Coincidence and illusion

[QED]

OK, we're all humans here (apart from any visiting bots who are barred from this debate ). That means we all have pretty much the same basic issue of hardware, but each of us runs a different version of software. So when we experience things with our eyes, ears etc. we are quite likely to interpret them in different ways.

Harvey1 wrote a marvelous piece in the When God knows a soul goes to hell.. thread (a source of much interesting debate about everything but the original OP!):

Once I was pondering what God would say about a certain situation that I had encountered, and I was deep into that particular thought (parked in front of a store), a particular message on an LED display lit up with a sentence that perfectly answered the question. So, I don't think it is necessarily in contradiction that God can communicate to us. Incidentally, Richard Feynman had an interesting experience with a so-called supernatural clock:

Once we were talking about the supernatural and the following anecdote involving his first wife Arline came up. Arline had tuberculosis and was confined to a hospital while Feynman was at Los Alamos. Next to her bed was an old clock. Arline told Feynman that the clock was a symbol of the time that they had together and that he should always remember that. Always look at the clock to remember the time we have together, she said. The day that Arline died in the hospital, Feynman was given a note from the nurse that indicated the time of death. Feynman noted that the clock had stopped at exactly that time. It was as the clock, which had been a symbol of their time together, had stopped at the moment of her death. Did you make a connection? I asked NO! NOT FOR A SECOND! I immediately began to think how this could have happened. And I realized that the clock was old and was always breaking. That the clock probably stopped some time before and the nurse coming in to the room to record the time of death would have looked at the clock and jotted down the time from that. I never made any supernatural connection, not even for a second. I just wanted to figure out how it happened.

This raises an interesting question: Are some of us getting all worked-up (into a spiritual lather) over nothing more than coincidences and other illusions? I firmly believe this to be the case. I believe this mainly because of the nature of our minds and the the way they are known to operate. While it is often impossible to dismiss experiences such as those supplied by Harvey, we can do simple experiments to demonstrate to ourselves that we perceive things not as they are, but as we expect to find them. The classic Negative mask illusion shows that what we "see" is informed greatly by our expectations.

Now given the fallibility of our perceptions it seems obvious to me that, like us today, humans long ago would readily fall for such coincidences and illusion and develop a great deal of superstition where none was warranted. I suggest that the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on anywhere except in our furtive imaginations. How, given the knowledge of our fallible nature, can we justify any belief in the supernatural at all?

[harvey1]

I notice that you keep falling short of addressing the crop-circle example. I also notice that your argument relies on forcing the premise that "there is no God" upon me. For the sake of argument the existence or lack of existence of God is irrelevant to what I'm pointing out: that people are known to be prone to illusions, superstition and reading "supernatural goings-on" into mere coincidences. This is an observation. I've given some (what I feel are over-generous) "waving hands in the air" figures like 19 out of 20 cases of all paranormal reports being traceable to entirely natural phenomena. This being the case, it seems reasonable to make the assumption that the remaining 5% of unexplained cases are due to the same fallible human nature that we are so painfully aware of as leading to the other 95%.

It's not a valid approach, QED. The supernatural claims that you suggest are based on claims that the world behaves differently than what is supposed by a naturalist approach, an approach that I share with you. So, of course crop circles, and whatever hoopla that you refer to here are going to prove to be natural phenomena because we both agree that there is no supernatural phenomena like this which violates natural tendencies of our world.

However, what I'm talking about are not violations of the natural world. They are certainly violations of metaphysical naturalism, but you have not provided a physical reason for denying those "hocus-pocus" elements do not exist. Your only argument is based on your metaphysical presumptions.

So, for example, I argue that at least one universe popped into existence (viz, our universe) because there are metaphysical laws "out there." Are you going to seriously tell me that this is foolish because some fool goes out there at night and construct crop circles? Do you see why I don't agree that you are providing any answers whatsoever to this issue?

