Some thoughts on the Euthyphro dilemma

[shinydarkrai94]

I've been thinking about the Euthyphro dilemma lately and I made a response a few days ago to an atheist on YouTube named TheoreticalBS and his comments on the Euthyphro dilemma (if you want to watch it, it's right here: In this thread I'd like to elaborate on some of those ideas and discuss my solution to the dilemma.


The Euthyphro dilemma is as follows:

“Is something moral because God commands it or does God command it because it is moral?�

It is asserted that both of these possibilities are problematic. One objection to the first possibility is that this opens up the possibility of abhorrent commands. In one possible world, God would command that we should love our neighbor, but what is to prevent him from commanding that we should torture innocent babies for our pleasure?

It is said that the second possibility would be problematic because that would mean that morality is independent of God. If morality is independent of God, then you don't need theism for morality.

The typical apologetic response to this is that neither of these options are accurate. Instead, something is moral because it is in God's nature. I would agree that this is more accurate. If we were to say that something is moral BECAUSE God commands it, that would imply that God's commands are the ultimate standard of morality. But from a Christian worldview, God bases his commands from his nature.

Some have claimed that this does not free us from the Euthyphro dilemma. They have argued that a new Euthyphro dilemma can be proposed:

“Is something moral because it is in God's nature or is it in God's nature because it is moral?�

Of these two, I accept the first option. Things are moral because they are in God's nature. This option is still subject to the objections raised against the proposal that things are moral because they are commanded by God, but I don't any of them convincing problems.

In this thread, I will mainly cover one objection, the one that I previously mentioned. That is, if things are good solely because they are in God's nature, then why couldn't God have had a different nature, one which would obligate us to torture innocent babies, for instance?


Arbitrary morality in different worlds

I have two problems with the claim that the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma leads to arbitrary morality (in this sense).

My first problem is that this claim relies upon the assertion that moral facts remain the same in every possible world. If this assertion is false, then a world in which we are morally obligated to torture innocent babies for fun would be possible, and thus choosing this first possibility of the Euthyphro dilemma would not really be problematic. Personally, I don't see a lot of problems with moral facts varying in hypothetical possible worlds, except that we may feel that this couldn't be true.

The second problem that I have is that this makes morality arbitrary only in the case of a God who has a nature that could vary in different worlds. In other words, this first option wouldn't be a problem for Christian morality because if Yahweh's nature was different, then we simply wouldn't define him as Yahweh. In every possible world in which morality is dependent upon Yahweh's nature, moral facts will stay the same.

So let's say that Yahweh's nature is the same in every possible world in which he exists. Another potential objection would be that if this were the case, then God's nature wouldn't really be the ultimate source of morality, but it would be the things that God's nature is based upon (like love, forgiveness, etc). If this were the case, then God wouldn't be necessary for morality. This is a bad argument though. Yes, you can describe God's nature in a different way by figuring out what the criteria are for 'being in God's nature', but if God's nature were different or if God didn't exist, then those criteria would be meaningless. It would no longer be true that love, forgiveness, etc are objectively moral (unless we're considering a Platonistic world with the same moral facts). The only reason why love, forgiveness, etc are considered moral is because that's what God's nature is.

Arbitrary standard

Is there a reason or justification for God's nature being the way that it is or is it simply arbitrary? In this case, I would say that God's nature must be arbitrary and this isn't a problem. Any objective moral standard must be arbitrary, actually. If there was a further explanation of the ultimate standard for morality, then we would have to ask what the reason for that standard is...on and on into infinite regress. It has to stop somewhere and no matter what, the standard will be arbitrary in this sense. This is true regardless of whether we hold a Christian view of morality, a Platonistic view of morality or whether we simply reject the idea of objective morality altogether. In Christianity, the ultimate standard would be God's nature. In Platonism, the ultimate standard would be whatever moral facts happen to exist eternally. Without objective morality, the standard is whatever the person decides it to be (least amount of suffering, for example). The main difference between objective morality and subjective morality is that if we lived in a world with objective morality, it would actually be true that our actions were morally right or wrong.

