Can there be real causation for a material atheist?

[harvey1]

Here is my argument against material atheism:

1. If a material atheist world exists, then there must be a material cause for every effect; there can be no effect without a material cause.
2. Slicing up time to the minimum slices of time, we see there cannot be material causes that materially connects time slice A to its effect in time slice B.
3. Therefore, a material atheist world does not exist.

Based on this argument, can anyone show that it is possible for a material atheist world to exist?

[Curious]

it is a fact, is it not, that the known laws of physics have been discovered by the observation and interpretation of these behaviours?

But, it is a fact, is it not, that new behaviors of the universe have been discovered by using new theoretical structures to predict new, unobserved phenomena?

Yes you are correct but these predictions are based on the known sets of properties and behaviours observed in other, more easily observable phenomena. It is possible to solve any valid mathematical argument using only 4 operators (well 1 really if you don't mind being very long winded) but you might only have become competent in the use of these operators based on a very few simple uses.

Let's not confuse the issue. I do not say that the laws regulate the behaviour at all. The laws are a description of the behaviour.

Yes, you say that laws are equivalent to regularities.

But being based on the nature of the "objects" involved and not on some set rules that the objects are compelled to adhere to (ie. they are internally determined rather than externally)

The behaviour could be stable while a table with a property of 1 leg would have an unstable behaviour. The behaviour is dependent upon the property in this respect.

This suggests that properties are dependent on laws. If so, then I agree. However, you wish to say that laws do not determine the nature of matter. You say that properties of matter determines the behavior. Your example should demonstrate how the property of being a one leg table has unstable behavior without referring to outside laws (e.g., gravitational pull, etc.). Of course, this is impossible since every material object is subject to laws of nature to explain its actions. So, why treat the fundamental nature of the universe any differently than how we treat common objects?

The table is unstable due to the properties of itself AND the properties of the earth. It is the interaction of the properties that determines the behaviour. In fact the one legged table would not be unstable if there was no gravity or external force applied to it. The property would be the same but the behaviour would be different depending on external considerations (ie. the properties of other things), just like it is for common objects in the real world.

It acts the way it does because behaviour is dependent upon property. There are different types of matter because there are different stable (and unstable) configurations of energy.

This suggests to me that different types of matter respond to lawful conditions in the universe differently. If you wish to say that the properties of matter determine behavior, then why refer to a law as some kind of explanation for the stable or unstable nature of some configuration of energy? Why not just say that we define "unstable" as that which has this configuration and we define "stable" as that which has this configuration. There is no "why" as to the reason one is stable and the other is not. That's where you are on a slippery slope since mathematical structures give us a reason (e.g., conforms to a minimum principle of least energy or least time, contains a symmetry or follows from a conservation principle, etc.).

An acid in a glass has the same properties as the same type of acid in a beaker made of aluminium. The behaviours of the two acids would be very different. If you were to put an acid and an alkali together you would get salt and water but both would be considered stable in the absence of the other. The salt and water would have very different properties to either the acid or the alkali and their own behaviours would depend on their own environment and the properties of the objects with which they interact. They all abide by the same "rules" but have different properties which affect the behaviours in the same way that everybody must abide by the rule of being at least 4'6'' to go on a roller coaster but only those under this minimum requirement are disqualified from going on the ride.

Matter stays in one type because it is stable. If it is not stable it changes to a more stable form or releases it's energy.

But it is "stable" because it is a certain configuration of energy, so that seems like a circular argument. Why not just say that there is no reason why matter stays in one type? That would seem to me to be a more consistent answer.

It is only stable in an environment that supports this stability. We know that matter does not always stay in one type and it is affected by external properties.

Science tries to do without magic. Many interactions are very well understood while others are more mysterious. Science still looks for answers though and seeks to prove them.

Yep. Science seeks laws that are consistent with logical and mathematical explication.

Which it does very well, with a few exceptions.

It seems unreasonable to expect science to have all the answers when it is still in it's infancy. The data we have to formulate theories is far from complete so how could we have formulated the complete theory of everything especially given that very few people even attempt such an endeavour.

That's true if the issue is a scientific issue. However, when the issue of material causation is a philosophical issue. This is because we are talking about the nature of existence and the nature of cause, hence it is subject to philosophical analysis. If we can show that any answer leads to an unresolvable paradox, then this is a good philosophical argument casting strong doubts on the philosophical belief in question.

