How Brutish are Brute Facts?

[harvey1]

QED and I started discussing this subject on the nature of brute facts on another thread in the Christianity sub-forum. However, I wanted to make this discussion a separate thread so we can fully explore this subject matter:

The cost of atheism is that we have to believe something is a brute fact that happens to be the most complex object we have ever observed. In fact, so complex is it, that we can't come anywhere close to emulating such a design using supercomputers and the like, yet you expect us to believe such a departure from parsimony as being parsimonious!

I have pointed out to you often that this argument carries no weight because the nature of discovery and human understanding is fickle. It is an indisputable fact that we frequently miss that which is right-in-front-of-our-noses because we are often using the wrong tools or mindset. This is, after all, what we keep accusing each other with in many of our discsussions. So I am adamant that we cannot use our lack of savvy to assess the possibility or complexity of an unknown entity.

Let me put your argument in a more formal form so it is easier for me to point out the fallacious nature of that argument:

1. Brute facts are needed in every ultimate explanation of the world
2. The brute fact for atheism is that there is a (meta)universe
3. There are no prescriptive laws that determine or restrict brute facts
4. We have no way to evaluate the complexity, likelihood, or probability of this (meta)universe brute fact to bring about universes such as our own
5. There's no reason based on (4) to believe that it ought to be obvious or simple to simulate a world which naturally produces complexity that in principle can bring about universes such as our own
6. The observable universe can naturally be explained in terms of a brute fact (meta)universe that is allowed to evolve over time such that at some point in this process our universe naturally appears
7. The brute fact (meta)universe, according to (6), is a natural explanation
8. Occam's razor requires that we believe the most parsimonious explanation--which translates into a natural explanation

...9C. The universe is a consequence of a brute fact (meta)universe needing no God to explain its existence: God is unlikely to exist

Now, I'm sure you would like to make changes to the above argument, however I think no matter how you change it, it is a faulty argument. For example, (3) appears to contradict (4). If there are no prescriptive law limitations that determine the brutish nature of your brute fact (meta)universe, then absolutely anything is possible even brute fact scenarios that do not lead to universes with sophisticated structures. However, if anything is possible, then we do have a means to gauge likelihood. We have many conceptions of behaviors that the (meta)universe could have exhibited as a brute fact behavior. There are literally thousands or millions of behaviors that we can imagine that would never produce a universe such as our own. Hence, it appears the likelihood of a (meta)universe having a behavior that evolves sophisticated structures as our own looks diminishing small compared to the large number of brute fact (meta)universes that would not do anything of the sort. Hence, (4) is false. If (4) is false, the (5) is false. If (5) is false, then this is not a parsimonious solution (7), and hence it violates Occam's razor ( 8 ), and therefore not only is your conclusion false, but any explanation that doesn't violate Occam's razor should be more likely to be considered true (e.g., a belief in an Omniscient Interpeter, God).

If the [meta]universe was to evolve, it had to allow complex structures to evolve. This behavior cannot be programmed, not anything close. I realize you think that there might be a set of behaviors out there that a 1-billion line cellular automata algorithm could accurately simulate which does the trick, but that still doesn't answer why the metauniverse didn't have a behavior that a 10 line cellular automata algorithm would describe (e.g., a "beacon" metauniverse). Why do we not live in a beacon universe? We know your answer: "because we don't." But, that is not a good answer.

Do you deny that the majority of the worlds cosmologists working today are willing to accept scenarios where this is not the only universe that ever existed? If it rarely came up for serious consideration, that might make it "not a good answer" but I think you'll find it is a better answer than that.

QED, you're mixing up this issue. Cosmologists proceed based on prescriptive laws that other universes are likely given those prescriptive laws (e.g., quantum cosmological laws, or inflationary laws due to quantum laws, etc.). What you are saying of a brute fact (meta)universe has absolutely nothing in common with these scientific theories. You aren't basing your views on any law. You are basing it on a brute fact that has no prescriptive law that determines its truth or falsity. In fact, it is very difficult for me to access how it is that a principle of parsimony is even a concern for you since a principle of parsimony would be a prescriptive law, and you say there are no prescriptive laws. So, why do you limit brute facts to a principle of parsimony as a prescriptive law? Of course, if you don't do that, then your view becomes an irrational view, and as we agree, if there is a rational explanation and an irrational explanation, we are obligated to give precedence to the rational explanation.

