Scientism and Scientific Fallacies and Role of Philosophy

Definition of terms and explanation of concepts

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Scientism and Scientific Fallacies and Role of Philosophy

Post #1

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Pigliucci wrote:[S]ientism is the concept that science can and will resolve every question or problem in any realm if given enough time and resources. I do not think that most professional researchers readily subscribe to it, but I know of individuals who seem to.

-- Pigliucci, Massimo. Denying Evolution: Creationism, Scientism, and the Nature of Science. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates; 2002; p. 184.
Pigliucci wrote:Philosophy is not meant to "solve" problems the way science does, and most certainly not to solve scientific problems. The role of the philosopher -- at least in the modern understanding of the word -- is to be a metathinker, to think about how we reach certain conclusions and by what means we proceed in our inquiries (epistemology), as well as to elaborate on the relationship between what we do and what we should do (ethics) and on the big picture of reality (metaphysics). Although all these philosophical activities must be informed by science (or the philosopher will condemn herself to a rather sterile exercise in logic decoupled from the real world), they are not scientific and their effectiveness cannot be judged by scientific standards. It is precisely this obsession with applying scientific standards to everything else that characterizes scientism.

-- Pigliucci, Massimo. Denying Evolution: Creationism, Scientism, and the Nature of Science. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates; 2002; p. 115.
Barbour wrote:While I accept the evidence for evolution, as almost all scientists do, I do not accept the philosophy of materialism that is assumed or defended by many scientists. Materialism is the assertion that matter is the fundamental reality in the universe. Materialism is a form of metaphysics (a set of claims concerning the most general characteristics and constituents of reality). It is often accompanied by a second assertion: the scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge. This is a form of epistemology (a set of claims concerning inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge). The two assertions are linked: if the only real entities are those with which science deals, then science is the only valid path to knowledge. (Barbour 2002: 4-5)

In addition, many forms of materialism express reductionism. Epistemological reductionism claims that the laws and theories of all the sciences are in principle reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry. Metaphysical reductionism claims that the component parts of any system determine its behavior. The materialist believes that all phenomena will eventually be explained in terms of the actions of material components, which are the only effective causes in the world. In the past, powerful new theories excited the imagination of scientists who sometimes extrapolated them beyond their proper domains. In the eighteenth century many scientists thought that Newtonian physics could in principle account for all phenomena, but in the twentieth century quantum physics has shown the limits of such predictability. Today molecular biology is an immensely fruitful research program, and we may be tempted to think that it will explain the behavior of all living things. But new ideas in the biological sciences encourage a less reductionist view. (Barbour 2002: 5)

Scientists have often extended scientific concepts beyond their scientific use to support comprehensive materialistic philosophies. The identification of the real with measurable properties that can be correlated by exact mathematical relationships started in the physical sciences, but it influenced scientists in other fields and continues today. I would argue that the quantifiable properties of matter have been abstracted from the real world by ignoring the particularity of events and the nonquantifiable aspects of human experience. We do not have to conclude that matter alone is real or that mind, purpose, and human love are only byproducts of matter in motion. (Barbour 2002: 5)

In their popular writings, scientists tend to invoke the authority of science for ideas that are not really part of science itself. Theism and materialism are alternative belief systems, each claiming to encompass all reality. If science is taken to be the only acceptable form of understanding, then explanation in terms of evolutionary history, biochemical mechanisms, or scientific theories excludes all other forms of explanation. (Barbour 2002: 5)

-- Barbour, Ian G. Nature, Human Nature, and God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press; 2002; pp. 4-5.
Last edited by Rob on Fri May 05, 2006 2:48 pm, edited 2 times in total.

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Scientism: God and Science in the Public Schools

Post #2

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Baker wrote:Scientific explanation--explanations put forward on the basis of scientific consideration--are fully naturalistic, and have no place for appeal to a supernatural agent. It does not follow from this, however, that all correct explanations are scientific explanations. We must distinguish between scientific claims--claims made from within science--and claims made about science. One important claim about science (one that I reject) is that science is the arbiter of all knowable truth, that there is nothing to be known beyond what science delivers. Call this claim "scientism."

(Scientism) Science is the arbiter of all knowable truth.

If scientism were correct, then from the commitment of science to methodological naturalism, it would follow that all correct explanations (not just scientific explanations) are naturalistic. That stance would rule out, a priori, any explanation that appealed to God. This, I think, would be a bias. But this does not follow from the methodological naturalism of science; it follows only with the addition of the metaphysical extra-scientific thesis of scientism. Scientism is like a closure principle--“and that’s all there is.” If we reject scientism, as I think that we should, then from the fact that all scientific explanations are naturalistic, it does not follow that all legitimate explanations are naturalistic. So, exclusion of God from the science classroom is not necessarily exclusion of God elsewhere--for example, where we are trying to give a metaphysical account of why there is something rather than nothing at all. This latter question--Why is there anything rather than nothing at all?--is not a scientific question and will not be susceptible to a scientific explanation. But unless we are scientistic, we may think that there is some explanation--albeit not a scientific one. Again, however, question not susceptible to scientific answers do not belong in a science classroom.

… To sum up: Science is not committed to the nonexistence of God, as it would be if it were based on metaphysical naturalism. Science is committed to naturalistic explanations. Science does not count any explanation that appeals to God or to supernatural phenomena as a scientific explanation (thus, it is committed to methodological naturalism). But methodological naturalism is not bias: it is in the nature of science. And unless one conjoins methodological naturalism with scientism, nothing at all follows about the nonexistence of God. So, methodological naturalism (but not scientism) is part of science, and given the success of science, it is idle to charge that science should be something other than what it is (pp. 57-59)

-- Baker, Lynn Rudder. 2000. God and Science in the Public Schools. Philosophic Exchange 30: 53-69.

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Scientism Philosophical Agenda, Not Scientific Truth

Post #3

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Smith wrote:[M]odern science is what divides modern from taditional societies and civilizations. Its content is the body of facts about the natural world that the scientific method has brought to light, the crux of that method being the controlled experiment with its capacity to winnow true from false hypotheses about the empirical world.

