The Permissibility of Faith

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In my experience, when debating with those who believe in God, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.

For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have faith that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "faith" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.

So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to faith?


spetey

[harvey1]

Hello Spetey, as always, some good replies by you...

Let's review: you first learn that I don't commit to causal connections to the external world for every belief (but I don't rule it out either); I say maybe there are a priori beliefs.

You are agnostic with regard to all causal connections for a belief. Would that be correct?

To your credit, you try to back up your definition some; you equate the dictionary phrase "unwarranted" with "no commitments to causal connections of an external experience". But wouldn't you say that's just a tiny bit of a stretch?

I think that if causal connections are not required, then a belief can be offered without them, and that's unwarranted.

1) P is knowledge of the world if it is warranted as an external truth

2) Warranted belief entails that the reasons to believe have met a satisfactory criteria (e.g., no hampering logical fallacies were used to construct the belief, no gross misconstrual of evidence, etc.)

3) An external truth is a truth about the world (versus some imaginative or formal system truth which is true based on some internalist criteria)

4) "Warranted as an external truth" is an established causal tie that in principle connects a belief with the world using criteria of (2) with respect to (3)

5) If a causal connection between a belief and the world is in principle rejected as needed in an epistemolgy, then there are no beliefs that are "warranted as an external truth" (4), and therefore P cannot be claimed as knowledge of the world (1).

6) If Ps "as knowledge" are claimed by an epistemology without (4), then an internalistic claim must be made to truth which must be decided by an authority. This authority can be anyone, including a dogmatic figure.

If you define "dogmatism" to be whatever disagrees with your empiricist epistemology, then that strikes me as a bit dogmatic!

I apologize if I said something to the effect that you are a dogmatic person. I merely wish to say that anytime someone claims that knowledge can exist in principle (i.e., it is not a result of some interaction with the external world somewhere, somehow in the past (e.g., via natural selection's effect on our biological ancestors, etc.)), then that is also a claim to knowledge and I ask them to prove it. I've asked you to prove it, and all you've done is tell me to trust you and accept that you are not being inconsistent with respect to this thread's demand that people who have faith to show that their reasoning is not from "faith." I find that ironic since you are asking for someone to give reasons for their knowledge when in fact your epistemology allows someone to have knowledge without having that knowledge through a causal process (i.e., even in principle).

But if I were really convinced that allowing the very possibility of a priori beliefs thereby made me a dogmatist, I would reject the possibility. Okay? Are we agreed that neither of us are dogmatists--that both of us think beliefs need justification?

I don't see you as a dogmatist, I see you holding an epistemological view that would allow it, and which might be influencing you in ways that you are not aware of. Think of it this way:

1) P is an a priori statement
2) P is not causally commited to the world (allowed by your epistemology)
3) P is subject to revision (required by your epistemology)
4) Q is a causally connected fact that should naturally lead to a non-P belief such as R (but of itself does not contradict P)
5) Q is rejected as an a priori statement
6) Natural deductions of Q (leading naturally to R) are suppressed because P is held as (1)

P could be anything, e.g., "materialism is a true philosophy about how matter is fundamental." Q could be anything causally connected, e.g., "virtual particles pop in and out of existence per the uncertainty principle." R could be a platonist philosophy.

Now, in your epistemology, it is permissable for P to be accepted as a more fundamental truth than Q, even though Q should lead to a more preferable philosophy (e.g., platonism or R). It can be argued by those a priorists that P is more relevant to philosophy than vp's contradicting materialism, since popping in and out of existence is not a proper criterion for deciding on a "true philosophy" (nor do vp's directly contradict P). Therefore, you have a society of materialists who are dogmatic about P and who just won't give up their belief despite Q being true and for most societies would lead to a fundamental shift away from a P belief (6).

Of course, this is only an example. But, how close to reality is it? I think it is very close to how people hold beliefs to be true (like P) even though it is not the natural way of things. Of course, this is just being human, but why give humans more reason to reject an R belief than they already are predisposed to doing? I say that people who can argue for R by appealing to causal connections should have the upper hand. In my epistemology they can do so, but in your epistemology I worry that dogmaticism can be justified and suppress R.

That's great that you hold that position of revising a belief in light of new experience, but why not take the added leap and just say that every belief must be committed to some kind of experience (e.g., a distant evolutionary past kind of experience)? Why do you resist this very straightforward request?

Because it might not be true. It's hard to say whether set theory is amenable to experience of the world, for example.

It has nothing to do with it being true, it's has only to do with it being grounds to say something is knowledge about the world. Set theory can work in its own context, but if someone wants to extend set theory into saying it is about the world, then show how its axioims are causally supported by some fundamental observation of the world. That's very easy to do.

It's a hard question (whether some beliefs are justified a priori) and you've given me no reason to settle it one way or another. For that matter, in this thread, you allow for the possibility of some kind of a priori beliefs. Does that make you a dogmatist by your own lights?

