How Brutish are Brute Facts?

[harvey1]

QED and I started discussing this subject on the nature of brute facts on another thread in the Christianity sub-forum. However, I wanted to make this discussion a separate thread so we can fully explore this subject matter:

The cost of atheism is that we have to believe something is a brute fact that happens to be the most complex object we have ever observed. In fact, so complex is it, that we can't come anywhere close to emulating such a design using supercomputers and the like, yet you expect us to believe such a departure from parsimony as being parsimonious!

I have pointed out to you often that this argument carries no weight because the nature of discovery and human understanding is fickle. It is an indisputable fact that we frequently miss that which is right-in-front-of-our-noses because we are often using the wrong tools or mindset. This is, after all, what we keep accusing each other with in many of our discsussions. So I am adamant that we cannot use our lack of savvy to assess the possibility or complexity of an unknown entity.

Let me put your argument in a more formal form so it is easier for me to point out the fallacious nature of that argument:

1. Brute facts are needed in every ultimate explanation of the world
2. The brute fact for atheism is that there is a (meta)universe
3. There are no prescriptive laws that determine or restrict brute facts
4. We have no way to evaluate the complexity, likelihood, or probability of this (meta)universe brute fact to bring about universes such as our own
5. There's no reason based on (4) to believe that it ought to be obvious or simple to simulate a world which naturally produces complexity that in principle can bring about universes such as our own
6. The observable universe can naturally be explained in terms of a brute fact (meta)universe that is allowed to evolve over time such that at some point in this process our universe naturally appears
7. The brute fact (meta)universe, according to (6), is a natural explanation
8. Occam's razor requires that we believe the most parsimonious explanation--which translates into a natural explanation

...9C. The universe is a consequence of a brute fact (meta)universe needing no God to explain its existence: God is unlikely to exist

Now, I'm sure you would like to make changes to the above argument, however I think no matter how you change it, it is a faulty argument. For example, (3) appears to contradict (4). If there are no prescriptive law limitations that determine the brutish nature of your brute fact (meta)universe, then absolutely anything is possible even brute fact scenarios that do not lead to universes with sophisticated structures. However, if anything is possible, then we do have a means to gauge likelihood. We have many conceptions of behaviors that the (meta)universe could have exhibited as a brute fact behavior. There are literally thousands or millions of behaviors that we can imagine that would never produce a universe such as our own. Hence, it appears the likelihood of a (meta)universe having a behavior that evolves sophisticated structures as our own looks diminishing small compared to the large number of brute fact (meta)universes that would not do anything of the sort. Hence, (4) is false. If (4) is false, the (5) is false. If (5) is false, then this is not a parsimonious solution (7), and hence it violates Occam's razor ( 8 ), and therefore not only is your conclusion false, but any explanation that doesn't violate Occam's razor should be more likely to be considered true (e.g., a belief in an Omniscient Interpeter, God).

If the [meta]universe was to evolve, it had to allow complex structures to evolve. This behavior cannot be programmed, not anything close. I realize you think that there might be a set of behaviors out there that a 1-billion line cellular automata algorithm could accurately simulate which does the trick, but that still doesn't answer why the metauniverse didn't have a behavior that a 10 line cellular automata algorithm would describe (e.g., a "beacon" metauniverse). Why do we not live in a beacon universe? We know your answer: "because we don't." But, that is not a good answer.

Do you deny that the majority of the worlds cosmologists working today are willing to accept scenarios where this is not the only universe that ever existed? If it rarely came up for serious consideration, that might make it "not a good answer" but I think you'll find it is a better answer than that.

QED, you're mixing up this issue. Cosmologists proceed based on prescriptive laws that other universes are likely given those prescriptive laws (e.g., quantum cosmological laws, or inflationary laws due to quantum laws, etc.). What you are saying of a brute fact (meta)universe has absolutely nothing in common with these scientific theories. You aren't basing your views on any law. You are basing it on a brute fact that has no prescriptive law that determines its truth or falsity. In fact, it is very difficult for me to access how it is that a principle of parsimony is even a concern for you since a principle of parsimony would be a prescriptive law, and you say there are no prescriptive laws. So, why do you limit brute facts to a principle of parsimony as a prescriptive law? Of course, if you don't do that, then your view becomes an irrational view, and as we agree, if there is a rational explanation and an irrational explanation, we are obligated to give precedence to the rational explanation.

[Bugmaster]

Sure, they can be falsifiable in principle, but physical limitations prevent S and T to be falsifiable in practice.

