An Argument for Dualism

[Dimmesdale]

Let us start out with the default materialist position that consciousness, or "mind" if you will, is an epiphenomenon of the brain.

Where is this epiphenomenon located? Or is it located at all (I'm sure many will point this out - but the validity of the question remains, as I will explain further)? Does it reside as a unified field of electrical impulses throughout the brain and extending into the nervous system? If so, one may ask: is it of a unitary nature, or is it merely a conglomeration of separate electrical events, which merely appear to be a singular self? Is it, in that case, of a sporadic inconstant nature?

If the materialist goes the latter route, as I think he has to, I feel there are some problems. But first let me say that it is highly counterintuitive to the average person to think that his self is not unitary in direct experience. We all say "I" when referring to ourselves, and we feel there is weight behind this statement. We are, after all, individuals. One may say that it is because of association with a body that is discrete from other bodies that we come to this conclusion. But this is only a supposition that is far from proven. We feel ourselves often as moral agents with integrity, and this causes us to transcend bodily concerns such as in the case of sacrificing our life for a cause. Be that as it may, I will not dwell on this point.

If we say that individuality, or personal unity as I would like to call it, is an illusion, then there is no locus or "center" from which the self could be organized. If we ourselves could organize it by dint of our own misperception, that would seem superhuman, almost divinely fanciful. We do not at some stage in our existence 'decide' to identify as mere 'I', and to think that we simply derive this from our misperception also requires some sort of background as to the 'how.' I suppose the standard derivation would be via evolution. But how could impersonal biological processes lead to a personal predisposition to identify as 'I'? Why not identify as random processes, without consciousness? Why does consciousness say 'I' at all? Why are we not insentient? Is it because of survival, the will to 'be' - what Spinoza termed the conatus? Perhaps, perhaps not.

If there is no established explanation forthcoming for why selfhood is an illusion, one ought to, therefore, default to the common sense position that what we feel (and some would go so far as to say know) means that we do in fact have a self.

And that raises the problem of where this self is located.

For, if we are reducible to our bodies, then so is this self. Perhaps not like an appendage (though some amputees may very well feel dramatically changed after losing a limb) but as a unitary field of being co-hereing with the body.

And how would a materialist model trace that exactly? Where do we exist, for instance, in sleep or in a coma? We are not "there", at least not fully, although technically we are alive nonetheless by conventional standards. Even if we are not unconscious, how would you measure consciousness? A neuron more or less? If our bodies, including our brains, are constantly in flux, with cells dying at various rates, how is this united field allowed to perdure and persevere?

To me it seems that, in order to avoid chaos and incoherence and incongruity, one would have to admit that this field of awareness, the self, is not dependent on the fickle changes of the body, but in fact transcends it as a separate category. Otherwise, if the body changed - even if ever so minutely, then this unitary field would shatter, would not be the same field as it was previously. It would be a completely new entity, in which case I as Tom at 11:01 PM would cease to exist, and a new entity would immediately hijack his body. There has to be some kind of enduring substance that is not at the mercy of what are many, many changes in the body happening all the time.

But one might take an example from the planet. "Well, the earth has a magnetic field, does it not?" I would say "yes" but this magnetic field is simply something we ourselves measure rather than something we ourselves are. The earth's magnetic field is not a subject or experiencer. There lies the difficulty. There is no way to know the knower except to be the knower. And so material examples are inadmissible. They cannot prove what is the case.

[fredonly]

Let us start out with the default materialist position that consciousness, or "mind" if you will, is an epiphenomenon of the brain.

That's a strawman, not a "default materialist position". Most mental activity can be accounted for through mechanisms consistent with metaphysical naturalism.

Where is this epiphenomenon located?

Although I reject epiphenomenalism, it's a red herring to imply it would have a location. Mental activity is a process, entailing a series of intentional states.

f we say that individuality, or personal unity as I would like to call it, is an illusion, then there is no locus or "center" from which the self could be organized.

Non-sequitur. There is "unity" because sensory input is received and processed by each individual brain.

And how would a materialist model trace that exactly? Where do we exist, for instance, in sleep or in a coma? We are not "there", at least not fully, although technically we are alive nonetheless by conventional standards. Even if we are not unconscious, how would you measure consciousness? A neuron more or less? If our bodies, including our brains, are constantly in flux, with cells dying at various rates, how is this united field allowed to perdure and persevere?

The neural configurations in a brain are present even during unconsciousness, even though the the executive function is laying dormant - or being employed in dreaming.

The only legitimate objection to a materialist theory of mind is the "hard problem of consciousness". I recommend you read up on this, and then present a more relevant challenge.

[Dimmesdale]

Although I reject epiphenomenalism, it's a red herring to imply it would have a location. Mental activity is a process, entailing a series of intentional states.

Honestly, I can't even follow the argument I outlined here, fallacious or not. It's been too long.