But you are asking for the views concerning a materialistic perspective which makes it a scientific issue.

I don't say God is necessarily without explanation. I don't know God's characteristics either so I think it would be foolhardy to try to list them. I really don't see how my belief one way or the other is relevant to the argument. We are talking physical here and as far as I can see there are physical causes to physical events. Spiritual is a different argument entirely (so you see I am not a total materialist).

It's relevant here because we are two theists having a conversation about the fundamental nature of the universe. If you wish to favor one fundamental approach over another, that's fine, but when you wish to favor two fundamental approaches, that's stretching your resources very thin. I don't see a tremendous need for God if you think material causes material, it's bordering on superfluous. Also, causally I would be interested how God can cause anything to happen if God is not composed of material substance. It seems like you have two opposing systems of thought that conflict with each other.

I have no problem with any apparent inconsistency and my own belief has no obvious inconsistency that I can see. Obviously my own belief is made up of far more than you have seen so any inconsistency that you may see is more to do with your incomplete knowledge of my philosophy than the philosophy itself. Again though I fail to see how my belief has the slightest bearing on the subject as I was once an atheist and think it highly unlikely that fundamental causation is in any way linked to my perspective one way or the other. I think it likely that the principles were the same before, during, and after my conversion so I think my own point of view is irrelevant to the argument.

What is more simple than property. A distinct entity can change by addition to become something else. Two waves can combine to form a different wave. All mathematical structures are built using simple addition. Addition creates geometry, structure and form. There are not 101 invented characteristics here. New geometries and structures have new properties and subsequently new behaviours but all abide by the rules of addition because that is how they are made.

It is simple but contradictory. If you have any kind of primitive action of some property, then every primitive action is a brute fact. So, you need to count all the primitive no-explanation elements in a material ontology:

1. Space
2. Time
3. Configuration of energy A
4. Persistance through time of A
5. Movement through space of A
6. Change of movement through space for A
7. Configuration of energy B
8. Persistance through time of B
9. Movement through space of B
10. Change of movement through space of B
11. Interaction of A and B (type 1 interaction)
12. Interaction of A and B (type 2 interaction)
13. Etc., etc.

Now, I drastically simplified this. Even a basic computer algorithm could do nothing interesting with any of the above. In addition, I've assumed that you could have material causation, but the movement in time immediately brings up the problem of material causation. With all of these behaviors being brute facts (without explanation) combined with a lack of rational account of material causation, the only sensible thing to do is to give up this account. It doesn't make any sense.

For a start time and space are the same and should really be described in the list as space-time and is a behaviour rather than an entity in it's own right. Movement and persistence again are behaviours.

The above list should actually just read:

Energy.

So energy has properties that enable it to behave in any observable way. The geometry of any configuration brings with it the properties of that geometry. A computer can easily make a vast array of differing structures from this simple beginning.
Not too many brute facts I think.

[QED]

Curious> Have you read the paper by Peter Lynds that Harvey's been referring to? It's only seven pages and from what I can see holds no mystery for materialism. Paul Davies agrees with me as well judging by this discussion piece in New Scientist:

In his letter, Michael Crick makes the mistake of conflating the flow of time with intervals of time (15 November, p 33).

Peter Lynds's reasonable and widely accepted assertion that the flow of time is an illusion (25 October, p 33) does not imply that time itself is an illusion. It is perfectly meaningful to state that two events may be separated by a certain duration, while denying that time mysteriously flows from one event to the other. Crick compares our perception of time to that of space. Quite right. Space does not flow either, but it's still "there".

[harvey1]

Peter Lynds's reasonable and widely accepted assertion that the flow of time is an illusion (25 October, p 33) does not imply that time itself is an illusion. It is perfectly meaningful to state that two events may be separated by a certain duration, while denying that time mysteriously flows from one event to the other. Crick compares our perception of time to that of space. Quite right. Space does not flow either, but it's still "there".

QED, Davies does not explain this further, however Davies is a platonist like myself, so under this interpretation we can think of time as space. That is, the laws of physics provide an underlying structure for spacetime. There need not be a real flow to time.

However, rather than rely on obscure quotations without knowing exactly what the author is thinking, why not provide your argument as to how a third premise is possible, and then show how this third premise establishes how material causation is consistent with this possibility? This is what I am looking for here.

[QED]

However, rather than rely on obscure quotations without knowing exactly what the author is thinking, why not provide your argument as to how a third premise is possible, and then show how this third premise establishes how material causation is consistent with this possibility? This is what I am looking for here.