As an analogy, if the power goes out in a city grid, the breakers can automatically reset themselves when the fault clears. 95% of the time the problem will be identifiable to the maintenance crew that follow-up the incident (i.e. lighting strike, cable damage or overload. But 5% of the interruptions might not provide the engineers with any clues to the cause of the outage. What I'm saying is that it is not reasonable to suggest causes outside of the regular events given that there are so many regular possibilities. Any engineer who seriously proposes that the pixies must have been involved would deserve what he gets from his workmates. But if the power grid was so robust that it had been running for thousands of years without incident, then any sudden unexplained trip would indeed warrant a wider scope for speculation. What I'm trying to capture in my argument is the breadth of speculation that we are justified in applying to human reports given the known fallibilities of humans. For all I care God might be up there laughing at us jumping at the movement of our own shadows.

I think that once you separate what I'm saying from what someone who claims supernaturalism is widely at work, then you'll be in a better position to address my argument. One of the main issues that prevents you from doing so is your metaphysical naturalist presumptions. You assume that metaphysical naturalism is true, and therefore the fools out there construing supernaturalist explanations are the same as the folks who believe there to be deeper causal explanations for natural events than what randomness would dictate. You then conclude that metaphysical naturalism must be correct. I'm sorry to tell you, but I think it is totally an invalid way to approach this issue.

[Bugmaster]

Why hasn't anyone agreed that material causation is not valid? I don't know. They should. The argument was dropped by all those who say they aren't convinced, so if they really think I'm wrong, then why not put forth an argument that shows why my argument is not consistent.

Yes yes, I still have pages and pages to read through on that thread...

Even though Bugmaster has picked up this discussion, it's really not a discussion that has much to do with the OP of that thread. We should probably have that discussion on a more apt titled thread (e.g., "is mathematics/logic real?... etc.).

Yeah, you're probably right. However, I wasn't convinced about your brute facts position, eithter. As far as I understand, your position is that logical causality has an independent, Platonic existence, and that all other physical laws derive from it. I've argued against this, but neither side has been convinced so far.

The difference is that one of us thinks that causation is materially based, and the other doesn't.

Fine, but then you still have to explain how non-material causation is able to affect material objects. Hand-waving about wave functions is not convincing enough, becasue wave functions are material, too.

My form of naturalism is a platonic law kind of naturalism...

Then, by definition, it's not naturalism. It's dualism.

I didn't get the same impression from that Paul Davies quote than you did. He seems to be saying that there are some physical laws that transcend universes, and that, ultimately, these laws shape our way of thinking. That makes sense to me, but that doesn't automatically imply dualism, and certainly not the existence of any deity.

[QED]

Paul Davies seems to be in many different minds at once. In his book the Mind of God, for example, he shoots down the several common arguments for the existence of God; the ontological argument, the cosmological argument and the argument from design. However, in the end, he seems to imply that all the arguments when put together, support the notion of there being some kind of God despite the fact that they do not stand on their own. Perhaps Harvey can shed some light on how this can be?

The supernatural claims that you suggest are based on claims that the world behaves differently than what is supposed by a naturalist approach, an approach that I share with you. So, of course crop circles, and whatever hoopla that you refer to here are going to prove to be natural phenomena because we both agree that there is no supernatural phenomena like this which violates natural tendencies of our world.

So are you agreeing with Richard and me that Arlene's clock was not supernaturally influenced by the occasion of her death?

[harvey1]

However, in the end, he seems to imply that all the arguments when put together, support the notion of there being some kind of God despite the fact that they do not stand on their own. Perhaps Harvey can shed some light on how this can be?

That's not my interpretation of "the Mind of God." If I recall, he is never really clear on the God question, but I think he threw his support into a pantheistic God because of the nature of the laws of physics. I'll confirm this.

So are you agreeing with Richard and me that Arlene's clock was not supernaturally influenced by the occasion of her death?