Where do I allow a priori beliefs in that post? The only exception I have allowed is treating beliefs as a priori since evolution has handed us many beliefs which affect our ability to perceive, and therefore we cannot judge those beliefs as anything but as a priori, however that's not to say that those beliefs did not come from previous perception events by our ancestors. They are in principle causally connected. If I didn't feel that way, then I would be giving up the notion that knowledge is possible. It is because we have contact with the external world that knowledge of the world is possible. If not for that contact, then I should say that claiming knowledge makes no sense at all.

Who decides what is a priori and what is a posteriori?

Oh yikes, the classic "who decides" appeal to ignorance that I probably hear twice a week on college campuses. Imagine asking "who decides whether the earth is flat or round?" No one decides, it's flat or it's not, and we have to try to figure it out. Similarly there is a priori justification or there's not--no one decides, we figure it out. It's hard to figure out. That doesn't mean there's no answer.

Who's "we"? Is "we" the dogmatist who holds power by claiming that their knowledge is a priori which only they have access to? I can't believe you would hold such a philosophy, Spetey. It competely contradicts a materialist mindset that holds that people are entirely material beings. You've basically given the key of the city over to whoever wants to be "we" and told them it's okay to cite a priori knowledge as a justification for their beliefs -- even when it contradicts empirically-derived knowledge.

If neither of us are dogmatists then we can actually have a discussion about a topic of the type we both came here to discuss. Meanwhile, frankly, this discussion looks like an evasive distraction on your part. If you have reasons for your belief, give them. If you see me being dogmatic in practice, point it out. But let's please get to it.

Let me replace the term "faith" with "a priori," "God" with "Materialism," and "religion" with "philosophy" for the beginning post of this thread:

• In my experience, when debating with those who believe in Materialism, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to a priori beliefs as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "a priori beliefs"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. A Priori beliefs to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.
  
  For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have an a priori that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "a priori beliefs" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.
  
  So why might appeal to a priori beliefs be permissible when it comes to discussions of philosophy? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to a priori beliefs?

[spetey]

Hi Christian Debaters!

I don't see you as a dogmatist, I see you holding an epistemological view that would allow it, and which might be influencing you in ways that you are not aware of.

Thanks for not seeing me as a dogmatist. I think we have both demonstrated that we are committed to giving reasons for our positions.

And I suppose it's possible that my epistemology allows dogmatism in the sense that even though it's explicit about how any belief should be revisable, someone could be a dogmatist and hold my epistemology and not be aware of the inconsistency. Of course, any epistemology allows dogmatism in this sense.

As for the a priori belief stuff, I think maybe we're not on the same page. Put it this way: I believe that the square root of two, "sqrt(2)", is irrational. This is plausibly an a priori claim (though again, nowhere in my view am I committed to saying so). And I think I have good reason to believe that sqrt(2) is irrational. Here's, in summary, why I think sqrt(2) is irrational:

1. Suppose, for contradiction, that it's rational. Then it can be represented as p/q for natural numbers p and q.
2. Then (p/q)^2 = 2, so (p^2)/(q^2) = 2, so p^2 = 2(q^2).
3. Thus either p^2 or q^2 has an odd exponent of two in its prime factorization.
4. But no square of a natural number can have an odd exponent in its prime factorization.
5. This is a contradiction, so I conclude that the original supposition, that sqrt(2) is rational, must be false. Thus sqrt(2) is irrational.

Now, nowhere did I mention how this belief connects to my sense experience. And I'm not certain I could, even after working on it. But I think I hold that sqrt(2) is irrational for good reason; in fact, I think it's about as good a kind of reason as you might ask for. Now, do you think I'm being dogmatic in believing that sqrt(2) is irrational, because I didn't show how this belief was "caused by experience"? Or do you mean something different by "a priori" or "experience" so that we're just talking past each other by mistake?

Of course, if we're talking past each other about a priori beliefs, it fortunately doesn't matter since the propositions of interest to us--like whether there's a God, or whether there is immaterial substance of some kind--are a posteriori claims. I say we discuss those!


spetey

[harvey1]

Suppose, for contradiction, that it's rational. Then it can be represented as p/q for natural numbers p and q. Then (p/q)^2 = 2, so (p^2)/(q^2) = 2, so p^2 = 2(q^2). Thus either p^2 or q^2 has an odd exponent of two in its prime factorization. But no square of a natural number can have an odd exponent in its prime factorization. This is a contradiction, so I conclude that the original supposition, that sqrt(2) is rational, must be false. Thus sqrt(2) is irrational.

It's not clear to me from your wording, but I am of course well aware of the reductio ad absurdum argument in this case...

Now, nowhere did I mention how this belief connects to my sense experience. And I'm not certain I could, even after working on it. But I think I hold that sqrt(2) is irrational for good reason; in fact, I think it's about as good a kind of reason as you might ask for. Now, do you think I'm being dogmatic in believing that sqrt(2) is irrational, because I didn't show how this belief was "caused by experience"? Or do you mean something different by "a priori" or "experience" so that we're just talking past each other by mistake?