I felt that that 'Obscure quotation' was a highly relevant comment which, in it's few words tells us that there is no mystery to the flow of time -- which is precisely what you come here claiming.

All concepts of causality refer to particle interactions. From what I understand the most important fact about particle interactions is the Uncertainty Principle so I find the idea of 'causality' somewhat meaningless with respect to the particle interactions of the microworld in the first place. All particles move; ones that are massless move in space, and ones that are massive move in time, or a combination of space and time. There is no 'cause' for this motion; it is inherent in the characteristics of the particles. They do it because they are particles, and the definition of particles is that they move.

Then there are vacuum fluctuations: these are also acausal. We know they exist because of the Casimir effect. They happen at all points in space, and appear to be part of the definition of 'empty space' just as motion is part of the definition of 'particle'. Since the mechanics of particles are symmetric and reversible with respect to time, we cannot identify any particular motion as a cause or as an effect.

And of course, the ultimate cause of any motion can be a vacuum fluctuation; a particle moving through empty space may interact with particles created by vacuum fluctuations. So the effect of a field may be to increase the chance of interacting with certain sorts of pairs, that is, a field may increase the chances of certain types of particles, the ones associated with the field, manifesting from vacuum fluctuations.

With 'causality' being somewhat meaningless with respect to the microworld, it is therefore only of limited utility in the macroworld of everyday experience, because while there are irreversible interactions, there are also reversible ones. Indeed the cause of our own universe might have been a vacuum fluctuation according to some cosmologists. if this is true, then the creation of the universe was itself acausal.

So when it comes to reality, any argument that God provides anything at all to do with causality leaves a great number of acausal phenomena completely unexplained. Furthermore, all of the causes of all phenomena seem to stem from the acausal phenomena: there are, therefore, no phenomena left unexplained that you need God to account for. Indeed acausal phenomena must be without explanation, otherwise the explanation for acausal phenomena involving the uncertainty principle would not be correct... thus, a universe which had a God to provide an explanation for acausal phenomena would have no uncertainty principle, and therefore no atoms, and therefore no life as we know it Jim.

[harvey1]

Yes you are correct but these predictions are based on the known sets of properties and behaviours observed in other, more easily observable phenomena.

Perhaps I don't get your point. A new theory provides behavior patterns of the universe that were unobservable in principle because you need the knowledge from the new theory to make the observation. For example, observing the indirect behavior of quarks is heavily theory-laden since the theory tells you the suspected mass of quarks, the kinds of particle interactions to test for, etc.. If laws were merely a result of observing behaviors, then quarks should have been observed and then the theory explaining them should have resulted. But, this was not the case. Quarks were predicted to exist by Murray Gell-mann, and from his Eightfold Way theory, quarks were eventually found to exist through statistical collisionis of particles.

The table is unstable due to the properties of itself AND the properties of the earth. It is the interaction of the properties that determines the behaviour. In fact the one legged table would not be unstable if there was no gravity or external force applied to it. The property would be the same but the behaviour would be different depending on external considerations (ie. the properties of other things), just like it is for common objects in the real world.

So, what property of matter causes the Casimir effect?

The Casimir effect is caused by the fact that space is filled with vacuum fluctuations, virtual particle-antiparticle pairs that continually form out of nothing and then vanish back into nothing an instant later.

Is it a property of matter to "continually form out of nothing and then vanish back into nothing an instant later?" Why does the theory predict virtual particles that conforms to the uncertainty principle (or law)?

An acid in a glass has the same properties as the same type of acid in a beaker made of aluminium. The behaviours of the two acids would be very different. If you were to put an acid and an alkali together you would get salt and water but both would be considered stable in the absence of the other. The salt and water would have very different properties to either the acid or the alkali and their own behaviours would depend on their own environment and the properties of the objects with which they interact. They all abide by the same "rules" but have different properties which affect the behaviours in the same way that everybody must abide by the rule of being at least 4'6'' to go on a roller coaster but only those under this minimum requirement are disqualified from going on the ride.

But, Curious, why does chemistry have certain rules? Is the answers not found in the laws of quantum mechancis? Again, and again, as humans study a system, they find mathematical laws that dictate why those systems are the way they are. Humans are now getting to the point to where the systems are entirely abstract and the laws cannot any longer be ascribed to properties of some larger meta-state space. For example, we see this in well-known phenomena such as the Casimir effect requiring virtual particles and an uncertainty principle in order to explain the phenomena.