[Bugmaster]

We are talking about causality and obviously if we rule-out an infinite past (which I'm not entirely convinced we should) then there would have to be some initial uncaused cause of everything. This is what we term a brute fact (or naked fact).

A brute fact is a fact that you start reasoning from. For example, if it is a brute fact that space is black, then there is no reason why space is black, it just so happens to be black.

Ok, it seems to me that these two definitions are very different. No wonder you guys can't come to an agreement :-)

[harvey1]

We are talking about causality and obviously if we rule-out an infinite past (which I'm not entirely convinced we should) then there would have to be some initial uncaused cause of everything. This is what we term a brute fact (or naked fact).

A brute fact is a fact that you start reasoning from. For example, if it is a brute fact that space is black, then there is no reason why space is black, it just so happens to be black.

Ok, it seems to me that these two definitions are very different. No wonder you guys can't come to an agreement

It doesn't matter if we start reasoning from an infinite past where the brute fact is an infinite universe, or some initial uncaused cause of everything, both would be facts that we start reasoning from.

[harvey1]

Hence the topic you started. This whole thing has the anthropic principle written all over it. Isn't it obvious that we will never be able to determine the amount of luck involved in creating "just the right brute fact".

This issue is addressed in my formal argument. There are no prescriptive rules which determine which brute fact is likely, hence the behavior or property characteristics of a (meta)universe brute fact is completely arbitrary. However, we do know far more property characteristics of cellular automatas that are conceivable (and programmable) which don't show sophistication versus one's that do. In fact, we don't know any cellular automata that does show this level of sophistication, not even close. Therefore, we can state categorically that it is unlikely that a property characteristic of great sophistication would arbitrarily happen to be a brute fact. Since there are no prescriptive laws which would dictate that a (meta)universe have such a sophisticated property characterization, there is no mechanism to explain how an unlikely characteristic happened to be the case by brute fact. Therefore, this choice can be safely eliminated as a cause.

I realize that for some unknown reason you do not buy into this logic, so let's look at your argument step by step (unfortunately you never corrected my argument detailing your argument, so I'm restricted to using this version until you provide your own). :

1. Brute facts are needed in every ultimate explanation of the world
2. The brute fact for atheism is that there is a (meta)universe
3. There are no prescriptive laws that determine or restrict brute facts
4. We have no way to evaluate the complexity, likelihood, or probability of this (meta)universe brute fact to bring about universes such as our own
5. There's no reason based on (4) to believe that it ought to be obvious or simple to simulate a world which naturally produces complexity that in principle can bring about universes such as our own
6. The observable universe can naturally be explained in terms of a brute fact (meta)universe that is allowed to evolve over time such that at some point in this process our universe naturally appears
7. The brute fact (meta)universe, according to (6), is a natural explanation
8. Occam's razor requires that we believe the most parsimonious explanation--which translates into a natural explanation

...9C. The universe is a consequence of a brute fact (meta)universe needing no God to explain its existence: God is unlikely to exist

Now, (4) is a premise of your's, but you state it above as a fact. But, what is this premise based on? I think it is based on the possibility that there might be unknown reasons for a brute fact to provide a setting for sophisticated universes to evolve. However, (3) wipes out this basis for thinking that. What (3) does is say that a property characteristic which does nothing interesting is just as probable as one that has Porky Pig appear with "that's all, folks!"

