subjective ethics: a scientifically verifiable fact?

[Pompey]

Divine Insight writes:

Right and wrong is entirely a subjective human judgement. Period.

If humans didn't mind being raped then no human would think that rape is wrong.

What is it going to take before you understand this simple "Scientifically verifiable fact"?

This is not a question of whether you think morality is objective or subjective, but rather that subjective morality is a scientifically verifiable fact, and the claim that this is a question of science and not philosophy.

I find this claim very bold and cannot find any kind of concrete data that supports this. Thus far DI and I have just been going back and forth with each other, but I'm interested in hearing other people's thoughts.

Is ethics a scientific category? Is subjective morality a scientifically verifiable fact? If it is, please supply the data from the scientific community that verifies this.

[Bust Nak]

I am back, and ready for another round.

I think the issue is that there are two different meanings of 'mind independence' - one being universal validity, the other being hard to describe. I believe robust moral realism intends the other sense, while minimal realism only includes universal validity. For instance, I think "X is wrong iff everyone disapproves of X" would be classified differently by the two.

"Not a matter of opinion" is how I would describe the other sense.

I would agree with minimal moral realism (and you ... I think) that this specific sense - universal validity - is all that is (evidently, at least) necessary for a moral proposition to be said to be factually or objectively 'true' (or something along those lines).

An example contradiction in the wiki is the claim "Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to moral realism" (despite "there are also universalist forms of subjectivism") - I believe they may be referring to robust moral realism - there is one sense in which it is mind dependant (i.e. the subjects influence it), even if it might not be mind dependant in the other sense (even if universally valid).

I think you are reading too much into it. The universalist forms of subjectivism are opposed to moral realism itself, which include both robust and minimal moral realism.

Barring the trivial case (I think you accepted?), i.e. change with respect to something else, consider utilitarianism where utility is maximum pleasure.

If the claim "Free chocolates increase pleasure [for everyone]" is objectively true, "Giving out free chocolates is good" is objectively true as it increases utility. The truth of the claim "Free chocolates increase pleasure" could change, in which case the truth of whether or not it is good will change. "Giving out free chocolates is good" was objectively true, now it might not be.
I agree that the ethical system itself - "maximising utility is good" - hasn't changed, and that you could phrase it "Giving out free chocolates is good... so long as they increase pleasure" so that it wouldn't change, but there is a conclusion that does change in some sense.
The alternative would be that an objective claim ALWAYS needs prefacing with "at this time, at this position, given these conditions", etc. It's unnecessary, just like it was with the car's position.

Regardless of the condition, we simple check if the statement is treated as matter of opinion or one of fact. I can phrase conditional statements as both subjective and objective, just as I can phrase absolute statements both subjective and objective.

A normative statement provides some kind of claim like "this is desirable", "this ought to be the case". A subset of such statements are moral statements, "this is good", "this is bad". (Which, to me, appear similar to "this should be done", "this shouldn't be done".)

You could say that they model how the world should or shouldn't be.
I would say that a claim like "X should be the case" would be objectively true if X were in the 'best interests' of everyone. I.e., "Given that X is undesirable, you ought not do X" seems to be trivially true. If everyone thinks X is undesirable, then "You ought not do X" is universally true.

For instance, I'd contend that "That which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" is universally (and therefore objectively) true. (I say wanting not to exclude not caring, which technically is not wanting.)

But is "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" a matter of fact, or just your opinion?

It is true that sticking a knife in my heart is a bad idea if I want to live, but it is not representative of the world as I haven't stuck a knife in my heart (and hopefully won't).

If it is true that sticking a knife in your heart is a bad idea if you want to live, then are you not also making a statement about knifes and hearts? Is that statement accurate? I would say yes to both questions.

I find this 'accurate depiction of the world' a weird way of phrasing things.
Isn't it true that, in the Lord of the Rings, Gandalf killed a Balrog? Do you really want to phrase this as "an accurate depiction of the world"? Should abstract and esoteric statements be considered 'accurate depictions of the world'? Questions about other 'possible' worlds?

Yes to all of them.

