Can a perfect god be virtuous?

[bernee51]

The God traditionally believed in under philosophical theism must be all-virtuous, but certain virtues (like courage) can only be developed in the context of flawed, fallible creatures. Ergo, a perfect God cannot be all-virtuous. One or the other attribute must give way and if theists insist on ascribing both to God, then God is logically impossible.

In The Impossibility of God by Douglas Walton the following argument is offered:

• 1 God is (by definition) a being than which no greater being can be thought. (premise)
  2 Greatness includes greatness of virtue. (premise)
  3 Therefore, God is a being than which no being could be more virtuous. (from 1, 2)
  4 But virtue involves overcoming pains and dangers. (premise)
  5 Indeed, a being can only be properly said to be virtuous if it can suffer pain or be destroyed. (premise)
  6 A God that can suffer pain or is destructible is not one than which no greater being can be thought. (premise)
  7 For you can think of a greater being, that is, one that is nonsuffering and indestructible. (premise)
  8 Therefore, God does not exist. (from 3, 5)

Yet more proof, along with the Argument form Evil and the Argument from Non Belief, that god, as biblically described and believed in, is logically impossible.

[Sleepy]

1 God is (by definition) a being than which no greater being can be thought. (premise)

Arguably God is (by definition) a being greater than which can be thought. Otherwise God is defined by man rather than man by God.

2 Greatness includes greatness of virtue. (premise)
3 Therefore, God is a being than which no being could be more virtuous. (from 1, 2)

I would agree with 3

4 But virtue involves overcoming pains and dangers. (premise)
5 Indeed, a being can only be properly said to be virtuous if it can suffer pain or be destroyed. (premise)

Greatness according to the definition in premise 2 MUST include greatness of virtue if premise 2 is to be true. Premise 3 is true ONLY if premise 2 is true. Virtue as defined in premise 4 invloves overcoming pains and dangers. Therefore greatness as defined by these premises MUST include the possibility of pain and suffering if 3 is to be true, leading to the conclusion in 5.

6 A God that can suffer pain or is destructible is not one than which no greater being can be thought. (premise)
7 For you can think of a greater being, that is, one that is nonsuffering and indestructible. (premise)

Here is where the argument self destructs. If greatness according to it's own premises is measured by among other things pain and suffering then 6 and 7 cannot be true. If however 6 and 7 are true, then 2 and therfore 3 cannot be true. The argument suffers from self contradiction over its own definition of greatness.

In essence, 2, 3, 4 and 5 contradict 6 and 7. They are not compatable according to their own definition of greatness. Which leads me back to premise 1 which I expressed concern over initially.

Being that Jesus in the bible suffered on the cross I would suggest He displayed virtue. Therefore fulfilling the greatness qualification in that category.

Therefore due to the contradictory statements within the argument, 8 cannot be concluded from this argument.

Nice try.

Yet more proof, along with the Argument form Evil and the Argument from Non Belief, that god, as biblically described and believed in, is logically impossible.

No, it is naive to suggest this.

[MagusYanam]

I think, bernee, that you are confusing the Platonic concept of God with the Biblical. This happens frequently, unfortunately, in both Christian and atheist apologia, so let's set the record straight.

The Abrahamic God (of the Judaist, Christian and Islamic traditions) is a person with great but not limitless power, the ability to change his mind, lament, forgive, and (by the Christian tradition) suffer. One of God's aspects, it can be argued, was tortured and put to death. So here I have to agree with Sleepy: God can display, and indeed has displayed, virtue by the definition you provided.

Also, it seems that Walton is assuming but not arguing for a virtue-ethics based moral standard. Before premise (2) can be considered valid, it has to be argued whether moral greatness is a matter of properties or a matter of actions. I think it is fair to assume that we can more easily classify a specific action as good or evil than a property. Thrift is considered a virtuous (i.e., normatively 'good') property, although its extreme, miserliness, is considered a vicious (i.e., normatively 'bad') one. It is easier to classify the actions which comprise the labels normally called 'virtues'. If you give away your entire livelihood to a poor person, that would probably not be considered a moral good, since it destroys your ability to do further good. But if you refuse to give away anything even when a poor beggar asks, that would be an evil inaction.

I assert two alternative measures of moral greatness in place of premise (2) to be argued. The first is the utilitarian, although God's moral goodness can't be determined until every action in the universe which can be contributed to him is tallied. Has God created more pain in the universe than pleasure, or vice versa?

The second is the deontological. Has God fulfilled his highest moral obligations to his creatures throughout history? Has he broken any of his moral obligations?