THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN wrote:...
the Court has held on many occasions that the government violates the establishment clause when it engages in conduct that a reasonable observer would view as an endorsement of a particular religious belief or practice, including prayer. On the other hand, the Court has held that some forms of “ceremonial deism,� such as legislative prayer, do not violate the establishment clause.
...
It goes beyond mere “acknowledgment� of religion because its sole purpose is to encourage all citizens to engage in prayer, an inherently religious exercise that serves no secular function in this context. In this instance, the government has taken sides on a matter that must be left to individual conscience. “When the government associates one set of religious beliefs with the state and identifies
nonadherents as outsiders, it encroaches upon the individual's decision about whether and how to worship.� McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 883 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, I conclude that § 119 violates the establishment clause.
...
[R]ecognizing the importance of prayer to many people does not mean that the government may enact a statute in support of it, any more than the government may encourage citizens to fast during the month of Ramadan, attend a synagogue, purify themselves in a sweat lodge or practice rune magic. In fact, it is because the nature of prayer is so personal and can have such a powerful effect on a community that the government may not use its authority to try to influence an individual’s decision whether and when to pray.
...
If the executive branch were free to disregard the First Amendment, it would mean that decades of Supreme Court decisions are invalid.
...
To many, the idea of government endorsement of religion is not only acceptable, but also a desirable way to promote public morality and strengthen community bonds. ... To those people, the problem is that government does not promote religion
enough. ... To those whose beliefs comport with the message sent by the government, it is difficult to understand why anyone would object to the message.
However, religious expression by the government that is inspirational and comforting to a believer may seem exclusionary or even threatening to someone who does not share those beliefs. This is not simply a matter of being “too sensitive� or wanting to suppress the religious expression of others.
...
Justice O’Connor has framed the problem concisely: “government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full members of the political community.�
...
It is important to clarify what this decision does not prohibit. Of course, “[n]o law
prevents a [citizen] who is so inclined from praying� at any time. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). And religious groups remain free to “organize a privately sponsored [prayer event] if they desire the company of likeminded� citizens. Lee, 505 U.S. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring). The President too remains free to discuss his own views on prayer. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
only issue decided in this case is that the federal government may not endorse prayer in a statute as it has in § 119.
[center]ORDER[/center]
IT IS ORDERED that
- The motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., Anne Nicol Gaylor, Annie Laurie Gaylor, Dan Barker, Paul Gaylor, Phyllis Rose and Jill Dean, dkt. #103, is GRANTED with respect to plaintiffs’ claim that 36 U.S.C. § 119 violates the establishment clause; the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Barack Obama and Robert Gibbs, dkt.#82, is DENIED with respect to that claim.
- It is DECLARED that 36 U.S.C. § 119 violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- 3. Defendants are ENJOINED from enforcing 36 U.S.C. § 119. The injunction shall take effect at the conclusion of any appeals filed by defendants or the expiration of defendants’ deadline for filing an appeal, whichever is later.
Entered this 15th day of April, 2010.
