The fine-tuned universe.

[Undertow]

The specifics of this argument have recently come to my attention. The logic behind it is that many of the universes constants are within such a limited range so that intelligent life, such as us, can arise. This would evidence the idea that a god or external force had a say in the creation of the universe to allow for us to come about.

Why is this a weak argument? It seems pretty amazing to me, and I challenge the atheist position that this is a godless universe. Also, I challenge the idea that the theistic position is merely one of "blind faith." There would be elements of faith, sure, but this kind of argument, if valid, could only make the theistic argument gain evidence.

[HughDP]

Hi Undertow,

I'd question one of your premises:

(P3) Any slight tweaking of the physical constants would eliminate the possibility of intelligent, complex life-forms, such as us, to come about.

Would it? How do we know this? I think it would be fairer to say that the combination of physical constants required for intelligent life is currently thought to be a relatively improbable one, rather than saying 'any slight tweaking would eliminate the possibility' as that implies that our current set of physical constants is the only set that would lead to intelligent life and I really don't think we know that.

Apologies, I'm not really trying to 'nit-pick', it's just that I think there's a big difference between saying that the set of constants in our universe is the only one that would allow intelligent life to form, and saying that the set of constants required for intelligent life to form is currently considered to be relatively improbable.

[Undertow]

Hi Undertow,

I'd question one of your premises:

(P3) Any slight tweaking of the physical constants would eliminate the possibility of intelligent, complex life-forms, such as us, to come about.

Would it? How do we know this? I think it would be fairer to say that the combination of physical constants required for intelligent life is currently thought to be a relatively improbable one, rather than saying 'any slight tweaking would eliminate the possibility' as that implies that our current set of physical constants is the only set that would lead to intelligent life and I really don't think we know that.

Apologies, I'm not really trying to 'nit-pick', it's just that I think there's a big difference between saying that the set of constants in our universe is the only one that would allow intelligent life to form, and saying that the set of constants required for intelligent life to form is currently considered to be relatively improbable.

Valid questions, and I might look to answer them later on with research. Right now I've got a hell of an inorganic chemistry practical on the brain. Never mind that, though, I'll just leave everyone with this nice, short article I found. I think it sums up the two camps thought processes well (and in a balanced manner), and it comes from a theistic perspective:

http://quake.stanford.edu/~bai/design.pdf

[Beto]

The specifics of this argument have recently come to my attention. The logic behind it is that many of the universes constants are within such a limited range so that intelligent life, such as us, can arise.

I was under the impression the universal constants are within such a limited range so that the universe can sustain itself. How does it follow that the "purpose" was to sustain intelligent life?

The constants are so that the universe can sustain itself? Says who? The universe? How does it know to sustain itself? Please elaborate on this point.

I'm just saying that I see the constants as necessary for the universe to exist in its observable form. I don't understand the logic leap from "constants needed for the universe to exist as it is" to "constants needed to produce intelligent life". As far as I can observe, "intelligent life" just happens to be available in a "small" interval of the spectrum.

EDIT: When I wrote "sustain itself", I didn't mean to imply the universe has a conscious quality to it, but I guess that's one interpretation.

Bold text = you're mixing this up. You should have written "constants needed to produce intelligent life" and "such a set of constants is rare among all possible sets of constants" to "there was a supernatural purpose behind this universe."

And to be honest I thought it would have gone without saying that the constants we have are necessary for the universe we observe, as the universe we observe is an outworking of those constants. That's really not the issue here.

All I'm saying is that maybe the universe wouldn't exist at all (at least in a way we can conceive as "physical") if the constants were any different. Perhaps "intelligent life" HAS to be possible in a conceivable "physical" universe, and is not a matter of "chance" or "design". I don't think either is responsible for my being here, if that makes any sense.

[Undertow]

The specifics of this argument have recently come to my attention. The logic behind it is that many of the universes constants are within such a limited range so that intelligent life, such as us, can arise.

I was under the impression the universal constants are within such a limited range so that the universe can sustain itself. How does it follow that the "purpose" was to sustain intelligent life?

The constants are so that the universe can sustain itself? Says who? The universe? How does it know to sustain itself? Please elaborate on this point.

I'm just saying that I see the constants as necessary for the universe to exist in its observable form. I don't understand the logic leap from "constants needed for the universe to exist as it is" to "constants needed to produce intelligent life". As far as I can observe, "intelligent life" just happens to be available in a "small" interval of the spectrum.

EDIT: When I wrote "sustain itself", I didn't mean to imply the universe has a conscious quality to it, but I guess that's one interpretation.