Scientism adds to science two corollaries: first, that the scientific method is, if not the only reliable method of getting at truth, then at least the most reliable method; and second that the things science deals with--material entities--are the most fundamental things that exist. These two corollaries are seldom voiced, for once they are brought to attention it is not difficult to see that they are arbitrary. Unsupported by facts, they are at best philosophical assumptions and at worst merely opinions.... For the knowledge class in our industrialized Western civilization, it has come to seem self-evident that the scientific account of the world gives us its full story and that the supposed transcendent realities of which religions speak are at best doubtful. If in any way our hopes, dreams, intuitions, glimpses or transcendence, intimations of immortality, and mystical experiences break step with this view of things, they are overshadowed by the scientific account. Yet history is a graveyard for outlooks that were once taken for granted. Today's common sense becomes tomorrow's laughingstock; times make ancient truth uncouth. Einstein defined common sense as what we are taught by the age of six, or perhaps fourteen in the case of complex ideas. Wisdom begins with the recognition that our presuppositions are options that can be examined and replaced if found wanting.

-- Smith, Huston. Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief. New York: HarperCollins; 2001; pp. 59-60.

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Methodological Naturalism vs. Philosophic Naturalism #1

Post #4

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Scott wrote:Theistic Evolutionism

Theistic Evolution (TE) is a theological view in which God creates through the laws of nature. TEs accept all the results of modern science, in anthropology and biology as well as astronomy, physics, and geology. In particular, it is acceptable to TEs that one species can give rise to another; they accept descent with modification. TEs vary in whether and how much God is allowed to intervene--some believe God created laws of nature and is allowing events to occur with no further intervention. Other TEs see God as intervening at critical intervals during the history of life (especially in the origin of humans). ... [T]there is much variation (Hewlett and Peters 2003). In one form or another, TE is the view of creation taught at the majority of mainline Protestant seminaries, and it is the position of the Catholic Church. In 1996, Pope John Paul II reiterated the Catholic version of the TE position, in which God created, evolution happened, humans may indeed be descended from more primitive forms, but the Hand of God is required for the production of the human soul (John Paul II 1996)....

Agnostic Evolutionism

Although poll data indicate that most Americans have a belief in God or some higher power, a minority do not (Kosmin et al. 2002). Just as there are variations in worldview among believers, so also are there differences among those who do not believe in God. The term "agnostic" was coined by "Darwin's Bulldog," the nineteenth-century scientist Thomas Henry Huxley, to refer to someone who suspended judgment about the existence of God. Huxley felt that in this world, it is impossible to know or even grasp ultimate reality; therefore neither belief in nor rejection of the existence of God is warranted. To Huxley, the thoughtful person should suspend judgment. Huxley was a strong supporter of science and believed that knowledge and beliefs should be based upon empirical knowledge--and that supernaturalism would eventually be supplanted by science. But he felt it was more honest not to categorically reject an ultimate force or power beyond the material world (Huxley [2002] 1884).

I have no doubt that scientific criticism will prove destructive to the forms of supernaturalism which enter into the constitution of existing religions. On trial of any so-called miracle the verdict of science is “Not proven.” But true Agnosticism will not forget that existence, motion, and law-abiding operation in nature are more stupendous miracles than any recounted by the mythologies, and that there may be things, not only in the heavens and earth, but beyond the intelligible universe, which “are not dreamt of in our philosophy.” The theological “gnosis” would have us believe that the world is a conjuror’s house; the anti-theological “gnosis” talks as if it were a “dirt-pie” made by the two blind children, Law and Force. Agnosticism simply says that we know nothing of what may beyond phenomena.

Agnostics believe that in this life, it is impossible truly to know whether there is a God, and although they believe that it is not probable that God exists, they tend not to be dogmatic about this conclusion. AEs accept the scientific evidence that evolution occurred, but they do not consider important the question of whether God is or was or will be involved. They differ from the next position on the continuum by not categorically ruling out the involvement of God, although like Materialist Evolutionists, they are nonbelievers.

Materialist Evolutionism

We should distinguish between two uses of the term "materialism" (or "naturalism"). As we discussed earlier [see pp. 50; 124; 237; 246; 249], modern science operates under a rule of methodological naturalism that limits it to attempting to explain natural phenomena using natural causes. Materialist Evolutionists (ME) go beyond the methodological naturalism of science to propose not only that natural causes are sufficient to explain natural phenomena, but also that the supernatural does not exist. This is a form of philosophical naturalism. To a philosophical naturalist, there is no God. The philosophy of humanism is a materialistic philosophy, as is atheism. ... [P]hilosophical naturalism is distinct from the practical rules of how to do science.

This is an important distinction ... because some anti-evolutionists criticize evolution and science in general for being not only methodologically naturalistic but also philosophically naturalistic. This is a logical error.… It is very likely the case that all philosophical naturalists are simultaneously methodological naturalists (all Ps are Ms). It does not follow that all methodological naturalists are philosophical naturalists (not all Ms are Ps). It might be the case … but this would have to be determined empirically, not logically. In fact, such a claim is empirically falsified, for there are many scientists who accept methodological naturalism in their work, but who are theists and therefore not philosophical naturalists. Gregor Medal--the monk whose research become the foundation of genetics--is a classic case of a scientist who was a methodological naturalist but not a philosophical one, and there are many scientists today who, like him, are methodological but not philosophical naturalists.

[Of the three major groups of materialists; agnostic and humanists,] atheists, reject the existence of God but tend to be more actively antireligious than the other two.

Religion, Science, and Philosophical Naturalism

What are the relationships among religion, science, and philosophical naturalism? (….) All three of these terms refer to ways of knowing: a field of study that philosophers call “epistemology.” The epistemology we call science is primarily a methodology that attempts to explain the natural world using natural causes…. Science is actually a quite limited way of knowing, with limited goals and a limited set of tools to use to accomplish those goals.

(….) When a scientist makes a statement like “Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have him in mind” (Simpson 1967: 344), it is clear that he or she is speaking from the perspective of philosophical naturalism rather than from the methodology of science itself. As anthropologist Matt Cartmill has observed, “Many scientists are atheists or agnostics who want to believe that the natural world they study gives them grounds for that belief. It’s an honorable belief, but it isn’t a research finding” (Cartmill 1988: 83). (….)

Religion concerns the relationship of people with the divine, but it also may include explanations of the natural world and the origin of natural phenomena. Religious views almost universally derive from revelation, but this does not rule out the use of empirical and logical approaches to theology. In fact, many Christian denominations pride themselves on their reliance on logic and reason as a means both to understand the natural world and to evaluate theological positions. But an ultimate reliance on revelation can place religion into conflict with science. … When revealed truth conflicts with empirical knowledge, how does one choose?

(….) In science, on the other hand, there is no revealed truth. Although some explanations are believed to be very solidly grounded, it is understood that even well supported theories can be modified and, in rare circumstances, might even be replaced by other explanations. For the limited purpose of explaining the natural world, science has a major advantage over religion in that individuals of different philosophical, religious, cultural, and/or ideological orientations, using the methodology or science, can debate their differences based on repeatable--and repeatedempirical investigations. Different scientists, using different techniques, technologies, and observational approaches, provide validation not possible through revelation.

