The "Supernatural": Burden of Proof?

[boatsnguitars]

Question:
Why should the burden of proof be placed on Supernaturalists (those who believe in the supernatural) to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural, rather than on Materialists to disprove it, as in "Materialists have to explain why the supernatural can't be the explanation"?

Argument:

Placing the burden of proof on Supernaturalists to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural is a logical and epistemologically sound approach. This perspective aligns with the principles of evidence-based reasoning, the scientific method, and critical thinking. Several key reasons support this stance.

Default Position of Skepticism: In debates about the supernatural, it is rational to start from a position of skepticism. This is in line with the philosophical principle of "nullius in verba" (take nobody's word for it) and the scientific principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, the burden of proof should fall on those making the extraordinary claim of the existence of the supernatural.

Presumption of Naturalism: Throughout the history of scientific inquiry, the default assumption has been naturalism. Naturalism posits that the universe and its phenomena can be explained by natural laws and processes without invoking supernatural entities or forces. This presumption is based on the consistent success of naturalistic explanations in understanding the world around us. After all, since both the Naturalist and Supernaturalist believe the Natural exists, we only need to establish the existence of the Supernatural (or, whatever someone decides to posit beyond the Natural.)

Absence of Empirical Evidence: The supernatural, by its very nature, is often described as beyond the realm of empirical observation and measurement. Claims related to the supernatural, such as deities, spirits, or paranormal phenomena, typically lack concrete, testable evidence. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those advocating for the supernatural to provide compelling and verifiable evidence to support their claims.

Problem of Unfalsifiability: Many supernatural claims are unfalsifiable: they cannot be tested or disproven. This raises significant epistemological challenges. Demanding that Materialists disprove unfalsifiable supernatural claims places an unreasonable burden on them. Instead, it is more reasonable to require Supernaturalists to provide testable claims and evidence.

In conclusion, the burden of proof should rest on Supernaturalists to provide convincing and verifiable evidence for the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural. This approach respects the principles of skepticism, scientific inquiry, and parsimonious reasoning, ultimately fostering a more rational and evidence-based discussion of the supernatural in the context of understanding our world and its mysteries.

If they can't provide evidence of the supernatural, then there is no reason for Naturalists to take their claims seriously: Any of their claims that include the supernatural. That includes all religious claims that involve supernatural claims.

I challenge Supernaturalists to defend the single most important aspect at the core of their belief. We all know they can't (they would have by now), but the burden is on them, and it's high time they at least give an honest effort.

Please note: Arguments from Ignorance will be summarily dismissed.

[The Tanager]

Okay then, in that scenario, how would we know they existed? I've been asking for a scenario where something is both ubiquitous (and accepted as a known phenomenon) and supernatural. Something verifiably exists, but is not natural.

What do you mean by “verifiably exists”? What are all the ways you accept that existence can be “verified” by?

But it tells us nothing about any other supernatural beings or phenomena. In other words, it doesn't help us understand what supernatural looks like.

Why does it need to tell us about other supernatural beings or phenomena? The question of this thread is about if there is something that is rightly called supernatural, not an exhaustive description of supernatural beings that exist.

It just defines one particular thing as supernatural because it draws a rather arbitrary circle around what is called natural and defines that which is outside of it as supernatural.

How is the circle arbitrary? It’s logically necessary. We have a positive definition of natural. ‘Supernatural’ logically works off of that definition, so there is nothing arbitrary about it. It seems like you are still faulting it for not being a positive definition, but we shouldn’t expect negative definitions to act like positive definitions or meet that standard…or they’d be positive definitions.

If God is the only supernatural being then there's no reason to categorise it as supernatural. Its category is "things that are god" and the positive attributes you mention are attributes of that category. The only reason we'd have an extra category to describe the same thing, is if there are other potential members of that category, and the only way we'd know or even conceptualise that, is if that category has attributes that might place other things into that category. And since I can't get you to even imagine a ghost being both accepted to be real and supernatural, I don't think that's happening.

