Free-will

[sofyst]

Whether it be a label given by Christians or non-Christians, Atheist or Agnostics, I think that the idea of 'free-will' is thrown around far too much, without further realizing or knowing what exactly is the nature of this horrid beast (I say horrid because I do not agree with it ).

Therefore, may I ask that we discuss what exactly free-will is? I would first like someone, anyone, to posit their definition of what free-will is. Then I think we should all discuss this definition to see if it is satisfactory. If not, we'll try another. Then we can, hopefully, come to a working definition of what free-will is. Then we can debate on whether or not it truly exists.

[Corvus]

Would you then say that it can be the capacity to make choices that are affected by internal causes, and yet still be labeled as free will? Or must it be free from external as well as internal causes?

Ah, now we get to the part where we go about defining "free". I would say free will, as it is defined by humans, is still considered free if it is prompted/affected by internal causes or affected by external causes. My own opinion is that there is no answer to your question unless we agree on a term for free. Free was originally used to describe the opposite of a state of captivity or domination by another person. Does that mean a "free" will is only one that is not subject to an external entity? I suppose that particular definition would include everything under the sun.

Note: An issue with your question - My definition of free will stated it to be the capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause. I admit that it can be affected by external causes, and that a large part of our choices exist solely through the influence of these external causes.

the capacity to make wholly individual choices.

"The capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause".

Could we perhaps agree that these definitions would be better suited if the words choices and were replaced with 'will'? After all, we are discussing whether the will is free or not, or a suitable definition for this 'freedom of the will'; therefore would it not be best to stick with what is 'willed' rather than venturing off into what is chose. Or do you see this as a insignificant replacement.

The definitions would read:

The capacity to wholly individually will.

The capacity to will that is not a direct result of an external cause.

In these senses we would understand the 'willing' to be free, and hence free-will would be used. However if we maintained the use of choice, I think that we would have to then discuss that it is freedom of choice that is being addressed. As the choice is what is not a result of an external cause.

I think this to be a minor issue, yet one which will have lasting effects later...could we agree on this?

How would you define will? A quick glace at Dictionary.com suggests that the capacity to choose is exactly what we classify as will.


Pardon if this post is a bit confusing, or poorly written. Typing this in my 30 minute lunchbreak, and wish I could spend more time on it.

[sofyst]

Forgiveness is given. Perchance at a latter time when you are more apt to formulate it into words more easily understandeable and representative of your true thoughts; then you could share them with the class.

I will wait until then...but be warned. I am very A.D.D., therefore I cannot wait long.

[Corvus]

Forgiveness is given. Perchance at a latter time when you are more apt to formulate it into words more easily understandeable and representative of your true thoughts; then you could share them with the class.

I will wait until then...but be warned. I am very A.D.D., therefore I cannot wait long.

Oh no, go ahead. My footnote was a disclaimer covering me in the event that someone couldn't surmise my thoughts from my hastily written words. Go ahead and respond to my post, and If there is some difficulty in understanding, then I will try to explain myself clearer.

[The Happy Humanist]

I think that the will would have just as much to do with the action as it would have to do with the mind. The mind can control the will which in turn controls the body, which is action. Yet the body can likewise control the will which then controls the mind.

The mind is the will. They are inseparable. The actions of the body are all expressions of will (conscious or otherwise).

Imagine if God had not made us creatures of free will. What is the opposite condition? As the Christians are fond of saying, we would be robots. And robots have no thoughts, and robots do not move until programmed to do so. There is no mind, there is no "I". Once one is self-aware, one has thoughts...and thoughts are an unconsciously willed phenomenon.

If I understand that it is not good for me to gorge myself upon food, I can reason within my mind that this is a horrid practice. Then I can will myself not to continually eat until I am gordo. This would be mind controlling will controlling body.

I think you're thinking of will as in "willpower." That's only a part of the whole definition of "will." Will is volitional action - including the act of thinking. No, ESPECIALLY the act of thinking. And thinking is a function of who you are, your self-identity.

Now, consider all or even part of your volitional thinking being removed from you, as we are told will happen when you enter the Pearly Gates. I am given to understand that we will be unable to even consider unpure thoughts or actions. They won't occur to you. Sounds nice....but is that really you in there? Or an idealized version of you, turned into a not-quite-autonomous automaton? Will you get to enjoy heaven...or will your celestial avatar, who is not-quite-you?

