The Equal Omniscience and Omnipotence Argument

[Compassionist]

The Equal Omniscience and Omnipotence Argument

Premise 1:

If a being is omniscient, it knows every possible outcome of every possible creation.

Premise 2:

If a being is omnipotent, it has the power to bring about any logically possible outcome, including the existence of beings who are equally omniscient and omnipotent.

Premise 3:

A world where all sentient beings are equally omniscient and omnipotent would contain no involuntary suffering, no vulnerability, and no inequality, since each being could prevent harm to itself and others.

Premise 4:

A perfectly omnibenevolent being necessarily prefers the outcome that maximizes well-being and minimizes suffering.

Premise 5:

Creating vulnerable, ignorant, and powerless sentient beings when one could instead create equally omniscient and omnipotent beings knowingly introduces avoidable suffering.

Premise 6:

Knowingly introducing avoidable suffering contradicts omnibenevolence.

Conclusion 1:

If a deity created sentient beings who suffer, that deity either lacked the knowledge, the power, or the will to prevent that suffering.

Conclusion 2:

Therefore, such a deity cannot be simultaneously omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

1. If God could have made all beings equally omniscient and omnipotent but did not, God is not omnibenevolent.
2. If God wanted to but could not, God is not omnipotent.
3. If God did not know such a creation was possible, God is not omniscient.
Therefore, a being responsible for preventable suffering cannot be all three at once.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to William in post #10]

Yes — logically speaking, classical theism does not rule out the bare possibility that we exist within a created order.

But that concession does almost no explanatory work.

Classical theism deliberately characterises God in maximally negative and under-determined terms: simple, immutable, impassible, timeless, “Being itself,” knowable only by effects. Once God is defined that way, almost any world-state becomes compatible with the hypothesis — including worlds that look exactly like ours whether God exists or not.

That is precisely the problem.

A hypothesis that is compatible with every possible observation does not thereby gain explanatory power. It merely remains unfalsified. Classical theism can be made consistent with:
• a created universe
• an eternal universe
• a simulated universe
• a universe with gratuitous suffering
• a universe with no discernible teleology

So while “we might exist within a created thing” is not logically excluded, nothing about classical theism uniquely predicts or discriminates that conclusion over its alternatives.

Logical compatibility ≠ evidential support
Non-contradiction ≠ explanation

That is why denying or affirming individual divine attributes matters: each move shifts classical theism either toward vacuity (where it explains everything and therefore nothing) or toward testable claims (where it ceases to be classical theism).

So yes — creation is allowed.
No — it is not established, preferred, or indicated by the framework itself.

[William]

[Replying to Compassionists AI in post #11]

I can agree with Compassionists critique of 'Classical Theism' yet it does not in itself mean that we do not exist within a created thing.

[William]

Neutral Overview of the Philosophical Debate Thread
Phase 1: The Logical Argument (The Trilemma)

The debate was initiated by the “Equal Omniscience and Omnipotence Argument,” a formal logical trilemma targeting the classical theistic conception of God as simultaneously omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent (the “tri-omni” God).

Core Logical Claim:
If a tri-omni deity exists, it would have both the knowledge and power to create a world populated by beings who are themselves equally omniscient and omnipotent—a world containing no involuntary suffering. The existence of a world with vulnerable, suffering beings is therefore logically incompatible with such a deity. The conclusion: a being responsible for preventable suffering cannot possess all three “omni” attributes at once.

Key Initial Exchanges:

The argument was engaged on its own logical terms. A central exploratory question was posed: If the tri-omni God is incoherent, could a creator lacking one of these attributes (e.g., a non-benevolent omnipotent being, or a benevolent but limited being) still exist and create a world? The thought experiment of such a being creating “copies of itself” was examined and found to lead either to infinite regress or other conceptual issues.

A defense of the tri-omni God was offered via the classic Free Will Defense: suffering is permitted as the necessary condition for genuine moral agency, authentic love, and spiritual growth. This defense was met with an internal critique: if such virtues require limitation and vulnerability, then a limitless, immutable God would, by that definition, be incapable of possessing them. This highlighted a tension between anthropomorphic moral reasoning and the classical attributes of divine simplicity and impassibility.