Scientists looking at geological and biological data can piece together a natural history of the Grand Canyon and test one another’s explanations against the lay of the land itself. The ability to go back to natureagain and againto test explanations, rework them, and retest them is one of the strengths of science and a major contributor to the amount of empirical knowledge exponentially amassed over the last 300 years. To some, though, the open-endedness of science is a weakness: they seek definite answers that will never change. For them, Ashley Montagu’s definition of science as “truth without certainty” is insufficient; for others, it is science’s greatest strength (Montagu 1984: 9)

Just as attempts to explain the natural world through revelation cause friction with scientists, so also do statements by some materialist scientistsspeaking in the name of sciencewho make statements about the ultimate nature of reality cause friction with religious people. [Other scientists as well point out this form of scientism too.] Upon reflection it should be recognizable that if science has the limited goal of explaining the natural world using natural causes, it lacks the tools to make justifiable statements about whether there is or is not a universe beyond the familiar one of matter and energy.

-- Scott, Eugenie C. wip. Evolution vs. Creationism: And Introdution. California: University of California Press; 2004; pp. 64-68.

[Eugenie C. Scott is Excutive Director of the National Center for Science Education. She has written extensively on the evolution/creationism controversy and is past president of the American Association of Physical Antrhropologists.]

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Methodological Naturalism vs. Philosophic Naturalism #2

Post #5

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Scott wrote:Perhaps the most important reason scientists restrict themselves to materialist explanations is that the methods of science are inadequate to test explanations involving supernatural forces. (....) We have been discussing a rule of science that requires that scientific explanations use only material (matter, energy, and their interaction) cause; this is known as methodological naturalism. To go beyond methodological naturalism to claim that only natual causes exist--that is, that there is no God or, more generally, no supernatural entities--is philosophical naturalism. The two views are logically distinct because one can be a methodological naturalist but not accept naturalism as a philosophy. Many scientists who are theists are examples: in their scientific work they explain natural phenomena in terms of natural causes, even if in their personal lives they believe in God, and even that God may intervene in nature. (Scott 2004: 50)

Intelligent Design supporters are hostile to methodological materialism and propose a new kind of science, "theistic science." (Scott 2004: 124)

Anti-evolutionists, especially Intelligent Design (ID) supporters, believe that evolution seems plausible only to those in the grips of a nonscientific ideology: philosophical naturalism. Evolutionists respond that the sort of naturalism implicit in science is only methodological, adopted not dogmatically but to enable scientific progress. (Scott 2004: 237)

Empirical testing relies fundamentally upon use of the lawful regularities of nature that science has been able to discover and sometimes codify in natural laws. (….) Of course science is based upon a philosophical system, but not one that is extravagant speculation. Science operates by empirical principles of observational testing; hypotheses must be confirmed or disconfirmed by reference to empirical data. (….) Science assumes Methodological Naturalism because to do otherwise would be to abandon its empirical evidential touchstone (pp. 88-89). (Scott 2004: 249-250)

Selection excerpted from:

Pennock, Robert T. 1999. Tower of Babel: The Evidence Against the New Creationism. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.


... Scientific explanation--explanations put forward on the basis of scientific consideration--are fully naturalistic, and have no place for appeal to a supernatural agent. It does not follow from this, however, that all correct explanations are scientific explanations. We must distinguish between scientific claims--claims made from within science--and claims made about science. One important claim about science (one that I reject) is that science is the arbiter of all knowable truth, that there is nothing to be known beyond what science delivers. Call this claim "scientism."

(Scientism) Science is the arbiter of all knowable truth.

If scientism were correct, then from the commitment of science to methodological naturalism, it would follow that all correct explanations (not just scientific explanations) are naturalistic. That stance would rule out, a priori, any explanation that appealed to God. This, I think, would be a bias. But this does not follow from the methodological naturalism of science; it follows only with the addition of the metaphysical extra-scientific thesis of scientism. Scientism is like a closure principle--“and that’s all there is.” If we reject scientism, as I think that we should, then from the fact that all scientific explanations are naturalistic, it does not follow that all legitimate explanations are naturalistic. So, exclusion of God from the science classroom is not necessarily exclusion of God elsewhere--for example, where we are trying to give a metaphysical account of why there is something rather than nothing at all. This latter question--Why is there anything rather than nothing at all?--is not a scientific question and will not be susceptible to a scientific explanation. But unless we are scientistic, we may think that there is some explanation--albeit not a scientific one. Again, however, question not susceptible to scientific answers do not belong in a science classroom.

… To sum up: Science is not committed to the nonexistence of God, as it would be if it were based on metaphysical naturalism. Science is committed to naturalistic explanations. Science does not count any explanation that appeals to God or to supernatural phenomena as a scientific explanation (thus, it is committed to methodological naturalism). But methodological naturalism is not bias: it is in the nature of science. And unless one conjoins methodological naturalism with scientism, nothing at all follows about the nonexistence of God. So, methodological naturalism (but not scientism) is part of science, and given the success of science, it is idle to charge that science should be something other than what it is (pp. 57-59) (Scott 2004: 251-252)

Selection excerpted from:

Baker, Lynn Rudder. 2000. God and Science in the Public Schools. Philosophic Exchange 30: 53-69.

The Game of Science

Richard Dickerson is a molecular biologist.

Science, fundamentally, is a game. It is a game with one overriding and defining rule:

Rule No. 1: Let us see how far and to what extent we can explain the behavior of the physical and material universe in terms of purely physical and material causes, without invoking the supernatural.

Operational science takes no position about the existence or non-existence of the supernatural; it only requires that this factor is not to be invoked in scientific explanations.

(....) It would augur well, for both science and religion, if creationists and evolutionary biologists would realize jointly that the question of the existence or the nonexistence of a Deity is irrelevant to the study of biological evolution. Both the die-hard atheist and the theistic evolutionist can function as modern biologists with absolute integrity. (Scott 2004: 252-253)

Selection excerpted from:

Dickerson, Richard E. 1992. The Game of Science. Journal of Molecular Evolution 34: 277-279.

-- Scott, Eugenie C. Evolution vs. Creationism: And Introdution. California: University of California Press; 2004; p. 50; 124; 237; 249-253.