However, I can disagree that "mental activity" is a "process" in all respects. It depends what you mean by mental activity. For me, the formation of thoughts, (whatever that is) is a process. But a thought itself is not necessarily an "event." Furthermore, I would say that consciousness itself, is no process. I consider it more along the lines of a definite object. Like a mountain. Or an ocean. It has the same type of endurance and everlasting nature, in my book.

I think it is sheer dogmatism to make any sweeping generalization about consciousness or 'mental activity' all being a process. It isn't clear that that MUST be so.....

For example, a Thought "Is." We say of a material object, such as a rock, that it "Is." By saying the word "Is" we indicate some "thing's" definite existence. It isn't necessary to invoke any hocus pocus to make a thought into an object, it already is one by virtue of language. First we need to doubt our language, before we can doubt that a thought is a mere 'process' without any tangible self-existence.....

And then, we would have to question the existence of the rock, too.....

[fredonly]

However, I can disagree that "mental activity" is a "process" in all respects. It depends what you mean by mental activity. For me, the formation of thoughts, (whatever that is) is a process. But a thought itself is not necessarily an "event." Furthermore, I would say that consciousness itself, is no process. I consider it more along the lines of a definite object. Like a mountain. Or an ocean. It has the same type of endurance and everlasting nature, in my book.

I think it is sheer dogmatism to make any sweeping generalization about consciousness or 'mental activity' all being a process. It isn't clear that that MUST be so.....

It's also dogmatic to insist a thought is a "thing". Anyway, I'm not insisting anything- I'm just relating my view, as you're relating your own.

I defend my view on the basis that the brain is an organ and brain activities occur. I embrace physicalism, which entails that brain+its activities can fully account for everything associated with the "mind". Under this paradigm, "the mind" is a term of art - and vaguely refers to that which engages in perceiving, thinking, etc. All the things that are evaluated in philosophy of mind are processes. A thought entails a series of "mental states (i.e. physical states).

For example, a Thought "Is." We say of a material object, such as a rock, that it "Is." By saying the word "Is" we indicate some "thing's" definite existence. It isn't necessary to invoke any hocus pocus to make a thought into an object, it already is one by virtue of language.

Language doesn't establish what exists; it establishes only how people have historically considered things. So - indeed, if you're going to claim a thought is an existing ontological object that exists in the world, then you have to account for how this can be. Obviously, it's not consistent with physicalism - so you have to assume something(s) nonphysical exists. Why think that?

First we need to doubt our language, before we can doubt that a thought is a mere 'process' without any tangible self-existence.....

I went for a run this morning. Does this run exist as an object in the world, or is it just a shorthand means of conveying the activity of running?

And then, we would have to question the existence of the rock, too.....

Non-sequitur. The fact that runs and thoughts are not objects of the world doesn't imply that rocks aren't either.

[Dimmesdale]

It's also dogmatic to insist a thought is a "thing". Anyway, I'm not insisting anything- I'm just relating my view, as you're relating your own.

I myself am a strict dogmatist in many ways. The difference is, I don't make any bones about it. When a purported "free thinker" does it, then that to me is hypocrisy.

I defend my view on the basis that the brain is an organ and brain activities occur. I embrace physicalism, which entails that brain+its activities can fully account for everything associated with the "mind". Under this paradigm, "the mind" is a term of art - and vaguely refers to that which engages in perceiving, thinking, etc. All the things that are evaluated in philosophy of mind are processes. A thought entails a series of "mental states (i.e. physical states).

I believe that the mental and the physical can run parallel in many ways. Such as for example the experience of hunger. If I feel hungry, that is the outcome of a physical deprivation, which leads to a mental longing. However, there are other instances when the mental and the physical do not run in tandem. If I raise a gun and prepare to shoot someone unjustly, that is not the mere effect of physical causality at play, but brings to bear the factor of free-will decision making. My physics, in other words, did not cause me to engage in unethical behavior.

Language doesn't establish what exists; it establishes only how people have historically considered things.

Not true. In some cases, words do have an actual impact on reality. If a judge makes a formal judgment in court, then that can cause things to be initiated in terms of proceedings, etc. It is a condition of his authority that he must dictate such fiats. Or if an umpire makes a judgment in a game, that alters the course of it - without his word having bearing on the game, the game would play out differently.

So - indeed, if you're going to claim a thought is an existing ontological object that exists in the world, then you have to account for how this can be. Obviously, it's not consistent with physicalism - so you have to assume something(s) nonphysical exists. Why think that?

Why not think that? Mathematical truths exist, but would you say they are physical? If physicality didn't exist, would math have never existed? Prior to the universe coming into being by chance, did math exist? Or was the truth of math void before the big bang? If so, then could 2+2 have equalled 5 prior to the big bang, since logic were then contingent on physical processes?

I went for a run this morning. Does this run exist as an object in the world, or is it just a shorthand means of conveying the activity of running?