Though naturally, the meaning of 'true' is also a hotly contested philosophical topic.

Had a read through that, "correspondence theory" matches how I view truth best. If you ask me what truth is, I would answer truth is the set of statements that accurately describes the world, seems pretty close to "truth is a matter of accurately copying what is known as objective reality and then representing it in thoughts, words and other symbols."

[Jashwell]

I think the issue is that there are two different meanings of 'mind independence' - one being universal validity, the other being hard to describe. I believe robust moral realism intends the other sense, while minimal realism only includes universal validity. For instance, I think "X is wrong iff everyone disapproves of X" would be classified differently by the two.

"Not a matter of opinion" is how I would describe the other sense.

Perhaps, but isn't [whether or not someone holds an opinion] itself a fact?

I don't necessarily agree that they are opposed to minimal moral realism, which only proposes universal validity as a requirement.

Regardless of the condition, we simple check if the statement is treated as matter of opinion or one of fact. I can phrase conditional statements as both subjective and objective, just as I can phrase absolute statements both subjective and objective.

Yes, but there's no more reason to say change can't apply to a moral objective system than to any other objective system.

But is "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" a matter of fact, or just your opinion?

I think there's good reason (for any given individual) to avoid "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not". If it's an opinion, it's a universal one - one that is in everyone's interests.
If "Stabbing myself in the heart is bad, given I want to live" is true and factual, what about "Given that everyone wants to live, an individual stabbing themselves in the heart is bad"?

I find this 'accurate depiction of the world' a weird way of phrasing things.
Isn't it true that, in the Lord of the Rings, Gandalf killed a Balrog? Do you really want to phrase this as "an accurate depiction of the world"? Should abstract and esoteric statements be considered 'accurate depictions of the world'? Questions about other 'possible' worlds?

Yes to all of them.

I wouldn't agree, but if you think it's not a problem for concepts and fictions, then this is no problem for normative statements.

[Bust Nak]

"Not a matter of opinion" is how I would describe the other sense.

Perhaps, but isn't [whether or not someone holds an opinion] itself a fact?

Sure, the same way it is an objective fact that I like vanilla ice-cream, and yet taste is subjective.

Regardless of the condition, we simple check if the statement is treated as matter of opinion or one of fact. I can phrase conditional statements as both subjective and objective, just as I can phrase absolute statements both subjective and objective.

Yes, but there's no more reason to say change can't apply to a moral objective system than to any other objective system.

Lets just say change applies to a moral objective system like it would any other objective system. The way that changes applies to the answer to 1+1.

But is "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" a matter of fact, or just your opinion?

I think there's good reason (for any given individual) to avoid "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not". If it's an opinion, it's a universal one - one that is in everyone's interests.
If "Stabbing myself in the heart is bad, given I want to live" is true and factual, what about "Given that everyone wants to live, an individual stabbing themselves in the heart is bad"?

That sounds to me like you are treating "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" as a matter of fact.

Yes to all of them.

I wouldn't agree, but if you think it's not a problem for concepts and fictions, then this is no problem for normative statements.

Well, if I make a statement about Gandalf killing a Balrog in LotR, am I not accurately describing the content of fictional book in reality?

[Jashwell]

But is "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" a matter of fact, or just your opinion?

I think there's good reason (for any given individual) to avoid "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not". If it's an opinion, it's a universal one - one that is in everyone's interests.
If "Stabbing myself in the heart is bad, given I want to live" is true and factual, what about "Given that everyone wants to live, an individual stabbing themselves in the heart is bad"?

That sounds to me like you are treating "that which everyone wants not, has always wanted not and will always want not ought to be avoided" as a matter of fact.

Isn't it a matter of fact as to whether or not everyone has found (and will always find) a certain thing undesirable?
That such a thing is therefore undesirable is just an example of what I think is a normative fact.

Yes to all of them.

I wouldn't agree, but if you think it's not a problem for concepts and fictions, then this is no problem for normative statements.

Well, if I make a statement about Gandalf killing a Balrog in LotR, am I not accurately describing the content of fictional book in reality?