I might add that this whole nominalistic perspective of your's, with respect to the laws of physics, would make little sense in the bigger scheme. For example, Newton's F=ma is a very simple relationship. It's not actually the way the universe operates since we know it is an approximation. If, as you say, the properties of matter determine the laws, then why is it that this formula isn't correct but has the simplicity that it does? Why is the approximation of so many laws of physics nothing short of beautiful in their simple relationships? Why are the reductions to many of these laws able to reproduce these equations in their approximate form by considering the special considerations in which those equations apply in their classical limits? If the world is as you suggest, then the laws are inventions by physicists. The approximations are just our own way of putting things together with our own limitations. Yet, the simplicity and the universality of the classical equations show that this cannot be the case.

Yet, we would expect this to be the case if the laws are mathematically real. That is, mathematics has a certain beauty about itself, and this beauty reflects itself in the equations that naturally deduce from the axioms of the different branches of math. And, not only that, many of the equations of physics are just special cases in mathematics, which only reinforces the point that laws should be treated as a priori over individual properties.

It is only stable in an environment that supports this stability. We know that matter does not always stay in one type and it is affected by external properties.

But, see, it seems to me as if you have given up on your thesis that internal properties determine the stability or unstability of the energy configuration. Your now having to address a much wider "external properties" with the faith that somehow or another, there is an external properties out there which is materially based which can explain the full nature of the universe. Yet, this isn't even the direction of quantum gravity research. QG is focused on finding laws that tie together GR and quantum theory.

But you are asking for the views concerning a materialistic perspective which makes it a scientific issue.

No, I'm not asking for a materialistic perspective based on science. I'm asking for a materialistic cause that can be shown to be a materialist cause in principle. There's a big difference. For example, back in 17th century both Liebniz and Newton debated about the nature of space. Newton, of course, favored substantivalism whereas Liebniz favored relationism. These are philosophies, but they deal with the nature of space. This is philosophy of science. That's all that I have introduced here. I want to talk about the philosophy of science with respect to material causation.

I think it likely that the principles were the same before, during, and after my conversion so I think my own point of view is irrelevant to the argument.

Yes, but as you said so yourself, your conversion had to do with a personal experience and not some new cosmological perspective. Obviously you must have been wrong about your cosmological perspective because that led you to being an atheist, but now you know that atheism is wrong. Hence, the cosmological perspective must be wrong.

You're right that I don't know the details of your view, but I do know that you are still pursing your previous cosmological perspective (which before your personal experience made atheism to be a consistent belief for you). Now that are a theist, it appears you just added a belief of God on top of your previous cosmological perspective. This is why this issue is relevant here because your argument for material cause is combined with your belief on a spiritual cause, and these two views are incompatible from a practical point of view. Anything is possible, I suppose, but it doesn't make sense that you would pursue both ontologies when only one suffices to explain the world. It's like being a substantivalist and a relationist. Only one is needed to explain how space is ultimately structured.

That's not to say that there aren't theists who share your view, I'm sure there are. However, I cannot imagine why Occam's razor does not bother you in this view. If I for a minute thought that a material solution could explain the world, then why would I possibly be a theist? There's no rational reason that I could give myself.

For a start time and space are the same and should really be described in the list as space-time and is a behaviour rather than an entity in it's own right. Movement and persistence again are behaviours.

Steven Weinberg, for one, disagrees. Weinberg thinks spacetime is a useful metaphor. So, for now, let's keep them separate since we do not have reason to think that they are one. There are theories floating around where there are multiple time dimensions, many space dimensions, etc.. Each of these must be considered a primitive unless they can be reduced to something more primitive, but you can't reduce space and time to anything more fundamental while still giving a material account.

The above list should actually just read: Energy. So energy has properties that enable it to behave in any observable way.

Curious, you should know that energy exists as bosons and fermions. And, we have many fermions and a few bosons to consider at this present time in our understanding of the universe. And, bosons and fermions require space and time. They must interact, etc..

[Curious]

Yes you are correct but these predictions are based on the known sets of properties and behaviours observed in other, more easily observable phenomena.