Therefore, I think it be just as important to discuss what the will is in reference to the action (which I do not think we are solely doing here) as it would be to discuss it in reference to the thoughts of the mind.

Two sides of the same coin, as I said above. We can't will one thing and do another (except in rare cases of brain damage or callosal disconnect) . We can't decide to turn left and turn right instead. So discussion of outward actions is really secondary - whatever actions we take, you can be certain there was a volitional thought process behind it, the will...if you will . And since your thoughts are always uniquely bound to your identity, if there is no free will, there is no person.

[sofyst]

Very well Happy Humanist, thank you for your comments; they will be considered and reviewed at a later time.

Ah, now we get to the part where we go about defining "free". I would say free will, as it is defined by humans, is still considered free if it is prompted/affected by internal causes or affected by external causes. My own opinion is that there is no answer to your question unless we agree on a term for free. Free was originally used to describe the opposite of a state of captivity or domination by another person. Does that mean a "free" will is only one that is not subject to an external entity? I suppose that particular definition would include everything under the sun.

Ah yes it would. Some however would distinguish those things which are external to the will. They would place two categories: those external to the person, and those internal in the person.

Some would object, as you have noted, and say that the will must be free of all external influences (whether it be in or outside the person). Yet some recognize that this is ridiculous as people will in accordance with their own feelings, you 'choose' something because you desire it the greatest at the moment.

Therefore I would recognize that the will is bound by the self, influences within the self; yet I would still maintain that it is completely unhindered by things outside of the self.

You holding a gun to my head and telling me to recant Christianity is an example of an external influence. However, if I am inclined to take up your most pleasantly presented offer, I wouldn't be doing so because you influenced me directly (indirectly, yes). As the ultimate determining factor would be my desire for life above my desire to please my Lord.

However, if I refuse to abide by your wicked threats; then it is greater desire within me to please my Lord, rather than to succumb to your wickedness.

You understand, my desires influence my will. These are internal in the self; yet external the will.

Would you agree?

Note: An issue with your question - My definition of free will stated it to be the capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause. I admit that it can be affected by external causes, and that a large part of our choices exist solely through the influence of these external causes.

Yet you would say that to be completely free, free-will must be absolutely 'free' of all external influences (desires included)?

I think I understand. And would agree. This is a working definition of 'free-will'. And if freedom is required to be devoid of all influences, I would reject this freedom. Would you not?

[Corvus]

Very well Happy Humanist, thank you for your comments; they will be considered and reviewed at a later time.

Ah, now we get to the part where we go about defining "free". I would say free will, as it is defined by humans, is still considered free if it is prompted/affected by internal causes or affected by external causes. My own opinion is that there is no answer to your question unless we agree on a term for free. Free was originally used to describe the opposite of a state of captivity or domination by another person. Does that mean a "free" will is only one that is not subject to an external entity? I suppose that particular definition would include everything under the sun.

Ah yes it would. Some however would distinguish those things which are external to the will. They would place two categories: those external to the person, and those internal in the person.

Some would object, as you have noted, and say that the will must be free of all external influences (whether it be in or outside the person). Yet some recognize that this is ridiculous as people will in accordance with their own feelings, you 'choose' something because you desire it the greatest at the moment.

Therefore I would recognize that the will is bound by the self, influences within the self; yet I would still maintain that it is completely unhindered by things outside of the self.

You holding a gun to my head and telling me to recant Christianity is an example of an external influence. However, if I am inclined to take up your most pleasantly presented offer, I wouldn't be doing so because you influenced me directly (indirectly, yes). As the ultimate determining factor would be my desire for life above my desire to please my Lord.

However, if I refuse to abide by your wicked threats; then it is greater desire within me to please my Lord, rather than to succumb to your wickedness.

You understand, my desires influence my will. These are internal in the self; yet external the will.

Would you agree?

Yes, but what is the origin of your desires, if not the external world and the pre-ordained structure of the self, which, as you state, is external to the will?