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Methodological Naturalism vs. Philosophic Naturalism #3

Post #6

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Ruse wrote:[W]hat we mean by the word "science" in general usage is something which does not make reference to God and so forth, but which is marked by methodological naturalism. .... Since the scientific revolution, the professional practice of science has been marked by an ever-greater reluctance to admit social or cultural beliefs, including those of religion. (Ruse 2001: 101)

(....) The fact is that, having set the boundaries to science, many do go on immediately to claim that what lies beyond the boundaries is wrong or misguided or nonsensical. In the language we have been using, whatever people may say that they are doing -- and many are proudly open in their actions -- there is often a slide from methodological to metaphysical naturalism. The logical positivists used to claim that everything outside logic and science is meaningless, and this would certainly include Christianity. Plantinga is absolutely right that there is a tendency to characterize science on the basis of subjects like Darwinism and then to denigrate everything which does not fit the pattern. But note that this is surely only a tendency, ... and there is nothing in Darwinism, or in the notion of science that it supports, which says that [one's religious or philosophical] commitment is [a priori] wrong or stupid. .... If scientists and philosophers persist in saying that [any religious faith and/or belief] position is meaningless simply because it is not science, then it is they who are guilty of arbitrary stipulative definitions. (Ruse 2001: 101)

(....) There is no question that many scientists, Darwinians at the front, take their naturalism so seriously (dare one say, religiously) that they sound like David Hume at his most ferocious. They simply would not accept any law-breaking miracle, and if indeed Christianity depends on them, so much the worse for it. (....) [O]ur powers of sense and reason are God-given, and although employing them in finding out the nature of the world may lead to revisions in our faith, this activity can hardly be considered inherently irreligious. (....) Science stoppers are just that: science stoppers. One might well say that they should be no more acceptable to the Christian than to the Darwinian. (Ruse 2001: 106)

[Michael Ruse is a sociobiologist/philosopher and a self-described die-hard Darwinian.]

-- Ruse, Michael wip. Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001; pp. 101-102; 106.

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Snarks Thrice Times Said and the Birth of Scientism

Post #7

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Reid wrote:[L]ike the Bellman's "Rule of Three" in "The Hunting of the Snark":

"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice;
That alone should encourage the crew [students].
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true."

Martin Gardner, commenting on the "Rule of Three", points out that the cyberneticist Norbert Weiner who had written that a computer's effectiveness may be checked by asking it the same question serveral times, or asking the question of serveral other computers, had speculated that the human brain might have a simlar checking mechanism, and noted the similarity with Bellman's rule of three. J.B.S. Haldane also confessed to Bellmanship:

"I give annual ... lecture courses. I introduce an idea with such words as 'A possible explanation of these facts is ...' Next year this becomes 'the most probable explanation ...', and after I have said it three times it becomes 'the explanation'. What is worse, when I write a text book I use this last phrase. I fear that a good many scientific theories originate in this way."

-- Reid, Robert G.B. (1985) Evolutionary Synthesis: The Unfinished Synthesis. p. 163.

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Evolution, Natural Selection, and Macroevolution

Post #8

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Pigliucci wrote:Now there are a couple of important things that evolution is not, misleading claims by creationists [and mechanistic materialists] notwithstanding. For example, evolution is not a theory of the origin of life, for the simple reason that evolution deals with changes in living organisms induced by a combination of random (mutation) and nonrandom (natural selection) forces. By definition before life originated there were no mutations, and therefore there was no variation; hence, natural selection could not possibly have acted. This means that the origin of life is a (rather tough) problem for physics and chemistry to deal with, but not a proper area of inquiry for evolutionary biology.... It could be that life originated because of self-organization ... under the proper environmental conditions, soemthing that one of these days will require demonstration by a bright young scientists. (Pigliucci 2002: 76)

(....) Evolution is also most definitely not a theory of the origin of the universe. An interesting as this question is, it is rather the realm of physics and cosmology. Mutation and natural selection, the mechanism of evolution, do not have anything to do with the stars and galaxies. It is true that some people, even astronomers, refer to the "evolution" of the universe, but his is meant in the general sense of change through time, not the technical sense of the Darwinian theory.... The origin of the universe, like the origin of life, is of course a perfectly valid scientific question, even though it is outside the realm of evolutionary biology. (Pigliucci 2002: 77)

-- Pigliucci, Massimo (2002) Denying Evolution: Creationism, Scientism, and the Nature of Science. Sinauer Publishers.
Pigliucci wrote:Chapter 7: Scientific Fallacies

Of Whales, Bacterial Flagella, and the Big Bang

A good way to start is to appreciate that often evolutionary biologists dismiss creationist arguments out of hand because they are "obviously" wrong, without realizing that even a wrong argument can point the way to a legitimate question underlying the fabric of evolutionary theory. Let us consider a few examples to clarify. One of the creationists' persistent questions concerns the distinction between micro- and macroevolution. Scientists use these terms in a very different way from what creationists seem to imply, which is part of the problem. For a biologist, microevolution refers to changes in a species over short periods of time that can be explored with the conceptual and mathematical tools of population genetics and ecology. Macroevolution, on the other hand, refers to changes that occur over much longer periods of time; this is usually the research field of the paleontologist. (Pigliucci 2002: 236)

The relationship between micro- and macroevolution is a legitimate field of research within evolutionary biology, and one that has generated a large amount of controversy over at least the past 60 years. Indeed, the beginning of the debate is often traced to correspondence between Darwin and Huxley, in which the latter pointed out to the author of The Origin of Species that there was no need to postulate very slow and gradual changes as the only pattern of descent with modification, and that sometimes things could move along significantly faster, thereby speeding up the appearance of novel structures or groups of organisms, such appearance being a typical macroevolutionary event. (Pigliucci 2002: 236-237)

The debate resumed during the first part of the twentieth century, during the so-called neo-Darwinian synthesis that has shaped much evolutionary thought until very recently. One of the major contributors to the synthesis was paleontologist George Ledyard Stebbins, who proposed the concept of "quantum evolution" to explain the sudden (in geological terms) appearance of certain groups of animals in the fossil record. According to Stebbins, evolution can proceed at different rates, depending on the environmental conditions and presumably on the amount of available genetic variation in the population that are evolving (the larger the amount of variation, the faster evolution can proceed, other things being equal). But Stebbins, partly under pressure from his more "orthodox" (i.e., mor gradualistically Darwinian) colleagues, such as systematists Ernst Mayr, eventually dropped the idea of quantum evolution from later editions of his book, a process that Carl Schlichting and I have referred to as the "hardening" of the synthesis.[1] (Pigliucci 2002: 237)