Notice, though, you wish to use Occam's razor in ( 8 ), so based on the razor, we can say that simplicity should favor a brute fact (meta)universe having very little complexity compared to a Porky Pig universe. So, based on your own lights we have a good reason to say that (4) is invalid. You even said yourself that a 5-minute old brute fact (meta)universe with all memories embedded was a violation of Occam's razor, so you do acknowledge the use of a parsimony principle in invalidating (4). We have good reason to suppose that a brute fact (meta)universe should be as simple as conceivable, and therefore this rules out the sophisticated kind of brute fact (meta)universe. I say this (meta)universe must have a certain degree of sophistication since we have not quickly discovered such an property characteristic in any cellular automata. This alone makes such a property characteristic as not obvious, and therefore not likely. From what we know of the special conditions for universe creation, it is apparent that this brute fact (meta)universe would need to have a good deal of sophistication.

Therefore, your (4) is invalid.

Sure we can dismiss the world stocked full of memories five minutes ago, but as we roll back the temporal component to the inception of the ultimate 'meta' there is no such estimate of probability available (i.e. the 'N' in 1 in N).

This paragraph seems to contradict. Either a possibility can be dismissed because there is a means to judge likelihood, or there are no means to judge likelihood so every possibility is equally valid. Which is it?

All we know is that the probability was 1. Even your one dimensional beacons or two-dimensional squiggles have unknown Ns so why are you entitled to say they are any more likely? It might seem like a daft question to you, but you have to realize the inordinate number of assumptions that are being made in the proposal of any brute fact.

But, you just said a 5-minute old universe having embedded memories is dismissable? Why is that now you say that we can't know anything?

Btw, why is Occam's razor an issue for a brute fact world if there are no prescriptive laws which exist that limit the brute fact nature? For example, it would seem that a Looneytune world is equally as plausible as our world in your conception (i.e., if a principle of parsimony cannot be shown to be prescriptive in principle).

[QED]

You've invited me to make corrections to your interpretation of my argument, but this relies wholly on my being able to follow your interpretation unambiguously. First I need to understand exactly what you mean by prescriptive laws. This one strikes me as being ever so tricky, as it implies a prescriber. Now all the prescriptive laws we find in math, for instance, are arbitrary conventions agreed on by mathematicians in order to ensure that everyone gets the same results when working on equations i.e. 'The Order of Operations'. But the key feature is that they are arbitrary. More importantly they must not contradict descriptive laws as these are drawn from reality. But here's the problem: how do we know if the reality described by our descriptive laws is a product of a prescriptive law in the first place? I have a nasty feeling this can loop for ever.

Sure we can dismiss the world stocked full of memories five minutes ago, but as we roll back the temporal component to the inception of the ultimate 'meta' there is no such estimate of probability available (i.e. the 'N' in 1 in N).

This paragraph seems to contradict. Either a possibility can be dismissed because there is a means to judge likelihood, or there are no means to judge likelihood so every possibility is equally valid. Which is it?

If we have a means to judge likelihood (as in the case of a 5 minute old world) then we can soundly dismiss it, as we can tot-up all the variables that have to be in place and see immediately how unlikely it is. All I'm pointing out is that the number of variables diminishes as we wind the clock back to our brute fact as evolution has yet to take-off. We still don't have a way to assess the likelihood of the brute fact itself, but we can assume it will be composed of fewer variables so its probability can be assumed to be higher. We are looking for a probability of one and we know that the probability of this brute fact is tending towards one. That is all.

]All we know is that the probability was 1. Even your one dimensional beacons or two-dimensional squiggles have unknown Ns so why are you entitled to say they are any more likely? It might seem like a daft question to you, but you have to realize the inordinate number of assumptions that are being made in the proposal of any brute fact.

But, you just said a 5-minute old universe having embedded memories is dismissable? Why is that now you say that we can't know anything?

If we are tending towards a probability of one then there is still a race on between all the different possible configurations. You chose to throw-up some examples of simple configurations in an effort to widen the field, but I'm pointing out that the assumptions being made about these examples makes individual comparisons of likelihood impossible.

Btw, why is Occam's razor an issue for a brute fact world if there are no prescriptive laws which exist that limit the brute fact nature? For example, it would seem that a Looneytune world is equally as plausible as our world in your conception (i.e., if a principle of parsimony cannot be shown to be prescriptive in principle).