[Ionian_Tradition]

You say the nature of Yahweh is the standard of human morality...I must confess, I have my doubts.

However in an attempt to perhaps quell my doubts I submit this simple test which I believe will help us determine whether or not Yahweh's nature is indeed the standard of human morality:

Is there an attribute, aspect or quality intrinsic to Yahweh's nature which would be immoral if reflected in human beings?

Since we are assuming for the moment that there is objective morality rooted in God's nature, then no, there is nothing in God's nature that would be immoral if reflected in human beings. This is true by definition.

For instance, is it in Yahweh's nature to take vengeance upon those who have offended him/her/it? Is it moral for man to do the same? Or is it in Yahweh's nature to punish infants for the crimes of their family or community? Is it moral for man to do the same? If it is in Yahweh's nature to do these things yet it remains immoral for man to emulate this conduct, then it is clear that what is within Yahweh's nature is not the standard of human morality. The moral quality of human conduct will then require measurement by some different standard.

What say you?

Your descriptions of Yahweh's actions are far too vague because there isn't any context. My contention is that it is in Yahweh's nature to avoid causing more suffering than necessary ultimately. Is it logically possible for Yahweh to do things which cause a lot of suffering that may seem unnecessary, and yet, for Yahweh to cause less suffering overall? Of course.

Are you implying that motives are what make an act moral or immoral, not merely the act itself? If such is the case, what of a man who lies to his wife and conceals the truth of an adulterous affair shared with another woman in an attempt to avoid causing himself, his wife, and his mistress to suffer more than necessary? Shall we count his deceit a moral act by virtue an intent to avoid causing unnecessary suffering?

Moreover, where have you acquired the notion that it is in Yahweh's nature to avoid causing unnecessary suffering? Is this not mere speculation on your part?

[sayak83]

I've been thinking about the Euthyphro dilemma lately and I made a response a few days ago to an atheist on YouTube named TheoreticalBS and his comments on the Euthyphro dilemma (if you want to watch it, it's right here: In this thread I'd like to elaborate on some of those ideas and discuss my solution to the dilemma.


The Euthyphro dilemma is as follows:

“Is something moral because God commands it or does God command it because it is moral?�

It is asserted that both of these possibilities are problematic. One objection to the first possibility is that this opens up the possibility of abhorrent commands. In one possible world, God would command that we should love our neighbor, but what is to prevent him from commanding that we should torture innocent babies for our pleasure?

It is said that the second possibility would be problematic because that would mean that morality is independent of God. If morality is independent of God, then you don't need theism for morality.

The typical apologetic response to this is that neither of these options are accurate. Instead, something is moral because it is in God's nature. I would agree that this is more accurate. If we were to say that something is moral BECAUSE God commands it, that would imply that God's commands are the ultimate standard of morality. But from a Christian worldview, God bases his commands from his nature.

Some have claimed that this does not free us from the Euthyphro dilemma. They have argued that a new Euthyphro dilemma can be proposed:

“Is something moral because it is in God's nature or is it in God's nature because it is moral?�

Of these two, I accept the first option. Things are moral because they are in God's nature. This option is still subject to the objections raised against the proposal that things are moral because they are commanded by God, but I don't any of them convincing problems.

In this thread, I will mainly cover one objection, the one that I previously mentioned. That is, if things are good solely because they are in God's nature, then why couldn't God have had a different nature, one which would obligate us to torture innocent babies, for instance?


Arbitrary morality in different worlds

I have two problems with the claim that the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma leads to arbitrary morality (in this sense).

My first problem is that this claim relies upon the assertion that moral facts remain the same in every possible world. If this assertion is false, then a world in which we are morally obligated to torture innocent babies for fun would be possible, and thus choosing this first possibility of the Euthyphro dilemma would not really be problematic. Personally, I don't see a lot of problems with moral facts varying in hypothetical possible worlds, except that we may feel that this couldn't be true.