First, you should consider the axioms for the complete ordered fields. Abstract algebra is needed to formally construct this argument, and that's where you need experience with the world to construct the axioms. I suppose you could just imagine some cool axioms to construct this stuff - having nothing to do with the world - but then there is no basis to say that you've constructed knowledge about anything "out there." If you can show that it doesn't matter how you invented the knowledge (e.g., it is still useful by using it in scientific theories), then that use becomes the means by which you can justify the math as knowledge of the world. Until that happens, you have no justification for treating something unjustified like that as knowledge.

However notice, at no point have I succumbed to anything called "a priori knowledge." I simply have allowed knowledge to come about only after I have sufficient experience (e.g., the reals included in scientific theories) before I accept the "square root of 2 as irrational" as being knowledge about the world. Until I have that experience, I treat it like the rules of chess. It may have application as a game, but whoa baby before I say that the rules of chess are a priori knowledge of the world. I simply cannot buy that -- not unless you can show me how the rules of chess make for better strategies in war or something like that. If you can do that, then it is experience which becomes the route to that justification of those rules, not some mystical contact that the inventors of chess had located somehow in their head.

As it turns out though, mathematical axioms do come from the world of experience, so it is only natural that humans can use mathematical theorems as useful knowledge since the world, for some strange reason, is mathematically describable. Of course, I think that reason has to do with the inherent nature of a platonic reality.

[spetey]

Hey Harvey (and others),

Let's review where we are. I asked, essentially, if it's important to give reasons for controverisal positions that affect others. You (eventually) said yes. I said yes too. You said that actually, and despite myself, I'm committed to saying no. I found this surprising and asked you to justify your claim. You probe my epistemology for some time, looking for what you consider to be a chink, and discover that I haven't totally ruled out the possibility of a priori beliefs. You then reveal that you are sure, somehow, that anyone who hasn't totally ruled out such beliefs must be a dogmatist, no matter how much they protest otherwise, and no matter how well they might be able to give reasons for their beliefs. Is that correct?

First, you should consider the axioms for the complete ordered fields. Abstract algebra is needed to formally construct this argument, and that's where you need experience with the world to construct the axioms. I suppose you could just imagine some cool axioms to construct this stuff - having nothing to do with the world - but then there is no basis to say that you've constructed knowledge about anything "out there." If you can show that it doesn't matter how you invented the knowledge (e.g., it is still useful by using it in scientific theories), then that use becomes the means by which you can justify the math as knowledge of the world. Until that happens, you have no justification for treating something unjustified like that as knowledge.

<sigh> Okay. Here is a standard axiom from the minimal arithmetic theory Q: For a special logical constant 0, and for all x, x*0=0. (See for example Boolos & Jeffrey's Computability and Logic 2nd edition p107.) Please justify this fundamental axiom by appeal to experience.

(To anticipate: if you say basically that it and the math that comes from it "works", then that's a generic endorsement that I could similarly apply to any putatively a priori belief, and thus if that's the only kind of experiential justification you require, then I easily meet this requirement--no beliefs are a priori in this permissive sense.)

I simply have allowed knowledge to come about only after I have sufficient experience (e.g., the reals included in scientific theories) before I accept the "square root of 2 as irrational" as being knowledge about the world.

[Warning: undue sarcasm ahead that I can't resist leaving in.] Wow, you've experienced the real numbers? What was that like? Myself, my sensory perceptions are only fine-grained to a finite degree. You must be built special. What was pi like out at that trillionth digit, how did it feel or smell? Gee, I haven't even experienced the natural number sequence. I'm still working on it, but haven't yet got past 50-digit numbers.

Of course, I think that reason has to do with the inherent nature of a platonic reality.

That's another thing. Your belief in this platonic reality--that's through experience? What do the platonic reals taste / smell / feel / hear / look like? Or do you mean that you can infer the existence of the platonic reals from sense experience and inference rules? Because I'd be interested in what those inference rules taste / smell / feel / hear / look like, or how you otherwise got experiential knowledge of them.

Harvey, aside from the fact that I think you're fighting a losing battle, I also think we have long ago lost sight of the issue (and by "we" I mean "you"). The question of this thread is really a procedural one for this forum: are we all committed to giving reasons for beliefs here, or is it okay to retreat to faith sometimes? You and I have agreed on this procedural rule. I remain thrilled about that. If I violate that rule, you can call me on it, and if you violate that rule, I can call you on it. I just don't see the point in showing that maybe I might someday violate that rule despite my fervent, outspoken dedication to it. (And that would be according to your understanding of my view, which you admit isn't so unlikely to be mistaken given your relative inexpertise in the area, right?)

I say we wait until I actually do violate this rule on an issue of interest to us, and then call me on it, okay? If you think I'm being dogmatic in my reasons for atheism somewhere, prove it when it comes to atheism. Let's talk about those things on this thread.


spetey

[spetey]

Hey Harvey (and others),

Let's review where we are. I asked, essentially, if it's important to give reasons for controverisal positions that affect others. You (eventually) said yes. I said yes too. You said that actually, and despite myself, I'm committed to saying no. I found this surprising and asked you to justify your claim. You probe my epistemology for some time, looking for what you consider to be a chink, and discover that I haven't totally ruled out the possibility of a priori beliefs. You then reveal that you are sure, somehow, that anyone who hasn't totally ruled out such beliefs must be a dogmatist, no matter how much they protest otherwise, and no matter how well they might be able to give reasons for their beliefs. Is that correct?