Perhaps I don't get your point. A new theory provides behavior patterns of the universe that were unobservable in principle because you need the knowledge from the new theory to make the observation. For example, observing the indirect behavior of quarks is heavily theory-laden since the theory tells you the suspected mass of quarks, the kinds of particle interactions to test for, etc.. If laws were merely a result of observing behaviors, then quarks should have been observed and then the theory explaining them should have resulted. But, this was not the case. Quarks were predicted to exist by Murray Gell-mann, and from his Eightfold Way theory, quarks were eventually found to exist through statistical collisionis of particles.

And without the previous observations and accrued data of scientists do you think it likely that such a prediction could have been made? The observation of planets and their orbits has similarly lead to the discovery of previously unknown planets.

The table is unstable due to the properties of itself AND the properties of the earth. It is the interaction of the properties that determines the behaviour. In fact the one legged table would not be unstable if there was no gravity or external force applied to it. The property would be the same but the behaviour would be different depending on external considerations (ie. the properties of other things), just like it is for common objects in the real world.

So, what property of matter causes the Casimir effect?

The Casimir effect is caused by the fact that space is filled with vacuum fluctuations, virtual particle-antiparticle pairs that continually form out of nothing and then vanish back into nothing an instant later.

Is it a property of matter to "continually form out of nothing and then vanish back into nothing an instant later?" Why does the theory predict virtual particles that conforms to the uncertainty principle (or law)?

It is a known property of energy that it can, and does, create mass from no mass. Energy has the potential to "aggregate" into distinct particle signatures. Sub-space resonance is as good a guess as any or you might just call it energy flux. There is no evidence that these particles are additional to the total system energy and there is no "vacuum" that can be created to show that the particles arise from "nothing".

An acid in a glass has the same properties as the same type of acid in a beaker made of aluminium. The behaviours of the two acids would be very different. If you were to put an acid and an alkali together you would get salt and water but both would be considered stable in the absence of the other. The salt and water would have very different properties to either the acid or the alkali and their own behaviours would depend on their own environment and the properties of the objects with which they interact. They all abide by the same "rules" but have different properties which affect the behaviours in the same way that everybody must abide by the rule of being at least 4'6'' to go on a roller coaster but only those under this minimum requirement are disqualified from going on the ride.

But, Curious, why does chemistry have certain rules? Is the answers not found in the laws of quantum mechancis? Again, and again, as humans study a system, they find mathematical laws that dictate why those systems are the way they are. Humans are now getting to the point to where the systems are entirely abstract and the laws cannot any longer be ascribed to properties of some larger meta-state space. For example, we see this in well-known phenomena such as the Casimir effect requiring virtual particles and an uncertainty principle in order to explain the phenomena.

As I stated earlier, different geometries have different properties so it is unreasonable to expect geometry A to have the same behaviour as geometry Z. Given time though we may well find that both act according to the same set of "rules". There is nothing to suggest that larger structures should be immune to these same quantum fluctuations but the structure has sufficient integrity (in the main) to be seemingly unaffected.

I might add that this whole nominalistic perspective of your's, with respect to the laws of physics, would make little sense in the bigger scheme. For example, Newton's F=ma is a very simple relationship. It's not actually the way the universe operates since we know it is an approximation. If, as you say, the properties of matter determine the laws, then why is it that this formula isn't correct but has the simplicity that it does?

You have lost me here. Are you saying that an equation cannot be both simple and incorrect? I could say that E=M and this would be both simple and incorrect. Of course the equation F=ma falls apart at high speeds but for the purpose that it was used (in it's day and today for the most part) it is perfectly adequate.

Why is the approximation of so many laws of physics nothing short of beautiful in their simple relationships? Why are the reductions to many of these laws able to reproduce these equations in their approximate form by considering the special considerations in which those equations apply in their classical limits? If the world is as you suggest, then the laws are inventions by physicists. The approximations are just our own way of putting things together with our own limitations. Yet, the simplicity and the universality of the classical equations show that this cannot be the case.

These equations reflect the boundaries of the observations. Minute changes due to the speeds involved were just too small to be observable or measurable. At the speeds involved, mass was the primary consideration but at speeds approaching the upper limit the original mass becomes negligible in comparison to the burden due to speed. What this shows is that the properties of matter still affect the behaviours but in certain circumstances the affect of one property might appear major while in others might seem minor but it is still a consideration in both cases.

Yet, we would expect this to be the case if the laws are mathematically real. That is, mathematics has a certain beauty about itself, and this beauty reflects itself in the equations that naturally deduce from the axioms of the different branches of math. And, not only that, many of the equations of physics are just special cases in mathematics, which only reinforces the point that laws should be treated as a priori over individual properties.