The second problem that I have is that this makes morality arbitrary only in the case of a God who has a nature that could vary in different worlds. In other words, this first option wouldn't be a problem for Christian morality because if Yahweh's nature was different, then we simply wouldn't define him as Yahweh. In every possible world in which morality is dependent upon Yahweh's nature, moral facts will stay the same.

So let's say that Yahweh's nature is the same in every possible world in which he exists. Another potential objection would be that if this were the case, then God's nature wouldn't really be the ultimate source of morality, but it would be the things that God's nature is based upon (like love, forgiveness, etc). If this were the case, then God wouldn't be necessary for morality. This is a bad argument though. Yes, you can describe God's nature in a different way by figuring out what the criteria are for 'being in God's nature', but if God's nature were different or if God didn't exist, then those criteria would be meaningless. It would no longer be true that love, forgiveness, etc are objectively moral (unless we're considering a Platonistic world with the same moral facts). The only reason why love, forgiveness, etc are considered moral is because that's what God's nature is.

Arbitrary standard

Is there a reason or justification for God's nature being the way that it is or is it simply arbitrary? In this case, I would say that God's nature must be arbitrary and this isn't a problem. Any objective moral standard must be arbitrary, actually. If there was a further explanation of the ultimate standard for morality, then we would have to ask what the reason for that standard is...on and on into infinite regress. It has to stop somewhere and no matter what, the standard will be arbitrary in this sense. This is true regardless of whether we hold a Christian view of morality, a Platonistic view of morality or whether we simply reject the idea of objective morality altogether. In Christianity, the ultimate standard would be God's nature. In Platonism, the ultimate standard would be whatever moral facts happen to exist eternally. Without objective morality, the standard is whatever the person decides it to be (least amount of suffering, for example). The main difference between objective morality and subjective morality is that if we lived in a world with objective morality, it would actually be true that our actions were morally right or wrong.

God believes certain things are right and certain things are wrong because he is that sort of character, no deeper reason. So obviously his beliefs are simply opinions and cannot be demonstrated to be true beliefs about right or wrong in any sense or form. Therefore it is arbitrary and subjective. Therefore other sentient beings (even if less powerful etc.) have no moral obligation to follow them....unless they are coerced by threat of hell and rewards of heaven of course. But then in God's opinion that is the right way to go....that's how the bloke's nature is.

[Thatguy]

If a god x has a different nature from god y, then they are not the same beings. So God can't change his morals.

But if God's nature is not required to be what it is, why can't he change it? What, other than mere assertion, establishes that God's morals are unchanging? If God's morals could change then, as an omnipotent being, he should be able to change them.
If God's nature includes the ability to change, then changing would not make him into a different being, he'd just be the same being, only changed. If God x is different from God Y then they are different. But if God X changes in some way he is still God X, in changed form. If we've sort of established that one could be a God and have different morals then the ability to change morals would not be inherently contradictory.

[Thatguy]

Since we are assuming for the moment that there is objective morality rooted in God's nature, then no, there is nothing in God's nature that would be immoral if reflected in human beings. This is true by definition.

I'm also wondering if God's nature is a good basis for our own moral codes. Are there things that are moral for humans to do that would not be moral for God to do?

For instance, many tell me that God cannot lie. I can lie. Sometimes, that's even the moral thing to do. The classic example is, for instance, if I were in Nazi occupied territory and a Gestapo agent asked me if my neighbor was hiding any Jews. If my neighbor was hiding Jews, and telling the truth, or even refusing to answer, would result in the wrongful death of others, it would be immoral of me to tell the truth. It would never, I'm told, be moral for God to lie. This situation is easily resolved by God, being all powerful he can ensure that he tells the truth but no innocent people are killed for it. We, being far weaker, cannot, so the lie is needed. What is moral for God in the situation (telling the truth) is not moral for us. We are almost never similarly situated to God so our conduct must be judged on different standards.

In any instance, we cannot tell if God acted as he did because it would be moral for us to do so or because it was only moral because as an all powerful, all knowing being he could accomplish results we could not with means that, for us, would be immoral.

Moral standards for the conduct of Gods must be very different from those for the conduct of mortals.