First, you should consider the axioms for the complete ordered fields. Abstract algebra is needed to formally construct this argument, and that's where you need experience with the world to construct the axioms. I suppose you could just imagine some cool axioms to construct this stuff - having nothing to do with the world - but then there is no basis to say that you've constructed knowledge about anything "out there." If you can show that it doesn't matter how you invented the knowledge (e.g., it is still useful by using it in scientific theories), then that use becomes the means by which you can justify the math as knowledge of the world. Until that happens, you have no justification for treating something unjustified like that as knowledge.

<sigh> Okay. Here is a standard axiom from the minimal arithmetic theory Q: For a special logical constant 0, and for all x, x*0=0. (See for example Boolos & Jeffrey's Computability and Logic 2nd edition p107.) Please justify this fundamental axiom by appeal to experience.

(To anticipate: if you say basically that it and the math that comes from it "works", then that's a generic endorsement that I could similarly apply to any putatively a priori belief, and thus if that's the only kind of experiential justification you require, then I easily meet this requirement--no beliefs are a priori in this permissive sense.)

I simply have allowed knowledge to come about only after I have sufficient experience (e.g., the reals included in scientific theories) before I accept the "square root of 2 as irrational" as being knowledge about the world.

[Warning: undue sarcasm ahead that I can't resist leaving in.] Wow, you've experienced the real numbers? What was that like? Myself, my sensory perceptions are only fine-grained to a finite degree. You must be built special. What was pi like out at that trillionth digit, how did it feel or smell? Gee, I haven't even experienced the natural number sequence. I'm still working on it, but haven't yet got past 50-digit numbers.

Of course, I think that reason has to do with the inherent nature of a platonic reality.

That's another thing. Your belief in this platonic reality--that's through experience? What do the platonic reals taste / smell / feel / hear / look like? Or do you mean that you can infer the existence of the platonic reals from sense experience and inference rules? Because I'd be interested in what those inference rules taste / smell / feel / hear / look like, or how you otherwise got experiential knowledge of them.

Harvey, aside from the fact that I think you're fighting a losing battle, I also think we have long ago lost sight of the issue (and by "we" I mean "you"). The question of this thread is really a procedural one for this forum: are we all committed to giving reasons for beliefs here, or is it okay to retreat to faith sometimes? You and I have agreed on this procedural rule. I remain thrilled about that. If I violate that rule, you can call me on it, and if you violate that rule, I can call you on it. I just don't see the point in showing that maybe I might someday violate that rule despite my fervent, outspoken dedication to it. (And that would be according to your understanding of my view, which you admit isn't so unlikely to be mistaken given your relative inexpertise in the area, right?)

I say we wait until I actually do violate this rule on an issue of interest to us, and then call me on it, okay? If you think I'm being dogmatic in my reasons for atheism somewhere, prove it when it comes to atheism. Let's talk about those things on this thread.


spetey

[harvey1]

Harvey, aside from the fact that I think you're fighting a losing battle, I also think we have long ago lost sight of the issue (and by "we" I mean "you"). The question of this thread is really a procedural one for this forum: are we all committed to giving reasons for beliefs here, or is it okay to retreat to faith sometimes? You and I have agreed on this procedural rule. I remain thrilled about that. If I violate that rule, you can call me on it, and if you violate that rule, I can call you on it. I just don't see the point in showing that maybe I might someday violate that rule despite my fervent, outspoken dedication to it. (And that would be according to your understanding of my view, which you admit isn't so unlikely to be mistaken given your relative inexpertise in the area, right?)

Because Spetey, there are principles involved. If the principle is that there are exceptions to what counts as justification to knowledge (e.g., a priori knowledge), then what standard justifies an exception? I think if you answer that question, you'll be much closer to understanding my answers in the Diversity thread.

I say we wait until I actually do violate this rule on an issue of interest to us, and then call me on it, okay? If you think I'm being dogmatic in my reasons for atheism somewhere, prove it when it comes to atheism. Let's talk about those things on this thread.

You are missing the point here. It's not that you are violating this rule, or are even in danger of it. What you are doing is setting up an epistemology that is doomed to allow exceptions based on unacceptable premises. I simply cannot allow knowledge of the world that is not acquired from the world. I don't care what it is. If you introduce it, then you might as well introduce any faith's beliefs as part of those exceptions.

<sigh> Okay. Here is a standard axiom from the minimal arithmetic theory Q: For a special logical constant 0, and for all x, x*0=0. (See for example Boolos & Jeffrey's Computability and Logic 2nd edition p107.) Please justify this fundamental axiom by appeal to experience.

Let's first use "r" instead of x...

• r="A count of the number of things you wish to reference."
  c="A count of the number of things you wish to reference (the count doesn't have to be the same things you counted to get the value for r)."
  "for all r"= "For all the things you could have in principle counted to get the value for r."
  