Note: An issue with your question - My definition of free will stated it to be the capacity to make choices that are not a direct result of an external cause. I admit that it can be affected by external causes, and that a large part of our choices exist solely through the influence of these external causes.

Yet you would say that to be completely free, free-will must be absolutely 'free' of all external influences (desires included)?

I think I understand. And would agree. This is a working definition of 'free-will'. And if freedom is required to be devoid of all influences, I would reject this freedom. Would you not?

If I were free of all influences, the question of whether or not to reject this particular freedom would fall on deaf ears. It's impossible, as asking the question is externally influencing the will of the one who answers. It's quite funny; will is the capacity to choose, but every choice relies upon the existence of an external world that presents scenarios for one to decide about. Choice requires options, and options are only possible with constraints.

Here's a question; does choice ever occur, or is every one of our choices merely a product of deduction?

[sofyst]

Yes, but what is the origin of your desires, if not the external world and the pre-ordained structure of the self, which, as you state, is external to the will?

The orgin of your desires may be the external world (distant causes) yet the desires themselves are still internal (immediate causes).

If I were free of all influences, the question of whether or not to reject this particular freedom would fall on deaf ears. It's impossible, as asking the question is externally influencing the will of the one who answers. It's quite funny; will is the capacity to choose, but every choice relies upon the existence of an external world that presents scenarios for one to decide about. Choice requires options, and options are only possible with constraints.

I like those thoughts.

Here's a question; does choice ever occur, or is every one of our choices merely a product of deduction?

Explain what you mean by deduction...please.

[Corvus]

Yes, but what is the origin of your desires, if not the external world and the pre-ordained structure of the self, which, as you state, is external to the will?

The orgin of your desires may be the external world (distant causes) yet the desires themselves are still internal (immediate causes).

I agree, except I am not entirely sure why you put in the bracketed items. I feel it convolutes the issue somewhat, when everything could be the cause of a cause of a cause.

If I were free of all influences, the question of whether or not to reject this particular freedom would fall on deaf ears. It's impossible, as asking the question is externally influencing the will of the one who answers. It's quite funny; will is the capacity to choose, but every choice relies upon the existence of an external world that presents scenarios for one to decide about. Choice requires options, and options are only possible with constraints.

I like those thoughts.

And you still believe in God?

Here's a question; does choice ever occur, or is every one of our choices merely a product of deduction?

Explain what you mean by deduction...please.

[/quote]

Ah, I thought you would have guessed this one. Think about the process of making decisions or choices. Take Mr Muffin's ice cream, for example. There are an assortment of flavours here, some of which you like, some of which you know you do not like, and some of which you tried. Depending on the character of the person approaching the ice scream stand, whether this person is naturally brave or taught themselves not to take chances, the person may go for his favourite flavour, or be adventurous and try the new crocodile's teat flavour. The flavour he settles on will be determined through a process of deduction in which he evaluates the risks and benefits filtered through his perspective. Even when you sit down to this debate forum, the reason you do so is probably based on a number of reasons. You have free time, you have an internet connection, you enjoy debating, you have some interest in learning, etc, etc. Mr Muffin once made a very good post about the question of choice in which he made the point that it if all choice is a matter of deduction in this manner, then the choice of whether or not to believe in God is certainly not as black and white as it is made out to be, and neither should one be blamed for what is a deduction based off the intrinsic reasoning powers of a human being. The reason I choose to walk this way instead of that way is because it suits my current nature.

So what I mean by deduction is that all decisions are made, conscoiusly or not, by the input of data combined with the calibration of our reasoning.

[sofyst]

So what I mean by deduction is that all decisions are made, conscoiusly or not, by the input of data combined with the calibration of our reasoning.

As long as we understood the input of data to include our very natures (I choose homemade vanilla not only because it is available, but because I like that flavor above all*) I would see no problem with saying that our decisions are made by the input of data combined with the calibration our reasoning.

However, I would likewise like to specifically point out, as I think you already know (by your choice of saying 'consciously or not'), that this calibration of our reasoning is not always actively or consciensly within our minds. I may come to the ice cream and choose homemade vanilla but it is because I desire this flavor and it is available, I do not necessarily spend five minutes reasoning whether or not I should really choose homemade vanilla. It is often done in what may appear to be a rash judgement of me just randomly choosing the first flavor that makes my mouth salivate, yet the time of the judgement in no way excludes the motives behind it.