As I said, from the scientific point of view, this is not acceptable. Let's say I have invented a new theory of electromagnetism which fits together with the rest of physics, but uses a completely different form of mathematics. My theory makes the same predictions as the conventional one, except that it also predicts the existence of pink carnivorous smurfs on one of the planets in the Andromeda Galaxy. Well... Until we can send a ship there and look at the smurfs (or lack thereof), no one would be justified in switching over to my theory, because we have no way of telling whether it's true -- as opposed to the current theories, which we have already verified to be approximately true.

Once you know P1, P2, P3,..., PN, Quine-Duhem thesis says that you can construct a theory T that can also predict P1, P2, P3,..., PN. The mechanism of T could be ridiculous but consistent with all of known science. I once "met" a physicist on the net who insisted that his "model of reality" could reproduce every prediction of science. Of course, his model was a severe distortion of how physics is currently understood, but no one could show that his mathematics was incorrect...

I'd actually support your crazy physicist guy. If he manages single-handedly to invent a "new kind of science" (heh heh), which is consistent with science as we know today... more power to him. However, in order to have any value at all, his new science should do more than our current one -- otherwise, there's no reason for us to switch. Unlike the physicist-robots in your example from a few posts ago, we don't have unlimited resources.

Here's my ole' debating buddy's website. Quine-Duhem thesis lives on...

That's... that's a lot of text. I'll have to get back to you on that.

No. Logical implications are necessary to tell us metaphysically what is true about the world.

I'm not sure what you mean by "metaphysically". I'd certainly agree that logical implications are essential for our current process of understanding the world, but that's more a statement about us and this process, and less of a statement about the world.

From a pure methodological perspective, science is only concerned about which models work to best explain the world and provide predictions that are verifiable.

Agreed, except you should be careful with "best", because it seems to imply an external standard against which our understanding of the world may be judged -- and we currently do not have access to such a standard.

Science as a pure methodological enterprise should remain agnostic about metaphysical issues, although science can produce theories that are more conducive to (or even require) a particular metaphysical outlook.

If science is the best tool we have for understanding the world, and science remains agnostic about metaphysical issues, what does this tell us about metaphysical issues, from the parsimonious point of view ?

[harvey1]

As I said, from the scientific point of view, this is not acceptable. Let's say I have invented a new theory of electromagnetism which fits together with the rest of physics, but uses a completely different form of mathematics. My theory makes the same predictions as the conventional one, except that it also predicts the existence of pink carnivorous smurfs on one of the planets in the Andromeda Galaxy. Well... Until we can send a ship there and look at the smurfs (or lack thereof), no one would be justified in switching over to my theory, because we have no way of telling whether it's true -- as opposed to the current theories, which we have already verified to be approximately true.

Okay. Let's assume that your theory T does not hypothesize some ridiculous smurf, but let's say it correctly hypothesizes P1, P2, P3,..., PN that QED (theory S) hypothesizes, and it hypothesizes that the holographic principle is correct. Further, let's say that P1, P2, P3,..., PN is overwhelmingly verified for one-electron atoms, but there is no such verification for three-body and four-body atoms (which there isn't). I'll call those three-body and four-body predictions as Q predictions. So, your T could be correct for the Q predictions, and the current S could be wrong for the Q predictions. Why should we say that S is an approximate truth of nature and your T theory is not? Granted, you knew P1, P2, P3,..., PN prior to making your theory, but is that itself reason to give S primacy over T?

However, in order to have any value at all, his new science should do more than our current one -- otherwise, there's no reason for us to switch. Unlike the physicist-robots in your example from a few posts ago, we don't have unlimited resources.

But, isn't our reason (if I understand you correctly) for believing S over T due to S being first in providing verifications of its P1, P2, P3,..., PN predictions? Yet, T makes the same verified P predictions as S. Why should we give precedence of S over T? It sounds like you are playing "whoever saw it first" kind of game.

If science is the best tool we have for understanding the world, and science remains agnostic about metaphysical issues, what does this tell us about metaphysical issues, from the parsimonious point of view ?