  "area of a matrix"="Look at a tile floor. The number of tiles on the floor is the area of the matrix. To designate a smaller area, just mark with a marker the tile rows and the tile columns that you want to designate as your smaller area. Count only the tiles that are in a row that you marked, and count only the tiles that are in a column that you marked. The total number of tiles is the area of the new designated smaller area."
  
  [r,c]= "now, let r equal the number of rows and let c equal the number of columns for that smaller area."
  
  (r*c)="the number of tiles in the new designated small area."
  
  0="there are no columns to include in your designated small area."
  
  r*0="there are no tiles in your smaller area since every tile represents at least 1 column, so you have no tiles for your new designated small area"
  
  "For a special logical constant 0, and for all r, r*0=0"::: "For a situation where there are no columns, it doesn't matter how many rows you wish to designate for a new small area, this designated area will have no tiles in it."

(To anticipate: if you say basically that it and the math that comes from it "works", then that's a generic endorsement that I could similarly apply to any putatively a priori belief, and thus if that's the only kind of experiential justification you require, then I easily meet this requirement--no beliefs are a priori in this permissive sense.)

You can't use "it works" as justification that the knowledge is a priori knowledge. All you can say is that it is not known how that knowledge came to be conceived. However, I can demonstrate many instances where knowledge has been conceived on an empirical basis, but I ask you to show me a case where knowledge can come from non-empirical sources that have no possibility as being as a result of causal contact with the world (e.g., via natural selection). The fact that you believe such is possible is an IPU'ish belief. I might believe in things I cannot see (e.g., God), but I believe that knowledge only comes from causal interaction with the world. It is overwhelmingly obvious if you ask me. And, I can demonstrate many, many cases where causal interaction leads to knowledge. I don't see how you can believe in knowledge might be acquired in a non-causal interactive manner. It's completely inconsistent with the reasons for your atheism. You are basically saying that naturalism could fail in this instance. This inconsistency on your part, and your insistence to defend it is evidence that your epistemology is in no position to judge those who believe due to "faith."

Wow, you've experienced the real numbers? What was that like? Myself, my sensory perceptions are only fine-grained to a finite degree. You must be built special. What was pi like out at that trillionth digit, how did it feel or smell? Gee, I haven't even experienced the natural number sequence. I'm still working on it, but haven't yet got past 50-digit numbers.

You and I both experience the axioms of number theory. If we didn't, I doubt humans would have found such an early need for numbers.

That's another thing. Your belief in this platonic reality--that's through experience? What do the platonic reals taste / smell / feel / hear / look like? Or do you mean that you can infer the existence of the platonic reals from sense experience and inference rules? Because I'd be interested in what those inference rules taste / smell / feel / hear / look like, or how you otherwise got experiential knowledge of them.

Don't misinterpret what I'm saying. Causal contact doesn't mean you have to experience the inside of a blackhole to call our theories knowledge which describe such. All it means is that we cannot know about blackholes unless that knowledge of blackholes is causally implied by the things we do have causal contact with. However, if anyone says they believe in blackholes because of a priori knowledge, then I'd say that they lost a screw somewhere.

[harvey1]

Yo Spetey, here's a quick summary as to why a priori knowledge is a senseless concept (especially considering your materialist views):

1) Bob claims a priori knowledge about p.

2) Upon further evaluation there is indeed no way that Bob should possess p knowledge from any explainable means.

3) Bob claims that each night while sleeping (since he can remember) a little bit of p knowledge has accumulated up until today.

4) Receiving p while sleeping is therefore a perception of Bob. Therefore, Bob has an unexplainable "sixth sense" of perception to receive p.

5) Hence, Bob cannot claim p as a priori knowledge since p conforms to an empiricist account of knowledge (i.e., knowledge comes from perceptions, including a speculated "sixth sense").

If you want to think in evolutionary terms, just let "Bob" represent all hominids and let "sleeping" for "evolving via natural selective means." So, the act of receiving a priori knowledge is contrary to the premise of a priori knowledge as knowledge that exists without experience. The only way that I can conceive of a priori knowledge without experience as being feasible is if pre-existing souls exist as some kind of eternal state, and this pre-existence brought knowledge to the body. In that case, Bob can refer back to his knowledge prior to the experience of obtaining that knowledge. Is that really what you want to be agnostic about?

[spetey]

Because Spetey, there are principles involved. If the principle is that there are exceptions to what counts as justification to knowledge (e.g., a priori knowledge), then what standard justifies an exception?

Ah! Perhaps here is the confusion. To you "a prioiri knowledge" is just synonymous with "unjustified knowledge". I suppose this is because you are wedded to a certain specific empiricist epistemology. But nowhere did I say some beliefs are exempt from justification. In fact I explicitly deny belief-foundationalism. I think all beliefs must be justified. I'm just not positive that this justification must always refer ultimately to sense experience. I am agnostic about the very difficult question of whether some beliefs can be justified a priori.

So here is another way to put our current dialectical situation: I am agnostic about whether some beliefs can be justified without appeal to sense experience. You, on the other hand, have a very strong position on this question: you say there is no such thing as a priori justification. This is a very difficult and intricate question, and I have yet to see why you believe it so strongly.

