism/subjectivism because it comes from one's view of Y (whether aesthetic taste is an objective or subjective feature of reality). What do you see as the equivalent argument for aesthetic taste being objectivism/subjectivism? I don't think there is an equivalent Y.

[Bust Nak]

My argument is that X (aesthetic freedom) is objectivism/subjectivism because it comes from one's view of Y (whether aesthetic taste is an objective or subjective feature of reality).

We were talking about liking X (aesthetic freedom) though. What is your argument that liking aesthetic freedom being objectivism/subjectivism? I am guessing these ("liking X" and "X") aren't the same thing to you since you said whether you would still like certain music (while disapproving people listening to it) if music taste was somehow an objective feature of reality.

[The Tanager]

My argument is that X (aesthetic freedom) is objectivism/subjectivism because it comes from one's view of Y (whether aesthetic taste is an objective or subjective feature of reality).

We were talking about liking X (aesthetic freedom) though. What is your argument that liking aesthetic freedom being objectivism/subjectivism? I am guessing these ("liking X" and "X") aren't the same thing to you since you said whether you would still like certain music (while disapproving people listening to it) if music taste was somehow an objective feature of reality.

Sorry, I hastily wrote that. My argument is that liking X (aesthetic freedom) is objectivism/subjectivism because it comes from one's view of Y (aesthetic taste) being either an objective or subjective feature of reality.

So, if Y (music taste) were objective (say, rap music was objectively good and all other music was objectively bad), then I would dislike X (aesthetic freedom). My liking folk music would be the Y (music taste) I hold.

I don't see an equivalent argument for aesthetic taste being objectivism/subjectivism, not seeing an equivalent to Y above.

[Bust Nak]

Sorry, I hastily wrote that. My argument is that liking X (aesthetic freedom) is objectivism/subjectivism because it comes from one's view of Y (aesthetic taste) being either an objective or subjective feature of reality.

So, if Y (music taste) were objective (say, rap music was objectively good and all other music was objectively bad), then I would dislike X (aesthetic freedom). My liking folk music would be the Y (music taste) I hold.

I don't get it, why would you still like folk music if it is objectively bad?

[The Tanager]

I don't get it, why would you still like folk music if it is objectively bad?

What do you mean by "like"? Like I said before, I naturally like objectifying women but I don't like it (i.e., I don't think it is good to do that and will seek not to satisfy that desire).

[Bust Nak]

What do you mean by "like"? Like I said before, I naturally like objectifying women but I don't like it (i.e., I don't think it is good to do that and will seek not to satisfy that desire).

These are the same meaning of "like." Here is a google definition: find agreeable, enjoyable, or satisfactory. Some aspects (lets call these X) of objectifying women you find agreeable, other aspects (lets call these Y) you don't find agreeable.

This is how I saw your position:

A) You like X regardless of whether X is an objective feature of reality or not, yet whether you like Y depends on whether Y is an objective feature of reality or not.

This is what you are telling me:

B) You like X regardless of whether X is an objective feature of reality or not, yet whether you like Y depends on whether X is an objective feature of reality or not.

Neither scenario make sense to me. What would make sense would be something like:

C) You like X regardless of whether X is an objective feature of reality or not, just as you like Y regardless of whether Y is an objective feature of reality or not. Or

D) You like X depends on whether X is an objective feature of reality or not, just as you like Y depends on whether Y is an objective feature of reality or not.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bust Nak in post #699]

I think "like" is used in different ways. It often gives me one kind of immediate pleasure to objectify a woman. Sometimes that feeling is also accompanied by a displeasure because objectifying women harms them, myself, and others. I think the displeasure outweighs the pleasure, making the action immoral. That is what I mean.

[Bust Nak]

I think "like" is used in different ways. It often gives me one kind of immediate pleasure to objectify a woman. Sometimes that feeling is also accompanied by a displeasure because objectifying women harms them, myself, and others. I think the displeasure outweighs the pleasure, making the action immoral. That is what I mean.

I don't think we are, here you speak of pleasure and displeasure. That's what I mean by like and dislike. You dislike it more than you like it, that's perfectly normal.