The word "run" I would say is more or less just a word, a marker, a sound produced by our lips. But what it stands for..., yes, absolutely, that is a real concept. Why doubt it? Obviously the conditions for its existence are there - your action of moving faster relative to how you usually move, the fact that it is an action which occurs at some times and not others.... yes, behind "run" there is richly contentful concept that in some manner exists!

How much more our most intimate thoughts of self!

Non-sequitur. The fact that runs and thoughts are not objects of the world doesn't imply that rocks aren't either.

We use language to refer to both. If runs and thoughts can be shown to be mere "term of arts" then perhaps rocks are merely more elaborated illusions themselves.

But I think both are ontologically real.

[fredonly]

It's also dogmatic to insist a thought is a "thing". Anyway, I'm not insisting anything- I'm just relating my view, as you're relating your own.

I myself am a strict dogmatist in many ways. The difference is, I don't make any bones about it. When a purported "free thinker" does it, then that to me is hypocrisy.

I'm not dogmatic at all. I recognize that physicalism is an unprovable metaphysical theory, but - because the physical world undeniably exists, it seems the best starting point - to see where it can take us.

there are other instances when the mental and the physical do not run in tandem. If I raise a gun and prepare to shoot someone unjustly, that is not the mere effect of physical causality at play, but brings to bear the factor of free-will decision making. My physics, in other words, did not cause me to engage in unethical behavior.

More dogmatism? Or is there something you think can't possibly be accounted for with a physicalist framework?

Language doesn't establish what exists; it establishes only how people have historically considered things.

Not true. In some cases, words do have an actual impact on reality. If a judge makes a formal judgment in court, then that can cause things to be initiated in terms of proceedings, etc. It is a condition of his authority that he must dictate such fiats. Or if an umpire makes a judgment in a game, that alters the course of it - without his word having bearing on the game, the game would play out differently.

Judgements don't directly change anything that exists in the world, except for the mind that made the judgement, thus establishing a new belief. The issuance of a judgement establishes new beliefs in the minds of everyone who plays by those rules, and it is beliefs that then influence individual behaviors. No objects are created outside the minds of the participants.

So - indeed, if you're going to claim a thought is an existing ontological object that exists in the world, then you have to account for how this can be. Obviously, it's not consistent with physicalism - so you have to assume something(s) nonphysical exists. Why think that?

Why not think that? Mathematical truths exist, but would you say they are physical?

Mathematical truths don't exist independently in the world. Consider "45 degree angle": this is not an ontological object. Rather, there are objects that stand in a 45 degree angle with respect to each other. We can think abstractly about such things, and identify mathematical relations between abstractions. But that doesn't imbue them with existence in the world.

If physicality didn't exist, would math have never existed? Prior to the universe coming into being by chance, did math exist?

"The universe" is ambiguous, so let's consider the totality of physical reality (which may, or may not be what you were referring to).
By my definition of the physical world, it has existed at all times. It is metaphysically impossible for a state of affairs to precede it. I define the physical world as the totality of material existence. Quantum Field Theory suggests that quantum fields are the fundamental building blocks of physical reality- and therefore I label them "physical". IMO, the past is finite, which entails initial conditions; time proceeds from those initial conditions.

Did mathematical truths exist before there were minds? No, because truths are propositions - and only exist as mental "objects". Did objects exist that instantiated various mathematical relations? Maybe, maybe not- it depends on whether the relation existed within, or between, some aspects of physical reality.

could 2+2 have equalled 5 prior to the big bang, since logic were then contingent on physical processes?

Logic is semantics, and has nothing directly to do with reality. But we can treat 2 and 4 as properties that are held by some objects: an object that consists of 2 things has a "two-ness" property. Two such objects, when considered together, have a "four-ness" property. These numerical properties have bearing on how these objects relate to other objects. The existence of these properties is not dependent on minds to think abstractly about them. If you believe "2" exists in the world, how does "2" get attached to physical objects?

The word "run" I would say is more or less just a word, a marker, a sound produced by our lips. But what it stands for..., yes, absolutely, that is a real concept. Why doubt it?

Sure, "run" is a concept - just as "thought" is a concept. Both words stand for a concept, but that doesn't imply either of them refer to an object of the world. Do you treat all abstractions as ontological objects? It makes for an unnecessarily crowded world.

Non-sequitur. The fact that runs and thoughts are not objects of the world doesn't imply that rocks aren't either.

We use language to refer to both. If runs and thoughts can be shown to be mere "term of arts" then perhaps rocks are merely more elaborated illusions themselves.

"Perhaps"=logically possible. It is also logically possible that solipsism is true, and you are the only being in existence. I'm more interested in what is reasonable to believe. It seems unreasonable to believe rocks don't exist.

But I think both are ontologically real.

We agree about rocks. We don't agree about runs and thoughts, and "mathematical/logical truths". As I alluded, physicalism is the simplest metaphysical picture of the world; I see no reason to populate the world with abstractions, or concepts that refer to processes.