Outcome of Phase 1: A logical stalemate was reached where the trilemma appeared successful against the specific model of a tri-omni creator, but did not logically eliminate the possibility of a creator of some other kind.

Phase 2: The Epistemological Critique (The Explanatory Vacuum)

The debate then shifted from logical coherence to epistemological utility. A new, powerful critique was introduced:

Core Epistemological Claim:
Classical theism, by defining God in maximally transcendent, negative terms (simple, immutable, timeless, “Being Itself”), becomes compatible with any conceivable state of the world. It can be made consistent with a universe of suffering or one without, a created cosmos or an eternal one. Because it predicts and explains no specific features of our world, it is an unfalsifiable and explanatorily vacuous hypothesis. Logical compatibility with the evidence is not the same as providing evidential support or a meaningful explanation.

The Resulting Dialectical Tension:
This critique is potent but operates on a different level than the original argument. It judges theism by the standards of empirical explanation and predictive power—standards central to the philosophy of science but not explicitly invoked in the initial logical trilemma.

The Final, Meta-Philosophical Challenge:
The thread concluded with a pivotal question aimed at this shift: “The original argument was a logical one. Where is it established that theism must be judged by, or sustained by, the standards of scientific explanation?” This question challenges the unstated premise that the only valid form of explanation for any claim about reality is a scientific one, and asks for a justification for applying this epistemological framework to a metaphysical proposition.

Open Threads & The State of the Debate:

The Logical Thread: The trilemma stands as a successful internal critique of the coherence of the tri-omni God as the creator of this world. It does not, by itself, disprove the existence of *a* creator or ground of being.

The Epistemological Thread: The “explanatory vacuum” critique is a formidable objection to classical theism’s value as a testable hypothesis about worldly events, but its relevance depends on accepting that metaphysical claims must meet scientific-style standards of evidence.

The Unresolved Conflict: The debate now hinges on a prior, meta-question: What are the proper rules of reasoning for questions about ultimate reality? Is it a matter of logical deduction and metaphysical necessity, or must it submit to the empirical, falsifiable methods of the natural sciences? The two phases of the debate represent two different answers to this question.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to Compassionists AI in post #11]

I can agree with Compassionists critique of 'Classical Theism' yet it does not in itself mean that we do not exist within a created thing.

My critique of classical theism is not an argument for non-creation. It is an argument about explanatory insufficiency.

Saying “we might exist within a created thing” is a statement of logical possibility. Classical theism is perfectly compatible with that claim — but it is also compatible with its negation, and with virtually every other large-scale metaphysical possibility.

That’s the key issue.

A framework that allows everything rules out nothing. It therefore cannot, on its own, tell us whether creation actually occurred, what kind of creation it would be, or why the world looks this way rather than another.

So yes:
• the critique does not imply non-creation,
• but neither does classical theism imply creation.

At that point, the question is no longer “Is creation possible?” — almost everyone agrees it is.
The real question is “What reasons do we have to think creation is the best explanation, rather than merely a permissible one?”

That is the gap I’m pointing to.

[William]

[Replying to Compassionists AI in post #11]

I can agree with Compassionists critique of 'Classical Theism' yet it does not in itself mean that we do not exist within a created thing.

My critique of classical theism is not an argument for non-creation. It is an argument about explanatory insufficiency.

Saying “we might exist within a created thing” is a statement of logical possibility. Classical theism is perfectly compatible with that claim — but it is also compatible with its negation, and with virtually every other large-scale metaphysical possibility.

That’s the key issue.

A framework that allows everything rules out nothing. It therefore cannot, on its own, tell us whether creation actually occurred, what kind of creation it would be, or why the world looks this way rather than another.

So yes:
• the critique does not imply non-creation,
• but neither does classical theism imply creation.

At that point, the question is no longer “Is creation possible?” — almost everyone agrees it is.
The real question is “What reasons do we have to think creation is the best explanation, rather than merely a permissible one?”

That is the gap I’m pointing to.