Science is toothless without metaphysics. For example, science of itself cannot say that IDism (as a general hypothesis, not necessarily Behe's version of IDism, for example) is right or wrong. We can easily imagine scenarios where ET comes to earth and says they did all the major stuff with regards to major evolutionary steps. We'd just be dumbfounded, but there's nothing metaphysically impossible with this event happening in the future. However, we cannot realistically think this way and still utilize the information that science is providing to us. We need to make a certain number of metaphysical assumptions in order to claim the knowledge that science puts at our footstep. It is why, afterall, that you are an atheist, for example. You think science supports your metaphysical beliefs, and I say it doesn't. However, we are both engaged in metaphysical reasoning based on the existing models of science. This is why we can exclude IDism as a real possibility, and we don't (and shouldn't) waste much time considering it. That's based on a philosophy of science which both take for granted as being correct. Our philosophy of science diverges, though, once we get to the question on whether metaphysical naturalism is correct. I say that particular philosophy is wrong, and you believe it is right. Science itself is agnostic on philosophy, so we need philosophical arguments to justify one view over the other. That's why science can never eliminate philosophy. Philosophy will always be one of our main tools to understanding the world, and therefore it is irrelevant that science is mostly agnostic on metaphysical issues.

[Bugmaster]

Okay. Let's assume that your theory T does not hypothesize some ridiculous smurf, but let's say it correctly hypothesizes P1, P2, P3,... So, your T could be correct for the Q predictions, and the current S could be wrong for the Q predictions. Why should we say that S is an approximate truth of nature and your T theory is not?

I see no categorical difference between ridiculous smurfs and holographic principles. The bottom line is that the statements your new theory T makes must be falsifiable. If they're not falsifiable -- either a priori, or because of insufficient funding, or whatever -- then I'm not justified in believing T over S, until you come up with some theory whose predictions are falsifiable.

But, isn't our reason (if I understand you correctly) for believing S over T due to S being first in providing verifications of its P1, P2, P3,..., PN predictions?

Er, no. The reason we prefer S over T is because S fits the experimental data better. T might fit it even better, but if we can't determine how well it really fits (because we can't visit Andromeda and look at the holo-smurfs), then we can't determine how likely it's to be true, and thus we're not justified in believing in it over S.

If S and T make identical predictions, all of which are falsifiable, then we could pick either one. However, seeing as we're humans with limited lifespan and not automated physics bots, it would be more efficient for us to keep S, until something actually better comes along.

Science is toothless without metaphysics. For example, science of itself cannot say that IDism (as a general hypothesis, not necessarily Behe's version of IDism, for example) is right or wrong.

That is absolutely true, but I don't see how this makes science "toothless". Weak IDism (i.e., IDism that's compatible with science as we know it today) may be true or it may be false, but it's actually pretty irrelevant. IDism basically says, "god did it"; it doesn't say how or why. Thus, IDism's explanatory power is null, and thus it's simply not terribly interesting.

We can easily imagine scenarios where ET comes to earth and says they did all the major stuff with regards to major evolutionary steps.

In fact, the Raelians believe just that :-) And I think Scientologists do to, I can never tell with them.

We need to make a certain number of metaphysical assumptions in order to claim the knowledge that science puts at our footstep. It is why, afterall, that you are an atheist, for example. You think science supports your metaphysical beliefs, and I say it doesn't.

That's not true. Science can't support or refute metaphysical beliefs at all, since it deals strictly with the physical world (by definition). I'm an atheist because the theistic metaphysical beliefs aren't sufficiently supported by anything, not because my own lack of metaphysical beliefs is somehow scientific.

Science itself is agnostic on philosophy, so we need philosophical arguments to justify one view over the other. (1) That's why science can never eliminate philosophy. (2) Philosophy will always be one of our main tools to understanding the world, and therefore it is irrelevant that science is mostly agnostic on metaphysical issues.

I don't see how (2) follows from (1). I think science has been very successfull at understanding the world so far (after all, this Internet thing we're using to communicate is scientific in nature). Philosophy, on the other hand, got us into all kinds of Platonic diversions which aren't nearly as useful. They may still be true, mind you, but science is just so much better at "understanding the world", as you put it.

I would agree that, if the dualistic Platonic realm does exist, then science would be unable to explore it, and perhaphs philosophy would be useful for that. However, I deny that such a Platonic realm exists (or, rather, I think that it's highly unlikely to exist), so my statements stand.

[harvey1]

The reason we prefer S over T is because S fits the experimental data better. T might fit it even better, but if we can't determine how well it really fits (because we can't visit Andromeda and look at the holo-smurfs), then we can't determine how likely it's to be true, and thus we're not justified in believing in it over S.