There are other beings within the category. You can, conceivably, have a supernatural being that is enormously powerful and one that has no causal power. For instance, if one thought numbers were real things but not natural things (I don’t think that, just an example). Numbers do not have causal powers. So, they’d be supernatural and distinct from God. Supernatural ghosts (those who used to be natural beings, say) would not be eternal, in contrast to the ultimate cause of the universe, which is eternal. That’s a clear distinction.

[Diogenes]

I'm fine if that's what we get wrong. If there happen to be ghosts and our story gets them wrong, that's understandable. If we can't even conceptualise them being supernatural, then we don't know what something supernatural would look like.

We can conceptualize them as being supernatural; I was just saying I don’t know of an argument that they are necessarily supernatural. If ghosts have no matter/energy/natural property to them, then they are supernatural. Why isn’t that conceptualizable?

Okay then, in that scenario, how would we know they existed? I've been asking for a scenario where something is both ubiquitous (and accepted as a known phenomenon) and supernatural. Something verifiably exists, but is not natural.

It's a definition for that argument then. That's all it is. It has no parity with anyone's beliefs who believes in the supernatural. In your definition, you can believe in the supernatural but you don't know what you're believing in, you just know what you're believing in, isn't. It's not a whole lot different than saying I think there are aliens in the Vega system. I don't know anything about what I think is there and for all you know I'm counting dust particles with weird movements, but hey, they're not human.

If one stopped at the definition, sure. But I don't. For instance, the Kalam, if true, tells us positive things about at least one supernatural being’s characteristics.

But it tells us nothing about any other supernatural beings or phenomena. In other words, it doesn't help us understand what supernatural looks like. It just defines one particular thing as supernatural because it draws a rather arbitrary circle around what is called natural and defines that which is outside of it as supernatural.

If God is the only supernatural being then there's no reason to categorise it as supernatural. Its category is "things that are god" and the positive attributes you mention are attributes of that category. The only reason we'd have an extra category to describe the same thing, is if there are other potential members of that category, and the only way we'd know or even conceptualise that, is if that category has attributes that might place other things into that category. And since I can't get you to even imagine a ghost being both accepted to be real and supernatural, I don't think that's happening.

Good points PM!

Tanager's arguments are basically a 'special pleading.' Each tribal 'god' is special to the members of its tribe. The First Cause argument, whether dressed up in new Emperor's Clothes as 'Kalam' or not, remains the silliest of arguments for a God. The 'first cause' would not even have to be a god, a theistic being. It could be existence itself, or a non personal force. Where it really goes wrong is at its inception where arbitrarily decides this first cause must have a personality, a sense of self awareness; that it must be not only a personal god, but the god of one's own particular tradition. That this fallacy is not immediately apparent to everyone is astonishing . . . or would be if we didn't already have great experience with farce being taken seriously by humankind.

Then there is The Great Equivocation, the use of 'supernatural' in the sense that if such a category exists, it is not supernatural at all, but simply part of a nature we do not fully understand.

[Purple Knight]

Okay then, in that scenario, how would we know they existed? I've been asking for a scenario where something is both ubiquitous (and accepted as a known phenomenon) and supernatural. Something verifiably exists, but is not natural.

What do you mean by “verifiably exists”? What are all the ways you accept that existence can be “verified” by?

I can't possibly list all of them. Some examples are video recordings, large numbers of witnesses independently telling the same stories, and evidence that can't be explained any other way. Can you imagine a way something supernatural could be verified, not by argument, but out in real life, by real observation and testing? If not, and if we can't have a way for anything supernatural to be verified, the only way for anything supernatural to definitely exist is to be defined into existence by an argument.

But it tells us nothing about any other supernatural beings or phenomena. In other words, it doesn't help us understand what supernatural looks like.

Why does it need to tell us about other supernatural beings or phenomena? The question of this thread is about if there is something that is rightly called supernatural, not an exhaustive description of supernatural beings that exist.