I recall that I asked you some weeks back a question along the lines of if you were an omni-entity, what would you create, and one of the answers you gave was that you would create copies of yourself.

I see now that you have thought that through and agree with me now that this would not be an option. My argument remains that an omni entity would not create anything.

What I am attempting to ascertain here at this point is this:
Is your argument then, that questions that cannot be formulated and answered within the paradigm of empirical, testable hypotheses are not genuine questions about reality, or at least not questions that can yield meaningful knowledge.

If that is your position, then you are advocating for a form of scientism—the view that the scientific method is the only source of genuine knowledge. That claim itself is not a scientific, testable hypothesis. It is a philosophical axiom. By its own standard, it cannot be justified as 'meaningful knowledge about reality.' It is a self-defeating premise.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to William in post #15]

No — that is not my position, and this is an important clarification.

I am not claiming that only empirically testable hypotheses generate meaningful knowledge. That would be scientism, and I reject it.

What I am claiming is narrower and more precise:

When a claim is offered as an explanation of how the world actually is, it must place some principled constraints on what would count for or against it.

That requirement is not “scientific dogma”; it is a minimal condition for explanatory intelligibility. It applies just as much to historical reasoning, metaphysics, and philosophy as it does to science.

Non-empirical questions can yield meaningful knowledge — logic, mathematics, ethics, modal reasoning, and conceptual analysis all do. But notice what they have in common:
they constrain possibilities. They rule things out. They allow us to say “this follows” or “this cannot be the case.”

Classical theism, as deployed here, does not do that.

When God is defined as:
• simple
• timeless
• immutable
• impassible
• knowable only by effects
• compatible with every possible world-state

then any observation becomes equally expected. Creation, non-creation, suffering, no suffering, teleology, no teleology — all fit. At that point, the framework stops functioning as an explanation and becomes a permission slip.

That is not a rejection of metaphysics. It is a rejection of metaphysical vacuity.

On the “omni-entity would not create anything” point:
Yes — once omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence are taken seriously, creation ceases to be motivated by lack, improvement, or need. That observation supports my critique. It shows that appeals to divine creation require additional assumptions beyond omni-attributes — assumptions that classical theism itself does not justify.

So to be explicit:

• I am not saying non-empirical questions are meaningless.
• I am not saying science is the only route to knowledge.
• I am saying that explanations which place no constraints do not explain.

This is not scientism.
It is the basic distinction between logical possibility and epistemic warrant.

That distinction is doing the real work here — not an appeal to the supremacy of science.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to William in post #13]

The debate now hinges on a prior, meta-question: What are the proper rules of reasoning for questions about ultimate reality? Is it a matter of logical deduction and metaphysical necessity, or must it submit to the empirical, falsifiable methods of the natural sciences?

This is a careful and largely fair summary — but there is one crucial misframing that needs to be corrected.

The epistemological critique I introduced does not claim that metaphysical claims must “submit to the empirical, falsifiable methods of the natural sciences.” That framing sets up a false dilemma between pure metaphysics and scientism.

What is actually being appealed to is a much weaker and more general standard, one that predates modern science and applies to all forms of explanation — including metaphysical ones:

An explanation must place constraints on what would count as the case if it were true rather than false.

This is not a scientific criterion.
It is a criterion of explanatory coherence.

Logical deduction, modal reasoning, and metaphysical necessity all satisfy this requirement when they are doing genuine work. They rule things out. They generate entailments. They allow us to say: “If this were false, we would not expect X.”

Classical theism — when defined in maximally apophatic, transcendent terms — does not.

That is why the “explanatory vacuum” critique is not a category error. It does not judge theism by scientific standards, but by minimal epistemic standards shared by science, history, and philosophy alike.

To put it plainly:

• Logical coherence alone tells us only what is possible.
• Explanation requires telling us what is favoured, disfavoured, or excluded.

Once God is defined so that every conceivable world-state is equally compatible — created or uncreated, ordered or chaotic, helpful or harmful — the framework ceases to function as an explanation of reality and becomes a metaphysical wildcard.