You're accurately describing the content of a fiction, if you want to say that fiction is then part of reality, that's fine, and I'd agree that there's a sense in which it is. It's certainly embedded and instantiated in reality.

I myself would treat 'exist' for concepts in a different manner entirely.

[Bust Nak]

Isn't it a matter of fact as to whether or not everyone has found (and will always find) a certain thing undesirable?
That such a thing is therefore undesirable is just an example of what I think is a normative fact.

What is or isn't desirable isn't normative. What ought to be avoided is the normative part. That's what the whole is/ought gap debate is about. "Should you avoid what is undesirable?" is a different question to "Is it undesirable?"

You're accurately describing the content of a fiction, if you want to say that fiction is then part of reality, that's fine, and I'd agree that there's a sense in which it is. It's certainly embedded and instantiated in reality.

I myself would treat 'exist' for concepts in a different manner entirely.

Going back to the theories of truth, which would you say is how you view truth?

[Jashwell]

Isn't it a matter of fact as to whether or not everyone has found (and will always find) a certain thing undesirable?
That such a thing is therefore undesirable is just an example of what I think is a normative fact.

What is or isn't desirable isn't normative. What ought to be avoided is the normative part. That's what the whole is/ought gap debate is about. "Should you avoid what is undesirable?" is a different question to "Is it undesirable?"

What is or isn't desirable is in fact normative.
"Normative means relating to an ideal standard of or model, or being based on what is considered to be the normal or correct way of doing something. "
"In economics and philosophy, a normative statement expresses a value judgment about whether a situation is subjectively desirable or undesirable. It looks at the world as it "should" be."
(Wikipedia).

"X is desirable" - Normative
"Y thinks X is desirable" - Positive
"Everyone thinks X is desirable" - Positive

You're accurately describing the content of a fiction, if you want to say that fiction is then part of reality, that's fine, and I'd agree that there's a sense in which it is. It's certainly embedded and instantiated in reality.

I myself would treat 'exist' for concepts in a different manner entirely.

Going back to the theories of truth, which would you say is how you view truth?

I'm undecided, I'm not particularly convinced that either is exclusively the best description of truth. To me 'x is true' can be largely contextual (but still meaningful).

[Bust Nak]

Isn't it a matter of fact as to whether or not everyone has found (and will always find) a certain thing undesirable?
That such a thing is therefore undesirable is just an example of what I think is a normative fact.

What is or isn't desirable isn't normative. What ought to be avoided is the normative part. That's what the whole is/ought gap debate is about. "Should you avoid what is undesirable?" is a different question to "Is it undesirable?"

What is or isn't desirable is in fact normative.
"Normative means relating to an ideal standard of or model, or being based on what is considered to be the normal or correct way of doing something. "
"In economics and philosophy, a normative statement expresses a value judgment about whether a situation is subjectively desirable or undesirable. It looks at the world as it "should" be."
(Wikipedia).

"X is desirable" - Normative
"Y thinks X is desirable" - Positive
"Everyone thinks X is desirable" - Positive

But "X is desirable" is just the incomplete form of "I think X is desirable." How does it change from a positive statement to a normative one by omitting to mention the subject? That is unless you are suggesting that something can be desirable without anyone desiring it.

I'm undecided, I'm not particularly convinced that either is exclusively the best description of truth. To me 'x is true' can be largely contextual (but still meaningful).

Ok, I am guessing that is why you think it was odd to equate truth with accurate descriptions of reality.

[Jashwell]

What is or isn't desirable is in fact normative.
"Normative means relating to an ideal standard of or model, or being based on what is considered to be the normal or correct way of doing something. "
"In economics and philosophy, a normative statement expresses a value judgment about whether a situation is subjectively desirable or undesirable. It looks at the world as it "should" be."
(Wikipedia).

"X is desirable" - Normative
"Y thinks X is desirable" - Positive
"Everyone thinks X is desirable" - Positive

But "X is desirable" is just the incomplete form of "I think X is desirable." How does it change from a positive statement to a normative one by omitting to mention the subject? That is unless you are suggesting that something can be desirable without anyone desiring it.