Still, during the 1940s a challenge to the recently established neo-Darwinian consensus came from a prominent geneticist Richard Goldschmidt. … Goldschmidt questioned the assumption that simply extrapolating from microevolutionary phenomena would yield a satisfactory explanation of macroevolution, and he explored some of the possible alternatives. With little knowledge of molecular genetics and developmental biology, Goldschmidt couldn’t offer more than bold speculations, the most famous of which is his idea of "hopeful monsters." We need to discuss this concept in a bit of detail because it is still used today by creationists to alternately ridicule evolutionary theory for proposing different hypotheses and accuse evolutionary biologists of ignoring important alternatives that some of their own colleagues have proposed. (Pigliucci 2002: 237)

Goldschmidt reckoned that one way macroevolutionary processes, such as the origin of a new body plan (say, the transition from reptiles to birds), could happen is by what he referred to as "systemic mutations." A systemic mutation, or genetic revolution, is a reorganization of an entire genome in which genes are duplicated and/or shuffled around on the chromosomes. Goldschmidt was aware that when much smaller genomic rearrangements take place (such as the change of physical position of one gene in the fruit fly), major phenotypic changes can occur. Indeed, he had done part of the fundamental work in this field and was therefore on solid empirical ground. Goldschmidt thought that if a genetic revolution were to occur in the offspring of an organism, the result would be, literally, a "monster" -- that is, an animal that would look (and possibly behave) very differently from its relatives and conspecifics. Goldschmidt realized that most such monsters would simply die, or at least would not be able to find mates and reproduce. However, occasionally some might survive to adulthood and even find mates among conspecifics that would not find them too repulsive. These "hopeful monsters" would then fuel the evolutionary change within a species and, if successful, in the long run serve as the origin of a different group of animals altogether. (Pigliucci 2002: 237-338)

Goldschmidt’s ideas, although ridiculed by creationists as an example of how absurd evolutionary biologists can become to defend their "irrational" faith in naturalistic explanations, have actually been abandoned by professional biologists for more than 50 years (roughly since our increased understanding of molecular biology from the 1950s on). Interestingly however, we do know of the existence of some very successful hopeful monsters: A large number of plant species (and almost all ferns) actually do originate through genomic revolutions caused by a spontaneous duplication of their entire set of genes -- a phenomenon called polyploidy. Polyploidy can occur either because of the failure of meiosis (the cellular process that reduces the number of chromosomes to half before each generation begins and that allows sexual reproduction to restore no more than the original full complement) or because of the mating of gametes from two different species, which occasionally can yield a fertile hybrid offspring. Polyploidy does not occur frequently in animals for reasons that are still not well understood and that probably have to do with key differences in the developmental processes of animals and plants. Ironically, however, Goldschmidt did identify a major process leading to macroevolutionary change in many species, just not in the animals he had in mind. (Pigliucci 2002: 338)

Thirty-two years after the publication of Goldschmidt’s book, two paleontologists -- Niles Eldredge and Stephan J. Gould -- reopened the macroevolutionary question with their theory of punctuated equilibria… This is another topic that is very much misunderstood and used out of context by creationists … Eldredge and Gould attempted to link a standard theory of the origin of new species proposed by biologist Ernst Mayr[4] with the observable fossil record -- that is, to link, to link micro- and macroevolution by means of an established theory and the available empirical evidence. They succeeded to a large extent... (Pigliucci 2002: 338)

The publication of Eldredge and Gould's original paper in 1972 spurred a healthy series of research papers aimed at either poking holes in their theory or at supporting it. The current consensus seems to be that there is enough empirical evidence to grant punctuated equilibria real existence, although we do not know how often this mode of macroevolution occurs when compared with more traditional, gradual, evolutionary change. Even so, however, the theory of punctuated equilibria does not solve the problem of micro- versus macroevolution because it provides only part of the answer. Specifically, we now have a model of how biological phenomena at the level of population demography can explain patterns observed in the fossil record, but we still don't know how these changes occur at the genetic and developmental levels... (Pigliucci 2002: 338-239)

Given all this, what, then, causes macroevolution in animals? By and large we still do not know.... Plenty of research has been done over the last few decades to study the developmental and genetic differences between different types of organisms, and this research is likely to lead eventually to a satisfactory anwer to the question of micro- versus macroevolution.... (Pigliucci 2002: 339)

Where, then, is the scientists' fallacy in explaining macroevolution within the context of creationism-evolution discussions? [Or any other discussions for that matter.] It lies in the pretense that we have a full answer when at most we have a few (tantalizing) clues. (Pigliucci 2002: 339)

(....) Perhaps the mother of all macroevolutionary mysteries is the Cambrian explosion... As we saw ..., there is nothing to indicate that the relatively rapid origin of many new body plans in animals is a mystery requiring anything more than our current understanding of evolutionary and ecological problems. [He ignores Evo Devo then] Yet the clues currently available are so few [Not any longer, if one looks at the evidence from Evo Devo] that it is not intellectually honest to say that we "understand" the Cambrian explosion. We are studying it, and we are making progress. One cannot ask more from science. (Pigliucci 2002: 240)

[1] See C. Schlichting and M. Pigliucci, Phenotypic Evolution: A Reaction Norm Perspective (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer, 1988).

[4] Mayr's theory was the so-called allopatric theory of speciation. Allopatry means simply "in different places," and the theory says that if a small population becomes geographically isolated from a larger population from which it originated the small population may evolve independently from the mother group for some time. Population genetics theory (and empirical evidence) tells us that small populations often evolve faster than large ones (they have, literally, less "inertia") because their rare genes can spread relatively rapidly within small populations. If the geographical isolation between the new, small population and the original large one persists long enough, the new population might become different enough to be a new species. Once this happens, the new species, if successful, may expand its area of distribution and population size, and these demographic phenomena can occur very rapidly (during a few thousand of generations). Eldredge and Gould simply realized that allopatric speciation, seen in a geological time frame, would lead to long periods of no change (times of equilibrium, which they called stasis), "punctuated" by relatively rapid (geologically speaking) periods of change -- hence their theory of punctuated equilibria.