Again, S and T are tied with respect to the confirmed observations: P1, P2, P3,..., PN. In no way has S exceeded T in terms of the current testing of the observables. The only main difference between S and T in terms of predictions is that they differ on their respective Q predictions. In both cases, Q has not been observed.

it would be more efficient for us to keep S, until something actually better comes along.

Why? How does our whim make a difference in which theory is more "approximately true?"

That's not true. Science can't support or refute metaphysical beliefs at all, since it deals strictly with the physical world (by definition). I'm an atheist because the theistic metaphysical beliefs aren't sufficiently supported by anything, not because my own lack of metaphysical beliefs is somehow scientific.

I disagree with you, and I think Richard Dawkins (among others) disagrees with you. He argues that evolutionary theory is only consistent with atheism, and is not consistent with theism. I don't agree with him on that part of his argument, but I agree that evolutionary theory could favor atheism over theism unless there are good reasons from theists on why nature is blind with respect to her creations. I think there are good reasons. If I did not think so, then I would be forced to agree with Dawkins. If we have a model of science that best fits a particular philosophy, then that model of science supports that philosophy.

Let me give you a less grand of an example. The debate between substantivalism and relationism (philosophy of space) has been greatly influenced by the recent models of science. There are particular models that support one over the other. For example, string theory currently requires a background space, therefore it (currently) would be a substantivalist model of space. However, quantum loop geometry theory would show space as not fundamental to the theory. Here is a clear example of two metaphysical views being supported by particular models of science. In fact, I think examples of this type are much more the rule than the exception with respect to metaphysical issues. There's a number of metaphysical issues that are simply not raised anymore because of the success of scientific models in settling the dispute. Perhaps many of those issues aren't even considered metaphysical issues anymore because science encroached into the metaphysical terrain.

I would agree that, if the dualistic Platonic realm does exist, then science would be unable to explore it, and perhaphs philosophy would be useful for that. However, I deny that such a Platonic realm exists (or, rather, I think that it's highly unlikely to exist), so my statements stand.

Well, in order to make progress in this discussion, my idea is to concentrate first on whether you can be a realist unless you treat the principle of parsimony (etc.) as something that nature exhibits versus something that humans imagine. I contend that you cannot be a realist unless you are willing to do so. Presumably, if you had to choose between realism/platonism and anti-realism/nominalism, you might choose realism/platonism. If not, then our discussion concerns the issue of whether anti-realism is justified or not.

[Bugmaster]

Again, S and T are tied with respect to the confirmed observations: P1, P2, P3,..., PN. In no way has S exceeded T in terms of the current testing of the observables. The only main difference between S and T in terms of predictions is that they differ on their respective Q predictions. In both cases, Q has not been observed.

Ok, so if getPredictions(S)={P, N, Q}, and getPredictions(T)={P, N, Q}, and P and N are verified by both S and T... then you're right, there's no philosophical difference between S and T. There are still factors that will cause us to pick S over T (or vice versa), but they have nothing to do with pholosophy; they're mere time-saving devices for us:

it would be more efficient for us to keep S, until something actually better comes along.

Why? How does our whim make a difference in which theory is more "approximately true?"

It doesn't. However, if we're faced with two equally true theories, but one of them (namely, T) requires us to do massive amounts of work (namely, rewriting all of science to match T), then there's no practical need for us to pick T over S, even though we'd be philosophically justified in doing so.

I disagree with you, and I think Richard Dawkins (among others) disagrees with you.

Richard Dawkins is not the boss of me :-)

He argues that evolutionary theory is only consistent with atheism, and is not consistent with theism. I don't agree with him on that part of his argument, but I agree that evolutionary theory could favor atheism over theism unless there are good reasons from theists on why nature is blind with respect to her creations. I think there are good reasons. If I did not think so, then I would be forced to agree with Dawkins.

I think that evolution is consistent with theism, but not with most branches of Christianity, which state (explicitly or implicitly) that God created everything "manually", and that the Earth is ~6000 years old. Still, I don't see how evolution supports dualism at all... True, it doesn't deny dualism, but it doesn't support it, either.

...However, quantum loop geometry theory would show space as not fundamental to the theory. Here is a clear example of two metaphysical views being supported by particular models of science.

I guess I'm thinking of something different when I think of metaphysics... I don't see either of these spatial geometries as being metaphysical; they both describe physical reality in some way. Both of them are also purely hypothetical; more research is needed before we can accept either one as readily as we accept, say, evolution. Anyway, when I think of metaphysics, I think of something that is explicitly beyound scientific testing, a priori -- and quantum physics is obviously testable.