I suppose the thing that makes "Y thinks X is desirable" positive is that it describes what some things (in this case, a person's views) are and not what they should be. To be normative, it'd have to be something like "Y [thinking X is desirable] is desirable", or "Y should think X is desirable".

There are two things that change, depending on how you mention the subject - you might switch the statement to being objective: "Y thinks X" is objective, "I think X" is often subjective (if you don't decay 'I' into 'Jashwell'/the person who said 'I', but instead interpret 'I' as yourself). It also might switch it from normative to positive - "X ought be" (describes an ideal world) to "I think [X ought be]" (describes the real world).

I'm pretty sure (with regards to morality) views on normative statements vary pretty wildly. Some think all moral statements are false, all are subjectively true, all can be neither true nor false, all are meaningless, etc. In some senses, people might consider objectively true normative statements to therefore be positive - e.g. if X is objectively* undesirable, it doesn't just describe an ideal world, but it also describes some set of standards that could be considered part of this reality - perhaps the sense in which you believe 'stabbing myself in the chest is bad for me, if I want to continue to live' describes this reality. (*naturally not everyone would think a normative claim can be meaningful, let alone objective, and even then whether it can be true or false is also debated)

I'm undecided, I'm not particularly convinced that either is exclusively the best description of truth. To me 'x is true' can be largely contextual (but still meaningful).

Ok, I am guessing that is why you think it was odd to equate truth with accurate descriptions of reality.

I certainly think there is a reality, but I personally find it odd to consider every kind of truth - including mathematical truths, abstract concepts, the concepts of various mutual exclusives, fictions, etc as descriptions of this reality.

I suppose I'd lean towards coherence but with an emphasis on the shared experience of multiple participants - if you consider everyone on Earth, coherence looks a lot like correspondence. (I'd say this is how we'd reach such a correspondence/come to know things about reality.) But you can still have smaller contexts in which other things are considered to be true, e.g. fictions.

[Bust Nak]

But "X is desirable" is just the incomplete form of "I think X is desirable." How does it change from a positive statement to a normative one by omitting to mention the subject? That is unless you are suggesting that something can be desirable without anyone desiring it.

I suppose the thing that makes "Y thinks X is desirable" positive is that it describes what some things (in this case, a person's views) are and not what they should be. To be normative, it'd have to be something like "Y [thinking X is desirable] is desirable", or "Y should think X is desirable"...

Now we are getting into what the word desirable means. If the word implicitly implies what should be, then I'll agree with you.

I'm pretty sure (with regards to morality) views on normative statements vary pretty wildly. Some think all moral statements are false, all are subjectively true, all can be neither true nor false, all are meaningless, etc. In some senses, people might consider objectively true normative statements to therefore be positive - e.g. if X is objectively* undesirable, it doesn't just describe an ideal world, but it also describes some set of standards that could be considered part of this reality - perhaps the sense in which you believe 'stabbing myself in the chest is bad for me, if I want to continue to live' describes this reality. (*naturally not everyone would think a normative claim can be meaningful, let alone objective, and even then whether it can be true or false is also debated)

There are lots of varied view, I am trying to find out yours when I asked you if you treat certain statements as matters of facts or opinion.

I certainly think there is a reality, but I personally find it odd to consider every kind of truth - including mathematical truths, abstract concepts, the concepts of various mutual exclusives, fictions, etc as descriptions of this reality.

I suppose I'd lean towards coherence but with an emphasis on the shared experience of multiple participants - if you consider everyone on Earth, coherence looks a lot like correspondence. (I'd say this is how we'd reach such a correspondence/come to know things about reality.) But you can still have smaller contexts in which other things are considered to be true, e.g. fictions.

Ok, then going all the way back to the statement that kicked off this part of the conversation: the topic is not about determining whether an action is right or wrong under a particular moral system scientifically; we are determining whether a particular moral system is true scientifically.

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 38 by Bust Nak]

The OP seems to be about whether or not meta-ethical relativism (i.e. nobody is objectively right or wrong) is a scientifically verifiable fact. I don't think there's any question (outside of religious discussion) as to whether it's a fact that people hold (and have held) different views (descriptive ethical relativism).