Welcome to the Debating Christianity & Religion forums, sofyst!
sofyst wrote:Hello all, I am new to this board; therefore you must be kind to me!

Ha!

Which kind?
sofyst wrote:I am a Christian, a reformed Southern Baptist (go ahead think of all the evil connotations involved with all of these labels...).
I am, for all practical purposes, an atheist (go ahead, think of all the evil connotations)...
sofyst wrote:I am a determinist, yet a soft-determinist as the label has been drawn. Given the idea that I believe God to be simple and perfect, knowing all that is to be known, I would likewise say that the future is as the future will be...therefore fixed and unchangeable.
Yeah, I'm sort of a soft determinist myself, though a
sorta predictablist might be a more accurate description. Some things can be predicted rather well, such as Halley's Comet, the orbit of Jupiter, and sunrise time tomorrow. Yet some things, like turbulence, beta decay, and tomorrow's winning lottery numbers appear to be rather unpredictable.
sofyst wrote:I was just interested in a topic being started dealing with arguments for or against the nature of the future. Moreso interested in those who do not believe in the issue of free-will, strictly from an atheistic (or non-Christian) viewpoint.
Well, I'm an atheist, but I haven't a clue as to what the proper
atheistic viewpoint might be on the issue of free will. I must have misplaced my copy of the
Atheist Handbook...
As I stated above, some things are predictable (at least within a probability spectrum), other things appear to be random. So what does that tell us about free will and/or determinism? Does
uncertainty preclude or limit determinism? Though predictability does not confirm determinism, uncertainty may rule it out.
How would we ever know for sure if an event is random or predetermined?

Information that may be known about a particular outcome, but is unavailable, is, for all practical purposes, useless. If the gods know tomorrow's winning lottery numbers but do not communicate that information to anyone, it's as good as the numbers being unknown. That the winning numbers are not
known (by the players) does not mean that nobody will win, of course...
As to the
will part of free will, I certainly appear to have the capacity to decide
many of my actions, and that's good enough for me. For example, I have not yet decided whether I'll have pork chops or chili for dinner; both choices are available and the decision
appears to be mine. How could I tell if my meal choice was free-willed or pre-willed, anyway? If free will is just illusion, then maybe the illusion is sufficiently convincing. Frugality leads me toward something like: we appear to have (at least some) free will, therefore we probably do have (at least some) free will. If free will is an illusion, then we do not have the means to discern illusion from reality.
Regards,
mrmufin