It just defines one particular thing as supernatural because it draws a rather arbitrary circle around what is called natural and defines that which is outside of it as supernatural.

How is the circle arbitrary? It’s logically necessary. We have a positive definition of natural. ‘Supernatural’ logically works off of that definition, so there is nothing arbitrary about it. It seems like you are still faulting it for not being a positive definition, but we shouldn’t expect negative definitions to act like positive definitions or meet that standard…or they’d be positive definitions.

I'm not faulting the definition for being negative. Maybe a better word is "non-natural" though.

I'm faulting the definition for only describing one thing which the Kalam cosmological argument defines as supernatural.

The idea of a negative definition is fine, but it must be a useful subdivision.

There are other beings within the category. You can, conceivably, have a supernatural being that is enormously powerful and one that has no causal power. For instance, if one thought numbers were real things but not natural things (I don’t think that, just an example). Numbers do not have causal powers. So, they’d be supernatural and distinct from God. Supernatural ghosts (those who used to be natural beings, say) would not be eternal, in contrast to the ultimate cause of the universe, which is eternal. That’s a clear distinction.

Well numbers are purely stipulative, like moral rules. They don't exactly exist. And they do follow logical rules, so I can see how numbers could potentially be in this category. But I still think numbers are hardly supernatural by any common definition and would only potentially be supernatural by the definition the Kalam uses. This is not a common understanding of supernatural. It is a very specific definition tailored to define one specific being (the first cause) into being supernatural. If you said numbers, because they don't exactly exist, are non-natural, you might get some agreement. But if you had lists with things like apples, fish, toys, ghosts, psychic powers, numbers, rotary phones, and asked people to pick supernatural things off that list, the only people picking numbers would be those familiar with the Kalam cosmological argument and its definition of supernatural.

[The Tanager]

I can't possibly list all of them. Some examples are video recordings, large numbers of witnesses independently telling the same stories, and evidence that can't be explained any other way. Can you imagine a way something supernatural could be verified, not by argument, but out in real life, by real observation and testing? If not, and if we can't have a way for anything supernatural to be verified, the only way for anything supernatural to definitely exist is to be defined into existence by an argument.

I meant ‘all’ in a general sense like scientifically, historically, philosophically, etc. Okay, why do you think truth must be gained through “real observation and testing”? What “real observation and testing” makes that statement true?

I'm not faulting the definition for being negative. Maybe a better word is "non-natural" though.

I'm faulting the definition for only describing one thing which the Kalam cosmological argument defines as supernatural.

What do you mean only describing one thing? The definition doesn’t talk about any number; it doesn’t say whether there are 0, 1, or many things that are non-natural.

And how does the Kalam change the definition? It uses the definition, but doesn’t change it. It points to (at least) one thing that exists in the category that the definition speaks to.

Well numbers are purely stipulative, like moral rules. They don't exactly exist. And they do follow logical rules, so I can see how numbers could potentially be in this category.

I don’t think numbers exist either. I wouldn’t include them in the supernatural category, but I’m aware that they would be put there by some Platonists. If there is a better definition for supernatural, that you think the Kalam should use, then offer it.

But I still think numbers are hardly supernatural by any common definition and would only potentially be supernatural by the definition the Kalam uses. This is not a common understanding of supernatural. It is a very specific definition tailored to define one specific being (the first cause) into being supernatural.

What do you feel the common definition of supernatural is? I am not trying to tailor a definition for its use in the Kalam. I think they are separate questions. I come to them separately.

[William]

Natural can be defined as all that exists, so if ghosts or numbers or minds et al do actually exist, then they are rightly thought of /defined as natural.

Even that current science cannot show if minds are the conseqence of a god breathing life into lifeless, both life and lifeless are natural.

The differentiation is unnecessary. It is like saying that the outside of a clock is "natural" while its inner workings are not.

Even refferring to a clock (any man-made machine) as "non-natural" is a blind stab since it fails to account for the very natural process which such machinery derives.

