Utilitiarianism and the Trolley Problem "joke"

[Aetixintro]

Let's say that we have this train-conductor that has a choice of running over and killing this one person instead of the group of 5 people on a different track.

If we repeat this "procedure" infinitely, then these 5 people can put themselves in harm's way and "present" one person on the other track and in this way kill "infinitely" many people which reduces the group of 5 "cynical" people to a very small group.

Conclusion: Utilitarianism is not plausible as viable way for ethics!

Your opinion?

Link, Reductio ad absurdum: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum.

[wiploc]

Can you repeat the question in different words.

I'm a utilitarian, but I have no idea what you're trying to ask.

[2ndRateMind]

[Replying to post 1 by Aetixintro]

Utilitarianism, as I understand the theory, is not a matter to be reduced to this trolley problem or that, however amusing or enlightening such ethical fancies may be.

The basic premise of utilitarianism is that outcome is sole criterion for judging whether or not an act or rule is moral. (eg., the greatest happiness of the greatest number). And I find this to be a substantial position. I cannot see how an act or rule that leads to a 'bad' or 'evil' outcome might be considered moral.

The current academically respectable alternatives to utilitarianism are:
Deontology: the rule determines morality.
Virtue ethics: the character determines morality.
Situation ethics: the situation determines morality.

But how do we determine, in these latter three, why the moral is moral? Why, by the outcome. Deontology posits rules that in the end, for each individual and/or society, it thinks will lead to the best outcome. Virtue ethics has as its end, the flourishing of each human and all humanity as facilitated by good character. Outcome again. Situation ethics, has, as it's end, the decision in any given situation best suited to contrive the best possible outcome.

Thus, it seems to me, the central focus of utilitarianism on outcome is not to be lightly dismissed, just because hypothetical trolley problems are.

Best wishes, 2RM

[jgh7]

[Replying to post 1 by Aetixintro]

Utilitarianism, as I understand the theory, is not a matter to be reduced to this trolley problem or that, however amusing or enlightening such ethical fancies may be.

The basic premise of utilitarianism is that outcome is sole criterion for judging whether or not an act or rule is moral. (eg., the greatest happiness of the greatest number). And I find this to be a substantial position. I cannot see how an act or rule that leads to a 'bad' or 'evil' outcome might be considered moral.

The current academically respectable alternatives to utilitarianism are:
Deontology: the rule determines morality.
Virtue ethics: the character determines morality.
Situation ethics: the situation determines morality.

But how do we determine, in these latter three, why the moral is moral? Why, by the outcome. Deontology posits rules that in the end, for each individual and/or society, it thinks will lead to the best outcome. Virtue ethics has as its end, the flourishing of each human and all humanity as facilitated by good character. Outcome again. Situation ethics, has, as it's end, the decision in any given situation best suited to contrive the best possible outcome.

Thus, it seems to me, the central focus of utilitarianism on outcome is not to be lightly dismissed, just because hypothetical trolley problems are.

Best wishes, 2RM

I tend to disagree with the idea the deontology and virtue ethics are based on an expected outcome. I could see some views of them where the "means" are justified in themselves and not by the "ends" that arise from them. A rule can be in place because it's simply what is considered right or fair, and a person's morality can be judged by their character irrelevant of whether it leads to the expected outcome or not.

[wiploc]

I tend to disagree with the idea the deontology and virtue ethics are based on an expected outcome. I could see some views of them where the "means" are justified in themselves and not by the "ends" that arise from them. A rule can be in place because it's simply what is considered right or fair, and a person's morality can be judged by their character irrelevant of whether it leads to the expected outcome or not.

I certainly wouldn't expect proponents of deontology or virtue ethics to agree that utilitarianism underlies their philosophies. But I'm a utilitarian, and it seems to me that utilitarianism must underlie any reasonable moral system. What would be the point of, say, telling the truth if that didn't have a strong tendency to increase happiness? Why would anybody follow Jehovah's orders if doing so was expected to make people miserable?

Jonathan Haidt, in The Righteous Mind, purports to argue against utilitarianism by saying that other moral goals can have some tendency to increase happiness.

He offered six flavors of morality, six kinds of taste buds on the moral tongue. Let me see which ones I can remember. Not hurting people; being fair; honoring and supporting hierarchy; keeping pure things pure; recognizing and honoring the sacred. That's five of them--and Haidt isn't responsible for my clumsy descriptions. Liberals emphasize the first two, but conservatives give the six nearly equal weight.

When arguing that the conservative mindset makes some sense, Haidt says that unstable politics--a too frequent tendency to have revolutions--can reduce our quality of life. Thus, to some extent, supporting hierarchies amounts to not hurting people. Honoring the king is utilitarian. And he makes the same case for the other four moral flavors that liberals aren't so fond of.

His arguments make sense. But you would never reverse them. Nobody would argue that we ought to make people happy because that's a way of honoring the hierarchy. That would be nonsense. Because honoring hierarchy doesn't underlie utilitarianism; utilitarianism underlies honoring hierarchy.

Or, as a utilitarian, I might say it this way: To the extent that utilitarianism underlies our moral instinct to honor hierarchy, the instinct to honor hierarchy isn't perverse and irrational.

[2ndRateMind]

I tend to disagree with the idea the deontology and virtue ethics are based on an expected outcome. I could see some views of them where the "means" are justified in themselves and not by the "ends" that arise from them. A rule can be in place because it's simply what is considered right or fair, and a person's morality can be judged by their character irrelevant of whether it leads to the expected outcome or not.