Bold text = you're mixing this up. You should have written "constants needed to produce intelligent life" and "such a set of constants is rare among all possible sets of constants" to "there was a supernatural purpose behind this universe."

And to be honest I thought it would have gone without saying that the constants we have are necessary for the universe we observe, as the universe we observe is an outworking of those constants. That's really not the issue here.

All I'm saying is that maybe the universe wouldn't exist at all (at least in a way we can conceive as "physical") if the constants were any different. Perhaps "intelligent life" HAS to be possible in a conceivable "physical" universe, and is not a matter of "chance" or "design". I don't think either is responsible for my being here, if that makes any sense.

So you're saying it's possible that it just is? That it's somehow necessary? You'd understand, though, that this proposition doesn't make the arguments go away. People will still wonder.

Could you perhaps elaborate on this idea just a bit? I'm not picking up on the cohesion of it.

[Furrowed Brow]

Lets assume this universe is uniquely tuned and of all its properties it has one unique to itself and that property is an occupant with the ability to wonder.

Let y = “the ability to wonder”

We shall call this the y universe

Let P be a set of all the possible universe distinguished by some unique property.

P = (…?, ?, x, y, z, ?, ?…) = all possible universe with unique property.

We do not know how many universes occupy this set, or what counts as a unique property. But P could contain just y, or its membership could be infinite. Your guess is as good as mine.

Let Q be the set of all possible universe that share some properties.

Q = (…?, ?, y, ?, ?,?..)

Again we do not know how many universes Q contains, but lets say it is a very big number e.g. 10^400.

The logical mistake of the fine tuning argument is to see some parameters of this universe as unique, and to invoke a very large number of other potential universe of which y is a membe. So the math kinds of looks like 1/10^400 or some such improbability.

But that is not the right sum. The math is incomplete. And it is biased. We need to know how may members belong to P, and then the sum is P divided by Q. but we can't do that sum because we don't know what's in P.

The next step of the fine tuning argument is to say something like “but y is the only universe with life” or “y is the only universe that looks like y”. So this is like saying y is the only member of P that is like y. But that is really a tautology. Mathematically speaking why is y any more significant than any other universe with a unique property? Personally speaking, and egocentrically speaking, I’d say life is more important. But the fine tuning argument invokes math. And mathematically speaking y is no more important than any other variable x, y z and so forth. If we give y a weighting to make it more important than the other variables then the math is already biased. If we ignore the possibility of the set P, then the math is again biased. If y is the only member of the set P then we still need to divide P by Q. However we do not know that y is uniquely unique. If we are saying y is uniquely unique because it is the only universe that harbours life then we have already skewed the math by putting y in a set of its own. A judgement that has no mathematical basis. Thus the fine tuning argument is mathematically skewed to favour the fine tuning argument.

[QED]

I'll just leave everyone with this nice, short article I found. I think it sums up the two camps thought processes well (and in a balanced manner), and it comes from a theistic perspective:

http://quake.stanford.edu/~bai/design.pdf

From the above article:

The old design argument was refuted by the discovery that natural selection can mimic apparent design in organisms

"Can" alone is not enough to refute design in this example, but it firmly establishes a dichotomy to be resolved. The same has to be true for the design argument regarding the whole universe. If the theist is seen retreating from the biological design argument to the position of universal design it is only relatively "safe" in so much as the alternative explanations, while presently being beyond experimental verification, are more numerous as hypotheses -- where the intentional designer is but one potential solution.

While this "many to one" ratio of atheistic to theistic hypotheses is not bound to impress, it should serve to emphasise the considerable burden on the theist to demonstrate divine intent behind the world we experience. Even this intent can be broken down further into intent aimed specifically at us -- i.e. our existence not just being an incidental consequence of some other intention. I think this best demonstrates the precarious nature of the theistic argument.

Further from that article:

In selecting between God’s design and the many universes theory, one may use the criterion of Ockham’s razor. According to it, the simplest explanation that is compatible with the observed facts is the best one. Which is simpler: the existence of a large number of universes that can neither be detected nor proven or the existence of an omniscient God’s foresight and design in the creation of our universe? Many people, including me, think that God’s omniscience is a simpler explanation than the hypothesis of a large number of universes.

This is a highly objectionable use of Ockham's razor -- as a three-letter word God is unquestionably simple. Beyond that however, the concept of simplicity parts company with any entity capable of having intentions and manipulative enough to realize them. The judgement here seems to end abruptly at the point where the desired explanation enters the frame.