-- Pigliucci, Massimo. Denying Evolution: Creationism, Scientism, and the Nature of Science. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates; 2002; p. 236.
Scott wrote:The classic microevolutionary porcesses are natural selection, mutation, migration, and genetic drift, though some scientists would also include isolating mechanisms and other factors involved in speciation. These are genetically based mechanisms that affect gene pools of species, and that result in change (adaptation) or stasis. Microevolutionary processes operate at the level of the species or population. (Scott 2004: 183)

(....) Evolutionary biologists use the term "macroevolution" to refer to the topics relevant to understanding the distribution of patterns that emerge as species and lineages branche through time. Some of these are the rate of evolutionary change (rapid or slow), the pace of evolutionary change (gradual or jerky), adaptive rediation, morphological trends in lineages (e.g., whether body size gets smaller or larger), extinction or branching of a lineage, concepts ... such as species sorting, and the emergence of major new morphological features (such as segmentation, or shells, or the fusion or loss of bones). Scientists sometimes colloquially refer to macroevolution as "evolution above the species level," but this term does not do justice to the complexity of topics included within the concept. (Scott 2004: 183)

Micro- and macroevolution are thus different levels of analysis of the same phenomenon: evolution. Macroevolution cannot solely be reduced to microevolution because it encompasses so many other phenomena: adaptive radiation, for example, cannot reduce only to natural selection, though natural selection helps bring it about. (Scott 2004: 183)

(....) There is a robust argument among evolutionary biologists over how new body plans or major new morphological features arose. No one disputes the importance of natural selection: it affects the genetic variation in populations, which may be the basis for a new species (in conjunction with isolating mechanisms). All parties likewise recognize the possibility or even likelihood of other biological mechanisms affecting morphological features that distinguish major groups of organisms. The issue in evolutionary biology is how and how much natural selection and other microevolutionary processes are supplemented by other mechanisms (such as regulatory genes operating early in embryological development). (Scott 2004: 184)

-- Scott, Eugenie C. Evolution vs. Creationism: And Introdution. California: University of California Press; 2004; p. 183; 184.
Scott wrote:Within the scientific community, of course, there are lively controversies, including over how much of evolution is explained by natural selection and how much by additional mechanisms such as those being discovered in evolutionary developmental biology ("evo-devo"). No one says natural selection is unimportant; no one says that additional mechanisms are categorically ruled out. (Scott 2004: 127)

-- Scott, Eugenie C. (2004) Evolution vs. Creationism: An Introduction. Univsersity of California Press.
Holmes wrote:The fossil record is not the only source of insight into the Cambrian Explosion. Scientists also have evidence from developmental biology the study of how a fertilized egg turns into an organism. Some early-acting genes can have profound effects on a developing embryo, and changes in these genes are inferred to have initiated the body plan changes of the Cambrian. Working together, molecular biologists and paleontologists are starting to untangle a fascinating scientific puzzle. (Scott 2004: 174)

When We Were Worms

... The paleontologists struggling to explain the Cambrian explosion face a tough task--500 million years separate them from their subject. Until recently their only option was to study the animal fossil record. But now, more and more researchers are taking a different path to enlightenment: scrutinizing the genetic record that has been handed down through the ages to today’s creatures. Comparing the genes of living animals has enabled biologists to crawl back down the evolutionary tree to deduce which genes were present back then and what roles they might have played. (Scott 2004: 176)

The exploration has led some researchers to make the heretical claim that the Cambrian explosion never happened, and others to say it certainly did, and that they have found a likely mechanism: the genes that help the cells of a developing embryo know front from back, top from bottom, and near from far. They believe that these genes were a necessary prerequisite for the exploration--though they may not have been what set it off. (Scott 2004: 176)

The most famous of these genes belongs to a set known as the hox cluster. Hox genes are the mapmakers that tell the embryo’s cells where they are on the body’s front-to-back axis and thus what they should become. In fruit flies, in which they were first discovered, eight hox genes line up on their chromosome like a train of boxcars. The gene at the front of the train tells cells there to make a head and other paraphernalia characteristic of that part of the body, number two takes over a bit further back, and so on back to the guard’s van (Americans call it the caboose), which holds sway over the hindsight end of the animal. By mucking up this orderly sequence, researchers create startling freaks such as flies sprouting legs from their heads. Other sets of genes lay out the body’s up-down axis or distinguish the base of a leg or a wing from its tip. (Scott 2004: 176)

… And about two years ago, three paleontologists began to suspect that these genes could be the answer to another great enigma, the Cambrian explosion. The modular way in which the genes map body regions would have provided evolution with a mechanism to modify one part of the body without changing the rest, to duplicate segments, or add new appendages where none existed before. This is the line taken by James Valentine, of the University of California at Berkeley, David Jablonski of the University of Chicago, and Douglas Erwin of the National Museum of National History in Washington, D.C. (Scott 2004: 176)

… Valentine, Jablonski, and Erwin needed to show that these mapmaking genes actually existed in the Cambrian. That posed a problem--Jurassic Park notwithstanding, genes don’t fossilize, least of all for half a billion years and more. (Scott 2004: 176)

… Fortunately, living organisms hold much of the secret. "The present is the key to the past," says Rudolf Raff, an evolutionary developmental biologist at Indiana University in Bloomington. Raff’s reasoning is simple. Living organisms are the tips of branches in the evolutionary tree. If the same gene occurs in two of these animals, that gene must also have been present in their common ancestor, back where their lineages first split apart. By comparing ever more distantly related organisms, biologists can move down toward the earliest branches near the tree’s root. (Scott 2004: 176)

Fruit flies and frogs--two veterans of the biology labs--have very different body designs. And they occupy twigs on two of the most fundamental branches of the animal tree, the groups known to biologists as protostomes and deuterostomes, respectively (named after the way in which the embryonic mouth forms). Paleontologists know from the fossil record that these two lineages diverged no later than the early Cambrian, 535 million years ago. They could scarcely be more distant cousins. (Scott 2004: 176-177)

… Yet over the past few years, developmental biologists have accumulated more and more evidence of astounding similarities between the DNA sequences in the mapmaking genes of these two groups. Flies and frogs, and by inference their common ancestor in the Cambrian or before, share six hox genes.… [T]he two have diverged so little in more than half a billion years that scientists can snip the gene out of a fly, plug it into a frog, and it will work perfectly, triggering the development of the bottom half of a frog wherever you insert it in the embryo.... Even genes that dictate the development of such modern-seeming accoutrements as hearts, [eyes,] nervous systems, and body segments appear to have been present in the frog-fruit fly common ancestor, way back in the Cambrian or earlier. (Scott 2004: 177)

This was just the evidence the three paleontologists needed--and its implications are still sinking in. For a start, it questions the old assumption that the common ancestor of horses and horseflies, lobsters and Londoners--the giga-great-grandmother of the early Cambrian or before--was a "roundish flatworm," little more than an oozing blob of cells. After all, if the genetic evidence is to be believed, that ancestor could equally well have been a sophisticated, segmented worm with eyes, a heart, a nervous system, possibly even antennae or legs, says, Eddy De Robertis, an embryologist at the University of California at Los Angeles. (Scott 2004: 177)