The beauty of the equations is a reflection of the structure and relationships it describes. The mathematics pales in comparison to the reality. An equation is nothing but symbolism. There is nothing beautiful about squiggles on a piece of paper, the beauty is in understanding what these squiggles stand for.

It is only stable in an environment that supports this stability. We know that matter does not always stay in one type and it is affected by external properties.

But, see, it seems to me as if you have given up on your thesis that internal properties determine the stability or unstability of the energy configuration. Your now having to address a much wider "external properties" with the faith that somehow or another, there is an external properties out there which is materially based which can explain the full nature of the universe. Yet, this isn't even the direction of quantum gravity research. QG is focused on finding laws that tie together GR and quantum theory.

The external properties that I refer to are the properties of B which affect behaviour of properties of A. I gave the example of an acid-alkaline reaction which I thought was easily understandable. Both are unstable in the presence of the other but stable in isolation.

I think it likely that the principles were the same before, during, and after my conversion so I think my own point of view is irrelevant to the argument.

Yes, but as you said so yourself, your conversion had to do with a personal experience and not some new cosmological perspective. Obviously you must have been wrong about your cosmological perspective because that led you to being an atheist, but now you know that atheism is wrong. Hence, the cosmological perspective must be wrong.

You're right that I don't know the details of your view, but I do know that you are still pursing your previous cosmological perspective (which before your personal experience made atheism to be a consistent belief for you). Now that are a theist, it appears you just added a belief of God on top of your previous cosmological perspective. This is why this issue is relevant here because your argument for material cause is combined with your belief on a spiritual cause, and these two views are incompatible from a practical point of view. Anything is possible, I suppose, but it doesn't make sense that you would pursue both ontologies when only one suffices to explain the world. It's like being a substantivalist and a relationist. Only one is needed to explain how space is ultimately structured.

That's not to say that there aren't theists who share your view, I'm sure there are. However, I cannot imagine why Occam's razor does not bother you in this view. If I for a minute thought that a material solution could explain the world, then why would I possibly be a theist? There's no rational reason that I could give myself.

I am sorry to hear that your belief is so dependent upon this one point. The physical universe, in my eyes, requires no such intervention and I suggest that unless you open your eyes to the ocean in front of you, you will be destined to spend your days, as Newton, flitting from one smooth pebble to the next. Matter begets matter, philosophical argument begets philosophical argument but spirit begets spirit. Instead of concentrating on the origin of your physical self perhaps you might take the time to consider the origin, and purpose of your spiritual self. Then you might just gain some insight into why I believe my own point of view is not in the least inconsistent.

The above list should actually just read: Energy. So energy has properties that enable it to behave in any observable way.

Curious, you should know that energy exists as bosons and fermions. And, we have many fermions and a few bosons to consider at this present time in our understanding of the universe. And, bosons and fermions require space and time. They must interact, etc..

I think you will find that energy exists in many forms and the smallest quanta known are just the limits of our ability to measure and observe. You are correct though that energy requires space and/ or time but as these are merely behaviours arising from the energy itself there is no problem.

[Curious]

Curious> Have you read the paper by Peter Lynds that Harvey's been referring to? It's only seven pages and from what I can see holds no mystery for materialism. Paul Davies agrees with me as well judging by this discussion piece in New Scientist:

In his letter, Michael Crick makes the mistake of conflating the flow of time with intervals of time (15 November, p 33).

Peter Lynds's reasonable and widely accepted assertion that the flow of time is an illusion (25 October, p 33) does not imply that time itself is an illusion. It is perfectly meaningful to state that two events may be separated by a certain duration, while denying that time mysteriously flows from one event to the other. Crick compares our perception of time to that of space. Quite right. Space does not flow either, but it's still "there".

Thanks for the link. I had not read this as if I took the time to read every link that Harvey1 posts I would have time to do little else. It is quite right that no matter how small we make the interval there is still motion between the beginning and end point of the interval which is why I used the zero interval example of the photon frame. I read quite quickly so I might have missed something but I am surprised that Zeno's was not shown to be merely an example of bad mathematics. As I stated earlier in this discussion, Zeno's paradox assumes that motion is impossible on the premise that 1<1. The second half of the motion is always greater than the first half at any point in the simulation. This is just like saying you cannot possibly get to 1 by adding half, half of half, half of half half etc. Of course you can't but a journey is made up of half PLUS half, not half plus less than half.