The whole theory (and any theory based in supernaturalism) is twisting truth in order to try and fit it into the lie which claims "God and other things" are "unnatural".

Once those who repect truth come to this realization, they stop supporting false teaching/philosophical concepts.

The truth sets their minds free from the false. They understand how the truth sets them free.

[alexxcJRO]

I am not trying to distort what you said. It appeared you were arguing against all religious claims because of these claims you reject. You should reject each of them on their own merit. The same goes with scientific hypotheses.

Sir I have analyzed all known general religion hypotheses before becoming an atheist.
I have become an atheist because there are all clearly debunked by reality and our current knowledge.
Also if one studies them all a common pattern emerges.

I reject it because its using the same faulty logic and same mechanism which I have shown.
One cannot ignore a continuous pattern of using ignorance to conjure gods.

Here is a quote from Augustine on the days of creation from his City of God: “What kind of days these are is difficult or even impossible for us to imagine, to say nothing of describing them.” He wrote at least 5 commentaries on Genesis, struggling with various interpretations he was aware of (literal and non-literal). Anselm is known for his allegorical interpretations of many passages. There has been a variety of interpretation throughout history.

Sir I am talking of the story of Adam and Eve story(original sin), Noah story, Samson Story, Joshua story, Moses and Exodus story.
Provide evidence that the above stories were viewed as not literal in the ancient times or the middles ages.

So, when a religious claim like the Kalam comes up, you’ve got to deal with that instead of saying something like “but these other religious claims have failed, so we can be confident this one will as well without doing the work of reasoning it out.”
Why do you think the Kalam does this? Show it in the argument. The reason the Kalam gets us to a God is through logical reasoning about what the characteristics of the cause of the spatio-temporal universe must be. This is by extending beyond the first 3 premises. It pivots on arguments that the cause of the spatio-temporal universe must be personal. Are you aware of the arguments and reject them or do you agree the cause being personal is a major piece of why one might rightly call the cause a god but are simply unaware of those arguments given?

Again
"Form of the argument
The most prominent form of the argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, states the Kalam cosmological argument as the following syllogism:[4]

Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Given the conclusion, Craig appends a further premise and conclusion based upon a philosophical analysis of the properties of the cause of the universe:[5]

If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans (without) the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.

Referring to the implications of Classical Theism that follow from this argument, Craig writes:[6]"

The second part is the part I talk about.

Ancient religious people:
If the thunder, sun has a cause, then Thor, Ra.
Wrong!
It's possible some other causes(natural) are responsible for thunder, sun.

Current religious people:
If the universe has a cause, then personal Creator: Yahweh.
Wrong!
It's possible some other cause(natural) is responsible for the expansion of the universe.

Same faulty mechanism. Same thing.

I believe it is wrong, but the question is how we can justify it is objectively wrong and not just our opinion akin to how we like one flavor of ice cream and not another. Why do you think it is wrong to kill those who don’t have the mental capacity to even be aware of differing views of right and wrong?

It's logical analysis ultimatelly based on the logical absolutes.
You need to be able to differenciate between right and wrong to be a moral agent. And therefore have any moral accountability.
Like it is with free will. One needs free will to be a moral agent.
One cannot punish a being that does not have the free will in an instance X to not do the wrong thing Y.

What’s important is why we believe what we do. Yes, you can quote people who agree with you, but respected scholars in the field disagree over this. So prove your view is the objectively correct one.
It is also evidence for their disposition towards psychopathy coupled with environmental and other factors influencing them, but not determining them. This is hotly debated among scholars in the field, yet you are using it as though your view is the clear consensus.

Dear sir you are conflating sociopathy with psychopathy. Sociopathy is more linked to environmental influences(->epigenetics) and psychopathy is more linked to genetics.
Psychopathy is heritable, children with psychopathy have some differences in their limbic system->the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior thalamic nuclei and limbic cortex which is used in emotion, behaviour, long-term memory process. This develops differently from other children, this brain region is smaller, less active than in other children.
Several genes are linked to psychopathy, including ANKK1, DRD2, MAOA, COMT, and 5-HTTLPR.