I reject the dichotomy you present. Crop circles or atheism is not being reasonable. I think that the laws of physics pertain to complex systems, and human bonds are part of a complex system, therefore the things that happen in our world are governed by meta-principles that your purely random/coincidental theology does not allow for. It seems your argument is based on this dichotomy which is what I reject.

[QED]

I reject the dichotomy you present. Crop circles or atheism is not being reasonable. I think that the laws of physics pertain to complex systems, and human bonds are part of a complex system, therefore the things that happen in our world are governed by meta-principles that your purely random/coincidental theology does not allow for. It seems your argument is based on this dichotomy which is what I reject.

I don't think you're being consistent by rejecting crop circles on the one hand but allowing for "human bonds" to make clocks stop on the other.

[harvey1]

Yes yes, I still have pages and pages to read through on that thread...

I'm glad that you find it worth your time...

As far as I understand, your position is that logical causality has an independent, Platonic existence, and that all other physical laws derive from it. I've argued against this, but neither side has been convinced so far.

That's not really what the brute fact thread was meant to discuss. What I wanted to do was present reasons why an atheist brute fact universe is an untenable position.

Fine, but then you still have to explain how non-material causation is able to affect material objects.

This is a primitive, so there is no "how." The world is based on a logic, and as a result of that, the logical structure that a universe has is what determines the behavior of the universe. I would say there's three aspects to the world. There's the phenomenal aspect, the world that we see. There's the platonic aspect, which includes logical structures, mathematical structures, wave functions structures, souls, etc., that are the structures that exemplify themselves in the phenomenal world. And, there's the noumenal aspect, which is the collective nature of God: the aspect of the world that gives reason for the platonic structures that exist and the phenomenal worlds that are instantiated. As complex as this might sound, it's something we deal with every instance in language. In language (a type of a platonic structure) we use a word to refer to something we see (a type of phenomenal world), and we try to give a theory as to why it is that way (a type of noumenal aspect which bridges thought/language with visible reality).

Hand-waving about wave functions is not convincing enough, becasue wave functions are material, too.

I haven't seen one. What color is it?

My form of naturalism is a platonic law kind of naturalism...

Then, by definition, it's not naturalism. It's dualism.

I disagree. I separate methodological naturalism from metaphysical naturalism. The difference is that methodological naturalism assumes that things happen naturally, that is, the efficient cause is natural. But, it doesn't try to pin any final cause on why it happens naturally. Metaphysical naturalism is committed to there being no final cause for the system in question, or looks at the efficient cause as the final cause for the system in question.

In the case of platonism, I haven't seen any clear definition on this from metaphysical naturalists. Some think that platonists are outside of being considered metaphysical naturalists, but as Davies quote suggests, this would be a great mistake since most cosmologists are platonists with regard to the laws of physics existing independently. For example, Steven Weinberg is a platonist in this respect, and it would be foolhardy to say that Steven Weinberg is not a metaphysical naturalist. He doesn't believe in God, and is one of the most avid atheists there are. So, I think platonism per se isn't relevant with regard to metaphysical naturalism. And, one can certainly believe in methodological naturalism and be a platonist. In fact, that's why many people are platonists is because they believe the world conforms to natural laws that exist "out there."

So, I would say that some forms of platonism are contrary to metaphysical naturalism, and perhaps some forms of platonism are contrary to methodological naturalism. I think the rule of thumb is that metaphysical naturalists are those who think the natural explanation (i.e., explanations requiring no mystical or intelligent-like beliefs about the efficient/final cause in question) is both the efficient cause and final cause. The methodological naturalist are those who think the natural explanation is exclusively reserved for an efficient cause. A supernaturalist (including dualists) are those who think that the efficient cause is something supernatural.