[harvey1]

Curious,

Okay, we've drifted far enough from the subject of this thread. Obviously we disagree as to whether a belief in God is justified if the strong anthropic principle is valid. I believe that if matter is eternal and can have enough universes to see vastly different configurations, then over time our universe would be at least possible (as QED has suggested). In that view, the spiritual conditions that bring people to God would just be aftermath of primate evolution. I see nothing inconsistent with the atheist view on this issue. However, where I see a breakdown in the atheist view is that I don't think you can have a material universe without a cause, and for that matter, I don't think there can be material causation period.

So, getting back to this issue, I ask how is material causation possible given the arguments I have presented. What I need from you, in argument form, is to show that material causation is in principle possible. If you cannot do that, then based on what faith do we justify that material causation is possible in principle? If we don't buy into faith, then why should we believe it given a perfectly good explanation in terms of there being existing laws above and beyond the material world which conforms to our knowledge of the physical laws?

I am sorry to hear that your belief is so dependent upon this one point. The physical universe, in my eyes, requires no such intervention and I suggest that unless you open your eyes to the ocean in front of you, you will be destined to spend your days, as Newton, flitting from one smooth pebble to the next. Matter begets matter, philosophical argument begets philosophical argument but spirit begets spirit. Instead of concentrating on the origin of your physical self perhaps you might take the time to consider the origin, and purpose of your spiritual self. Then you might just gain some insight into why I believe my own point of view is not in the least inconsistent.

I think you ought to listen to the atheists on this issue. If you admit their argument that a material universe can account for our universe, then I don't think your argument for a spiritual being carries much weight. There's ample evidence within biological evolution that spiritual awareness can evolve quite naturally if that produces more babies. In fact, I think a spiritual awareness did evolve for that reason. If this is all that stands in the way from you being an atheist, then I hope that thread is strong enough. For me, it would snap after a tsunami or two.

[harvey1]

As I stated earlier in this discussion, Zeno's paradox assumes that motion is impossible on the premise that 1<1. The second half of the motion is always greater than the first half at any point in the simulation. This is just like saying you cannot possibly get to 1 by adding half, half of half, half of half half etc. Of course you can't but a journey is made up of half PLUS half, not half plus less than half.

This addresses only the Archilles and Dichotomy paradox. The paradox that Lynds addresses is the arrow paradox. This is a problem for any time discrete solution, which even Penrose has recently acknowledged with regard to much of the research happening in quantum gravity (specifically quantum loop geometry):

As we have seen, the 3-space part of the 'general covariance' problem is neatly taken care of in the loop/spin-network states, but the extension of this to a full 4-space general covariance brings with is a whole 'Pandora's box' of problems... The difficulty has to do with the issue of how time-evolution, according to Einstein equation, is to be properly expressed in a generally covariant 4-space formalism. It is related to what is known as the 'problem of time' in quantum gravity (or, sometimes, the problem of 'frozen time'). In general relativity, one cannot distinguish time-evolution from merely a coordinate change (i.e., just replacing one time coordinate by another). A generally covariant formalism should be blind to a mere coordinate change, so the concept of time-evolution becomes profoundly problematic.(Penrose, The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe, p. 954, 2005)

So, Zeno's arrow is still in motion, frozen in time if you don't mind that analogy...

[Curious]

Curious,
I think you ought to listen to the atheists on this issue. If you admit their argument that a material universe can account for our universe, then I don't think your argument for a spiritual being carries much weight. There's ample evidence within biological evolution that spiritual awareness can evolve quite naturally if that produces more babies. In fact, I think a spiritual awareness did evolve for that reason. If this is all that stands in the way from you being an atheist, then I hope that thread is strong enough. For me, it would snap after a tsunami or two.

I know of no atheist who holds the belief that two separate entities cannot evolve completely independently of one another and later form a complete symbiosis. As you say, spiritual awareness can evolve quite naturally due to evolution just as eyes can. This does not mean light did not pre-date sensitivity to it. Do not think that this argument has even the slightest bearing on my own belief because it does not. It is not the nature of matter that makes me believe but the nature of spirit and my own experience and observations of this. As I said before, if you want to understand the physical then you study the physical but if you want to understand the spiritual then study this instead otherwise all you will ever learn is what spirit is not and not what spirit is.