I not entirely sure what you're asking here. Occam's razor is always going to be an issue when assessing the likelihood of hypothesis containing unknowns.

You lose me when you say "if a principle of parsimony cannot be shown to be prescriptive in principle"

[harvey1]

...I need to understand exactly what you mean by prescriptive laws. This one strikes me as being ever so tricky, as it implies a prescriber. Now all the prescriptive laws we find in math, for instance, are arbitrary conventions agreed on by mathematicians... the key feature is that they are arbitrary. More importantly they must not contradict descriptive laws as these are drawn from reality. But here's the problem: how do we know if the reality described by our descriptive laws is a product of a prescriptive law in the first place? I have a nasty feeling this can loop for ever.

I'm perfectly willing to consider a brute fact versus a prescriptive law (or "principle of causality"). However, this is my question. Was it a) necessary that an atheist brute fact (meta)universe conform to Occam's razor, or b) was it likely that an atheist brute fact (meta)universe conform to Occam's razor, or c) was it merely a brute fact that atheist brute fact (meta)universe conform to Occam's razor? If your answer is (a), then how is this not a prescriptive law since a prescriptive law necessitates the way the universe must be. If it is (b), then how is this not a probabilitistic prescriptive law since a prescriptive law necessitates the way the universe must likely be (e.g., Hartle and Hawking's path integral)? If it is (c), then why is it unlikely given that nothing is unlikely that the (meta)universe couldn't have our universe contained therein with memories, people, and all we see?

If seems to me that you must say that (c) is your answer. If so, then the principle of parsimony is just a brute fact, and therefore the reason you cannot judge the likelihood of our universe is because this is an irrational view. I say irrational since (c) states that there is no rational reason for the (meta)universe to be rational.

We still don't have a way to assess the likelihood of the brute fact itself, but we can assume it will be composed of fewer variables so its probability can be assumed to be higher. We are looking for a probability of one and we know that the probability of this brute fact is tending towards one. That is all.

On what basis can we assume this? A brute fact means that it could be anything. A brute fact world means that it is not constrained by logic. So, there are an infinite number of conceivable worlds that it could have been, and there is no restriction whatsoever that can be placed on these conceivable worlds. You might think that a brute fact is limited to be material, but why is that so? Is there a prescriptive law that requires something to be material? Is there some meta-logic to the World which states that only material things can exist? If so, then this meta-logic is the brute fact and it is definitely non-material!

If you acknowledge the weaker claim here that a brute fact world at least must be one of an infinite number of material combinations, then why not acknowledge that there are an infinite number of many less complex worlds that would, in principle, not give birth to one like our own? For example, a beacon universe would not do anything but act like a lighthouse. It would "flash" and then "not flash." If the universe could be anything, then is it possible that the world could be like that? If not, then what prescriptive law are you suggesting exists that would prevent this brute fact from being the case? If you agree that it is possible the brute fact could have been a one of an infinite number of simple worlds that could not give birth to a complex world such as our own (in principle), then again I ask, why not conclude that our world is very unlikely given the large number of behaviors seen in simply constructed cellular automata that do not give birth to sophisticated evolutionary structures in principle? Do you say it is not possible such "(meta)universes" could not exist as a brute fact? If not, then what prescriptive law are you suggesting exists that would prevent this brute fact from being the case? Do you agree that constructing a cellular automaton with features that bring forth worlds of comparable sophistication to our world has never been close to be achieved? If so, then why think that this is no indication of the complexity required to bring forth our world? Even if there is a cellular automaton out there that in principle could give birth to a complex world of similarity to our own, are you saying that there must be a prescriptive law which requires that particular set of brute facts for a (meta)universe to be the case? Why? It seems to me that there can be no prescriptive laws for your brute fact (meta)universe, then if there is any reason for Occam's razor in all of this (which I don't see how there can be given its prescriptive nature, but I'll just assume there is), then what allows us the liberty to say that the probability of the brute fact is undecideable? You are already judging some likelihood by saying that a universe that's 5 minutes old is unlikely. Why can't I use the same kind of reasoning to show that a brute fact (meta)universe is unlikely to produce a world like our own?