Since I consider myself a platonist who believes that the efficient cause is natural and the final cause is mystical/intelligent-like, I would call myself a methodological naturalist. I wouldn't call myself a dualist since I believe that there is some natural theory that will explain the nature of the mind. That is, I think it is given to scientific investigation. I think the ultimate result of this investigation (assuming humans don't go extinct or unsuccessful in the study of the mind) will leave the final cause as open to question.

I didn't get the same impression from that Paul Davies quote than you did. He seems to be saying that there are some physical laws that transcend universes, and that, ultimately, these laws shape our way of thinking. That makes sense to me, but that doesn't automatically imply dualism, and certainly not the existence of any deity.

Davies would probably fall into the methodological naturalist camp. Although, he might be a metaphysical naturalist if his form of platonism is the same as Weinberg's where he thinks the final cause is not mystical enough (or intelligent-like enough) to really be of any consequence (e.g., the mystical behavior of a quantum system or the the intelligence of a bacterium).

[harvey1]

I don't think you're being consistent by rejecting crop circles on the one hand but allowing for "human bonds" to make clocks stop on the other.

It's hard keeping up with you guys...

Why should I accept your metaphysical naturalism with respect to human affairs? Crop circles are supernaturalist explanations, and there's a world of difference between that and a methodological naturalist such as myself who believes that the efficient cause is a natural explanation. Crop circle people are not looking for the efficient cause to be a "natural" explanation. The explanation requires aliens, alien abduction, etc..

[QED]

the (philosophical) "rule" of "methodological naturalism". It could just as well be called atheism, and is really a religion to be accepted on faith.

It's good to have you on board Harvey

[harvey1]

It's good to have you on board Harvey

I stopped reading what those folks had to say a number of years ago when I realized that they really had nothing of value to say. I would suggest that you do the same.

[Bugmaster]

Fine, but then you still have to explain how non-material causation is able to affect material objects.

This is a primitive, so there is no "how." The world is based on a logic, and as a result of that, the logical structure that a universe has is what determines the behavior of the universe.[/qupte]
Ok, again, how does it do that ? How do the non-physical primitives combine to produce a physical reality ? The "how" is important because, by definition, logic and matter are completely different types of entities that cannot affect each other.

I would say there's three aspects to the world. There's the phenomenal aspect, the world that we see. There's the platonic aspect, which includes logical structures, mathematical structures, wave functions structures, souls, etc., that are the structures that exemplify themselves in the phenomenal world. And, there's the noumenal aspect, which is the collective nature of God: the aspect of the world that gives reason for the platonic structures that exist and the phenomenal worlds that are instantiated.

Ok, so you're a Tri-alist, not a Dualist. This is not making your case any easier to defend :-)

As complex as this might sound, it's something we deal with every instance in language. In language (a type of a platonic structure) we use a word to refer to something we see (a type of phenomenal world), and we try to give a theory as to why it is that way (a type of noumenal aspect which bridges thought/language with visible reality).

I, of course, would argue that language is our invention (though not a deliberate one, unless you're speaking Esperanto), and exists entirely within our heads, just as theories do. But then, you knew I'd say that :-)

The argument "our language has these structures, therefore they are real" is not exactly valid, but that's probably not what you meant, anyway.

Hand-waving about wave functions is not convincing enough, becasue wave functions are material, too.

I haven't seen one. What color is it?

Depends on the wavelength. If it's about 7000 A, then the color is red. But surely, you're not suggesting that physical reality only refers to things you can see with your eyes ? What about electrons ? Molecules ? Heck, what about bacteria ?

In the case of platonism, I haven't seen any clear definition on this from metaphysical naturalists. Some think that platonists are outside of being considered metaphysical naturalists, but as Davies quote suggests, this would be a great mistake since most cosmologists are platonists with regard to the laws of physics existing independently.

I think you might have the classic ontology/epistemology confusion here. It's one thing to say, "there is something about the process of universe formation that tends to produce certain physical laws", or, "our universe operates by certain fixed rules", and it's a wholly different thing to say, "the laws of physics exist independently in some Platonic realm".