[Purple Knight]

I can't possibly list all of them. Some examples are video recordings, large numbers of witnesses independently telling the same stories, and evidence that can't be explained any other way. Can you imagine a way something supernatural could be verified, not by argument, but out in real life, by real observation and testing? If not, and if we can't have a way for anything supernatural to be verified, the only way for anything supernatural to definitely exist is to be defined into existence by an argument.

I meant ‘all’ in a general sense like scientifically, historically, philosophically, etc. Okay, why do you think truth must be gained through “real observation and testing”? What “real observation and testing” makes that statement true?

I don't think that, and I actually respect spiritual truth as a real form of truth. If you insert the word shared before truth, then I agree, observation, testing, and replicability are necessary. And the reason is, without observations which I can also see, tests which I can also do, and experiments which I can replicate, I'm just trusting somebody and I don't have to do that.

I can trust if I want to, but there's no obligation. The obligation where real testing is concerned, comes from a need to make our way through the world together, and science is a good way to do that. Religion is also a good way to do that, but at its core it is more rigid. What happens if I say memories aren't stored in the brain? Well, hopefully (but this is not so much true anymore) fellow creatures of science will invite me to try and prove it. But what happens if I say the Old Testament God is still himself, still the god of Jews only, and incarnated himself into a man so he could baldfaced lie to gentiles? There's not a lot of room to test that, and if it's not your truth, then it's just not and the discussion ends there.

Same if ghosts exist. Ghosts don't exist in the Christian canon, so to you, they just don't, and for a hypothetical framework in which they did exist, it would require them to be observed and tested. Or, at least observed.

I'm not faulting the definition for being negative. Maybe a better word is "non-natural" though.

I'm faulting the definition for only describing one thing which the Kalam cosmological argument defines as supernatural.

What do you mean only describing one thing? The definition doesn’t talk about any number; it doesn’t say whether there are 0, 1, or many things that are non-natural.

And how does the Kalam change the definition? It uses the definition, but doesn’t change it. It points to (at least) one thing that exists in the category that the definition speaks to.

The Kalam isn't changing a definition. It is using a very unusual (as far as usage goes) definition of supernatural. The flaw is that it's very definitional. In other words, whatever started up the universe is supernatural but everything that started is natural because that's how we've defined Nature - as everything that started up.

If God reaches in here and lights a bush on fire, that's supernatural (I guess; maybe it's natural since it's occurring inside Nature) but if I do so with pyrokinesis, it's entirely natural because I am part of the universe God started and I'm defined in a way that means anything I do is natural, no matter what it is. And by the same token, if God rolls a ball down a hill, that's probably supernatural.

The definition doesn't even let us observe clearly extraordinary phenomena and say they're supernatural. It's all about who's doing the phenomenon, and whether they are the First Cause or not, because the first cause is simply defined to be outside Nature. It also doesn't let us observe mundane phenomena and say they are natural. Maybe nothing is natural, since God has a hand in all of it. Definitions must be useful and clear.

Well numbers are purely stipulative, like moral rules. They don't exactly exist. And they do follow logical rules, so I can see how numbers could potentially be in this category.

I don’t think numbers exist either. I wouldn’t include them in the supernatural category, but I’m aware that they would be put there by some Platonists. If there is a better definition for supernatural, that you think the Kalam should use, then offer it.

It would have to be fair to people who believe in the supernatural and not define them into correctitude, nor define their decriers into being incorrect. The best I can come up with is a phenomenon explained by no known natural law. It splits supernatural believers and doubters plainly between those who think we know every relevant, phenomenon-producing natural law, and those who think we do not.

[The Tanager]

Sir I am talking of the story of Adam and Eve story(original sin), Noah story, Samson Story, Joshua story, Moses and Exodus story.
Provide evidence that the above stories were viewed as not literal in the ancient times or the middles ages.