Another explanation, and the one that fits in best with Valentine and Co’s hypothesis, is that those key developmental genes existed in that roundish flatworm, but didn’t trigger the growth of eyes, limbs, hearts, and segments as they do in post-Cambrian animals…. The Precambrian "eye" that pax6 helped form may have been nothing more than a crude photosensor with a pigment cell to back it up, for instance. Indeed, the fossil record shows no trace of anything as sophisticated as the insect and vertebrate eyes in the earliest protostomes and deuterostomes. (Scott 2004: 177)

… John Finnerty and Mark Martindale of the University of Chicago report that sea anemones have a rich set of hox genes, even though these most primitive of animals have no head nor tail--they face the world equally well in all directions. … Finnerty suspects that [hox genes] may map out the anemones’ far simpler up-and-down axis instead. The best guess is that Precambrian flatworm then commandeered these crude mapmaking genes for use in the crucial front-to-back axis of its more complex body plan--possibly their first big role as the "language of evolution." (Scott 2004: 177)

"Creationists have often said that the one thing we can’t explain is the extremely rapid appearance of body plans in the Cambrian," says Valentine. "And this is the answer. We haven’t understood it until these development guys." (Scott 2004: 177)

... [W]hatever happened to kick-start the Precambrian worm into an evolutionary frenzy, it probably found it much easier to spin off new body plans than a creature would today. "You can do a lot to that animal in terms of its basic body arrangement for two reasons," says Raff. "One is that the world is empty ecologically, so there can be a lot of experiments. Whatever you're making doesn't have to be very good, because there isn't much competition. The second thing is that because the body's relatively simple, changes that would now be horrendous--like changing dorsal and ventral--would have been nothing at all. (Scott 2004: 177-178)

"In the post-Cambrian world, competition is severe, so if you're not good at making a living, you're dead meat. And body plans have become more elaborate, so changes that you make have more consequences. You've connected the genetic machinery together in a certain way, and it may be hard to unconnect it. That's left us with a world in which evolution is largly within body plans." (Scott 2004: 178)

In short, animal life on Earth has grown up. The heady, experimental days of its carefree youth are past and now, saddled with a job, a mortgage, responsibilities, it has settled down into a steady, plodding respectability. Looking back now, we can shed a tear for those days so long ago when life was young and we were worms. (Scott 2004: 178)

Selection excerpted from:

Holmes, Bob. 1997. When We Were Worms. New Scientist 156 (2104): 30-35.

-- Scott, Eugenie C. Evolution vs. Creationism: And Introdution. California: University of California Press; 2004; pp. 174-177.
Jose wrote:There's the "regulatory genome," meaning that portion of the genome involved in regulating gene expression, and thereby regulating developmental form. One of the hallmarks for many animals is a repeating pattern of segments, or "meres." The guys above have repeating patterns of segments--even the little frisbee at the bottom, Tribrachidium, whose three "arms" are wrapped around in a little triskelion. Look at those obvious segmental units on each "arm." I'll guess that we're seeing the results of the Master Switch genes ..., and that we're seeing diversity of form because of the way the Regulatory Genome has produced different patterns of expression of those Master Switch genes.

(....) There are constraints. Once you've got a Hox gene family, and once you're using it in a particular way, you can't make big changes to how you use these genes without screwing up development so much that you're dead. Tiny changes can be tolerated, but not big ones.... So, the normal rules of ecology, and the normal constraints of genetics and development, conspire to place limits on what can be achieved evolutionarily.

(....) [T]here are a great many well-documented examples of gradual change. Many of them were unknown at the time the old quotes were freshly spoken. So, while it may be true that at one time gradualism was not documented in the fossil record, that is no longer true.... In the case of the Cambrian Explosion, it is no longer justifiable to hang onto the old model, that all of the phyla just sort of suddenly appeared. We may not know the precise route that evolution followed, but we certainly know that there wasn't a *pop* and there everything was. There was a very long time beforehand during which lots and lots of gradual events could occur at their leisure. So life tootles along for a long time, without having the occurrence of an unplanned, and unplannable, fortuitous event. Then, for whatever reason, a fortuitous event occurs. Whether it's a type of mutation, or a cell-fusion, or what isn't critical right now. The point is, a fortuitous event occurred. After that event occurred, some new possibilities were made available.
Jose wrote:The fact remains, however, that it demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt how major morphological changes occur: by mutations in the regulation of developmental-control genes.

I think it is an obfuscation to equate this genetically- and molecularly-understood process with the vague term, "saltation." Saltation was invented to fill a knowledge gap, using the concept of sudden, major changes in form (mechanism unknown). Now that we know the mechanism for changes in form, and know the genes involved and how they work, we know that the reality doesn't match that old concept.

Of course, scientists can't "produce" major morphological changes on purpose, given that mutations occur at random. Even in searching explicitly for new Antp mutations, for example, one is at the mercy of probability distributions. I can expose flies to X-rays, but I can't tell the X-rays what to do. So, scientists can create collections of animals with different mutations, and perform crosses to move multiple mutations into the same strain--which is what Ed did to create the 4-winged fly--but they can't purposely set out to make a new form of animal with pre-planned characteristics.

(....) [T] there are now well-understood mechanisms for morphological change, involving the "regulatory genome" and "master switch genes" (i.e. changes in regulation of the genes that determine how development proceeds). These mechanisms solve the "problem" of morphological change, and simultaneously eliminate the need for terms like "macromutation" and "saltation." These terms are now seen to refer to mutations (and their effects) in regulatory genes.

I might note, by the way, that stating this fact is not falling into the false ideology of panselectionism. Panselectionism claims that selection is the primary, if not exclusive, means of sorting among mutations and converting genetic diversity into evolutionary change. Describing the mutations and their effects makes no claim of how they become fixed in populations. Often, selection has little to do with it--there are founder effects (e.g. one individual is the founder of an isolated population), or genetic drift (e.g. a few individuals survive a flood). It's actually rather amusing to listen to discussions among evolutionary biologists about the relative contributions of selection vs other mechanisms of fixing alleles in populations. Things can become quite heated, with people calling each other names (like "you rabid selectionist!"). I think the short answer is that we don't know the relative contributions. On the other hand, we hear a lot more about selection, because it's conceptually pleasing; it's hard to teach students about genetic drift and founder effects and keep them awake.
Jose wrote: I think it's an obfuscation to bring in Fisher's and even Goldschmidt's thoughts about things that were then unknown. The only difference between a "micromutation" and a "macromutation," as defined by evo devo, is which genes the mutations are in. So-called micromutations are in genes that don't control morphological characteristics (like hair color, or in the case of Peppered Moths, wing color). So-called macromutations are in genes that do control morphological characteristics....