I think, so far as deontology goes, Kant would agree with you. You are in good company! In his example of the shopkeeper, he offers us the alternatives of a shopkeeper deciding whether or not overcharge an innocent child because that will lead to more trade, should his honesty become known, (or at least, not less trade, should his dishonesty become known) and a shopkeeper who does not overcharge an innocent child out of concern for a rule (the categorical imperative) that is intrinsically right and good. For Kant, only the latter is acting morally.

Nevertheless, I am not sure you can entirely divorce what is right and good from a right and good outcome. I restate my position earlier; if a right and good action leads to a wrong, bad and evil outcome, is that action really right and good? Even if it is justified by this rule or that? For example, telling the truth may be considered to be always right and good. 'Thou shalt not bear false witness'. But is telling the truth to the Nazi Gestapo about Jews hiding in your house right and good? I suggest that it is not. One either has to modify the rule, and keep modifying it to cope with plethoras of special cases, or just admit that the moral is moral, in part at least, because of the anticipated and/or realised outcomes.

As for virtue ethics, the whole justification seems to me to be the idea that humans and humanity 'flourish' and thrive with virtue, and are corroded and diminished by vice. That is clearly an appeal to outcome. All we need do now is distinguish virtue from vice.

Best wishes, 2RM.

[jgh7]

I tend to disagree with the idea the deontology and virtue ethics are based on an expected outcome. I could see some views of them where the "means" are justified in themselves and not by the "ends" that arise from them. A rule can be in place because it's simply what is considered right or fair, and a person's morality can be judged by their character irrelevant of whether it leads to the expected outcome or not.

I certainly wouldn't expect proponents of deontology or virtue ethics to agree that utilitarianism underlies their philosophies. But I'm a utilitarian, and it seems to me that utilitarianism must underlie any reasonable moral system. What would be the point of, say, telling the truth if that didn't have a strong tendency to increase happiness? Why would anybody follow Jehovah's orders if doing so was expected to make people miserable?

Here's a definition of utilitarianism that I looked up:

the doctrine that an action is right insofar as it promotes happiness, and that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the guiding principle of conduct.

-----

Is that a satisfactory definition? I agree that an outcome is ultimately at the heart of most moral systems. But utilitarianism is definitely not. It is focused on the greatest happiness for the majority. Certain moral systems are not concerned about majority.

As a hypothetical, there could be a moral system that provides great happiness to 90% of a population while taking advantage of 10% and providing significant suffering to them. The other alternative is to not take advantage of the 10%, but with the outcome being that the 10% suffer less, but everyone at this point suffers due to economic struggles of this "fairer" system.

I would view the second option as more moral.

[wiploc]

Here's a definition of utilitarianism that I looked up:

the doctrine that an action is right insofar as it promotes happiness, and that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the guiding principle of conduct.

----

Is that a satisfactory definition?

Your definition doesn't offend me aside from the fear that you'll try to hold me to the details.

I don't claim to understand morality. I mostly just jump in when Christians claim that they understand it and I don't. Or when people raise straw man objections to utilitarianism.

I agree that an outcome is ultimately at the heart of most moral systems.
But utilitarianism is definitely not.

So, what outcome, other than human happiness, is looked for by these other systems?

It is focused on the greatest happiness for the majority. Certain moral systems are not concerned about majority.

I don't think I'm concerned about the majority either. I'm probably more concerned about total happiness. For instance, if you had to choose A or B, and A would make 51% of the people an ounce happier, but B would make 49% of the people a ton happier, B sounds better to me.

As a hypothetical, there could be a moral system that provides great happiness to 90% of a population while taking advantage of 10% and providing significant suffering to them. The other alternative is to not take advantage of the 10%, but with the outcome being that the 10% suffer less, but everyone at this point suffers due to economic struggles of this "fairer" system.

I would view the second option as more moral.

I'd need more information. I'm against oppressing 10%. Oppression is generally a bad thing, tending to reduce happiness. But could you and I sit down together and devise a situation that conformed to your description that we thought was good? (Possibly involving a military draft to repel an invading army?) I assume we could.

But I like your instinct towards fairness.

[Wootah]

Since 1 billion muslims would be happier with 15 million dead jews is it ok?

Or is it a desire that perversely would lower muslim happiness in the long run because of all the benefits of Jewish civilisation and invention? Kind of like how Germany lost WW2 in large part because they killed or exiled their Jewish population and scientists.

Hoiw do we know what will make the majority happy? Bread and circuses? What about slavery under Pharoah which acvording to the story was making the Jews more populous than tye Egyptians?

I genuinely want to know how anyone knows what the majority wants and how that morally matters.

[wiploc]

Since 1 billion muslims would be happier with 15 million dead jews is it ok?

Murder is not okay. Murder has a strong tendency to reduce happiness. Genocide too.

Hoiw do we know what will make the majority happy?

Sometimes we know. The fact that we sometimes don't know doesn't make utilitarianism wrong.

I genuinely want to know how anyone knows what the majority wants and how that morally matters.

If it doesn't matter, what does?

If you're a sociopath, you may not care whether anyone else is happy. But, if you're not, then the issue concerns you. Most moral choices involve either sacrificing some of your own happiness for a greater increase to the happiness of others (paying your taxes, for instance), or sacrificing current happiness for a greater increase to your own later happiness (brushing your teeth). You can make up a moral system that doesn't involve happiness, but you'll be the only one who cares about it.