Well, in order to make progress in this discussion, my idea is to concentrate first on whether you can be a realist unless you treat the principle of parsimony (etc.) as something that nature exhibits versus something that humans imagine. I contend that you cannot be a realist unless you are willing to do so.

As I said earlier, I disagree. I believe that parsimony is basically an artifact of our thinking. It's a very useful artifact, because it ultimately allowed us to build all kinds of crazy computers and things, but I don't think that this necessarily implies that parsimony has an independent existence. So far, I am not entirely convinced by your arguments to the contrary -- as I think I've shown more or less clearly above.

[harvey1]

Ok, so if getPredictions(S)={P, N, Q}, and getPredictions(T)={P, N, Q}, and P and N are verified by both S and T... then you're right, there's no philosophical difference between S and T. There are still factors that will cause us to pick S over T (or vice versa), but they have nothing to do with pholosophy; they're mere time-saving devices for us... if we're faced with two equally true theories, but one of them (namely, T) requires us to do massive amounts of work (namely, rewriting all of science to match T), then there's no practical need for us to pick T over S, even though we'd be philosophically justified in doing so.

Then in what sense can you call yourself a scientific realist? Since we can always add auxiliary amendments to construct T thereby making it equivalent with P predictions of S, and the only major difference between S and T is their parsimony, in what way can we say that S is approximately true (more than T, or T not really approximately true on the same scales...) if the principle of parsimony is only an "artifact of our thinking"?

Anyway, when I think of metaphysics, I think of something that is explicitly beyound scientific testing, a priori -- and quantum physics is obviously testable.

Well, this is why the principle of parsimony and FAPP (for all practical purposes) are needed. We can always construct a metaphysical version of our philosophy X such that X is consistent with any model of science, but that could also be shown to beyond belief (e.g., "apparent age" concept of creationists).

[Bugmaster]

Then in what sense can you call yourself a scientific realist? Since we can always add auxiliary amendments to construct T thereby making it equivalent with P predictions of S, and the only major difference between S and T is their parsimony, in what way can we say that S is approximately true (more than T, or T not really approximately true on the same scales...) if the principle of parsimony is only an "artifact of our thinking"?

Well, I'd say that all of science is only an artifact of our thinking, really. However, parsimony is crucial in science, because we have an actual way of verifying it. If your new theory T makes additional assumptions, then there's an increased chance that these assumptions could be incorrect. Thus, before we can embrace T, we need to verify these assumptions.

However, in the previous example, you stated that S and T have exactly the same set of core assumptions, and make exactly the same predictions about the world. In this case, neither of them is preferable from the philosophical standpoint; we're free to choose one or the other based on convenience.

We can always construct a metaphysical version of our philosophy X such that X is consistent with any model of science, but that could also be shown to beyond belief (e.g., "apparent age" concept of creationists).

I'm not sure what this "apparent age" concept is, but AFAIK, creationism is irreconcilable with science as we know it today. I'm not sure how you would construct a creationism that would be compatible with science at all, actually.

[harvey1]

Well, I'd say that all of science is only an artifact of our thinking, really. However, parsimony is crucial in science, because we have an actual way of verifying it. If your new theory T makes additional assumptions, then there's an increased chance that these assumptions could be incorrect. Thus, before we can embrace T, we need to verify these assumptions.

Is a theory's assumptions verified, or is it the predictions of the hypothesis that are verified? For example, if I assumed atheism, and therefore came up with the idea that the universe created itself would I have to have my atheist assumption verified? Couldn't I show that a universe that creates itself would have cosmic strings bouncing off magnetic monopoles, and this would be the prediction that I need to verify? A realistic example is how the hot big bang assumes that the universe came to exist from an expansion of densely packed matter-energy, however this assumption is untestable. There is no way to know if the universe really came a densely packed matter-energy. There is a way to test for the theory's predictions, viz., the universe would have roughly 25% helium and 0.01% of deuterium (and even less lithuim).

However, in the previous example, you stated that S and T have exactly the same set of core assumptions, and make exactly the same predictions about the world. In this case, neither of them is preferable from the philosophical standpoint; we're free to choose one or the other based on convenience.

They don't have the same core assumptions. They are able to predict the same set of P, while differing in Q predictions. However, if you we are free to choose between S and T, then this would suggest that you are an scientific antirealist since under no circumstances can we say that one theory is more "true" than another. There's always a T theory out there that can explain P in a manner that is consistent with T's assumptions.