I’m not claiming all of those were interpreted as non-literal. I was specifically talking about the beginning chapters of Genesis. Concerning Adam and Eve, for instance, Origen says it’s obvious that God didn’t actually plant a tree of life in Eden, among other things in De Principiis 4.1.16.

Ancient religious people:
If the thunder, sun has a cause, then Thor, Ra.
Wrong!
It's possible some other causes(natural) are responsible for thunder, sun.

Current religious people:
If the universe has a cause, then personal Creator: Yahweh.
Wrong!
It's possible some other cause(natural) is responsible for the expansion of the universe.

We don't just say if there is a cause, it must be God. There are actual arguments (as an extension to the Kalam proper, but coming directly out of it) given as to why it is a personal creator. That’s what I’m asking you about. Are you aware of the arguments theists use to point to the cause being personal? There are at least three arguments for the cause being personal. If you are aware of them, why do you reject those 3 arguments?

It's logical analysis ultimatelly based on the logical absolutes.
You need to be able to differenciate between right and wrong to be a moral agent. And therefore have any moral accountability.
Like it is with free will. One needs free will to be a moral agent.
One cannot punish a being that does not have the free will in an instance X to not do the wrong thing Y.

Why can’t one punish a being that does not have the free will in an instance X to not do the wrong thing Y?

Let's say Pete, who has all the mental capacities and free will you and I have, disagrees and says it is morally right to punish a being that doesn't have free will in instance X because it serves his interests and ethical egoism is the guiding principle of objective morality. Why is Pete wrong?

Dear sir you are conflating sociopathy with psychopathy. Sociopathy is more linked to environmental influences(->epigenetics) and psychopathy is more linked to genetics.

No, I’m not. You claimed psychopathics were born that way and anyone can do a quick search and see that scholars disagree on whether it is determined by genetics or a mix of genetics and environment.

[The Tanager]

I don't think that, and I actually respect spiritual truth as a real form of truth. If you insert the word shared before truth, then I agree, observation, testing, and replicability are necessary. And the reason is, without observations which I can also see, tests which I can also do, and experiments which I can replicate, I'm just trusting somebody and I don't have to do that.

But you can replicate logical arguments (built off of observations or other truths). Logic alone would be defining the supernatural into existence, but that isn’t what something like the Kalam does. It works off of observations and logic to go beyond those observations.

Same if ghosts exist. Ghosts don't exist in the Christian canon, so to you, they just don't, and for a hypothetical framework in which they did exist, it would require them to be observed and tested. Or, at least observed.

I don’t think Christian canon addresses that question one way or the other. I’m skeptically agnostic about the existence of ghosts.

The Kalam isn't changing a definition. It is using a very unusual (as far as usage goes) definition of supernatural. The flaw is that it's very definitional. In other words, whatever started up the universe is supernatural but everything that started is natural because that's how we've defined Nature - as everything that started up.

That’s not true at all. That is not the Kalam’s definition of ‘natural’. The Kalam starts with the typical definition of natural, then argues for that stuff to have started without saying anything about if other non-natural stuff started up or not.

If God reaches in here and lights a bush on fire, that's supernatural (I guess; maybe it's natural since it's occurring inside Nature) but if I do so with pyrokinesis, it's entirely natural because I am part of the universe God started and I'm defined in a way that means anything I do is natural, no matter what it is. And by the same token, if God rolls a ball down a hill, that's probably supernatural.

But Christianity teaches that you aren’t solely natural; you have a soul that is non-natural. Christianity speaks of that the natural and supernatural interact daily. The supernatural can have natural effects. And the natural can affect the supernatural, at least in our case.

The definition doesn't even let us observe clearly extraordinary phenomena and say they're supernatural. It's all about who's doing the phenomenon, and whether they are the First Cause or not, because the first cause is simply defined to be outside Nature. It also doesn't let us observe mundane phenomena and say they are natural. Maybe nothing is natural, since God has a hand in all of it. Definitions must be useful and clear.