*I say 'nature' not thinking about the basic human nature which can be known in common of all humanity, rather the distinctive likes and dislikes of each individual person. My nature is more inclined to intellectual things, whereas my brother's is more inclined towards practical things. If you can think of a word much more fitting, it would be helpful; yet nature is all that came to mind.

[PrismPaul]

If I might weigh in, I find this topic endlessly fascinating, have thought a lot about this lately, and I’ve arrived at the conclusion (to answer the original question of this thread):

Free-will is an illusion – a complete fiction.

I feel that determinism, the absence of free will, is the most reasonable theory of how our mind works and how we subsequently behave. (I don't believe that the matter can be “proven” one way or the other, by the way.)

Consider a venus flytrap. This plant could easily appear to an observer to "decide" whether to close on its prey and when to do so. Flies come and go, walk around, and then, seemingly at random - wham! The observer's conclusion makes sense until he is aware of the little hair that triggers closure. Once that is discovered, the flytrap behavior appears to be much less volitional, and much more deterministic.

I believe that a venus flytrap does not have free will. I believe it functions on an entirely deterministic basis. Inputs --> process --> outputs.

Move on to an ant. I think it is very reasonable to believe that an ant does not have free will. When an ant appears to "decide" to turn left or turn right, to continue searching for food or to take a piece of food and return to the anthill, I find it easy to believe that what is going on is very similar to what goes on with the flytrap - only of a more complex order. Inputs (many more) --> process (much more complicated) --> outputs.

It seems to me most reasonable to surmise that our human brain works the same way.

Our brain does things all the time that we do not "decide" to do. I do not decide to cause my heart to beat. I do not decide to squint my eyes when light shines into them. All "involuntary" reflexes are examples of the majestic computer/machine that is our mind/body acting deterministically. Inputs --> process --> outputs. Why doubt that the "conscious" function of our brain works on the same fundamental basis?

The universal set of living things that we can observe appear to behave along cause and effect processes that are on a scale from the relatively simple (amoeba) to the incomprehensively complex (us). As we move up that scale of complexity, we come to a point where we are unable to scientifically explain and trace the myriad of inputs nor the complexity of the processes that lead to the outputs (behavior). To me it is illogical to surmise that somewhere between the amoeba and us, this concept of "free will" appears. Indeed I think it probable that "free will" is just a word for "mental processes I can't possibly trace and understand". Man will probably always lack the ability to trace and fully understand the workings of the computer between our ears. This is no reason to conclude that it is not a computer. In fact, most of what we do know about the brain reinforces the idea that it acts like a computer.

It certainly appears to us as if we have free will. But then it once appeared to everyone that the earth was flat, or that the sun revolved around the earth. It was clear to people for generations that the sun rose and set in the sky, but they were wrong. The history of scientific progress has been one of dismantling poor conclusions that were based on correct observations. In most cases, these poor conclusions were under-girded by an inflated human ego. I think the same thing may well be going on here. Most feel that we lose something "special" about ourselves if we accept determinism.

However, I suspect there is a level of maturity in acknowledging this very real possibility about ourselves. Most men have come to accept that we are not at the center of the universe, and that we are genealogically related to other animals, even though both of these realizations involved mega-blasts to our ego. Most men will someday, I'm guessing, accept the idea that our behavior is not caused by some inexplicable magic called "free will", but rather by a wondrous process of cause and effect on an immense scale of complexity.

Along that line of maturity may be a more mature approach to human behavior. We have spent our history insisting on a model of "Forces of Evil" vs. "Forces of Good". We may come to realize that we can increase our wellbeing best by better understanding the inputs and processes that lead to all the various human outcomes. For example, we know well the increase in criminal behavior of fatherless boys, and the increased tendency to commit sexual abuse of those who were sexually abused themselves. Do these correlations not point to determinism?

Is it so hard to believe that our very thoughts are causally dictated by the sum of all of our influences, the result of myriad inputs over our lives, running through this mega-computer brain of ours?

If this is true, then our goal should be to find the inputs that lead to the best outputs - we don’t need to understand how the computer works in order to learn how to use it most effectively.