More importantly, even if it's the case that there is no a priori justification, for the purposes of this thread you have to establish this much more difficult claim:

• If someone is merely agnostic about the existence of a priori justification, that person is therefore a dogmatist--someone committed to holding some beliefs without good reason.

These are two very tricky things you have to establish before you come close to proving that I am a dogmatist despite myself. Again I say:

I say we wait until I actually do violate this rule on an issue of interest to us, and then call me on it, okay? If you think I'm being dogmatic in my reasons for atheism somewhere, prove it when it comes to atheism. Let's talk about those things on this thread.

I simply cannot allow knowledge of the world that is not acquired from the world.

I agree--knowledge of the world should be acquired from the world. If you are using "knowledge of the world" just to mean "knowledge" again, then (a) I wish you wouldn't, it's confusing--usually "knowledge of the world" means specifically empirical knowledge; (b) you have yet to show that all knowledge must have a posteriori justification.

0="there are no columns to include in your designated small area."

What designated small area? I don't see a small area of size zero. Wait, give me that microscope. Nope, I still don't see anything of size zero. So I still wonder why I should believe that axiom (x)(x*0=0) according to sense experience.

I might believe in things I cannot see (e.g., God), but I believe that knowledge only comes from causal interaction with the world. It is overwhelmingly obvious if you ask me.

I know you see it as "overwhelmingly obvious" that there is no a priori justification. But Plato and Descartes and Leibniz and ... and Peacocke and BonJour and tons of other extremely smart philosophers throughout the ages have not found it so obvious. So perhaps you can explain it to them (and me). Remember, we are committed to giving reasons for our controversial claims, instead of saying "it's obvious". If you can show it's obvious that there is no a priori justification, you should consider getting it published, because it would revolutionize epistemology.

You are basically saying that naturalism could fail in this instance.

Some do seem to claim that a priori justification would contradict naturalism, like Hilary Kornblith I think. Others like Georges Rey think that they are compatible. It's an interesting question, and I'd be curious to hear why you think they are in tension. (Of course not a lot hangs on it for me, since I'm not committed to a priori beliefs.)

This inconsistency on your part, and your insistence to defend it is evidence that your epistemology is in no position to judge those who believe due to "faith."

It's my extended willingness to defend my agnosticism with respect to this topic, despite its irrelevance to anything we really came here to discuss, that I think demonstrates that I am committed to giving reasons for any controversial claim, and therefore am not a dogmatist. On the other hand your repeated insistence on a claim you find "obvious" still strikes me as dogmatic.

You and I both experience the axioms of number theory. If we didn't, I doubt humans would have found such an early need for numbers.

Oh, so if we believe it, and have believed it for a while, like the axioms of math, then you can therefore conclude it has "experiential" justification? (Even, say, the Euclidean axioms we now know to be false of our world?) If so then I'm not worried about this sense of "experiential" conflicts with my view. I wanted to hear how you experienced the real numbers. What was that limsup axiom like?

That's another thing. Your belief in this platonic reality--that's through experience? What do the platonic reals taste / smell / feel / hear / look like? Or do you mean that you can infer the existence of the platonic reals from sense experience and inference rules? Because I'd be interested in what those inference rules taste / smell / feel / hear / look like, or how you otherwise got experiential knowledge of them.

Don't misinterpret what I'm saying. Causal contact doesn't mean you have to experience the inside of a blackhole to call our theories knowledge which describe such. All it means is that we cannot know about blackholes unless that knowledge of blackholes is causally implied by the things we do have causal contact with.

I know. That's why I asked, in the nested quotation above, what your experiential justification for those inference rules are. Somehow you get from sensory beliefs to all your other beliefs. You presumably have inference rules for these. What is the experiential justification for those? (Those, note, are just the kind of thing people often claim are a priori--laws of logic and such.)

However, if anyone says they believe in blackholes because of a priori knowledge, then I'd say that they lost a screw somewhere.

Me too. That's not at all a plausible example of a priori knowledge. But 2+2=4 is, for example.

So in summary, I need to hear a lot more about why you are so confident that there is no a priori justification, and why mere agnosticism with respect to this issue implies dogmatism.


spetey

[harvey1]

To you "a prioiri knowledge" is just synonymous with "unjustified knowledge".

No, not synonymous. It just happens to be unjustified. It could, for starters, be in principle justifiable if you can show me an instance how you can defeat the argument I gave in my last post on this thread. Of course, I still need to see more evidence that show that it didn't come by empirical means.

In fact I explicitly deny belief-foundationalism. I think all beliefs must be justified. I'm just not positive that this justification must always refer ultimately to sense experience. I am agnostic about the very difficult question of whether some beliefs can be justified a priori.

That's fine. So, why don't you say that a belief in a priori beliefs is not justified until the adherents can convincingly show that a) they exist, and b) justification must not always refer ultimately to sense experience?

You, on the other hand, have a very strong position on this question: you say there is no such thing as a priori justification. This is a very difficult and intricate question, and I have yet to see why you believe it so strongly.