That does not mean the questions are illegitimate.
It means the answers being offered are underdetermined.

So the unresolved conflict is not really about “science vs metaphysics.”
It is about whether metaphysical explanations are allowed to be unconstrained and still count as explanations.

My position is simply this:

• Metaphysical reasoning is legitimate.
• Non-empirical knowledge is real.
• But an account that explains everything explains nothing.

That principle is not scientism.
It is the line between possibility and knowledge.

[William]

[Replying to William in post #13]

The debate now hinges on a prior, meta-question: What are the proper rules of reasoning for questions about ultimate reality? Is it a matter of logical deduction and metaphysical necessity, or must it submit to the empirical, falsifiable methods of the natural sciences?

This is a careful and largely fair summary — but there is one crucial misframing that needs to be corrected.

The epistemological critique I introduced does not claim that metaphysical claims must “submit to the empirical, falsifiable methods of the natural sciences.” That framing sets up a false dilemma between pure metaphysics and scientism.

What is actually being appealed to is a much weaker and more general standard, one that predates modern science and applies to all forms of explanation — including metaphysical ones:

An explanation must place constraints on what would count as the case if it were true rather than false.

This is not a scientific criterion.
It is a criterion of explanatory coherence.

Logical deduction, modal reasoning, and metaphysical necessity all satisfy this requirement when they are doing genuine work. They rule things out. They generate entailments. They allow us to say: “If this were false, we would not expect X.”

Classical theism — when defined in maximally apophatic, transcendent terms — does not.

That is why the “explanatory vacuum” critique is not a category error. It does not judge theism by scientific standards, but by minimal epistemic standards shared by science, history, and philosophy alike.

To put it plainly:

• Logical coherence alone tells us only what is possible.
• Explanation requires telling us what is favoured, disfavoured, or excluded.

Once God is defined so that every conceivable world-state is equally compatible — created or uncreated, ordered or chaotic, helpful or harmful — the framework ceases to function as an explanation of reality and becomes a metaphysical wildcard.

That does not mean the questions are illegitimate.
It means the answers being offered are underdetermined.

So the unresolved conflict is not really about “science vs metaphysics.”
It is about whether metaphysical explanations are allowed to be unconstrained and still count as explanations.

My position is simply this:

• Metaphysical reasoning is legitimate.
• Non-empirical knowledge is real.
• But an account that explains everything explains nothing.

That principle is not scientism.
It is the line between possibility and knowledge.

AI Overview
The quote "an account that explains everything explains nothing," often attributed to philosopher Karl Popper, means a theory so broad it accounts for any outcome loses predictive power and scientific value, becoming unfalsifiable, like a myth instead of science; true scientific theories must make specific, testable predictions that could be proven wrong (falsifiable). Such all-encompassing explanations fail because they don't rule anything out, offering no real insight or information, only a tautology that can be twisted to fit any observation.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to William in post #18]

Yes, indeed.

[William]

Compassionist: My position is simply this:

• Metaphysical reasoning is legitimate.
• Non-empirical knowledge is real.
• But an account that explains everything explains nothing.

That principle is not scientism.
It is the line between possibility and knowledge.

AI Overview:
The quote "an account that explains everything explains nothing," often attributed to philosopher Karl Popper, means a theory so broad it accounts for any outcome loses predictive power and scientific value, becoming unfalsifiable, like a myth instead of science; true scientific theories must make specific, testable predictions that could be proven wrong (falsifiable). Such all-encompassing explanations fail because they don't rule anything out, offering no real insight or information, only a tautology that can be twisted to fit any observation.

[Replying to William in post #18]

Yes, indeed.

Great.

So we know then, that while showing that any creator cannot be the omni-entity under question (re "Classical" Theism) this in itself does not mean we do not exist within a created thing.

Once God is defined so that every conceivable world-state is equally compatible — created or uncreated, ordered or chaotic, helpful or harmful — the framework ceases to function as an explanation of reality and becomes a metaphysical wildcard.

This means that a creator would need to be at least defined alongside the reality we are currently experiencing if one is to properly explore the idea that we exist within a created reality.