The kind of "macromutation" that The Ancients imagined when they coined and used the term was for the imagined process of "saltation" in which a Whole Bunch of Things change at once, and presto-chango, there's a new form. This is, as you suggest, the way we'd have to think of the Cambrian "explosion," if we believed in such a thing any more, and if we had no knowledge of the metameric nature of the preceding animals (ie, they were segmented). Now that we do know some things about the preceding animals, why bother to postulate a magic solution when ordinary genetics will do the job nicely?

There is no data to support any other form of life, with unpredictable Lamarckian inheritance patterns. We're pretty much constrained to proposing mechanisms that involve normal genetics.

(....) Individuals cannot evolve. The only way to produce offspring that are different is by having one or more mutations occur in their sex cells, and of course, the reshuffling of existing alleles through meiosis. So, if a mutant offspring is born, he's either similar enough to the others that he can mate with them and pass on his mutations, or he's a dead end--he can't be a new species. He might have some morphological differences, due to mutations in regulatory genes, but if they make him look too different, potential mates won't recognize him. Of course, these "rules" might not apply to self-fertilizing hermaphrodites, like C. elegans.

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Reification of Statistical Shadows - Misplaced Concreteness

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Pigliucci wrote:Biological evolution is, as has often been noted, both fact and theory. It is a fact that all extant organisms came to exist in their current forms through a process of descent with modification from ancestral forms. The overwhelming evidence for this empirical claim was recognized relatively soon after Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859, and support for it has grown to the point where it is as well established as any historical claim might be. In this sense, biological evolution is no more a theory than it is a "theory" that Napoleon Bonaparte commanded the French army in the late eighteenth century. Of course, the details of how extant and extinct organisms are related to one another, and of what descended from what and when, are still being worked out, and will probably never be known in their entirety. The same is true of the details of Napoleon's life and military campaigns. However, this lack of complete knowledge certainly does not alter the fundamental nature of the claims made, either by historians or by evolutionary biologists. (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 1)

On the other hand, evolutionary biology is also a rich patchwork of theories seeking to explain the patterns observed in the changes in populations of organisms over time. These theories range in scope form "natural selection," which is evoked extensively at many different levels, to finer-grained explanations involving particular mechanisms (e.g., reproductive isolation induced by geographic barriers leading to speciation events). (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 1)

(....) There are a number of different ways in which these questions have been addressed, and a number of different accounts of these areas of evolutionary biology. These different accounts, we will maintain, are not always compatible, either with one another or with other accepted practices in evolutionary biology. (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 1)

(....) Because we will be making some potentially controversial claims throughout this volume, it is crucial for the reader to understand two basic ideas underlying most of what we say, as well as exactly what we think are some implications of our views for the general theory of evolutionary quantitative genetics, which we discuss repeatedly in critical fashion. (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 2)

(….) The first central idea we wish to put forth as part of the framework of this book will be readily familiar to biologists, although some of its consequences may not be. The idea can be expressed by the use of a metaphor proposed by Bill Shipley (2000) …. the shadow theater popular in Southeast Asia. In one form, the wayang golek of Bali and other parts of Indonesia, three-dimensional wooden puppets are used to project two-dimensional shadows on a screen, where the action is presented to the spectator. Shipley’s idea is that quantitative biologists find themselves very much in the position of wayang golek’s spectators: we have access to only the "statistical shadows" projected by a set of underlying causal factors. Unlike the wayang golek’s patrons, however, biologists want to peek around the screen and infer the position of the light source as well as the actual three-dimensional shapes of the puppets. This, of course, is the familiar problem of the relationship between causation and correlation, and, as any undergraduate science major soon learns, correlation is not causation (although a popular joke among scientists is that the two are nevertheless often correlated). (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 2)

The loose relationship between causation and correlation has two consequences that are crucial.... On the one hand, there is the problem that, strictly speaking, it makes no sense to attempt to infer mechanisms directly from patterns.... On the other hand, as Shipley elegantly show in his book, there is an alternative route that gets (most of) the job done, albeit in a more cicuitous route and painful way. What one can do is to produce a series of alternative hypotheses about the causal pathways underlying a given set of observations; these hypotheses can then be used to "project" the expected statistical shadows, which can be compared with the observed one. If the projected and actual shsadows do not match, one can discard the corresponding causal hypothesis and move on to the next one; if the two shadows do match (within statistical margins of error, of course), then one had identified at least one causal explanation compatible with the observations. As any philosopher or scientist worth her salt knows, of course, this cannot be the end of the process, for more than one causal model may be compatible with the observations, which means that one needs additional observations or refinements of the causal models to be able to discard more wrong explanations and continue to narrow the field. A crucial point here is that the causal models to be tested against the observed statistical shadow can be suggested by the observations themselves, especially if coupled with further knowledge about the system under study (such as details of the ecology, developmental biology, genetics, or past evolutionary history of the populations in question). But the statistical shadows cannot be used as direct supporting evidence for any particular causal model. (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 4)

The second central idea ... has been best articulated by John Dupré (1993), and it deals with the proper way to think about reductionism. The term "reductionism" has a complex history, and it evokes strong feelings in both scientists and philosophers (often, though not always, with scientists hailing reductionism as fundamental to the success of science and some philosophers dismissing it as a hopeless epistemic dream). Dupré introduces a useful distinction that acknowledges the power of reductionism in science while at the same time sharply curtailing its scope. His idea is summarized ... as two possible scenarios: In one case, reductionism allows one to explain and predict higher-level phenomena (say, development in living organisms) entirely in terms of lower-level processes (say, genetic switches throughout development). In the most extreme case, one can also infer the details of the lower-level processes from the higher-level patterns produced (something we have just seen is highly unlikely in the case of any complex biological phenomenon because of Shipley's "statistical shadow" effect). This form of "greedy" reductionism ... is bound to fail in most (though not all) cases for two reasons. The first is that the relationships between levels of manifestation of reality (e.g., genetic machinery vs. development, or population genetics vs. evolutionary pathways) are many-to-many (again, as pointed out above in our discussion of the shadow theater). The second is the genuine existence of "emergent properties" (i.e., properties of higher-level phenomena that arise from the nonadditive interaction among lower-level processes). It is, for example, currently impossible to predict the physicochemical properties of water from the simple properties of individual atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, or, for that matter, from the properties of H20 molecules and the smattering of necessary impurities. (Pigliucci et al. 2006: 4-5)

-- Pigliucci, Massimo and Kaplan Jonathan. Making Sense of Evolution: The Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2006; pp. 1-4.

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Post #10

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Ok Rob :wave: What are you saying?

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