Good pragmatists who believe knowledge is a result of experience should be inclined to reject a priori ridiculousness. Besides, if you can provide better evidence that a priori beliefs exist and that they are about the world, then I'd be happy to be agnostic about them. What ever happened to your "I need a reason, bit?" You see, Spetey, this is why I am suspicious of the rigmarole that you put theism through. When it comes to other philosophical beliefs, you are more than happy to remain agnostic about those beliefs! In some cases, you show little in the way of any skepticism with respect to philosophical beliefs. It seems you freeze up the moment the word "theism" has been spoken. You are discriminating against theism. Do you see why theists often suspect atheists of having deeply personal resentments that fuel their disbelief?

More importantly, even if it's the case that there is no a priori justification, for the purposes of this thread you have to establish this much more difficult claim: If someone is merely agnostic about the existence of a priori justification, that person is therefore a dogmatist--someone committed to holding some beliefs without good reason.

Again, if I made a statement that you were a dogmatist, then I apologize. I meant to always say that your agnosticism of a priori beliefs leave the door open for dogmatists to claim any belief as a priori, even beliefs that support dogmaticism

These are two very tricky things...

I only counted one.

Again I say: "I say we wait until I actually do violate this rule on an issue of interest to us, and then call me on it, okay? If you think I'm being dogmatic in my reasons for atheism somewhere, prove it when it comes to atheism."

What you are basically asking me to do is the following:

• Pretend that your views do not allow arguments solely established on "faith" to be potentially established
• Pretend that the "faith" beliefs you approve of are significantly different than the "faith" beliefs which you don't approve of
• Pretend that "we" (meaning you?) decide which "faith" beliefs need further justification from those that can be potentially accepted as "faith" beliefs

The last one especially strikes me as unreasonable since we should carry on at another thread where I should defend my reasons for a belief, whereas you've already appointed someone (you?) as the judge and jury. That seems out of touch and out of sync with this thread.

I agree--knowledge of the world should be acquired from the world. If you are using "knowledge of the world" just to mean "knowledge" again, then (a) I wish you wouldn't, it's confusing--usually "knowledge of the world" means specifically empirical knowledge; (b) you have yet to show that all knowledge must have a posteriori justification.

Since when must I argue against someone who can't prove there is other knowledge other than empirical? If you want me to argue that there is empirical knowledge, then I'll be glad to do so. However, if you want me to be agnostic of other types of knowledge that aren't causally rooted in our interaction with the world, then show me that such knowledge is even a sensible notion, and at least make it somewhat reasonable. At this point, I don't see it as reasonable at all. The fact that you are agnostic about this issue (where it isn't even sensible to consider), while you are atheist about theism (where it is very reasonable to believe), just shows a tremendous inconsistency on your part.

0="there are no columns to include in your designated small area."

What designated small area? I don't see a small area of size zero. Wait, give me that microscope. Nope, I still don't see anything of size zero. So I still wonder why I should believe that axiom (x)(x*0=0) according to sense experience.

If you wish to make this exercise easier to perform, you can mark the grout the color blue for those rows where tiles should be counted, and you can mark the color purple for those columns where tiles should be counted. If all you have is blue grout, then it doesn't matter how many rows you wish to count, you haven't marked for a column to be included (by marking the grout with purple), so you can't even count one column's worth of tiles. Even if you mark the grout blue for 1000 rows of tiles, if you haven't marked the grout purple for one column of tiles, you still should have a zero count of tiles. That axiom is trivially true, obviously, but it all stems from our experience.

In addition, you are being inconsistent again, Spetey. In another post in the Philosophy sub-forum today, you said maybe you are a nominalist. If you think x*0 is referring to a universal (i.e., some platonic structure) and not a particular, then you are hardly a nominalist. Even though I'm a platonist, I still believe those simple axioms can easily reference a particular. That would be an absurd position to hold if one were to reject it.

I know you see it as "overwhelmingly obvious" that there is no a priori justification. But Plato and Descartes and Leibniz and ... and Peacocke and BonJour and tons of other extremely smart philosophers throughout the ages have not found it so obvious. So perhaps you can explain it to them (and me). Remember, we are committed to giving reasons for our controversial claims, instead of saying "it's obvious". If you can show it's obvious that there is no a priori justification, you should consider getting it published, because it would revolutionize epistemology.

You crack me up. Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz were theists. Do you accept their beliefs on theism as reasonable too? I don't know about Peacocke and BonJour, but Plantinga is a pretty good philosopher who is a theist, is he being reasonable in his theist beliefs?

For me it's evident, from the lack of evidence and clear lack of conception, that a priori beliefs are some of the most ridiculous beliefs that linger from pre-evolutionary days. You can't blame Kant because he came before Darwin. But, if someone is going to argue a priorism and not be referring to knowledge that is of biological origin, then they better give pretty strong supporting reasons why they think such knowledge was not acquired by evolutionary processes. I've read BonJour, and his arguments are not convincing.

Some do seem to claim that a priori justification would contradict naturalism, like Hilary Kornblith I think. Others like Georges Rey think that they are compatible. It's an interesting question, and I'd be curious to hear why you think they are in tension. (Of course not a lot hangs on it for me, since I'm not committed to a priori beliefs.)