No, the nature of the phenomenon is not just about who’s doing it. And the first cause isn’t defined to be outside of nature, but rationally concluded to be outside of nature via arguments. These definitions absolutely let us observe mundane phenomena and say they are natural. The hand of the supernatural doesn’t mean nothing is natural.

It would have to be fair to people who believe in the supernatural and not define them into correctitude, nor define their decriers into being incorrect. The best I can come up with is a phenomenon explained by no known natural law. It splits supernatural believers and doubters plainly between those who think we know every relevant, phenomenon-producing natural law, and those who think we do not.

I don’t see how the definition of ‘non-natural’ defines either side as correct or incorrect. It’s a neutral definition. Your definition confuses epistemology with ontology. ‘Supernatural’ and ‘natural’ are ontological terms. By your definition, once we find a new natural law, something would go from being ontologically ‘supernatural’ to ontologically ‘natural’ not because it ontologically changed, but because our knowledge of it changed. We shouldn’t define X by our knowledge concerning X in that sense.

[Purple Knight]

That’s not true at all. That is not the Kalam’s definition of ‘natural’. The Kalam starts with the typical definition of natural, then argues for that stuff to have started without saying anything about if other non-natural stuff started up or not.

But Christianity teaches that you aren’t solely natural; you have a soul that is non-natural. Christianity speaks of that the natural and supernatural interact daily. The supernatural can have natural effects. And the natural can affect the supernatural, at least in our case.

This ruins the argument. If we (inside Nature) have souls that are supernatural, then the universe needs no specific, unified, vastly singularly powerful first cause. We each have a potential cause within us that needs no cause because it is supernatural. Even accepting every premise of the Kalam totally, that which is natural must begin to exist, but that which is supernatural does not need to, and since something supernatural needs no cause, but can cause natural things, for all you know, matter just grew around each of our souls, and each one is a first cause of the matter that grew up around it.

Now, you can think God made other supernatural things (our souls) but if there is more than one supernatural thing, we can't know which one did what, and it may be that all of them did some. This is accepting every premise of the argument as truth. The conclusion demonstrably does not follow, even according to the rules the argument lays out.

No, the nature of the phenomenon is not just about who’s doing it. And the first cause isn’t defined to be outside of nature, but rationally concluded to be outside of nature via arguments. These definitions absolutely let us observe mundane phenomena and say they are natural. The hand of the supernatural doesn’t mean nothing is natural.

This is just about where you draw the line between natural and supernatural. Nature is what needs a cause, and supernatural does not. So, how do you say that our souls are supernatural? Were they brought into being? I mean, they don't need causes, being supernatural. But if they do have a cause, then how can you say whether they are natural or not?

It would have to be fair to people who believe in the supernatural and not define them into correctitude, nor define their decriers into being incorrect. The best I can come up with is a phenomenon explained by no known natural law. It splits supernatural believers and doubters plainly between those who think we know every relevant, phenomenon-producing natural law, and those who think we do not.

I don’t see how the definition of ‘non-natural’ defines either side as correct or incorrect. It’s a neutral definition. Your definition confuses epistemology with ontology. ‘Supernatural’ and ‘natural’ are ontological terms. By your definition, once we find a new natural law, something would go from being ontologically ‘supernatural’ to ontologically ‘natural’ not because it ontologically changed, but because our knowledge of it changed.

Yes.

I agree it's not a perfect way to conceive things but it seems to be the way people do conceive things, and since language is defined by usage - it flows into the dictionary and not out of the dictionary - this bad understanding would nevertheless be the correct one. We do have other words that work like this, for example: The unknown. It's not a sin to have a definition work this way. And it is useful: Things that are well-explained are natural and things we can't explain without adding a new natural law are supernatural. It's useful it's just sub-ideal. And sometimes common usage is sub-ideal.