[QED]

...I need to understand exactly what you mean by prescriptive laws. This one strikes me as being ever so tricky, as it implies a prescriber. Now all the prescriptive laws we find in math, for instance, are arbitrary conventions agreed on by mathematicians... the key feature is that they are arbitrary. More importantly they must not contradict descriptive laws as these are drawn from reality. But here's the problem: how do we know if the reality described by our descriptive laws is a product of a prescriptive law in the first place? I have a nasty feeling this can loop for ever.

I'm perfectly willing to consider a brute fact versus a prescriptive law (or "principle of causality"). However, this is my question...

Hold on, all you've given me is a parenthetical "principle of causality" in answer to what you mean by "prescriptive law". I can't discuss this sensibly with you without fully understanding what a prescriptive law of the universe might be. A "principle of causality" sounds like the very brute fact that I'm considering.

[harvey1]

Hold on, all you've given me is a parenthetical "principle of causality" in answer to what you mean by "prescriptive law". I can't discuss this sensibly with you without fully understanding what a prescriptive law of the universe might be. A "principle of causality" sounds like the very brute fact that I'm considering.

The principle of causality is a brute law. That is, if it's not true, then the opposite case (i.e., considering the brute law as false) leads to absurdity:

1. A principle of causality does not exist
2. If there is no causality principle, then a consequent cannot follow from an antecedent
3. Therefore, the consequent is causally not related to the antecedent

Notice though, that (3) is the consequent. So, it is an absurd conclusion since a lack of a causal principle still leads to a consequent in (3).

The causal principle is a prescriptive law since a prescriptive law necessitates the way the universe must be.

[ENIGMA]

The principle of causality is a brute law. That is, if it's not true, then the opposite case (i.e., considering the brute law as false) leads to absurdity:

1. A principle of causality does not exist
2. If there is no causality principle, then a consequent cannot follow from an antecedent
3. Therefore, the consequent is causally not related to the antecedent

Notice though, that (3) is the consequent. So, it is an absurd conclusion since a lack of a causal principle still leads to a consequent in (3).

I don't buy premise 2, since it is quite possible to have logical implication without causation. For example:

Given a static (and absurdly simple) universe described below:

1 c
7 x
10 e
9 q
8 u

The following logical statement holds:

1) All even numbers in this universe have a vowel to the right of them.
2) 8 is an even number in this universe.
3) Therefore 8 has a vowel to the right of it.

Now, given that statement 3 follows from the first two statements, I must inquire about when causality comes into play into the above described static universe. Does the above logical statement somehow have any sort of causal effect on the universe above?

If not, then perhaps a de-conflation of causality and logical implication is in order.

[Bugmaster]

I don't buy premise 2, since it is quite possible to have logical implication without causation. For example:

I'm not 100% sure about causality, but logical implication definitely doesn't exist in the Universe -- at least, not in the same way that rocks and atoms and light exist. Implication is just a rule that we made up to simplify our thinking about things; it's not a law of nature.

Causality, on the other hand, is somewhat of a law of nature; at least, several natural phenomena (such as the transfer of momentum) can be expressed through it.

[ENIGMA]

I don't buy premise 2, since it is quite possible to have logical implication without causation. For example:

I'm not 100% sure about causality, but logical implication definitely doesn't exist in the Universe -- at least, not in the same way that rocks and atoms and light exist. Implication is just a rule that we made up to simplify our thinking about things; it's not a law of nature.

Logical implication is a rule that functions in any consistantly defined universe since all bases for logic are necessarily the case in such a universe (namely such things as a=a, a (not =) (not a), a and (not a) = contradiction, etc). My main contention about harvey's proof is that it conflates logical implication with causality, in effect proving that logical deductions are possible while passing them off as a "principle of causality" which, in and of itself, has yet to be so established.