I would recommend that you take another look at my five-point argument. It gave a rough (rough) draft why you cannot have a priori knowledge unless you are thinking in supernatural terms. Even the idea of knowledge being inside the biological brain suggests that it got there biologically. If knowledge comes to reside in the brain from a source other than experiences, how would you suggest that happens from a biological perspective?

Now, maybe I'm wrong and pre-existing eternal souls do bring knowledge with them into the body that was never a result of any experience, but that seems very hocus pocus to me. I'm not a metaphysical naturalist by any means, but I do think that our interaction with eternal stuff happens by our interaction with the world and not by soul migration.

It's my extended willingness to defend my agnosticism with respect to this topic, despite its irrelevance to anything we really came here to discuss, that I think demonstrates that I am committed to giving reasons for any controversial claim, and therefore am not a dogmatist. On the other hand your repeated insistence on a claim you find "obvious" still strikes me as dogmatic.

That's funny. I'm dogmatic because I say that a concept makes no sense (because it doesn't), there isn't a shread of evidence (because there isn't), and that makes me dogmatic? Isn't that what dogmatists (not you, though!) say when they want reasons why you are rejecting their dogmatic beliefs?

Oh, so if we believe it, and have believed it for a while, like the axioms of math, then you can therefore conclude it has "experiential" justification? (Even, say, the Euclidean axioms we now know to be false of our world?) If so then I'm not worried about this sense of "experiential" conflicts with my view. I wanted to hear how you experienced the real numbers. What was that limsup axiom like?

This conversation is cracking me up. It's as if we somehow changed sides in some alternate universe.

Well to answer your question, the fact that we experience an axiom and state that axiom, doesn't mean that the axiom is true in the widest sense of the world. It just means that we in fact do experience that axiom in our approximately flat spacetime geometry as it appears to us rather far away from the massive gravitational effects seen elsewhere in the universe.

And, as far as what we consider reasonable, sure, we can be agnostic on every possible belief since we need to be fallibilistic with respect to our experiences, however that is really not necessary. We can eliminate the ridiculous (e.g., we are in the Matrix) and spend our time more fruitfully by doubting only those things that we really are not so sure about (e.g., string theory, quantum loop theory, etc.) and not spend that time debating the ridiculous (e.g., whether or not knowledge is acquired magically).

Don't misinterpret what I'm saying. Causal contact doesn't mean you have to experience the inside of a blackhole to call our theories knowledge which describe such. All it means is that we cannot know about blackholes unless that knowledge of blackholes is causally implied by the things we do have causal contact with.

I know. That's why I asked, in the nested quotation above, what your experiential justification for those inference rules are. Somehow you get from sensory beliefs to all your other beliefs. You presumably have inference rules for these. What is the experiential justification for those? (Those, note, are just the kind of thing people often claim are a priori--laws of logic and such.)

Well, you see Spetey, that's the job of some new branch of paleo studies (one early attempt at such an approach is a site I found in my internet search that calls it paleo-bio-socio-psychology or paleopsychology or, perhaps a better term, paleoethology), as they try to understand and decipher how intelligence evolved and why we have the inference rules that we do. Do you really think such potential future field of paleo studies should be looking for the birth of "a priori" knowledge?

However, if anyone says they believe in blackholes because of a priori knowledge, then I'd say that they lost a screw somewhere.

Me too. That's not at all a plausible example of a priori knowledge. But 2+2=4 is, for example.

Well, you're going to be a busy guy when the world starts calling you to decipher what is appropriately labelled a priori and what is labelled as empirically acquired knowledge. I hope you include theism in the a priori knowledge. Maybe even Kant would instructed you to do so.

[harvey1]

Oh, so if we believe it, and have believed it for a while, like the axioms of math, then you can therefore conclude it has "experiential" justification? (Even, say, the Euclidean axioms we now know to be false of our world?) If so then I'm not worried about this sense of "experiential" conflicts with my view. I wanted to hear how you experienced the real numbers. What was that limsup axiom like?

I realized that I skipped a response to this issue by accident. Again, if you approach it nominalistically, then you need to reconstruct mathematics in a nominalistic language and then it becomes clear that we do experience reals as everyday objects. This work has already been done, so fortunately I don't have to bore you with tiles with grout marked in blue and purple. See, for example, the foundational work on measurements by Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971), or Hartry Field (1980) who constructed "science without numbers" (he really didn't succeed at that project (see Malament (1982) for his reply to Field's seminal work), but he succeeded enough to say that there's no reason to accept any a priori knowledge with respect to mathematics, at least knowledge which isn't due to evolutionary experiences). Another good reference to real numbers constructed nominalistically is Mark Balaguer's recent book Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, 1998 (p.114-117) [there is an excellent example of how real numbers are constructed for boat lengths]. What looks like talk of the complex and abstract just becomes talk of the mundane and everyday. I think we should all agree that nominalists have at least succeeded up to this point with regard to the basic starting point (e.g., axioms, rules of inference, definitions, etc.) of mathematical abstraction.